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
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VOL. III, NO. 2

SUMMER 1951

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## PREFACE

From 4 to 9 September 1950, the International Sociological Association and the International Political Science Association, held jointly under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, a World Congress of Sociology and Political Science at Zürich, Switzerland.

The initiative for the convocation of a large-scale international congress of sociology was taken at the constituent meeting of the International Sociological Association at Oslo, Norway, in September 1949. The Executive Committee of the Association immediately began its negotiations and asked Professor René König to inquire into the facilities available for a World Congress at Zürich in 1950. The plan met with the generous support of the Swiss authorities. An Organization Committee was set up in Zürich under the leadership of Professor Jean R. de Salis, chairman, Professor Richard Weiss, vice-chairman, and Professor René König, organizing secretary. This Committee took charge of the practical arrangements for the Congress in close co-operation with the federal, cantonal and city authorities as well as with the Swiss Universities, the Schweizerische Landesplanung, the Swiss Social Archives and the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule.

The International Political Science Association then decided to hold its own 1950 conference jointly with the sociological congress planned at Zürich: the result was a joint World Congress of Sociology and Political Science, the first international congress of the kind and on such a scale.

The Congress was held at Zürich from 4-9 September 1950 under the auspices of Unesco and under the patronage of a Swiss Committee, headed by the Director of the Federal Department of the Interior, Dr. Ph. Etter, and composed of a number of leading personalities representing the Confederation, the Canton and the City of Zürich, the Swiss Commission for Unesco and the Swiss Universities and Hochschulen.

The Congress was attended by more than 180 social scientists from 33 countries including the United States, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, India, Sweden, Austria, Israel, and Yugoslavia. Smaller delegations were sent from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Eire, Finland, Greece, Japan, Lebanon, Panama, Peru, Turkey, the Union of South Africa and Venezuela. Of the total of more than 180 delegates, some 110 were registered as sociologists and some 70 as political scientists.

The Congress was opened by a joint ceremony in the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule on Monday, 4 September.

The Chairman of the Organization Committee, Professor Jean R. de Salis, declared the World Congress open, greeted the two International Associations and welcomed their delegates to Zürich. Cordial greetings were also extended



to the representatives of Unesco and the United Nations, the Swiss Confederation, the Canton and the City of Zürich, the Swiss Universities and Hochschulen and a number of other organizations and institutions which had given their generous support to the Congress.

Professor de Salis emphasized the importance of the initiative taken by Unesco in establishing international associations in the social sciences and in making it possible for social scientists from all parts of the world to assemble and discuss problems relevant to the preservation of peace and the promotion of understanding. He expressed the hope that the delegates who had come from so many countries to exchange views and experiences would find in Zürich an atmosphere favourable to objective debate and fruitful co-operation.

Following the opening address, Regierungsrat Dr. Robert Briner, Head of the Department of Education of the Canton of Zürich, extended the greetings of the federal, cantonal and municipal authorities and welcomed the delegates to Zürich.

Dr. Briner stressed the importance for the preservation of peaceful relations of carrying on frank and objective discussions across national and cultural frontiers and emphasized the central mission of the sociologists and the political scientists of the world in this. As an example of the potentialities of peaceful adjustment between different groups and different cultures he pointed to the federal solution found in Switzerland and stressed as important factors in the Swiss development the deep-rooted respect for the dignity of the individual and the strength of local traditions.

Dr. Briner further hoped that the World Congress would give fresh impetus to the social sciences in Switzerland and strengthen their position in academic life, and in conclusion wished the delegates every success.

Further addresses were made by Professors Louis Wirth and Quincy Wright and a message from Mr. Jaime Torres Bodet was read by the Unesco observer to the Congress, Dr. K. Szczerba-Likiernik. Full texts of these three addresses appear in the present issue.<sup>1</sup>

Greetings from the United Nations were also extended by Dr. E. J. Galway, official representative of the UN Social Affairs Department.

The ceremony ended with a series of announcements by Mr. Erik Rinde, Executive Secretary of the International Sociological Association, Mr. Jean Meynaud, Executive Secretary of the International Political Science Association, and Professor René König, Organizing Secretary of the Congress, on technical and organizational matters.

Business and discussion meetings of both Associations were held in the Beckenhof throughout the week.

The Congress closed with a short ceremony on Saturday, 9 September. Professor Marcel Bridel, Vice-President of the International Political Science Association, expressed the gratitude of the political scientists and Professor Morris Ginsberg, Vice-President of the International Sociological Association, thanked the Swiss hosts, and particularly the Committee of Patrons and the Organization Committee, for their efforts to make the Congress such a success.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 000-00.



MESSAGE FROM Mr. JAIME TORRES BODET  
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF UNESCO  
TO THE CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY, AND  
POLITICAL SCIENCE ZÜRICH

4 September 1950

You have assembled, in a city as famous for its beauty as for its hospitality, to discuss one of the most absorbing subjects of our age—the contribution of sociology and political science to the study of international relations. Never before in history have the relations between peoples affected so directly the daily lives of all the individuals of which those peoples consist. The pace of the world's political evolution is such that one set of problems gives place to another faster than the human mind can follow; in a world continually changing, a world where the present is already dominated by the future, most people are living in terms of the problems of yesterday, or the day before. And so there is grave danger lest ideas—and, worse still, attitudes—lagging far behind the march of events, may reduce man to a blind passivity at the very moment when he should grasp the tiller strongly and become the master of his destiny. It is for that reason that I think that, of all the intellectual disciplines, yours are those aptest to bring men, not light alone, but salvation, by aiding them to grasp the setting in which their lives are to be led.

The methods of your work and the truths with which you deal are humanly relevant in a double sense, for your task is not merely to discover the secrets of nature: humanity itself is your study, and it is about Man himself that you teach Man. Is it surprising, then, that in this field mere knowledge in itself is education—Man a direct prelude to action? Is it conceivable that Man will not be fundamentally changed by the techniques of lucid and objective self-examination he learns from you?

This leads me to say that, in seeking to enlist your help and all that your science can give us, Unesco does not ask you to abandon the impartiality which is the very essence of your work, to stress one aspect of the facts at the expense of another, or to proffer half truths or subtle distortions—even for what may seem laudable ends. Nor do we seek from you a technique for acting on men and remoulding them otherwise than through that inner freedom of spirit that is the corollary of clear thinking. To Unesco the idea of treating Man as passive clay is unthinkable: Unesco trusts humanity and for that very reason needs educators, not witch doctors.

Hence it is of special importance that there should be closer relations between the intellectual leaders of the nations, that they should have opportunities of working together and seeking, by frequent contacts and constant exchanges, a world approach to their subjects. Work done within a single nation is too heavily influenced by that nation's immediate local concerns for it to attain readily to truths valid universally. In our dangerously partitioned world, it is the emergence of a common approach to social and political facts and of a tested method applicable in all places and circumstances which will pave the way for the growth of the one-world outlook without which there is no true peace.



I need not stress the value of the mere existence of an international organization from the point of view of exchanges of documentation, mutual information and, above all, those personal contacts whose full benefits we can only appreciate by trial. Yet this interchange of experience attains its fullest significance only in research, the lifestream of science, and it is that which most urgently needs placing on an international footing. At every stage of research, to go beyond national particularism, implies, consciously or otherwise, a new choice of problems, and fresh decisions on methods and research techniques. For once science is at grips with the vastness and variety of questions on the world plane, only a truly international approach will enable it to overcome the difficulties it dare not shirk. That is how truths can come to light which none will be able to dispute; that is how a common school of thought on human problems will come into being, and how a common attitude will develop towards the burning questions of our age.

These same considerations govern the planning of Unesco's social science programmes—ensuring international co-operation between specialists in all branches, raising the level of research and directing it to the solution of those problems most urgent for the establishment of peace throughout the world. It is a threefold policy aiming not simply at the increase of mere bookish learning but also at the good of all mankind. With the study of tensions, of methods in political science, of the machinery of international co-operation and the techniques of international conferences, and the publication of an *International Social Science Bulletin*, Unesco has already taken the first steps towards enlisting all the resources of sociological and political science for the attainment of clearer vision and better understanding in international relations.

It would, of course, be wishful thinking to assume that the social sciences are today able to point out unerringly the path to peace and set the feet of mankind therein; but it would surely be folly greater still to deprive ourselves of all the help that those sciences can give us in accomplishing our high purpose. Is not a deep knowledge of the springs of human action the necessary starting point of all work for the building of a world community? I agree that the first requisite for the attainment of these noble ambitions is faith in the future and in mankind; but it must be a faith at once enlightened and resolute. We must put away inertia, conformism and the spirit of drift, we must repudiate that blindness which does not recognize the facts. While our faith in man must indeed be unwavering and upheld by all our strength, we must also beware lest it be vainly spent in pious hopes: rather must it be rooted in a scientific knowledge of human life, and face squarely the dangers to man born of the tremendous changes in his social groupings and their infinitely complex interdependence. That is why, when I seek a basis for my hopes of a better and a more peaceful world, I turn, not to the vain promises of politicians nor to visionary programmes, but to that scientific work, thanks to which the human spirit of tomorrow is slowly taking shape.

All this brings us to a consideration of our age's characteristic tendency: to transfer the centre of gravity in social matters from the national to the international plane. No longer can the data concerning any sociological problem be drawn exclusively from within a particular region or nation: the world is daily becoming more tightly interwoven—a system in which all parts interact. I agree that, to all appearances, the State has never had wider powers: nevertheless it finds it increasingly difficult to decide its policy without taking into account the entire world situation in all its complexity. A new domain of inter-State co-operation is taking shape and crystallizing, and far-reaching modifications in the legal status of national entities can already be



foreseen with the promise of one political organization covering the globe.

To match the emergence of these new unifying forces, a new spirit is dawning and must develop, and the international system which only yesterday was no more than a philosopher's dream—a hypothesis of abstract thought—has today become a subject for investigation by the social sciences. The obvious dangers arising from misunderstanding between peoples emphasize yet further the importance of this new spirit, which you are destined to foster. The growing interdependence of humanity, materially and spiritually, lays on us the duty of unceasing vigilance in the management of international relations; and success in any practical activity on the international plane demands recourse to the methods and findings of the social sciences.

It is therefore significant that the first formal alliance between sociology and political science, in some sort the first organized effort to introduce into your disciplines the leaven of universality, should occur at the present dramatic point in history, when the nations are anxiously pondering the means of living together in peace and well-being, and shuddering at the thought of the tragic consequences which might spring from a single error in the analysis of international political and social problems.

This is a field in which Unesco's interests coincide with yours. Your comparative studies of electoral systems and your work on unions of State carry further our enquiry into political science throughout the world. Your examination of the problems of national characteristics and attitudes fits in with the study of national ways of life undertaken by us as part of our Tensions Project. Your study of the role of minorities in international affairs is broadening the horizon of our own investigators working—in Brazil or elsewhere—on the integration of minorities into a nation's life. Your judgment on the plans for setting up an International Institute of the Social Sciences will undoubtedly add something to the study of the question lately made by the Economic and Social Council. Unesco will have to carry out a scheme in this connexion and, in so doing, we shall both attach great weight to your views and ask for your co-operation. Thus in these and many other instances that could readily be called to mind, the repeated meeting of our respective paths augurs the closest co-operation between us in the future.

Our Organization, then, will certainly be handing over to you tasks involving the co-operation of many scholars in many countries and requiring the full safeguard afforded by the scientific method. In return, the help of our National Commissions will make it possible for you to establish new national branches and give fresh scope to your disciplines; and, since the range of each individual is increased by the possibility of contact with all his colleagues in other lands and branches, I am sure that sociological research will gain new impetus from our efforts.

The Secretariat of Unesco lacks the means to undertake on its own account the research in your field which urgently needs to be done. That is a task for the universities, the institutes and the organizations to which you belong. For our part, we shall look for ways of helping them and co-ordinating their activities. In promoting the growth of non-governmental organizations and suggesting to them tasks and studies which it cannot itself undertake, Unesco seeks to be, not a mere bureaucratic secretariat nor merely an assembly of government delegates, but a focus from which the whole world of learning may draw inspiration. We do and will ask much of you—your time, your thought and all the objectivity that science teaches you—but we think we can rightly ask it because we are a bridge between learning and the peoples of the world. I am persuaded that the challenge of actual events will spur your researches



and that from their fresh momentum Unesco in its turn cannot but benefit.

Soon you will be turning to the problem of the citizen's place in a planned economy: here again your work will impinge on an interest of the United Nations and their Specialized Agencies overtly proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Social organization is essential for the attainment and maintenance of certain rights, and anarchy is often another name for oppression of the weak by the strong; yet on the other hand, the citizen should not be called on to play his part as such save in peace and liberty and absolutely free from arbitrary coercion. You will agree, I think, that possibly the most important question of our age is that of striking a balance, firstly between individual freedom and the need for social organization, and secondly between Man's rights and his duties. No State that wishes its administration to conduce to the best management and fairest allocation of national resources can dispense with the active participation of every citizen. It cannot know real interests and traits and details of the nation's life, and thus it cannot administer directly all the communities of which the nation consists; it must call on them for co-operation in its work, both by keeping it fully informed and by active aid in implementing the laws and ordinances it promulgates. From the moment that the principle of co-operation with authority is observed and that any individual among the governed can claim a hearing on the management of a commonwealth and assert his rights according to law, the foundations at least of political democracy exist in the social structure.

Thus a realistic doctrine of freedom embodies not merely the notion of limitation to the coercive power of government, but also the positive notion of organization of individual relations for the common good and for the achievement of greater justice for all. It is illusory to speak of freedom in the abstract, in the negative: the term is, indeed, empty of meaning unless a just social organization enables every individual, without exception, to live in a manner befitting his human dignity, express himself freely and participate in every aspect of the life of his community.

I agree that the definition of such a balance between the negative and the positive elements in freedom calls for the nicest judgment; but I am sure that in our day the appointed task of the social and political sciences is to carry out the research which shall determine the requisites for the enjoyment by all men of true freedom. By choosing this path, these sciences will do more than bring to light a new concept; they will become fully integrated with the main current of humanism. They will show forth in all its fullness the notion that in human affairs, there is no neutral, no irrelevant truth, no truth to which the whole man—his nature, his values—is not fully committed, which does not need the assent of the heart no less than the mind. By blindness to that fact, by a cynical approach to human problems and by treating Man as clay to be moulded at will, the Fascist and Nazi systems went down to destruction; for, in a blaze of outraged wrath, their "human material" revolted from the "experiment" and the stern law of history arose and condemned those who had despised mankind. It is for the social and political sciences, practised in the generous spirit you bring to them, to attain to a deeper truth, which the future will not gainsay, and to spread that truth throughout the world.



P A R T I

THE WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

Zürich 4-9 September 1950







# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIOLOGY

*Opening Address by L. WIRTH*

This World Congress of Sociology meets at a time when this troubled world is threatened with disintegration. It is appropriate that these meetings should be held in the great city of Zürich, the home of Ulrich Zwingli, Heinrich Pestalozzi and Gottfried Keller, located at the crossroads of the European Continent, where peoples and cultures and ideas throughout recent centuries have met in an atmosphere of freedom. We are glad to meet in this city whose University and Technical High School enjoy fame throughout the world for their contributions to natural science, technology, humanistic scholarship and social science research. On behalf of the International Sociological Association, I wish to express to the distinguished representatives of the Swiss Confederation, the Canton of Zürich, the Government of the City and its Committee of Citizens, our deep appreciation for the effort they have made to provide ideal conditions in which this international conversation of science and scholarship can go on. You have provided lavishly for our convenience and our comfort and, what is more, you have given us a most favourable atmosphere of freedom and sympathetic interest for our labours. The living example of unity amidst differences, which the Swiss Confederation itself offers, will guide us in our deliberations.

We are happy also that in part of our programme, we shall be working in association with our sister discipline of political science.

Today we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the sciences and the arts of human relations—the ability of all peoples of all kinds to live together and work in the same world at peace. As scholars and scientists, we may not have the answers to these problems in time to avert catastrophe; and even if we had, we would have to reckon with the obstacles to their acceptance raised by those who make the practical decisions. We are engaged in a race between the progress of natural science and social science, between social intelligence and disaster. If armed conflict between the two power centres of the world can be avoided, we may be in a position to witness what men of reason and of good will all over the world would welcome; the peaceful demonstration as to which of the alternative systems of organizing human society could do most to advance civilization; which could feed, clothe and shelter its people most satisfactorily; which could nurture the talents and potentialities of all of its citizens to the highest level; which could give them the greatest protection against disease, poverty, ignorance, tyranny, greed, exploitation and aggrandizement; which could best promote creativeness, order, decency and progress; which could best enlist the energies and loyalties of its citizens; which could lift men to the highest levels of achievement in the arts and sciences and in the forms of peaceful and fruitful co-operation; which could best preserve and enhance the freedoms for which many generations have sacrificed their blood and treasure; and



which could contribute most to the benefit of the human race. If we can avoid having to meet the challenge of war, this is the challenge that we should seek to accept. It is the challenge of helping to build national societies expressive of and nurturing the best in human nature and in all the varieties of culture by which human group life is shaped on this planet, and thus to aid in the orderly building of a united, free, prosperous and peaceful world.

While in our Congress we shall be concerned primarily with the progress of scientific knowledge, we shall not be oblivious to the critical problems facing mankind. We recognize, however, that the knowledge we seek, if not immediately, then at least in the long run, is relevant to the all important practical problems mentioned above. We are here, in part, to knit together the broken lines of communication between scholars and scientists in our field in various countries, so that the pursuit of knowledge may be facilitated on a world-wide scale.

Since there are so many different conceptions in the world concerning the nature, the objectives and the methods of social science, and especially concerning sociology as a specialized discipline, it may not be inappropriate for me to take this occasion to state what we as sociologists seek to do and what goals we hold out for our disciplines.

Sociology is a general social science, in that it seeks to understand group life under all conditions and in all its aspects. In the course of the accumulation and refinement of knowledge, however, certain academic forms of specialization have developed. This calls for constant re-examination of the scope and functions of each specialized social science discipline. Sociology is one such special discipline, in so far as it is differentiated from other disciplines such as politics and economics. All the social science disciplines deal with essentially the same subject matter. They do, however, raise distinctive questions about this common subject matter. Thus political science approaches human behaviour with special emphasis upon power relationships, whereas economics seeks to understand human behaviour from the standpoint of the fact of scarcity. Sociology is differentiated from history as an intellectual discipline in that history emphasizes the unique and particular, whereas sociology seeks to formulate tenable generalizations and thus uses the data of history in the attempt to make history comparative. Sociology is related to anthropology in that the latter emphasizes what can be known about the behaviour of men in primitive, i.e., pre-literate societies. Sociology is related to certain practical arts and professions in that it furnishes a foundation of verified understanding and knowledge for such fields as social work, education, jurisprudence, psychiatry, criminology, industrial relations, race relations, international relations and a host of similar problems of policy making and action.

The subject matter of sociology is as wide as are the ramifications of group life. Wherever men are affected by, and affect the collectivity of which they are members, sociology has a role to play and problems to solve. As an intellectual discipline it has come to be concerned, therefore, with a great range of areas, such as the family, the community, social institutions, voluntary associations, art, religion, law and science itself, all of which furnish the problems and data for sociological analysis. These, however, are not the basic divisions or fields of sociology; they are merely the concrete phenomena concerning which sociologists might acquire competence by acquiring an intimate understanding of the factors and processes at work.

Sociology as a systematic discipline, at least in my country, might be divided into the following broad fields of interest: (a) The demographic and



ecological basis of social life; (b) Social organization, or the structuring of social groups; (c) Social processes or the analysis of the phenomena of social interaction; (d) Social psychology or the study of attitudes and of personality in relation to society and culture, and collective behaviour; (e) Social change and social disorganization or the study of the broad transformations going on in society, the manner in which they affect institutions, attitudes, ideas and behaviour, and the problem situations which men confront.

We no longer find it necessary, as did some of our predecessors, to account for the existence of group life. As far as we know men have everywhere and always lived in groups. Group life is thus part of human nature and of the order in which we live. Though group life is universal, the specific forms of group life differ in time and space and in accordance with historical experience and circumstance. Hence, the attempt to develop valid propositions in sociology calls for a comparative study of societies, cultures and personalities. It is out of such comparative studies that we arrive at the understanding and the generalizations which comprise sociological knowledge.

Sociology as a science, while seeking to follow the tenets of science in general, differs in some respects from the natural sciences or the disciplines that study the physical and material phenomena of nature, because in the study of social life we confront peculiar difficulties and unique possibilities. For one thing, the observer is always more or less intimately a part of the observed. Hence the student of social life can gain certain insights and understandings which the physical scientist, who looks at his subject matter from the outside, is prevented from getting. But at the same time the student of social life finds it difficult to obtain the degree of "objectivity" which is so highly prized in scientific work and which is easier to achieve when dealing with material objects or even living creatures devoid of powers of symbolic communication and rational reflection.

All group life involves certain norms and standards which affect the observer's point of view, especially if the observer himself is identified with the group holding these norms and standards. Hence, the selection of his materials, his presuppositions, his manner of study, his perception and his interpretation are influenced by his orientation to the norms of the society that he is seeking to study as well as those of the society with which he himself is identified.

Moreover, group life is difficult to study comparatively, because in order to make valid comparisons we must tear the phenomena to be studied out of their peculiar historical, geographical, and situational contexts. It is difficult to do this without doing violence to the phenomena themselves.

Furthermore, in social phenomena we do not operate with pure elements refined in a laboratory for purposes of study and capable of manipulation at will. We cannot easily isolate variables and hold other factors constant, and we are not free to set up experimental situations without considerable intervention from the society in which we carry on our work.

Finally, the results of scientific study in sociology, as in the other social sciences, have greater difficulty in gaining popular acceptance and in demonstrating their validity than do those of physical and biological science. Most of our data have a specific cultural setting, so that our generalizations may be valid only within narrow limits, rather than being universally applicable. Moreover, since everyone has some experience with social life and believes his own judgement to be as good as or better than that of others in such matters, everyone lays some claim to being an expert in social science, whereas it is easier to distinguish between the expert physicist or biologist and the layman.



With social phenomena it is difficult to demonstrate the validity of the experts judgement, as distinguished from common-sense judgements, because historical events cannot be repeated at will to show the precise influence of each of the many factors at work in bringing about a given result. Nor should we underestimate the difficulties which sociology and allied social sciences face by virtue of the fact that the ideas and generalizations with which they are concerned are, in large part, weighted down by the traditions of local and national cultures and thus take on the form of doctrines and dogmas. Unlike the generalizations of physical or biological science, they are thus more in the realm of the sacred than the secular, and a critique of these sacred beliefs not infrequently is regarded as "dangerous thought".

As science, the social sciences are very young, but as subjects of human intellectual interest they are as old as man himself. It was, therefore, to be expected that the ideas with which the social sciences are concerned should have acquired a high degree of rigidity. The ideas of the ancients concerning physical and biological phenomena have, however, undergone profound changes in the course of the discoveries—especially of recent centuries—concerning man, society and culture.

Similarly, whereas physical and biological science have become international (though this is less true of technology and applied science and still less of military technology), social science has continued to be more deeply rooted in national and specific cultural traditions. This is true despite the fact that it would be difficult to point to any fact or generalization of social science which is of sufficient importance that the possessors of this information find it advantageous to themselves or to the groups they represent to keep it secret.

There can scarcely be any doubt about the greater urgency of advance in social science than in physical science in the face of the problems confronting mankind today. Almost all of the utopian dreams men have entertained about their ability to control nature have been realized. In the last 50 years the people of the world have multiplied from approximately 1,600 millions to about 2,300 millions. Means of mass production in industry and agriculture have been discovered which, if they could be universally applied, would free men from most of the irksomeness of toil which has characterized their existence thus far. The requisite knowledge is available for preventing the hitherto most devastating diseases and for eliminating pain. The technology of transportation and communication through the aeroplane, the radio, the motion picture and television has virtually annihilated distance. At the same time, however, man's potential for destruction has increased enormously. Millions still cannot read or write, live under a primitive technology, are on the verge of starvation, are pawns in military struggles, and are lacking in freedom and the protection of the most elementary human rights. During the last half century unprecedented catastrophes have been endured and unprecedented possibilities have been born.

The social problems facing the human race have multiplied and become more acute not merely because of the new possibilities which the genius of science has created, but also because of the new expectations which men have come to entertain. If we compare what men claimed as their rights 100 years ago, or even 50 years ago with what men claim as their rights today, we find that the horizon of human aspirations has immensely widened. The world-wide contact among men—despite natural and, even more, artificial barriers—through trade, migration, education, missionary activities, advertising, propaganda and mass communication has taught men what kind of life is



possible, what kind of life they too ought to have, and what henceforth they should regard as their just due as men. Basic among these rights which men are claiming in response to the diffusion of the democratic idea and ideal throughout the world are the right to rule themselves, the right to existence—to food, clothing and shelter, to education and to participation in the making of common decisions. No one today dares defend imperialism—the claim on the part of one people to rule another. Economic security is increasingly regarded as a public responsibility. The luxuries of yesterday are becoming the necessities of today. Political freedom, economic security and respect for human dignity have become indivisible. The quest for human significance is increasingly shared by all. What is my right has become everybody's right.

These developments, quite as much as the changed conditions in the material world, have made the concerted drive to improve our knowledge of the relations between men more urgent than ever before. In turning to the scientific tasks we have set for ourselves at this Congress let us proceed in the spirit which a great American advocate of human freedom, William Lloyd Garrison inscribed upon his organ *The Liberator*, dedicated to the abolition of slavery nearly 100 years ago: "My Country is the world; my countrymen are mankind."

Though we cannot adequately thank you for the cordial hospitality which you have shown us, I know that if in our meetings here we will advance understanding among ourselves and knowledge concerning the problems of human relations even in a small degree, you will be pleased. May I express the hope that the holding of this Congress in Switzerland will contribute to a greater appreciation of the significance of sociology in your own institutions of higher learning. We, your guests from all the continents of the world, will, I am sure, carry back with us many happy memories of this visit.

Within the general framework of the joint World Congress of Sociology and Political Science, a number of organizational and administrative meetings, as well as a series of discussions of scientific papers, were arranged by the International Sociological Association. A summary report of the transactions of the Council and Executive Committee of the ISA has already appeared in the *Bulletin*.<sup>1</sup> A fuller report has been circulated to all participants and affiliated members, and is still available from the Secretariat of the ISA.

The general theme of the scientific discussion meetings was *Sociological Research in its Bearing on International Relations*. More than 60 papers from more than 25 countries were submitted for presentation at these meetings. These were read or reported on in sessions dealing with the following sub-themes: *A. General and Methodological Problems; B. Problems of National Characteristics and Attitudes; C. Sociological Aspects of Relations Between Nations*. A fourth group of discussion meetings was arranged in the form of a round-table of the two International Associations on papers submitted in response to the Unesco enquiry into *The Role of Minorities in International Affairs*.

Summary reports follow of addresses given, papers submitted and

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, pp. 541-44, 1950.



discussions carried on at the first three groups of meetings. For reasons of space most of the papers have been given here in abstract only, although some have been printed *in extenso* in a later section.

A report on the joint ISA-IPSA round-table appears in a special section of this issue.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>See pp. 391-420.



## A. — GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

The first session on General and Methodological Problems was opened by the President of the International Sociological Association, Professor Louis Wirth, of the University of Chicago.

Professor Wirth surveyed the actual and potential contributions of sociology to the study of international relations and outlined the bearing of sociological research on the clarification and solution of problems of world peace and stability.

Professor Georges Davy, Dean of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris and Vice-President of the ISA, gave the second opening address.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Davy emphasized the essentially sociological nature of the problems of international relations: the very terms *relations* and *nations* could only be fully understood in their reference to groups and not to isolated individuals. This did not, however, by any means exclude the necessity of a joint sociological and psychological approach to the problems of international relations; this necessity had come to be increasingly realized in the course of the rapid development that had taken place since Durkheim and Tarde fought out their battles.

Professor Davy traced the determinants of international tensions to psychological factors such as individual frustration, as well as to sociological factors such as class structure, traditions and educational systems. He gave particular emphasis to the function of language in building up national stereotypes and prejudices and in influencing attitudes to other nations through the persuasive and hortatory use of the emotive charges of words.

Professor Davy concluded with a plea to sociologists and psychologists to join in efforts to achieve further and deeper understanding of the processes involved in international relations.

A number of papers submitted were then read in summary:

Professor R. BLÜHDORN, University of Vienna. *L'aspect psychologique de l'enseignement universitaire des relations internationales*. Professor Blühdorn analysed the difficulties involved in the teaching of international relations to university students and particularly emphasized the need for psychological insight in the overcoming of national prejudice, bigotry and ignorance, and in the inculcation of a scientific attitude to the problems of international co-operation and understanding.

Mr. T. BOTTOMORE, London School of Economics. *Sociology and International*

<sup>1</sup> The full text of this address can be found in *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, Vol. IX, 1950, pp. 3-16.



*Relations: a Methodological Note.* Analysing the conditions for the achievement of objectivity, Mr. Bottomore stressed the importance of a unified social system within which sociologists could communicate and find common ground. The present lack of a unified social system made partiality and bias inevitable, but some advance toward increased objectivity could be made (a) by the formal organization of sociologists into an international and supra-national group, with its own value structure and influence on the social situation, and (b) by conceiving the study of international relations as a study of inter-group relations within a single social system.

Dr. Vladimir CERVINKA, Lausanne. *A Scheme for Analysis of International Relations.* Dr. Cervinka presented a scheme for the analysis of group relations at the international level, to apply to all groups related to other groups across national frontiers.

All group-forming relations were generated by interest in, attraction-repulsion, or attachment to common values of the group members. These relations were either *direct*, i.e. generated by members themselves as values, or *derived* from values external to the subjects. Most international relations were derived.

The analysis of derived relations involved (a) the listing of relevant values; (b) the determination of the attitudes of the subjects to the common values involved. The net attachment of a subject to a value must be weighted for compatibility with his attachments to other values. The attachment of a collectivity of subjects to a given value must be weighted for possible solidarity (co-operativeness-competitiveness) of the subjects with respect to it.

Applying this scheme, Dr. Cervinka analysed patterns of positive inter-relations derived from one or more values common to two or more subjects. These were termed groupoids, as distinguished from groups which are multi-individual entities formed according to groupoid patterns. Analysis of the stability of values and of the strength of attachments involved might be a useful tool for prediction and control of group behaviour. The use of such analytical tools might also contribute to the clarification of international controversies, such as those over "peace" appeals, etc.

Professor Jacques LECLERCQ, University of Louvain. *L'esprit international et l'intégration sociale.* Professor Leclercq stressed the importance of adopting an approach to international relations similar to that already successfully used in the analysis of inter-group relations within nations. The process of differentiation and integration was essentially the same in both cases. The study of the determinants of national unity and cohesion might throw light on the factors likely to increase international solidarity and understanding.

Professor Leclercq gave particular prominence to the role of human and personal contacts and relationships in the bringing about of a wider consciousness of social solidarity, and urged the necessity for further research into the frequency and character of personal contacts across national frontiers.

Dr. Edmond ROGIVUE, Kilchberg-Zürich. *Comment neutraliser l'"arme sociologique" ?* Dr. Rogivue stressed the practical impact of the development of a sociology of international relations, and warned against the misuse of sociology by politicians and propagandists. Sociologists were not bound by a Hippocratic oath to serve the welfare of humanity. The results of their scientific endeavours might too easily be turned into weapons in social and international conflicts.



The development of a politically independent sociology might, however, prove of the greatest importance to the future of mankind. Sociology deserved as much support as nuclear physics, but should be protected from regimentation by the State. Private business ought to recognize the value of a free and detached sociology and should raise it from the status of a "poor relation" which it had too long been occupying in most universities.

Dr. Bruce L. MELVIN, University of Maryland. *Rural Sociology in a Chaotic World*. Dr. Melvin urged the need for comparative research on rural populations in the various areas of the world, defining rural sociology as the study of people living from the land and those having direct contacts with them.

Most of these studies would be carried on in villages and towns where the people make their living from the soil and are not influenced by distant markets and prices. The studies should help the people to decide upon what is essential to their own welfare and to take their place in the larger society of which they are part, thus enabling them to participate more directly in the making of policy.

American rural sociologists had focused their attention on such social units as the family, the neighbourhood, and the community. In most other parts of the world, however, the basic units were the families and the villages in which they live. What are the structures of the villages in the various countries? What functions do the rural families perform beyond providing men and food for factories and armies? What types of personalities do they develop? What relation is there between the standard of living and the status of women in rural societies? These were only a few among many questions that ought to be tackled by comparative research of this kind, but which would require much time, money and energy.

Dr. Chr. PETERSEN, Copenhagen. *The Bearing of Social Research on International Relations*. Dr. Petersen considered the ways in which sociology can affect international relations and gave particular emphasis to the impact of sociology through democratic education and a deepening of ethical understanding. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was mentioned as a fruitful point of departure for sociological research on relations between nations.

Professor Hans THIRRING, University of Vienna. *Das Problem einer internationalen Unterrichtsreform*. Professor Thirring called attention to the fact that the main sources of danger to world peace were not to be found in material clashes of opposed interests but in ideological tensions, conflicts of beliefs, doctrines, and prejudices. The schools and the media for mass communication had great possibilities for exerting a positive influence for the reduction of tensions and the spread of world understanding and toleration.

Dr. Thirring referred to the Austrian memorandum to the Fourth General Conference of Unesco in September 1949, in which a plea was made for educational reforms designed to overcome the current infantile attitudes to social and international problems. The need for an expansion of psychological teaching and training at the secondary school level was strongly emphasized as a remedy against a number of fallacies and prejudices that have tended to increase ideological tensions.

Professor Rodolfo TECERA DEL FRANCO, University of Buenos Aires. *Teoría culto-política: ensayo sobre las posibilidades de un orden político mundial*. Professor



Tecera del Franco started from the principle that any political world order must have its roots in the social reality of the planet. Political institutions must reflect the cultural level of the social order on which they superimpose themselves. Past and present maladjustments might be traced to a lack of correspondence between political institutions and the social order of which they ought to be the authentic reflection. The cultural-social heterogeneity of groups and peoples sufficed to explain the variations in political institutions. Democracy, an historical offspring of the culture of the Occident, could not, therefore, act as an integrating force in a world so heterogeneous as that of today. Democracy must remain an ideal for visionary elites and it was useless and utopian to attempt to impose it on peoples whose cultural levels were not adapted to it. Political ideologies could not be universal in a world such as ours, and would never be so until the cultures of the world had been brought into harmony.

#### OTHER PAPERS SUBMITTED

The following papers submitted under the first sub-theme were presented in abstract form:

Professor Claude C. BOWMAN, Temple University, Philadelphia. *Conventional Thoughtways, Counter-tendencies and the Impairment of Science.* The sociology of knowledge provides insight into the development of sociology itself. Particularly in the United States, sociology has developed in an atmosphere of polarities of thought, wherein ideologies are challenged by counter-ideologies in a spirit of contest and debate. While such conflicts may be stimulating, they have often been obstacles to the development of sociology as a mature science.

The polarities described are: practicality versus scholarly detachment; ethnocentrism versus anti-conventionalism; the mores of prejudice versus humanitarianism; religion versus irreligion. When sociologists take a counter-position they may regard themselves as objective, whereas they are often merely entertaining a new set of prejudices. Some critical attitudes towards sociologists are a result of the unfavourable position of intellectuals in general.

The conscious use of value premises in research can enhance rather than detract from objectivity, as Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out, and there are signs that the gap between social research and policy-making is being reduced in American sociology.

A suggestion is made that the International Sociological Association promote international research in the relations between social environment and sociological thought.

Professor Helmut G. CALLIS, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. *Culture as a Key to World Order.* There was never a time when the objectivity of the social scientist and his comparing scrutiny were as greatly needed as in our age. As the products of their environment and social tradition, nations and governments are not conscious of the mainsprings of their conduct. Culture-alien attitudes are regarded as aberrations and invitations to aggression. Cultural bias is a main cause of international tensions.

Lack of social understanding, in sharp contrast to rapid technological progress in the manufacture of destructive weapons, is a particular danger in



the modern world. Thanks to modern communications and technology, we are living geographically in one world but psychologically in different worlds. Mankind faces a global problem of acculturation.

The origin of that problem is to be found in the conquest of all other living cultures by one: Western civilization. Western ideas and institutional traits have been a potent factor in undermining other cultures but have not disintegrated them. The resulting psycho-sociological situation in the relations of the world's great cultures to each other is being studied in the search for a specific diagnosis and specific remedies.

The effects of his predominance on Western man himself are analysed. It is found that Western disunity, self-centredness and other cultural shortcomings have impaired the West's globe-encircling mission. In consequence, we have now entered the second phase: the era of reaction on the part of the "submerged" cultures (Chinese, Indian, African, etc.). Initial frustration has given way to attitudes of mental reservation and aggressiveness towards Western rule. The world order is regarded by these peoples as being tyrannically imposed for the exclusive advantage of Western nations. The psychological implications of resentful "native" reaction are examined.

Russia has been singled out as one important exponent of anti-Western recalcitrance. The Russians, with a Western background but also an Oriental heritage, have seen themselves as perpetual victims of Western aggression and as the objects of Western capitalism.

The forces of anti-colonialism and Russian anti-Westernism have naturally allied themselves to present a major challenge to the West. The scope and nature of this challenge are discussed. The reverberations of this global "East-West conflict" have created a new pattern of international relations which is characterized by receding Western nationalism and the emergence of "ideological" blocks of countries.

Ideologically, the contemporary "two-power world" is looked upon as a world divided by half-truths—supplementary half-truths—which once formed a balanced whole in the Christian faith, originally underlying the twin civilizations of Russia and the West. One of these views regards man as the unchallenged master of his environment, individualistic, acquisitive, an end unto himself; the other sees man as a creature of his environment who must find his purpose in service to his social group. Both doctrines have basic weaknesses which express themselves in Russian and American culture and society as extreme examples.

Since both these one-sided systems are backed by enormous technological power and are attempting to impose their respective views on others, their antagonism is a main cause of contemporary tensions. The possibility of one system becoming victoriously dominant is speculated upon. The triumph of a "monolithic world state" is held to be socially and culturally undesirable for a variety of reasons.

Subsequently, the role of government in modern processes of acculturation is examined. This role is found to be exceedingly important in view of the concentrated power wielded by governments, but power is often wielded in excess of social understanding. Many governments, indeed, violate basic laws of social inter-relations and inter-group mental hygiene.

Finally, conclusions are drawn and both short-term and long-term recommendations made. Several immediate steps are suggested to reduce pent-up resentments and international tensions. It is recommended that the new world order be based on an "equilibrium of cultures" rather than on "balance of power" which has been found to be unworkable.



Professor Florestan FERNANDES, University of Sao Paulo. *Considerações sobre a aplicação dos conhecimentos sociológicos as relações internacionais.* The question is analysed whether sociologists can contribute to the study and solution of the tensions and conflicts existing today. Recent developments in the field of sociology seem to affirm the possibility of a positive contribution, but under two conditions: (a) a change in the current conception of applied sociology; (b) adjustment by sociologists to the conditions created by the changed social status of scientists in general. One effect of the enhanced social role of sociologists is their participation in the constitution of social channels through which scientific knowledge is practically utilized and transformed into social forces: "not pretending to change sociologists into diplomats or diplomats into sociologists" sociology could contribute effectively to diplomatic policy. It could serve diplomacy with its scientific knowledge and operative techniques in handling "social problems", thus reducing international tensions and conflicts.

Professor Mario LINS, Rio de Janeiro. *Possibilidades da superação das tensões sociais.* The determining factors of social tensions lie in psychological instabilities which have been projected on to the social field. The nature of this psychological determination of processes in the social field has so far never been studied in a systematic and scientific way. This failure is symptomatic of the general crisis in the construction of sociological theory—a crisis that cannot be overcome without a thoroughgoing change in the attitude of social scientists to logic and languages. The static logic of the Aristotelean tradition must be abandoned for a new dynamic logic, and the use of language in social science discourse radically reformed so as to make it a tool for the description, analysis and diagnosis of the empirical reality of the social situation.

Dr. Hanna MEUTER, Lobberich, Niederrhein. *Notes on General and Methodological Problems.* The central task of the social scientist in the present world predicament is to promote understanding between people of different regions, nations and cultures. This is a theoretical as well as a practical task: cognitive understanding of group antagonisms is a prerequisite for success in changing them for the better. An outstanding example of this process is given in Howard Becker's work on the history of German youth movements; one of its main findings was that those who knew least about another group tended to be most disdainful of it.

An important means of communicating social science insights lies in the field of narrative writing. Examples: the Zweig circle influenced by Leopold von Wiese's seminars, the writings of Sheila Kaye-Smith.

Dr. Kewal MOTWANI, Pondicheri, India. *The Need for Reorientation of Sociological Research.* Man has always sought to establish a principle of unity within the universe. The scientific method has been used and found wanting. Science is associated with a culture of machines and social conflicts and disorganization: nationalism, capitalism and democracy at home, and imperialism and racialism abroad. Against the pervasive philosophy of secularism, the sociologist is exhorted to seek unified truths, to become a religious man receptive of divine insights. This spirit is essential to effective sociological inquiry.

Professor Radhakamal MUKERJEE, University of Lucknow, India. *The Sociology of Group Extension: from the Crowd to the Commonalty of Mankind.* There



are four basic categories of social groups, viz., crowd, interest-association, community and (abstract) commonalty, that are met with in all cultures and exhaust all possible human relations. The depth of personality, the convergence of values, the degree of group inclusion and attachment, and the unity and stability of the group as an autonomous system of morality, are progressively greater as we move from Interest-group (e.g. class) to community (e.g., nation) and thence to commonalty (e.g. the UN). As we ascend from a crowd through an interest-group to community and abstract commonalty the total self is more deeply involved in group life and activity. The most intense and deepest self is the largest social community—the commonalty of mankind.

Man's moral insight and autonomy are nowhere greater than in the symbolic, enlarged commonalty group, implying his unique role in remaking his groups and institutions and their values and norms. Yet he has consistently failed to extend his conscience and faith to humanity and international relations.

The different types of social relationships comprise the framework of man's value meaning and moral experience. Reciprocity in the interest-group, equity and justice in the community, and love and sharing in commonalty emerge as imperatives of the different group patterns or "fields" among which man's social selves are distributed. Love and sharing are the highest and most universal ethical principles. The principles of reciprocity, justice and equity by themselves cannot achieve the unity of mankind which rests on the extension and elevation of the spirit of mutual understanding in international relations. Modern man has now to moralize the nation and state by his passions of love and equality.

Dr. Jozef OBREBSKI, University of Warsaw. *The Sociology of Rising Nations*. The full text of this paper is given in the section, *Selected Papers*.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Maria OSSOWSKA, University of Warsaw. *Psychological Assumptions in the Determination of Social Conditioning*. In the writer's studies of "bourgeois morality" she has considered the social conditioning of ideas. Human activity and doctrines (ideas, ideologies) can be understood by reference to interests they serve for the person, group or class. Such interests may be economic in character or related to the maintenance of social status and power. Many examples are presented. In the socio-economic interpretation of ideas (social conditioning) certain psychological assumptions are made about personal motives. These assumptions should be more clearly understood and explicitly recognized.

The writer also recognizes that the same doctrine can serve different and even contradictory purposes in different situations.

Professor Jean PICHON-RIVIÈRE, University of Buenos Aires. *L'entente internationale et la sociologie*. The methods of physico-mathematical science have their usefulness in exploratory studies of men, but are partly inapplicable. They are always inadequate for full understanding of human situations, and many lead to distortion when depended upon exclusively. Science is incomplete unless it includes the sciences of human nature and their methods, in which strict objectivity and accuracy in respect to empirical actualities are maintained. Personality tends to be depersonalized by modern techniques

<sup>1</sup> See pages 237-43.



of mass production and communication. Happiness based on morals is a goal superior to welfare based on merely material needs.

Thus far, today's science has proved conducive to cosmopolitanism (superficial conformity and specialization), rather than to a universal evaluative outlook, and synthetic insights which incorporate and integrate differences. Communications have reduced physical more than psychic and social distances. The family and the community, as means of communicating shared values, have been threatened by the technology of person-to-person and mass communication. An order based on persons as group-members is basic to international order and therefore to international policy. Personal and cultural differences are indispensable for the enrichment of the world community. Psychological analysis of the causes of intercultural tensions should show how to prevent differences from becoming causes of conflict. Unesco's research in this field should lead to measures for reduction of such tensions.

Professor Alfredo POVIÑA, University of Buenos Aires. *The Sociological Subject in International Relations*. As long as international relations deal only with a society of states, it is necessary that sociology should reach beyond this to the real community of nations. The nation, as much as the state, is consequently the sociological subject of international relations. In international organizations the great living forces and sectors of the nation should be represented equally with the states.

#### REPORT BY THE RAPPORTEUR

Professor Arthur HILLMAN, Roosevelt College, Chicago, then gave a general report on the papers submitted under the sub-theme of General and Methodological Problems:

Several contributors have addressed themselves to the question: What is the distinctive sociological object of study with special reference to international relations? Where should the sociologist focus attention? Dr. Cervinka has offered a theory of group relations applicable at the international level, and has proposed the concept of groupoids to refer to the pattern of positive inter-relations derived from a value common to two or more subjects. Professor Leclercq has described the nature of group solidarities and has called special attention to those classes of persons who think in terms of areas and social unities larger than those of national boundaries. Professor Poviña has distinguished between nation and state, and calls attention to the general awareness of the realities of collective behaviour on a large scale.

Some of our colleagues have carried their reasoning from the knowledge of smaller groups or societies to the largest social order. We refer to Dr. Cervinka's paper again in this respect. Dr. Rogivue has urged the study of small groups for the light thus thrown on the nature of the larger collectivities. Professor Mukerjee has distinguished four categories of groups in an ascending order of inclusiveness, and has identified the ethical principles which he considers appropriate to each of these types of groups. There is some recognition of the essential differences between nations and international relations and those groups and social relations which the sociologist has most fully studied. Some of these differences are fairly obvious but important, as in the nature of communication, but other differences between large collectivities



and small-scale groups might be the subject of further thought, and perhaps of discussion today.

With reference to research problems and suggestions on method we find interesting Dr. Cervinka's proposal for an analysis of group relations by reference to the values involved, but his scheme needs clarification. Dr. Meuter has stressed the value of the personal experience of the researcher with other national groups as a help in achieving freedom from national passions. Professor Pichon-Rivière has discussed the differences between the physical and social sciences. Dr. Motwani's paper challenges the basic assumptions of members of this group. While not many of us would share his view of the role of the sociologist, his paper may help to call attention to science as a part of culture and also to remind us of the modest disclaimers made at the opening session of the Congress by Professors Wirth and Quincy Wright.

The sociologist is a part of his subject matter, inevitably so when he studies nations or world organizations. Mr. Bottomore has dealt with the resulting problem of objectivity; he has emphasized both the need for conscious identification of values and has discussed the possibility of creating a universal frame of reference.

There are general discussions of sociology and the use of sociological knowledge in social control in the papers by Dr. Mario Lins and Dr. Petersen. With respect to education for international understanding, Professor Blühdorn has analysed some of the problems of university instruction, and Professor Thirring has been concerned with educational problems at various age levels. Dr. Meuter has suggested making scientific results known through the press and through fiction.

Somewhat distinct from education as a means of control are the broader efforts at the reorganization of situations. ("Manipulation" or "engineering" is sometimes used, but this may suggest merely moving human pawns or puppets about, without recognition that the controller or planner is also part of the total situation.) The reconstruction of motivations and national objectives with respect to war and peace includes education, but it must deal with other causes of tension and conflict as well. Part of the total context out of which harmony or discord between nations develop is recognized in the papers, but there is an emphasis on misunderstandings, with education as an antidote, and relatively little attention is given to the problems of instituting or revising national educational programmes, or to the economic, demographic, and political causes of war and of peace.

The role of the sociologist in public affairs is of special concern, and more active participation of sociologists in public life is recommended as a means of applying sociology to the reduction of international tensions. Professor Fernandes stresses this point. Dr. Rogivue has also discussed the ethical responsibilities of the sociologist and his opportunities in the world today.

After these references to research methods and various applications of knowledge, we return to the problem of society at large. The problems of creating world order and opinion are approached in various ways. Dr. Petersen has emphasized the necessity of building a system of international law. Describing the relation of political to social-cultural realities is a special contribution of sociologists to the understanding of international order. Professor Tecera del Franco's paper points out that political ideologies are culturally and socially limited, and Professor Pichon-Rivière's emphasizes a world order providing for personal qualities and differences rather than standardization.



Finally, we are reminded of the classic statement of John Dewey that "there is more than a superficial connection between the words: common, community, and communication". Throughout these papers we find evidence of the basic sociological insight conveyed by that statement.

#### DISCUSSION

After Professor Hillman's report the floor was declared open for discussion.

Professor Georges Friedmann, of the Centre d'études sociologiques, Paris, was surprised to find that none of the contributions to the Congress had mentioned the very important impact of technological development on international relations. The facts of technology were social facts and had a profound influence on the formation of personality. Recent research in industrial sociology showed how the multiplication of repetitive and partial tasks without long-term motivations creates conditions that thwart critical thought, creative initiative and independence of spirit (e.g. Reavely and Winnington, *Industry and Democracy*). Two conclusions of relevance to the theme of the Congress might be drawn: (a) Modern industry undermines the personality basis of a democratic form of government which is dependent on public opinion and critical reflection; (b) Modern industry creates conditions that counteract efforts towards understanding of other groups and other nations by thwarting the curiosity and the demand for objective and critical information among the working masses.

Professor Friedmann emphasized the primary role played by these facts of technology in increasing the susceptibility of the masses to aggressive and totalitarian propaganda. He suggested, as possible remedies, measures of industrial reform tending to ensure the co-operation of workers in the organization of their work, and to encourage their initiative, curiosity and inventiveness.

Professor Georges Smets, Director of the Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Brussels, took a pessimistic view of the potential contributions of sociology to the solution of the problems of war and peace. He did not believe that a deepening of our knowledge of social relationships would necessarily lead to peace and progress. Knowledge in itself was neither good nor bad. The practical application of knowledge raised the moral problem: to what ends are we to use our knowledge? This was a matter of moral choice. A deepened understanding of international relations might as well lead to an increase as to a reduction of tensions and frictions.

Professor Astolfo Tapia Moore of the University of Chile, greeted the Congress on behalf of social scientists and university authorities in Chile, and urged the International Sociological Association to adopt a resolution to be presented to all rulers and statesmen of the world, calling attention to the need for extensive improvement of social, economic and industrial conditions as a safeguard against wars and tyrannies and as a guarantee of durable peace.

Professor Jean Stoetzel, of the University of Bordeaux, warned against over-optimism with regard to the potential contributions of sociology to the solution of current problems, and stressed the need for more practical approaches. He urged the necessity of comparative research on the value systems and attitude patterns prevalent in the different countries, and called attention to the great number of piecemeal enquiries already made in this direction: public opinion polls, content analyses, etc. Even such relatively simple surveys as those made through Gallup polls might yield much of value,



not least because of their psychotherapeutic effect in helping to dissipate current stereotyped images of other nations and peoples.

M. Georges Goriély, of the University of Brussels, concurred in the view taken by Professor Smets: antagonism did not grow out of mutual ignorance, but was much more likely to develop as two nations grew to know each other.

Professor Rafael Caldera of the University of Caracas, stressed the need for a realistic sociology of international relations as an important tool in national and international policy-making.

Dr. Cervinka, Lausanne, analysed the relation between sociological theory and social and political practice and showed how sociology could provide safer estimates of the costs and advantages of alternative policies without taking direct part in decision-making.



## B. — PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES

Professor Morris Ginsberg, of the London School of Economics, Vice-President of the International Sociological Association, delivered the following opening address on The Problem of National Characteristics:

I should like to begin by drawing the attention of the members to the valuable report by Professor Klineberg on "Tensions affecting International Understanding",<sup>1</sup> which gives a comprehensive and balanced account of the numerous investigations which have been devoted in recent years to problems of national character and national attitudes. I cannot attempt here to survey the whole field and will confine myself to a few points which seem to me of special importance at the present time.

To begin with, there is the question how far current investigations avoid the difficulties and perplexities which the older students of what used to be called "the psychology of peoples" had to face. These difficulties were so great that many writers were led to dismiss the whole idea of a national character as an abstraction personified, or even as a complete illusion. Others thought of its use in history and sociology as on a par with the method of Molière's doctors, who explained the fact that opium sent men to sleep by saying that opium has a soporific virtue. There can be no doubt that these misgivings were to a large extent justified. To explain what a nation does by referring to its "soul" or "genius" amounted to hardly more than saying that a nation has a faculty for becoming what it becomes. What this faculty is can only be inferred *ex post facto*; If, by chance, a people was observed to strike out new paths, the reply could always be made that the faculty had always been there, but as a latent potentiality which required special circumstances to be elicited. No wonder that explanations of this kind were summarily dismissed by serious scholars. It is a remarkable fact, however, that the idea of national character survives its critics and from time to time is restated to suit the psychological climate of the day. In its present form the theory makes use of modern methods of observing and recording and of sampling techniques and is couched in terms of current theories of personality including those of psycho-analysis. It is worth while enquiring how far they succeed in avoiding the difficulties of the earlier studies.

It is sometimes maintained that the notion of character is only applicable to individual, self-conscious agents and has no meaning when applied to collective entities. This seems an extreme view. A group may rightly be said to have a character when it can be observed over a sufficiently long period of time to act in distinctive ways, which are shaped not merely by the character of the component members but by the nature of its organization.

<sup>1</sup> *Bulletin* 62, 1950, Social Science Research Council, New York.



In this sense, a fighting unit may, for example, come to have a character as a unit and its behaviour may in a measure be predictable in the light of what we know of it as a unit. In the case of groups of long standing, the group character is not the average or sum of the characters of the members. The organization tends not only to select the types that suit it, but it also acts selectively on the qualities of its members, eliciting and heightening those that are congruent with it and repressing those that are not. Of course, the organization is itself affected by the character of the members, so that the group and the members act and react on one another. The nature of these interactions is a proper subject for social psychology. What kind of groups may be said to have a character cannot, of course, be settled by general arguments of this kind but is a matter for empirical investigation in each case. Whether the nations of the modern world constitute suitable units for such investigation is very much open to doubt. The term "nation" covers groups differing very widely from one another in inner cohesion and complexity of structure. We cannot be sure that in all cases they possess "a" character in any sense which is useful in the diagnosis or prognosis of their behaviour. In the case of the large nations in particular it may well be true, as Mr. Maillaud has said with reference to France, that "any attempt to define national characteristics comprehensively is always presumptuous and generally futile". (*France*, p. 50.)

Anthropological studies of group character have the advantage that they can confine themselves to relatively small and homogenous groups. Today anthropologists would hardly write books on "The Mind of Primitive Man" or even on the character of "the" African "the" Amerindian or "the" Pacific Islander. Their caution, however, deserts them when they seek to apply their methods to the advanced societies and we get essays on the character of the Germans, the Japanese, and even of "Western Man". These, it seems to me, show little of the insight and most of the defects of the earlier works on the psychology of peoples—generalization from very inadequate data, lack of attention to variations of class and locality, and failure to distinguish between what is relatively permanent and what may be ascribed to passing influence or particular stages of development. Some of these difficulties will no doubt become less serious as the number of intensive regional and historical studies grows and effective comparison becomes possible. Meanwhile, I suggest, we ought to explore other ways of reducing the problem to manageable proportions. A beginning could perhaps be made by a comparative study of the mentality and character of occupational groups at comparable levels of development. It is plausibly held that there is such a thing as a peasant mentality. This could be tested by a comparative study of the character traits of peasants in different regions of the same country and the results compared with those of similar regional studies of other countries.

Similarly it would be of interest to find out whether there is any substance in the notion of an entrepreneurial mentality, and how far business men in different countries in comparable stages of economic development have any distinctive traits in common. The case of the priesthood, e.g. of the Catholic Church, would certainly repay investigation. It would be interesting to see which national peculiarities emerge within a common tradition.

Another and perhaps more difficult line of enquiry is to be found in the historical study of the influence of specific social or religious movements on character. A well attested case is the influence of Calvinism on the mental make-up of the Scots. How enduring and pervasive is that influence and how does it compare with the similar case of the Dutch? The comparative



study of languages also suggests problems which might be of great importance in this connexion. The student of philosophical literature, for instance, cannot but be struck by the way in which the structure of different languages affects the mode of approach and the entire method of thinking of those who use them. Can any methods be devised for the closer analysis of the nature of these differences?

The older writers on the psychology of peoples had to face not only the difficulties arising from the complexity of the groups they were describing, but also those arising from the absence of any generally accepted theory of the structure of individual character. Some based their descriptions on the ancient theory of types of temperament. With the emergence of instinct theories the attempt was made to show that peoples differed in the intensity of the basic instincts and emotions. Others erected types of character or personality *ad hoc* to suit their argument. Again others used a "faculty" psychology, of intellect, will and feeling, and claimed that nations differed from one another qualitatively or quantitatively, in respect of these faculties. Nowadays these crudities are avoided, but the position is still chaotic. There is very little agreement regarding the nature of the components of character, or the ways in which these combine to form the total character. The position is complicated further by the very important contributions made by the psychology of the unconscious to the study of character formation, e.g. reaction-formation, which is held to mould the original or basic components of character. Given a measure of agreement on typology and on methods of ascertainment or diagnosis, we should need, in order to establish a connexion between types of society and types of character: (a) to obtain statistical information on the frequency with which different types of character are distributed in different societies or in the same society at different periods; (b) an account of the circumstances or conditions which tend to give prominence to certain types of character and to repress others and, more generally, of the various ways in which the behaviour patterns of groups as seen in their institutions and collective achievements are affected by and affect the character structure of their component members. If, for example, the national character of the Germans under the Nazis is explained in terms of the dominance or prevalence of the "authoritarian" or sado-masochistic types, it is necessary not only to establish the existence of this character structure in the leaders and their followers, but also to show that it was more frequent in Germany than in other countries or in Germany at other times.

So far, I believe, there is no reliable statistical evidence of the distribution of typical character traits in different populations. One of the most important tasks today is to determine by what methods such statistical information can be obtained. The method of prolonged interviews, granted effective sampling, may be useful for some purposes, but is hardly adequate for purposes of psycho-analytic interpretation. Even if we assume that there is a measurable correlation between the distribution of traits in the normal population and the distribution of traits in their pathological form, the difficulty would remain, in view of the fact that at present there exist no reliable comparative data of the distribution of pathological traits or types. In the absence of such information, I do not see how psycho-analytic interpretations of group-differences can be validated. Should it turn out that the distribution of psycho-analytic types does not vary greatly as between different countries or periods, it would become necessary to enquire into the circumstances which enable certain types of personality to exercise decisive power over the institutional framework of their countries.



The idea that there is a close connexion between types of personality and types of society is very old. We find it already in Plato. In the eighth book of the *Republic* he gives a graphic description of five types of constitution and of the types of individual character corresponding to them—the aristocratic, in whom the various functions of the mind are harmoniously balanced under the guidance of reason; the timocratic, or contentious and ambitious man; the oligarchic, driven by the passion for wealth; the democratic, the man of unstable character who is everything by turns and nothing long; the tyrannical, who is the slave of his passions. His view is of interest because he tries to show how in different circumstances this or that disposition achieves sufficient prominence to “turn the scale, as it were, and drag everything else in its wake” (VIII, 544). In this way he would account for the changes from one type of constitution to another, which in his view follow a regular pattern.

A variant of this mode of approach is that of Pareto who explains alternations in the forms of government as due to changes in the relative proportions in which the “speculator” and “rentier” types are combined in the governing *élites*, and the extent of social mobility which affects the manner in which these types are recruited. Pareto, however, offers no reliable method for analysing the mental make-up of the governing *élites* or for determining the factors which affect their “circulation”. He hardly goes beyond the stage of impressionistic generalization. Perhaps the recent developments of the psychology of leadership combined with studies of social mobility may provide a more solid foundation for theories of this type. The question how far the continuity and stability of governments depend upon the degree of class rigidity, is certainly one which deserves extensive comparative study.

Attempts to link personality types with elements of culture and, in particular, political forms are full of pitfalls. A curious example is to be found in Jung's discussion of the relations between forms of art and types of character. Classical art, he thinks, is rooted in the tendency to introversion, while romantic art is similarly related to extraversion. The case is argued at length (*Psychological Types*, pp. 404 *et seq.*) and is supported with further evidence by Seligman. Our confidence is shaken, however, when we find precisely the opposite correlation defended by McDougall (*National Welfare and National Decay*, Chapter III). Equally unconvincing are the efforts made by McDougall to explain the differences in the governmental institutions of England and France in terms of differences in instinctive endowment. Despite these failures, theories of this sort are still very common. Thus the attitude of Frenchmen towards their government is frequently ascribed to an ingrained scepticism, a lack of emotional stability and seriousness of purpose, and this despite the fact that in their private lives the very opposite qualities are in evidence—seriousness and intensity of purpose, respect for order and continuity. What needs explanation is the fissure between public and private attitudes. To attribute this division to a “dualism” in the French character is merely to restate the problem in terms of occult qualities. The problem is one which needs historical analysis in the light of the long struggle against despotic power, the relations between Church and State and the intimate connexion between the patriarchal family and the rights of property. In this case again, the psychological analysis of the attitudes of the different social classes and regions in specific historical circumstances is a necessary preliminary to any attempt at describing the character of the French people as a whole.

The points that emerge from this brief survey may be summed up as follows:

1. The study of national characteristics should begin not with the nation as



a whole, but with smaller groups within it. This procedure would facilitate comparative studies and has the further advantage that it permits of the effective application of sampling techniques.

2. Efforts should be made to reach some agreed scheme of classifying traits of character and temperament. At present the position is chaotic and makes comparative studies well-nigh impossible. In particular, it would be an important step forward if psychiatrists would explore the possibility of compiling comparative statistical evidence of the distribution of psychopathic traits, and would discuss the validity of psycho-analytic interpretation of data reached by means of relatively short periods of intensive interviewing.
3. Psychological surveys should be closely linked with studies of social mobility and other factors affecting the relations between groups and classes within the social structure of the peoples under consideration.
4. Qualitative studies should not be under-rated. The judgements of historians and experienced observers are often more penetrating and illuminating than those reached by specialized psychological methods.

#### DISCUSSION

A discussion followed of the problems of national characteristics.

Professor J. P. Kruijt, of the University of Utrecht, concurred in the view that investigations might most fruitfully concentrate on smaller occupational or regional groups instead of on nations as a whole, and referred to the work achieved in this field by the sociographical movement in the Netherlands.

Professor Smets, of the Institut de Sociologie Solvay, stated that the main difficulty was that each group had its definite notions of national character and, being conscious of it, conformed to this character or rejected it.

Professor T. W. Adorno, of the Institute of Social Research, New York, and the Institut für Sozialforschung, Frankfurt, discussed the question of personality diagnosis in relation to the determination of "national character" and stated that a prolonged interview might suffice, even from the psycho-analytic point of view, to determine by what syndrome of traits a person is characterized. A single case-study was enough to verify the hypothesis that a person manifests such and such syndrome. But there was no claim to perfection for this method: the classification was used on the assumption that the validity and reliability of the typology and the method had been demonstrated elsewhere.

The Chairman, Professor Davy, complained that he had so far felt he was attending a congress of psychologists rather than sociologists and warned against over-emphasis of personality factors as against sociological determinants of national character.

Professor Georges Friedmann, Paris, fully agreed with Professor Ginsberg in his criticisms of current attempts at "scientific" determinations of national character, but warned against an under-estimation of the fruitfulness of the concept, particularly on the background of the vast mass of data available for the study of the impact of social institutions, such as *education*, on the formation of national characteristics.

As examples he pointed to the influence of the American School system on the personality characteristics of immigrant children and to the impact of



the "dating" rituals on the sentiments and attitudes of American youth. He also referred to the social control of expressions of emotions characteristic of the English (Jean Bailhache, *Le secret anglais*, Paris, 1946).

Professor Friedmann urged the need for concrete and reliable studies in this field and considered it an important task for the sociology of the twentieth century to investigate the ways in which society, through its institutions, class systems, family structure and systems of private and public education, contributes to the formation of personality and group characteristics. In particular, he pointed out the influence of technological facts on the evolution of national character and showed how different stages of technological development can be found to correlate with different attitudes to time.

Professor Ginsberg had the impression that the views he had set forth in his opening address had been slightly misunderstood. He did not at all reject a sociological approach to the study of national character nor did he underestimate the influence of social institutions on its formation, but he had found a number of serious theoretical shortcomings in recent studies in the field and reacted against their onesidedness and the insufficiency of the evidence advanced for their conclusions. He did not think much of the anecdotal method of approach and had urged the need for more exact and reliable procedures.

#### PAPERS READ

At the subsequent meeting on this sub-theme Professor Leopold von Wiese, of the University of Cologne, read a paper on "The Influence of Nationalism on International Tensions".

Professor von Wiese started by clarifying the distinction between "internationalism" as an attitude favouring friendly relations between separate nations, and "cosmopolitism" as a political ethos striving for brotherly union of all peoples of the earth or of all peoples of a large cultural area.

The main problem for a sociology of international relations is the development of a scientific method for the analysis of the possibilities and means of promoting a development from aggressive and destructive nationalism toward a cosmopolitism covering the largest possible cultural area. Two complementary avenues of approach were recommended: (a) research on individual attitudes in smaller groups and deduction of the characteristics of the collective attitude from such research; (b) analysis of the differences between individual egoism and collective egoism.

Professor von Wiese then showed how instincts of self-assertion and self-submission were combined in the collective egoism of nationalism. International tensions are caused by the clashes of these instincts and cannot be reduced by improvements in communication or similar measures: Cosmopolitism can only be advanced by channelling the instincts into a larger field. A realistic anthropological therapy of international ills must utilize, for the end of cosmopolitan brotherhood, the instincts so far exploited in the service of nationalism.

The following additional papers were read in summary :

Professors Max HORKHEIMER and T. W. ADORNO, Institute of Social Research, New York, and Institut für Sozialforschung, Frankfurt. *Prejudice and Personality*. Dr. Adorno reported on the large-scale research project on anti-semitism, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism sponsored by the American



Jewish Committee and carried out by the Institute of Social Research, New York, and the Berkeley group of social psychologists and public opinion experts.<sup>1</sup>

The central objective of the investigations undertaken had been the determination of correlations between political ideologies and the psychological character of those who embrace them. Research had been focused on the personality correlates of totalitarian ideologies, and a syndrome of character traits termed the "authoritarian personality" had been determined.

The Study of *Prophets of Deceit* had focused on the techniques of argument and appeals characteristic of the agitation and propaganda to which such "authoritarian" personalities are most likely to fall prey. The general study, *The Authoritarian Personality*, aimed at establishing correlations between personality types and such ideologies as are currently used by totalitarian and aggressively ethnocentric and nationalist propagandists. The technique used was intensive interviews guided by Freudian concepts and procedures. It was found through extensive statistical surveys that character structure was a more important factor than traditionally conservative views in determining whether persons tended toward persecution of weaker groups and responded to hate propaganda. A syndrome of character traits emerged and was termed the authoritarian personality, characterized by submissiveness to authority, conformity to the *status quo*, mental rigidity, black-white thinking, etc. Scales for measurement of the variables involved in the syndrome were constructed and used on a large sample of subjects.

Dr. Adorno emphasized the practical importance of studies of this kind, not only for the reduction of intergroup hatreds within nations, but equally for the approach to a diminishing of tensions on the international level.

Messrs. Chr. BAY, I. GULLVAAG, Harald OFSTAD and H. TÖNNESEN, Institute for Social Research, Oslo. *Nationalism: A Study of Identifications with People and Power*. The outline of this extensive monograph presented by Mr. Christian Bay has been printed *in extenso* in the section, *Selected Papers*.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Chr. PETERSEN, Copenhagen. *Rational and Irrational Motives behind National Sovereignty*. Dr. Petersen analysed the motives behind decisions taken by people in disputed border regions regarding their national attachment. He classified these motives under two heads: irrational—genesis, history, language, traditions, mores and religion; and rational—economic social and political.

These two types of motives may sometimes prompt identical action, sometimes conflict. An analysis of the disputes over South Slesvig and Alsace was given, based on this classification.

Dr. Petersen further discussed what considerations ought to guide a supra-national power like the United Nations in deciding upon lines of demarcation and arbitrating border disputes. The importance of internationally organized sociological research on border regions was emphasized, particularly as the results of such research might clarify the situation to the population concerned and help them in weighing the pros and cons of their alternatives.

<sup>1</sup> See *Studies in Prejudice* edited by Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman, particularly *Prophets of Deceit* by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman (Harpers, New York, 1949), and *The Authoritarian Personality* by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford (Harpers, New York, 1950).

<sup>2</sup> See pages 244-46.



## OTHER PAPERS SUBMITTED

The following additional papers submitted under this sub-theme were presented in abstract form as the authors were not present:

Professor Howard BECKER, University of Wisconsin. *What the Hitler Youth Inherited*. The use of "culture case studies" in building "constructive types" is described with emphasis on prediction as the scientific test. The method is used in the study of youth in the stable German society prior to the Franco-Prussian war as compared with youth in the rapidly changing society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas there was no organized youth movement in the earlier period, one appeared in the later, as a protest against secularization and the hypocritical standards of adults. The youth movement took the form of roaming (Wandervögel) and responding to charismatic leaders in goalless non-rational fashion. Social objects, expected responses, and reflected selves were characteristically intermingled. A society sacred to youth was created.

"What are the connexions, if any, between the older German youth movements and the Hitler Youth?" In the period between the world wars the older youth movements had lost vitality, and "youth tutelage" and political youth auxiliaries were formed, with definite goals manipulated by adults. The older motivation of protest and a narrow but intense nationalism prepared for the acceptance of charismatic leadership in Hitler. Before membership in official youth movements became compulsory, many youngsters followed Hitler willingly and gladly. A new fusion of social objects, responses and selves was evident.

Professor Emanuel CHALUPNÝ, University of Brno. *Le caractère national au point de vue sociologique et social-psychologique*. Interest in personality has led to the attribution of "personality" to groups and especially to nations because of their extent and continuity. Such "nation personalities" are methodological fictions made up of (a) traits common to the members; or (b) typical of the population; or (c) a resultant of offsetting forces, or algebraic sum of diverse "traits"; or (d) a composite of national heroes; or (e) an interacting configuration of related traits in a culture.

A number of portrayals of "national character" are appraised. Descriptions by strangers and by ethnocentric natives are equally weak. One recognizes terrain, the international division of labour, language structure, cultural history, literature, art, education, as variously effective factors. Statistical observation of modal traits would be costly and laborious.

Professor A. N. J. den HOLLANDER, University of Amsterdam. *Group Images*. Belonging to a group tends to change personal self-esteem into a feeling of superiority towards the members of other groups of the same category. Group antagonism gives rise to the notion of group characteristics; on the other hand already existing images contribute to the development of tensions. One should distinguish between "image" and "opinion". In group-judgement "opinion" is rarely founded on a rational basis, but is rather emotionally motivated. Such a judgement influences the formation of the image by a selective process. A study of the formative influences of group-images explains why these so often are mere illusions, projections of feelings, crystallizations of group-passions, mistaken for knowledge and insight. A close investigation will probably disclose the great importance of childhood



impressions. Forming a notion of another group requires interest. The motives of this interest are, again, rooted in the in-group and its nature strongly decides the image. It seems acceptable to ascribe the apparently irresistible charm of the notion of "national character" to the tendency towards incarnation of a group in the image of a person. Fixing life in an image amounts to fixing a dynamic form in a static one. "Conceptual lag" is evident when we cannot harmonize recent information about another people with the existing image. On the whole, the image seems to be less changeable than the opinion. A concrete example: the image and the appreciation of the Hungarians in Europe.

Different groups within one nation need not have the same notion and certainly not the same appreciation of another people. The most articulated of these groups can therefore influence the formation of the most generally shared "basic pattern" of the variants of the image. Example: the America-image in England during the first half of the nineteenth century. Several instances are given of image-formation by "endogenous" factors, i.e. factors operative in the observing group. Increasing mental and personal contact between members of different peoples may lead to a decrease of traditional notions and to a correction of persisting images. At the same time other contemporary tendencies counteract these corrective influences. Thought is never autonomous. A *communis opinio* about any people has never yet been attained, however thorough the attempt made.

A "speculum mundi" does not exist. A number of mirrors are, however, discernible, as many as there are peoples and groups within the peoples. The nature of their reflecting surface, and of the magnetic field established before them, both constantly changing, determines the images more than do the objects. When the existence of a group-image is accepted as a fact, it must be acknowledged as a factor of real danger to social harmony.

Professor Stanislaw OSSOWSKI, University of Warsaw. *Changing Patterns in Modern National Ideology*. An abridged version of this paper has been included among the *Selected Papers*.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Dinko STAMBAK, Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris. *L'inconnue slave*. Slavic people have long suffered from the stereotypes about them based upon superficial observations and prejudices. "Slavs" are neither savages, clods, nor mystics, any more than are other peoples.

Many "slavs" hold similarly prejudiced stereotypes about out-groups. No peoples should be judged on the basis of their least favoured members. Nor have the Slavophiles helped the situation by setting up ethnocentric stereotypes of their own, unconfirmed by factual research.

The contradictory elements in the overt life of Slavic peoples have produced misunderstandings among themselves, and between themselves and Western Europeans. Words, formulae, and ignorance have been the dividing factors.

To learn the actual character of a people, objective and thorough sociological fact-finding must cover many subtle aspects of its culture unknown to outsiders.

It is of great importance that the "Slavs" should understand themselves as human beings sharing a common "Slavic" heritage.

Sociologists, by joining with other social scientists in overcoming this ignorance about the "Slav", could improve international relations.

<sup>1</sup> See pages 247-53.



## REPORT BY THE RAPPORTEUR

Following the reading of papers, the rapporteur for sub-theme B., Professor Sverre Holm of the University of Oslo, gave a general report on the papers submitted to his section.

Professor Holm felt it to be impertinent to attempt a summary of all the aspects and problems dealt with in the papers submitted in the section and limited himself to surveying the contributions by classifying them so as to fit the problem pattern of the discussions that had taken place.

He had accordingly tried to arrange the papers on a polarity continuum ranging from one extreme of exclusive emphasis on personality structure as explanatory of national characteristics and attitudes, to another extreme of exclusive concern with social systems, organizations and institutions as basic to an understanding of the same phenomena.

At the psychological pole of this continuum he placed the report by Professors Horkheimer and Adorno on the research conducted by the Californian research team on the authoritarian personality as a basic factor in ethnocentrism and nationalism, centred as this research was on Freudian procedures, depth interviews and TAT tests. Closely related to this approach was the one adopted by the Norwegian research group at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, in its project on the dynamics of nationalist attitudes. A distinctive trait of this contribution was its deep concern with the elaboration of a frame-work of psychological theory leaning heavily on the Tolman-Krech conceptions of the processes of structuralization in the perceptual, cognitive and motivational fields of personality.

While these two contributions were definitely oriented toward an empirical and experimental design of research, the remainder of the papers submitted were either of a general programmatic character or presented historical, explanatory or analytical work without direct research orientation. Thus Professor Chalupný, in his paper on the analysis of national character, was mainly concerned with the reasons that had promoted the use of "personality" analogies in the description of social groupings, while Dr. Stambak's contribution was largely to be interpreted as an appeal for support of intensive historical and ethnographical studies of the characteristics of the "unknown Slav". Both these papers, however, pointed toward the general problem of stereotypes and "group-images" treated by Professor Den Hollander in his paper, an abstract from an article previously published in *Synthese*. In his view national character is nothing more than a group-image of other nations strongly rooted in the complex feeling of in-group belongingness. With his paper the frame of reference moves definitely from personality to the group itself. This emphasis on sociological as against psychological factors is even stronger in the paper of Professor Howard Becker, applying his method of "constructive types" to the study of German youth movements in their relation to nationalist ideologies, not to mention in the paper presented by the *Doyen* of European sociology, Professor von Wiese.

At the very end of the scale Professor Holm placed the paper submitted by Professor Stanislaw Ossowski on changing patterns of modern national ideologies. In this paper the orientation is exclusively sociological and the material drawn upon is clearly historical. The transformation of national patriotism into a national ideology of the class state is described and analysed in terms of social structure, and the implications of this transformation in the present predicament of the world are discussed.



In conclusion Professor Holm read the last section of the paper submitted by Professor Ossowski who, to the deep regret of all present, had not been able to attend the World Congress.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the text of Professor Ossowski's paper, page 247 *seq.*



## C. — *SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS*

The session was opened by the Chairman, Professor Morris Ginsberg.

Professor Theodor Geiger, of the University of Aarhus, delivered the opening address.

Professor Geiger set forth a scheme for classifying the various contributions submitted under sub-theme "C" by distinguishing various kinds of "international relations": (1) relations between national states; (2) relations between peoples regardless of political integration in states; (3) relations between sub-groups of two or more nations, e.g., between corresponding occupational, economic, cultural or scientific groups within different countries; and (4) relations between nations or nationalities within the same state.

In group 1 he placed the papers by Professor Haesaert and Dr. Tartakower on the question of regional solidarity and states' unions, the paper by Professor Eliot on the transition from international feuds to supra-national order, and the paper by Professor Vito on the state control of immigration.

In group 2 were papers dealing with the determinants of tensions between peoples, such as Mr. Anstey's on land hunger, Professor Bonné's on under-developed countries, and Professor Ulken's on the tensions problem in general.

In group 3 Professor Geiger placed the activities of the ISA itself and pointed to the importance of contacts between corresponding occupational groups in different nations for the promotion of international understanding.

Group 4 was divided into a number of sub-groups: (a) relations between different national elements in multi-national states such as Belgium, Finland and Switzerland—some of the problems arising from such relations are analysed in Dr. Lechner's paper on tensions and migrations between the four parts of Switzerland; (b) relations between racially different but peacefully co-operating elements within a state—here Professor Geiger placed Professor Beaglehole's study of the relations between Maoris and whites in New Zealand, and the two papers on relations in Ecuador by Professor Bossano and Dr. Paredes; (c) relations between national minorities and national majorities within a state; a special problem within this group was that of the impact of minority conflicts on international affairs, a topic treated in papers by Dr. Adler, Professor Clark, Dr. Infield and Dr. Skov; (d) the relations of Jewish groups to their host-nations—treated by Miss Hurwic in her paper on post-war Polish Jews, by Dr. Infield in his study of the identifications of *diaspora* Jews, and by Dr. Eisenstadt in his paper on the adaptation of Jewish groups of different origin in Israel; (e) relations between groups of the same nation split apart through the impact of international conflicts: the paper by Dr. Nowakowski on the readaptation of Polish remigrants from France, Professor Waris' study of the adjustment of Karelian DP's, Professor Schelsky on refugees from Eastern Germany, etc.; (f) finally, the relations between immigrants from one nation to the population of their new country; this is



studied extensively by Professor Lee in her paper on Chinese immigrants, and by Professor McKevitt in his study of Irish emigration.

After the opening address the following papers were read in summary:

Professor Alfred BONNÉ, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. *The Problem of Incentives for Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries*. Professor Bonné discussed the role of entrepreneurial incentives in economic development and emphasized the vast differences between the Western world and the underdeveloped areas in the conditions found for such incentives.

The question arises: Can the unique contribution made by entrepreneur personalities in the West be repeated in backward areas? An answer to this question must be based on a thorough analysis of the situations in backward countries. Most underdeveloped areas have two distinct economic sectors: the advanced sector dominated by foreign interests, and the indigeneous economy sector. The resentment felt by the native population has led to nationalist revolts aiming at the liquidation of foreign economic dominance. But in most such cases there have not been enough native entrepreneurs to take over after the foreigners. The solution cannot be found solely by relying on the initiative of individual entrepreneurs. It must be sought either "from above", by conferring upon the state the incentive function, or "from below", by generating a new sense of economic progress in the broad population. Developments of the former type have been attempted by several Islamic sovereigns, but were largely unsuccessful owing to the morale of the administrators and the conservatism of vested interests. Other states, however, particularly Soviet Russia, Turkey and Israel, have succeeded in replacing the initiative of the individual entrepreneur by that of the nation, through the introduction of incentives adequate for a disciplined cadre of administrators and through the inculcation of a spirit of enthusiasm and selfless endeavour for the common cause among the working population. There is, however, no general recipe for the treatment of backward nations and areas. Among new ideas in the field, Professor Bonné mentioned "joint enterprise capitalism" of the type introduced by the Rockefellers in their International Basic Economy Corporation active in Latin America.

Professor S. D. CLARK, University of Toronto. *American Expansionism and the Canadian Reform Movement*. Professor Clark outlined the history of American expansionism and continentalism by showing how the decentralized and separatistic organization of the United States had favoured expansion in border regions, Canada was forced to strengthen central control and Empire ties in order to defend itself against this expansion.

In conclusion, Professor Clark showed how the centralist government of Canada had moved on to more and more radical reforms while the United States had gradually turned its back on its revolutionary tradition of toleration of non-conformism and separatism and sought strength by consolidating the forces of the state in the face of the threat to its existence by another continental power of the same magnitude.

Professor T. D. ELIOT, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. *Implications of the Analogies between International Wars and Crimes*. Professor Eliot analysed the relationships between wars and crimes and stated that law enforcement had tended to be dramatically depicted in terms of "wars" against "public enemies", in a way that had aroused traditional attitudes of vengeance, denied all claims of criminals to human consideration and relied on retaliatory



penalties as a solution. This approach is sentimental in that it primarily satisfies the need felt for a scapegoat, rather than protects the public. It has perennially failed to prevent or stop criminality.

As long as wars are pursued with hate, wars will result—as the “wars” against criminals have resulted—in a cumulative heritage of hate. Only when wars can be waged without hate, by a third party representing collective judgement and for collective protection, may the vicious circle of international feuds become self-limited.

The treatment of Japan, and the recent raising of the UN flag in Korea are the nearest approaches to this goal so far.

Professor S. HUZAYYIN, Farouk I University, Alexandria. *Social Contacts and Impacts in the Arab East: Their Historical and Cultural Setting*. Professor Huzayyin outlined the history of international and intercultural relations in the Arab East and distinguished between: (a) peaceful infiltration leading to mutual response and receptivity; (b) forceful impact and aggression leading to resentment followed in some cases by retrogression and collapse. As an example of the first type of relation he analysed the impact of Hellenism on the ancient world. As examples of the second type he described the Mongol and Turk aggressions, the imperialist movements of expansionism, and the forceful settlement of what he regarded as an alien and heterogeneous population in Palestine.

Professor Francesco VITO, University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. *A Suggestion for Sociological Researches in the Field of Migration Policy*. Professor Vito outlined the arguments of classical economists and *laissez faire* ideologists against migration control and showed how changes in economic world conditions had rendered these arguments invalid: the amount of land suitable for settlement had been greatly reduced; technological progress had increased the amount of capital needed to keep a given number of workers employed; the wage differential between emigration and immigration countries had decreased. These changes in economic conditions had brought about a decline in the spontaneous flow of migrations but also necessitated increased control. The main objectives of immigration control were listed as (a) the safeguarding of the existing cultural and social structure of the population; (b) the maintenance or establishment of a demographic equilibrium between age groups; (c) the restriction of labour supply in accordance with trade union policy; (d) the avoidance of undue strain on social welfare and security budgets.

One of the great tasks facing the United Nations today is the co-ordination of migration policy as a means of reducing inequalities of economic opportunities and development. Sociological research can contribute in this direction by concentrating (a) on problems of assimilation in order to indicate ways of maintaining qualitative control of immigration for cultural, social and political reasons without risking serious quantitative restrictions of immigration; (b) on the long run effects of immigration control based on requirements of demographic equilibrium; (c) on the possibilities of combining long-run demographic criteria of control with short-run criteria dictated by employment policy, and (d) on the motivations and ideological undercurrents of trade union opposition to migration.

Professor Peter McKEVITT, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, Eire. *The Sociological Significance of Irish Emigration*. Professor McKevitt gave an account of the sociological background of Irish emigration.



Ever since the 1846-47 famine the population of Ireland has been continuously lowered by emigration. The original mass emigration was largely agricultural and reduced the rural population drastically, while urban population was less affected and even increased sharply as an effect of industrialization.

Professor McKevitt described the effects of emigration on the structure of the rural family and showed how the strong sentiment of loyalty to the home farm and concern with its continuity prompted emigrants to contribute to its upkeep and to its continuation as an independent unit. Seasonal emigration to England and Scotland also supplements the subsistence farming. Older emigrants help younger children to emigrate, thus localizing the emigrants from specific areas to specific areas. Most emigrants go into industry as the line of least resistance. Irish industry has failed to establish itself on the overcrowded western seaboard where it is most needed, but industrialization is the only effective means to offset the high birthrate and the large emigration.

Professor Émile SICARD, Centre national de recherches scientifiques, Paris. *De la concordance des principaux points de friction internationale et des grandes "inconnues" de la sociologie.* Dr. Sicard felt there would be general agreement that, for a number of regions and groups, sociology can as yet only offer knowledge of isolated phenomena but no insight into the whole fabric of social existence. Among such "unknowns" of sociology Dr. Sicard singled out the Slavic world as one example.

The areas of sociological ignorance coincide in a very striking way with the areas of international friction. Ignorance breeds disdain and distrust.

Dr. Sicard made a number of proposals for the promotion of mutual understanding through exchange of persons and information and recommended that efforts be made to transform sociology into an all-embracing science of description and comparative analysis of geographical "sectors" and historical "phases" of society.

In conclusion Dr. Sicard made a plea to Unesco to sponsor the organization of investigations of the sociologically "unknown" areas: the Slavic, Islamic, African, Latin-American and other areas.

Professor André de Maday, Geneva, then urged the need for an international institute for the study of Slavic and other "unknown" groups of peoples.

Professor Morris Ginsberg called attention to the Research Committee set up by the ISA and said he was convinced that this committee would be very grateful to Dr. Sicard for any suggestions he might elaborate for comparative studies of the kind he seemed to have in mind.

Dr. K. V. MÜLLER, Institut für empirische Soziologie, Hanover. *Begabung und soziales Verhalten bei den deutschen Heimatsvertriebenen.* Dr. Müller described a large-scale investigation of scholastic aptitude and social behaviour in children from 10-14 years undertaken in Niedersachsen in 1946 by the Institut für empirische Soziologie in co-operation with the Ministry of Education. On the basis of these investigations it was possible to compare the characteristics of groups that had been spared by fate and the groups that had been hit the hardest by war and expulsion: *Einheimische* versus *Heimatsvertriebene*. Contrary to expectations it was found that, both when compared by districts and by social strata, the children of expellees manifested the same degrees of scholastic aptitude and the same level of social behaviour as the children of indigenous parents. On the other hand there were definite differences within both



groups according to the social position of the parents, their occupation, economic status, etc.

The analysis of the data thus collected is not complete, but two conclusions seem warranted: (a) the influence of social environment on personality is not a dominant one; (b) while accordingly the factors of social environment should not be over-estimated, the factors of heredity and social selection should not be under-stressed in studies of the formation of personality.

#### OTHER PAPERS SUBMITTED

The following papers submitted under sub-theme "C" could not be presented except in abstract form, since the authors were not present:

##### (a) *General*

Professor C. A. DAWSON, McGill University, Montreal. *The Role of Geographic and Ethnic Factors in Canada's International Relations*. The main characteristics of Canada's international relations are described against the background of a survey of the geographical bases of its population developments and an analysis of the ethnic structure of the country.

Professor J. HAESSAERT, University of Ghent. *Obstacles à la cohésion de l'Europe: essai de sociologie des relations internationales*. Relations between states have hitherto at their best been peaceful contacts concerned with special matters of common interest. So far, all attempts at the establishment of a commonwealth of nations have failed. The Briand-Stresemann plan and the worker-movement's "Internationals" are discussed in detail.

Obstacles to European integration are pointed out: (a) differences in language; (b) differences in the size of the European states, and lack of power-balance among them; (c) the variety of economic structures and interests; (d) differences of political ideologies and traditions; (e) the political ambitions and constructive concepts of single leaders; (f) certain group-interests, which favour hostility, viz. armament industry, military circles, journalism; (g) differences in the psychological make-up of nations ("national character"); (h) protective trade-policy—a result of the industrial emancipation of former colonial countries.

The outlook for a United Europe is by no means promising. Probably, it will have to be enforced from outside, or made imperative by circumstances which made solidarity a matter of life or death.

Dr. Arie TARTAKOWER, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. *Problems of Continental Solidarity in the Near East*. Continental solidarity would be a stage halfway between the competition of unrelated nations, and a sovereign continental superstate. Continental solidarity will not be brought about by sentiments alone, but by real common interests. Such interests may be (a) the desire to keep foreign influence out of the continent; (b) the idea of continental security; (c) the idea of mutual assistance.

This last motive prevails on continents where some of the countries are underdeveloped. They are in need of assistance, while the more highly developed countries cannot prosper as long as they are surrounded by poverty and wretchedness.

Examples are given : Latin America, the Far and Middle East, the Near



East. In the Near East, the Arabian countries have formed an Arab League (1946), but none of these countries will be able to assist others. Turkey is as yet not sufficiently stabilized. In Israel, the necessary spirit of enterprise is present, but economic resources are lacking, and collaboration with the Arab countries would be impossible for the time being, relations being emotionally strained.

Professor H. Z. ÜLKEN, University of Istanbul. *Les tensions sociales et les relations interculturelles*. Social tensions may be described and accepted as facts (fatalism), or considered to be surmountable by analysis (activism).

Cultural tensions arise from the tendency towards cultural expansion, and the obstacles met by this expansion. The process of cultural expansion is exemplified by the broad outlines of mediterranean cultural history. In this process, the original centre of a culture represents tradition, whereas the outposts represent progress.

One of the obstacles to cultural expansion lies in the ever-increasing burden of heritage, multiplying the importance of education. Culture proceeds from the natural to the artificial.

But man is not an entirely rational being, nor is society a rational system. Earlier stages of culture are still at work within us, as undercurrents. Every analytical concept of mankind gives us one single aspect, and thus mutilates rather than explains the totality of man. Neither individualism nor collectivism, but personalism alone can give us a perfect perspective on mankind.

The means and possibilities of cultural expansion are discussed, viz. geographical conditions, migrations and wars, the impact of religions, ideologies and technical achievements. In modern times, cultural expansion is facilitated by the high development of technology and industry, and by the existence of politically organized nations. The main obstacles today are: prejudices of race and class, excessive intellectualism, machinism and individualism.

The culture of Islam is analysed and the causes of its rapid expansion are explained e.g., the absence of racial discriminations and class-distinctions, and the ability to channel nationalism.

Modern civilization has much to learn from Islam. In order to survive, modern civilization must fight the spirit of race and caste; it has to reconcile individualism and collectivism by personalism; it has to maintain liberty in the realm of the higher values (truth, morality, beauty), but to exert pressure in the realm of auxiliary values (economy, politics, law); it has to check excess intellectualism and individualism; it has to appease class-struggle, and strengthen the position of its middle classes.

#### (b) *Minorities*

Dr. Max ADLER, London. *Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy*. An attempt is made to define "ethnic groups" and "nation" in terms of "common history" and the difficulties are shown. "Ethnic" is defined in terms of the feelings of minority in-group insecurity, from which spring other patterns commonly observed in minority groups—political organization, exclusiveness, defensiveness, passive accommodation or aggressiveness, compensatory pride of achievement, efforts to retain or even to enlarge their membership.

Alternative reactions of such groups depend on their size, origin, outside support, geographic distribution, and treatment by the dominant group. Commonly found attitudes of members of dominant groups toward minorities are also analysed in part.



The problems of minorities are associated with the rise of nationalisms; minorities which existed in the absence of nationalism have often been comfortably accommodated or assimilated.

The relation of ethnic groups to political events, especially in Europe, is traced. Since political and territorial independence for all ethnic minorities is impossible, equal rights with reciprocal respect and tolerance are the only effective solution.

Professor Roger BASTIDE, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. *Assimilation culturelle et nationalisme*. Cultural assimilation does not necessarily or automatically reduce internal tensions, if a dominant group, e.g. of earlier-integrated immigrant stock, refuses to accept the out-group in an open-class structure. Cultural differences can co-exist without tension or friction where race or cultural traits do not limit status. Brazil and U.S.A. are contrasted in this respect. Cultural minorities may share ardent nationalism with the dominant group, if socially accepted. But culturally assimilated immigrants may continue to identify themselves with their alien nationalism; they may have dual national loyalty, which is threatened only by refusal of acceptance by the host nation or by war between the two nations. The wish to share and belong is the crux.

Modern communications, by maintaining contacts of immigrants with the homeland, can retard their assimilation. Assimilation is determined by social cultural laws, while nationalization depends upon voluntary acceptances.

Previously or partly acculturated immigrants or their offspring may over-compensate for their own still insecure status by becoming xenophobes toward newcomers. They hate the lurking alien within themselves, and transfer to hatred of the foreigner their patriotic guilt.

For the decrease of ethnic group tensions, the use of group analyses of ethnic tensions, with international control of divisive nationalistic propaganda, are proposed.

Professor Ernest BEAGLEHOLE, Victoria College, Wellington, New Zealand. *Some Sociological Aspects of Race Relations in New Zealand*. This paper has been included among the *Selected Papers* printed in *extenso* in this issue.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Luis BOSSANO, Central University, Quito, Ecuador. *Sobre el problema indigena en America*. An analysis is presented of the problem of the indigenous Indian minorities in Latin-American countries. The question is discussed in its demographic, economic, cultural, and humanitarian aspects. The importance of extensive sociological research in this field is emphasized, particularly as such research would provide the basis for a rational solution of the problem of the integration of the indigenous elements within the framework of modern civilization.

Miss Sara HURWIC, Social Research Centre, University of Warsaw. *Social Conditions for the Disappearance of Ethnic Group Isolation: the Jewish Group in Post-War Poland*. An account is given of a large-scale inquiry conducted in post-war Poland into the changing social position of the Jewish minority. Anonymous, intensive questionnaires were circulated to 13,000 Jews in three cities, and 800 detailed replies, mainly from well-educated Jews, were returned. These data were subsequently supplemented by field studies.

<sup>1</sup> See pages 253-58.



Of the 3 million Jews living in Poland before the war, not more than 100,000 remain. They constitute a disrupted and heterogenous group still emerging from the abnormal roles they had to assume to survive during the war years. Their isolation and voluntary segregation is, however, gradually breaking down as a result of the radical change that has taken place in the social structure of Poland since the war. Jews are offered great opportunities for integration in occupational areas from which they were formerly excluded or which they are no longer ashamed to accept: industry, agriculture, government. The superficial in-group solidarity and homogeneity created through the pre-war capitalist segregation of Jews as second-class citizens is gradually breaking down. Religious customs and endogamous practices tend to relax. The ghetto class structure is breaking down. Yiddish tends to be a domestic rather than a public language, and multilinguality is getting more frequent. Acceptance of the Communist ideology and the concomitant Polish nationalism has accelerated this process of assimilation. Antisemitism tends to be associated with capitalism. There is also an active propaganda for assimilation and toleration of people of different cultures. All these factors are continually playing their part in the progressive integration of the Jewish group within the greater society of Poles.

Dr. Henrik F. INFELD, Group Farming Research Institute, Poughkeepsie, N.-Y. *The State of Israel and the Cultural Autonomy of Jewish Minorities*. Orthodox Jews are exceptional among ethnic groups in the severity of their moral and social condemnation of defection. In *diaspora* this type of social control was intensified for group survival, while acculturation was simultaneously resorted to as a means of individual survival. Scattered Jews resemble their host cultures more than each other. A comparative study of Jewish sub-cultures might reveal whatever common elements remain.

Paradoxically, the creation of the State of Israel accentuated the dilemma of *diaspora* Jews; Zionism added a political common denominator. Many Jews, orthodox as well as culturally assimilated, preferred religious to political identification. Others argued that nobody needed to be called Jews except the Israelis. Acceptance of this view would accelerate world-wide assimilation—the very result feared by Zionism. By winning its case against assimilation, Zionism would thus have actually lost it.

For the Jews remaining in *diaspora* this development has intensified the awareness of the crucial problem of group coherence and cultural autonomy. Unfortunately, little help toward its solution can be expected from Israel itself: the political rehabilitation has not led to any parallel development of a cultural authority from which *diaspora* Jews could derive strength in the face of their present perplexities.

A number of efforts have been made, primarily in the United States, to clarify the social and cultural position of the Jews through the use of the techniques of social and socio-psychological research. Outstanding among these attempts are those initiated through the group-dynamics approach developed by the late Kurt Lewin.<sup>1</sup> Through these efforts, central parts of the basic complex of problems centred around group belongingness and loyalty conflicts have been brought down to a thoroughly empirical and testable level. In developing this approach, Lewin may have tended to overlook the human capacity for self-determination, but certainly he opened up important avenues for action-directed social research, not only on the

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Topological Psychology*, New York, 1936; *Resolving Social Conflicts*, New York, 1948.



specific problem of Jewish group coherence and cultural autonomy but equally on the general problem of intergroup relations.

Dr. Angel Modesto PAREDES, Quito, Ecuador. *Estudio de las clases sociales*. After a general discussion of schemes for the description of social status and the classification of strata, a detailed account is given of the main social classes existing in Ecuador: the upper white class descendants of Spanish Creoles; the mestizo classes upper, middle, lower; the lowest class indigenous Indians.

The thesis is set forth that the future of Ecuadorean society will be formed by the middle-class mestizos once the two streams of their heredity have become stable and harmonized. The mestizo group possesses the drive and the incentives necessary for an emergent dominant class and may find expression in new forms of culture. The process, however, is a slow one. The mestizos have so far not developed a distinct mentality and ideology of their own. Syndicalism may prove a potent catalyst in this process.

Mr. George W. WESTERMAN, National Civic League, Panama. *A Minority Group in Panama*. A description is given of the social, economic and juridical position of the 22,000 West Indian Negroes living as a minority in the Republic of Panama. Descendants of the contract labourers recruited at the time of the construction of the Panama Railroad and the Canal across the Isthmus, the West Indians tried to adapt themselves to Panamanian society but met with considerable racial hostility. Part of the difficulties they have had to face can be traced to the discriminatory practices kept up by the military government of the Canal Zone just across the border from the Republic.

In conclusion, the restrictive practices maintained in the Republic are shown to be untenable in the light of current biological and sociological knowledge and highly disadvantageous to the prosperity and welfare of Panamanian society as a whole.

### (c) Migrations

Mr. Bryan ANSTEY, London. *Land Valuations, Land Hunger, and International Tension*. Land-hunger, though one of the most important, is not the only cause of war. In earlier times, it furthered cultural expansion and development; today, it endangers the existence of both fighting parties, and civilization as such.

In many cases, the desire for *Lebensraum* could be satisfied without external conquest. The key to the problem is the right evaluation of land. If the community value of land is estimated aright, it will be used aright, there will then be no land-hunger, and in consequence less international tension. The community value of land has to be assessed by the sociologist.

Five land tenure stages are correlated with C. B. Blacker's five population stages.

#### Population cycle

- (1) High stationary
- (2) Early expanding
- (3) Late expanding
- (4) Low stationary
- (5) Diminishing

#### Land tenure cycle

- (1) Primitive communal
- (2) Feudal manorial
- (3) Individual capitalist
- (4) Bureaucratic
- (5) Advanced communal

In England, and other highly civilized countries, the fourth stage has been reached.

The population stages of the great national bodies of the world are shown, and correlated with known international tensions.



Dr. S. N. EISENSTADT, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. *Research on the Cultural and Social Adaptation of Immigrants*. This paper has been included among the *Selected Papers* printed in full in this issue.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Sei-Ichi IZUMI, Japan. *Acculturation of the Japanese Emigrants in Hokkaido*. As an outlet for over-population, Southern Hokkaido was unsuccessfully used in the eighteenth century, though more successfully after 1880. In 1925 there were 2,437,110 Japanese there, but the war stopped plans for doubling this number. It is now Japan's only outlet.

The history of one colony, originating from a single village in Southern Japan, shows heavy depletion through failures of agricultural economic adaptation, more recent accretions from many other local areas, heavy increase of intermarriages between these emigrant groups, emergence of redistributed power, new status structure, and a new community organization increasingly independent of identifications with places of origin. High birthrate continues as a problem.

Dr. Jean-Marcel LECHNER, University of Geneva. *L'action des migrations sur les différences de cultures morales: l'expérience de la Suisse*. This paper has been included among the *Selected Papers* printed in full in this issue.<sup>2</sup>

Professor Rose Hum LEE, Roosevelt College, Chicago. *Immigrants and their Adaptation: with Special Reference to the Chinese*. The adaptation of Chinese immigrants in various places of migration in the world are described as special cases of the adjustment of immigrants to the institutions of the receiving country. Factors explaining the social mobility of immigrants are indicated, abstractly and by illustration. The cultural background of racial and national tensions affecting the Chinese is summarized and supplemented with historical and geographical references. Suggestions for further research are included.

#### (d) *Refugees*

Dr. Bernard LAHY, École pratique des hautes études, Paris. Dr. Franz LORENZ, Forschungsstelle für Volkspsychologie, Wiesbaden. *Die deutschen Flüchtlinge in Westdeutschland und das Problem ihrer Eingliederung*. According to a statistical survey of July 1950, there were more than nine million refugees and expellees in Western Germany. An inquiry into the assimilation of these millions into the society of post-war Germany was made through the use of public opinion research techniques. A sample of 1,000 indigenous Germans and another of 2,000 refugees and expellees were interviewed. The initial question asked of the refugees was: "Would you like to stay on where you are now?" Two-thirds of them answered No. Further inquiries into the motivations for Yes and No answers were conducted. Nostalgia for the original home was found to be most frequent in older people and among unemployed ex-farmers and ex-employers. The indigenous Germans were asked whether they thought the refugees constituted a burden or a disturbing factor in their community, 42 per cent answered Yes, 47 per cent No. Asked whether they thought the refugees would be fully assimilated, 31 per cent said Yes, 40 per cent No. Main arguments against the likelihood of assimilation were (a) the

<sup>1</sup> See pages 258-62.

<sup>2</sup> See pages 262-68.



scarcity of housing; (b) the tensions brought about through discrepancies in moral standards.

Dr. Stefan NOWAKOWSKI, Social Research Centre, University of Warsaw. *Social Attitudes and Social Adaptation of Polish Remigrants in Silesia*. A description is given of the remigration of Polish workers to their homeland after World War II. Remigrants from France to Lower Silesia are singled out for intensive study. Of the 600,000 workers—mainly miners—who emigrated to France after 1918, 150,000 have come back to Poland. Among the adults only a few were naturalized in France. The main incentives to remigration were national allegiance and sympathy with the “people’s democracy”.

Remigrant groups tend to be associated with the public stereotyped images of the countries they have come back from and are often blamed for the weaknesses ascribed to their former host-nations. Conversely, remigrants to Lower Silesia tend to blame the settlers from former Polish provinces for the shortcomings usually attributed to Poles in the countries from which they have remigrated. No group antagonism has developed, however. The remigrants from France, having been absent from Poland for a shorter period than other remigrant groups, have acted as a mediating element and facilitated general readaptation. Close relations exist between autochthonous Lower Silesians and remigrants from Westphalia, both groups having suffered severely from German oppression. But isolationist tendencies have not appeared. All groups mix easily, the uniting force primarily being general eagerness to build up a socialist state in Poland.

Dr. Helmut SCHELSKY, Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft, Hamburg. *Die deutsche Flüchtlingsfamilie*. In an extensive investigation of the structure of the family in post-war Germany, it was found that German refugee families had undergone a number of changes not found in other families victimized by the war. The changes seemed largely to have come about independently of the social position and class status of the different refugee families. The more conspicuous of the changes were of the following categories: increase in family solidarity; decreased contacts outside the family; intensified concern with status restoration; increase in strain of internal relations; increase in personal neuroses; levelling of status of members within the family; reduction of romantic-erotic interests. It is assumed that these changes are characteristic of one-third of all West German families and thus indicative of the future of the German family.

Professor Heikki WARIS and Miss Vieno JYRKILÄ, Social Science Research Bureau, Helsinki. *The Social Adjustment of Displaced people in Finland*. The text of this paper is printed *in extenso* in the section of *Selected Papers*.<sup>1</sup>

#### REPORT BY THE RAPPORTEUR

Professor T. D. Eliot of Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., acted as rapporteur for the papers on minorities, migrations and refugees submitted under sub-theme “C”.

Professor Eliot stressed the highly international character of the contributions

<sup>1</sup> See pages 268-72.



submitted to the World Congress: the 28 papers submitted under sub-theme "C" came from 19 different countries, and of these, the 20 dealing more specifically with minorities, migrations and refugees came from 15 countries.

Professor Eliot selected one group of papers that dealt less markedly with international relations, being more concerned with migrants, refugees or displaced persons within the confines of a given nation: the Waris-Jyrkilä study of Karelian DPs, the Lahy-Lorenz, Müller and Schelsky studies on German refugees and expellees, the Izumi study of Japanese migrants to Hokkaido, the Nowakowski study of Polish remigrants in Silesia, and the McKevitt study of the sociological background and effects of Irish emigration.

Another group of papers focused on the specific problems of Jewish minorities, some of them intra-national and non-migrant, others trans-national and migrant: thus the Adler study of the role of Jewish minorities in international affairs, the Eisenstadt outline of research projects on the adaptation of Jewish immigrants to Israel, the Infield study of the impact of the autonomy of the state of Israel, and the Hurwic study of Jews in post-war Poland. Of these Professor Eliot singled out the Eisenstadt paper as one of the regrettably few directly oriented toward an empirical design of research. The paper by Miss Sara Hurwic of the Social Research Centre in Warsaw was found highly interesting, not only for its factual material but also for its marked conformity to the communist "line" identifying capitalism with anti-semitism and incorporating Jews within the national in-group. Professor Eliot also considered the paper by Dr. Infield, on the impact of Zionism and the emergence of the state of Israel on the position and attitudes of Jewish minorities a very stimulating one, although he could not sympathise with Infield's glorification of the over-rated group analysis work by Kurth Lewin.

Professor Eliot further considered the papers on racial minorities and found them to be among the most interesting and factual of all those submitted to the Congress: thus the Beaglehole paper on the way the Maoris have won equality and respect without assimilation in New Zealand, the Bastide paper on nationalism among minorities in Brazil, the Bossano and Paredes papers on the mestizos in Ecuador, the study by Professor Rose Hum Lee on the voluntary *diaspora* of the Chinese, and the paper by Mr. George W. Westerman on the minority of West Indian Negroes in the Republic of Panama.

Professor Eliot finally cited the paper by Dr. Lechner of Geneva on internal migrations and tensions in Switzerland as being a very illuminating one and emphasized the differences between the use of the word "minority" in the case of Switzerland and its use in other papers.



## D. SELECTED PAPERS

# THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISING NATIONS

J. OBREBSKI

### I. THE CHANGING SCIENCE IN THE CHANGING WORLD

The transformations which non-literate societies and their civilizations undergo in our contemporary world gradually deprive anthropology of its *raison d'être* as a distinct discipline of social research and study. This is manifested not only in a tendency to replace the anthropological perspective and method by the methods and techniques of other social sciences, but also in a reverse process. The penetration of anthropological methods into some fields of sociology has become a persistent trend of contemporary social research. The dividing line between anthropology and sociology thus loses its rigidity.

Yet a fuller co-operation between the two disciplines is far from being firmly established and there is a noticeable misapprehension as to the necessary objectives and procedures. Too frequently the anthropologist's contribution to the study of societies other than those of primitive peoples is wasted in the search for short-cuts with which he tries to replace the painstaking and careful research of the sociologist. Further, the anthropological intrusion into the sociological field is condemned by sociologists on general methodological grounds. It is stressed that "Anthropological methods, however adequate they may be for anthropological research into non-literate societies, are. . . inadequate for full sociological inquiry into literate societies" because of the fundamental difference which exists in the subject matter of their study, i.e. the difference between the literate and non-literate civilizations. "It is a difference which exercises a profound effect upon all the attributes of the two kinds of societies, on all their functions and relations, and in their entire social organization. . . . While anthropological methods are well adapted to the non-literate, behavioural aspects of culture . . . (they) lose their exclusive property when applied to societies which, because of their literacy we call civilizations.<sup>1</sup>"

A change in the scope of both anthropology and sociology and their inroads into each other's field becomes, however, increasingly justified in view of the changing face of our contemporary world. An ever increasing number of literate and non-literate civilizations and societies cease to exist as separate self-contained entities. The transitional formations which arise under our very eyes disclose to us an expanding universe of discourse, in which both sociology and anthropology are legitimately interested, with which they both have to deal *ex professo*, and in which a closer alliance between sociological theory and anthropological method can be exercised to the advantage of both disciplines. This field of common interest extends over the vast area of phenomena which—for a lack of a more adequate expression—can be called the phenomena of rising nations.

This paper deals with a possible co-operation between sociology and anthropology exclusively in this field where their joint research can be most fruitful. It describes the general context and nature of the phenomena of rising nations, outlines the main phases discernible in the growth of the new national structures, and ends with some suggestions as to the theoretical and methodological implications of the study of these processes.

<sup>1</sup> Bierstedt, Robert: "The Limitations of Anthropological Methods in Sociology", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 54, pp. 22-30, 1948-49.



## 2. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF OUR TIMES

The rise and growth of the new nations is undoubtedly significant and is a powerful factor in the present world crisis. Yet the political aspect of this phenomenon is but one facet of a much wider and more fundamental process. The great revolution of our times consists, perhaps, not so much in the emergence of the new nation-states, as in the formation of the new national cultures and national culture groups. The new formations do not spring *ab ovo*, nor do they recapitulate the slow historical process through which our present or past civilizations have come into being. They originate in the interaction of the two types of societies and civilizations, existing simultaneously in the same physical space, frequently within the same political framework, sometimes also under the same ethnic or national designation: the folk-societies or the peasant strata living under the regime of their traditional non-literate culture, and the national culture groups, displaying various sub-types of literate civilization and bound with the corresponding folk-masses either by a political order or a class system, sometimes also by a common cultural substratum. The historical processes by which the new national structures come into being invariably take the form of the expansion and penetration of the national literary civilizations beyond their former confines, of the collapse and disintegration of many folk-societies and of their cultures, of the growth of new civilizational configurations based on formerly non-literate peoples and, finally, of the corresponding transformations of the existing national societies.

The dimensions of this process are in direct proportion to the penetrating influence which our contemporary civilizations exert over all non-literate peoples of the world, and in an inverse proportion to the degree that these peoples or social strata have been made active participants in these civilizations. In the present world, autonomous non-literate societies and cultures are almost non-existent. With very few exceptions they are all drawn into the expanding universe of national civilizations, made dependent upon them and subjected to continuous change. At the same time, the existing civilizations are frequently founded on a very thin basis. Only few contemporary nations have evolved almost all-inclusive national structures, in which the segments of population that do not share the common literate civilization of the society are few and insignificant. Typical of the remainder of the world is a basic cultural dichotomy, the split of the society into two different social and cultural universes: the literate "national" civilization limited to a small layer of the society, and the folk-culture, embracing the originally non-literate masses. It is the destruction and absorption of the non-literate folk-societies by the national civilizations, and the rise of new social and civilizational structures, precipitated by this process, which constitutes the complex and unstable reality of present times.

The transformations which the folk-societies undergo in this process, take various historical forms. Sometimes they consist in the physical or social annihilation of the indigenous folk-groups and their replacement or absorption by an immigrant population and its civilization. Sometimes again the process assumes the formidable proportions of a full transformation of pre-existing social structures through the rise of new social classes and the growth of new cultural forms originated in these movements. This is what happened in many Eastern European societies, and a similar process is apparently on the way in other parts of the world, including Asia and Latin America. The growth in the Caribbean of new national culture groups from the peripheries of European civilizations and from their slavery systems imposed upon imported African populations, constitutes another variation of this process. Still another configuration comes into existence among the colonial peoples of Africa, where initially it takes the form of the collapse of the traditional tribal societies and the disintegration of the indigenous folk-cultures under the pressure of Western economy and the influence of Western civilization.

## 3. THE PROCESS OF RISING NATIONS

Are these different configurations and the transformations they undergo to be interpreted as incommensurable products of history, each explainable only in its own



terms? Or can they be scientifically approached as complexes of similar social phenomena, capable of comparative analysis, abstract description and systematic theory? The facts that we know, in spite of all the shortcomings of our knowledge, favour the latter alternative.

First of all, despite the difference in cultural substance and historical detail, these various configurations show a striking structural similarity. This structural similarity is owing to the basic similarity of all folk-societies and of national culture groups. It is determined above all by the nature of interrelations and interactions which develop between the national culture group and the non-national masses, wherever these two collectivities exist as component parts of a bigger whole, such as a nation or a state. Whatever its origin, history and composition, the national culture group, big or small, indigenous or alien, is a dominant group. It is dominant because it represents an organization capable of dynamic development and expansion, exercises a wide control over the political organization of the society and its economic institutions, and evolves group policies and actions fateful for both moieties of the collectivity. Secondly, its supremacy is founded on an enduring class order, in which a basic class division runs *pari passu* with the subdivision of the society into two different social and cultural universes. Owing to the fundamental differences in culture, the class stratification of the society becomes at this juncture bimodal and substantial, and the whole social structure takes the shape of a two-class system, particularly in societies where the national culture group is of foreign origin as, for instance, in the colonies.

The inner contradiction between the community principle and the class principle, which is found in any national society, becomes particularly emphatic under the class-and-culture dichotomy, and it circumscribes the course taken by the processes of assimilation of one group to another. The national culture group, in its activities directed towards the assimilation of the folk-society, displays two opposite tendencies. In the drive for expansion, continuity and self-realization it proceeds to assimilate and incorporate into its structure the individual members of the folk-groups and the folk-society as a whole. However, in defence of its inner organization, directive functions, cultural composition, and system of values, it evolves mechanisms of stratification and segregation, which relegate the new segments of the whole to an inferior class position and allow them to participate in the national society on a reduced scale, socially and culturally.

Hence the cultural assimilation of the folk-society to the national culture group frequently is accompanied by the processes of social dissimilation. The absorption of the folk-society by the national culture group, particularly if this group is a disproportionate demographic minority, does not take the form of a mass transition of the individuals from one group to another. It operates through the class-and-culture dichotomy, and the penetrating action of the institutions of the national culture group on the folk-society results not only in a cultural unification of the collectivity, but also in its segregation on the class principle. Subsequently, there emerge new derivative social structures and new cultural configurations. The clash between the assimilatory and dissimilatory processes paves the way for a specific historical process: the growth of the folk-society to cultural nationhood, not through the submission to the value systems, supremacy and guidance of the dominant group, but through a selective assimilation of its culture. This involves the rejection of class meanings and of the values inherent in them, and the formation, in strife and opposition to the dominant group, of a new national structure free from the former cleavages and contradictions.

#### 4. THE PHASES OF NATIONAL GROWTH

Not every folk-society reaches this final stage of national growth, and the rate and incidence of the transformations differ from one society to another. Reduced to a general abstract description, this complex and varied process seems to be characterized by the following phases:

The initial phase, which starts with the penetration of the institutional and associational framework of the national culture group into the folk-society, consists in the



assimilation of the elements of the national civilization by the folk-groups, and in their adaptation to the traditional culture pattern and social organization of these groups. Although this process is complex and varied, since the folk-society is divided into a number of self-contained communities and local groups, and each group has to undergo this process separately and independently, it presents definite structural similarities. First of all, the external imports, whether cultural values, patterns of social roles, or even institutions, change their original function and meaning in the readjustments they undergo when transplanted from one type of society and civilization to another. Secondly, the infiltration of external institutions and value systems into the folk-groups is accompanied by the disorganization of the traditional community. Finally, the penetration of some institutions of the national culture group into the folk-society and even their partial assimilation by the local groups, does not bridge the cultural chasm of the bipartite society. The folk-society, as a result of this process, is made dependent upon the organization and activities of the national culture group: directly, in the functioning of the newly adopted institutions and, indirectly, even in the perpetuation of its revised culture pattern. This establishes a permanent link between the national culture group and the folk-society, but does not signify their fusion. The original dichotomy does not disappear. On the contrary, it receives a new emphasis. The differences in the type of culture still persist between the two moieties of the collectivity and, integrated into the hierarchical order of the society, they contribute to the crystallization of its two-class system.

The next important phase is represented by a reverse process: not by the assimilation of the national institutions and culture patterns by the folk-society, but by the processes of assimilation of the folk-groups and its members to the national culture group and its institutions. It is at this juncture that the dissimilatory processes, rooted in the class system of the collectivity, start to take shape.

The folk-society has on the whole no place in the original structure of the national culture group and little or no share in its history. The national group is indifferent, sometimes even hostile to the cultural forms and values of the folk-society, although it may appreciate them as a source of artistic inspiration or as a common substratum of national mythology. The concept of wider unity which it eventually evolves usually takes for granted the division of the collectivity into a passive folk and an active national stratum. In the eyes of the national group, the folk-society is viewed as a collective value not because of its culture, but rather in spite of it. It is considered not as an active subject of the national group, but as an object of its acculturation activities and as an instrumental value: a reservoir of man-power to be utilized for the development of the national resources, human and material. Only in so far as they repudiate their original cultural background and master fully the personal patterns indispensable for membership in the national culture stratum, are the individuals of the folk-society given full entry into the national culture group. For the vast majority of the partially assimilated, participation in the civilization of the national culture group is circumscribed by the status and positions assigned to them, as also to members of the folk-stratum, in the subordinate layer of the class structure of the collectivity.

Operating within this culture-and-class dichotomy the institutions of the national culture group produce two-fold effects: they detach, physically and spiritually, the members of the folk-society from their own group and they reject them from the full participation in the national culture group. Whether it is class or caste spirit, or simply a cultural ethnocentrism, this spirit permeates, intentionally or non-intentionally, the teaching involved in the acculturation conducted through the institutions of the national culture stratum. Once subjected to the permanent influence of these institutions, the members of the folk-society are, consciously or unconsciously, indoctrinated in admiration for the traditions, values and achievements of the dominant group and instilled with a negative evaluation of their own society and tradition. They become severed from their native group, disentangled from their original loyalties, estranged from their traditional values, and made to wander, physically and spiritually, through social spaces other than the narrow world of their village community or tribal society. They change and become remodelled, but at the same time they do not enter the restricted stratum of the national culture group, which was instrumental in their detachment from their own society. Rather, they are somewhere



in between the two worlds, in new formations, arising around the focal points of the expanding institutional scaffolding of the national society. These new formations take various forms. The detribalized natives, migrant labourers, uprooted peasants, the *élite noire*, a native compound or an urban slum are obvious examples. But they exist also less obviously, in spiritual detachment from the community which is not necessarily accompanied by change of residence. The participants in these new aggregates may be found among the Christian converts of a pagan tribe, a village proletariat, dissatisfied youth, various categories of innovators, non-conformists and rebels.

The growth of these marginal formations introduces the first important structural changes in the collectivity. These changes do not affect directly the original composition of the national culture group and they may leave intact many local communities of the folk-society. They consist mainly in the emergence of new social groupings in various interstitial areas which have been formed by the invasion of the institutions of the dominant national group into the folk-society. Such groups are founded on the identity or similarity of these new social roles and of the functions performed by its members, for which there is no place in the traditional organization of either folk-groups or the national culture group. These amorphous and fluid bodies, derived from the interaction between the national culture group and the folk-society, cut across the segmentary structure of the folk-society. They develop new social spaces, super-local, in which the members of the folk-stratum aggregate not as members of their local communities, but as the members of a wider, "super-territorial" national community.

These structural changes are the prerequisites of the final phase of the process of rising nations. They provide the basis for the development of the group-forming processes, which lead to the emancipation of the folk-strata from their dependence upon the dominant group, to the formation of their own super territorial associations and institutions and, finally, to the growth of a new, and more inclusive, national structure.

In this final phase, the most significant structural occurrence is the emergence of various social movements, aiming at such changes in the folk-society and in its derivative formations, and also in the national structure, which would enable the folk strata to participate more fully in the national civilization. These movements take various forms: economic, religious, political, cultural. They are creative and constructive, and their enduring contributions to the growth of the new society proceed through: the formation and spread of institutions and associations binding the folk-society as a whole or its derivatives with the national community; organized action aiming at a more extensive assimilation of the national civilization with a simultaneous rejection of its class meanings and values; the development of the indigenous leadership both in the wider society and in the local community; a development of class and national consciousness and of the corresponding ideologies; increased cultural creativeness, manifested particularly in literature and art, expressing the new philosophies of the new national strata and the latter's search for their own social ideals and value systems. With the development of these movements the folk-society starts to disappear gradually as a separate entity and enters the reorganized national structure as a recipient of its cultural heritage and as a co-maker of its historical existence.

## 5. THE METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This tentative outline of the process of rising nations points undoubtedly to one fact. The transformations originated in the symbiosis of national civilizations and folk-societies do not consist, as it is frequently assumed, merely in an adjustment of the folk-society to new conditions, in a transitory disequilibrium of various local folk-groups, overcome as soon as these local groups reorganize their cultural inventory in a way more compatible with the pressures and requirements of the new situation. Historically and sociologically, the focus of this process is the growth of a new social reality, which belongs neither to the folk-society nor to the original national society, although it is related to both of them. It is the study of this chaotic, fluid and dynamic reality which calls for the attention of both sociologists and anthropologists and for their co-operation.



At present only the studies of ethnic or national minorities receive the full attention of sociologists and, owing to the close affinity of their problems to the problems of assimilation of folk-societies by national civilizations, such studies contribute indirectly, both in theory and method, to the study of rising nations.

Anthropological research has not advanced much beyond the study of the initial phase of the process. The fact that the growth of this new reality, in spite of its richness and complexity, and also in spite of its obvious existence, has escaped an adequate study, is due largely to the inadequacy of anthropological perspective and concepts applied in actual research. Anthropological studies of culture change are dominated by an historical perspective and a methodological concretism. Anthropologists appear to ignore the distinction between non-literate and literate civilizations; hence their preference for psychological theories and interpretations of culture change. They fail to notice that the main problem lies in the transition of the folk-society from one type of civilization to another, and that this transition takes place not in the local groups, but between and in-between the two different types of society. They seem also to be unaware of the fact that even the fullest account of all the changes that have occurred in a community studied has little significance unless these changes are brought into their relevant context: the interaction which develops between the national culture group and the folk-society, and the nation-forming processes precipitated by this interaction. The anthropological "temporo-centrism" too, deplored by Bierstedt, with its emphasis on phenomena accessible directly to personal observation of a visiting anthropologist, has undoubtedly been somewhat responsible for the fact that the historical nature of the process and its temporal and spatial dimensions have been overlooked.

Is this complex, dynamic and elusive reality inaccessible to anthropological inquiry? Has it to be passed to the sociologists perhaps in the anticipation of the final transformation of the folk-societies into the full-blooded national civilizations? By no means. A more adequate theoretical approach and the use of existing methods can open this new field to anthropological study, advance the further development of this science, and lead it to a more fruitful co-operation with sociology.

The success of the inquiry in detecting, recording and describing the processes of change depends directly upon the theoretical concepts applied in the study. In this respect the anthropologist has to rely as much on the relevant elements of sociological theory as the sociologist has to rely on the contributions of anthropology in testing and developing these theories. The most neglected and controversial parts of systematic sociology, such as the theory of nation, of social class, social personality, social space, and social processes and movements, can profit much by anthropological findings in the field of rising nations. Again, their development towards greater conceptual clarity and methodological precision is indispensable for the success of the anthropological study.

The reorientation of the study calls certainly for a corresponding adjustment in the methods and techniques of research. The anthropologist should abandon his methodological concretism and realize that the growth of the new super-local structures and functions should receive higher priority than the study of the changing customs and habits of the local groups. Accordingly, community studies should be used not only as an objective *per se*, but above all as a method of detecting and analysing the nationwide structural changes in their local manifestations. Finally, a much more extensive and confident use should be made of the autobiographical method.

The growth of the new personality type and structures, going side by side with the group-forming processes, escapes the grasp of the scientist if his vision is confined to the microcosmos of a local community. In the transforming folk-society, the local community does not exist any more as a self-contained and coherent social and cultural environment. Its members are exposed to multiple, differentiated and evasive formative influences. The new part of their social personality, and also its new structure, cannot be detected unless it is studied by following their movements in the wider social space, which starts to take shape and expand with the nation-forming processes in which they participate. It is the autobiographical method that enables the anthropologist to extend his intimate insight into society beyond the range of his direct contacts and observations and leads him to the discovery and perception of the phenomena which are out of his reach and hence capable of escaping his notice.



The study of the rising nations conducted on these lines opens new prospects for the anthropological study of society, as promising and rich as is the social and cultural reality involved in this process. It may also establish a solid foundation for interdisciplinary co-operation between anthropology and sociology in the fields in which this co-operation is indispensable for the advancement of our factual and theoretical knowledge of the processes of society.

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# THE THEORETICAL PREPARATION OF A RESEARCH PROJECT ON NATIONALIST ATTITUDES

C. BAY

I am privileged to submit for the consideration of the sociologists assembled at the World Congress a brief report on the theoretical framework of a research project to be carried out at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, on *The Dynamics of Nationalist Attitudes*.<sup>1</sup> The initiative for this research project was taken by Dr. David Krech, the current President of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, during his stay in Norway in 1949-50 as a Visiting Professor at the University of Oslo and Research Director of the Institute for Social Research. The theoretical framework for the project has been elaborated under his guidance by a team of four young Norwegian social scientists: Ingemund Gullvåg, Harald Ofstad, Herman Tønnessen, and myself. The project will actually be carried out during the academic year 1950-51 under the guidance of Dr. Herbert Hyman, of the National Opinion Research Center in Chicago, the current Research Director of the Oslo Institute.

The importance of gaining insights into the dynamics of nationalist attitudes would hardly need stressing in this assembly. If our century is witnessing a race between science and destruction—destruction represented above all by inter-group tensions culminating in war—then it seems clear that science has a better chance of winning the race the more its energies can be invested in efforts to understand the roots of tensions and war. We do not claim that the presence of nationalist attitudes among people in general is necessarily the sole or even the most basic cause of tensions and war, but we do submit that these attitudes serve to increase tensions, and that they in our time are a necessary condition for the conduct of large wars. We feel that research efforts toward understanding national attitudes are more urgently called for than are research efforts toward analysing national characteristics. It seems to us to be the nationalist-inspired distortions and exaggerations of differences in national character which stimulate international tensions, not these differences in themselves, if they are appreciable at all.

One important reservation must be made at this point, however. Our definition of “nationalist attitude” is in one respect somewhat broader than what appears to be the most common usage: By a nationalist attitude we understand an attitude involving one or more nations, though not all nations, as an object of identification. Thus, to our way of thinking, the possible creation of a new “Atlantic Pact-nationalism” or a “Western Europe-nationalism” may in the long run nourish the forces of destruction just as much as our present Norwegian, British, American or Russian nationalisms. Moreover, we are led to believe that the basic psychological processes are just the same whether the identification embraces one or several nations, so long as the individual’s cognitive world and emotional attachments yet draw a sharp and consistent line between “We” and “They”.

It is for this last reason that we decided not to try to formulate an exact definition of a “nation”, although we otherwise have put a great deal of work into our definitions. We assume that an identification with a nation—whether or not one would call Scotland, the Faeroe Islands, or Tunis, or Viet Nam, nations—psychologically has much in common with identifications with other social groups, such as with the family, with the community or the class, with political or religious movements, etc. In fact, we consider nationalist attitudes to be only one kind of manifestation of a basic psycho-

<sup>1</sup> See Chr. Bay, I. Gullvåg, H. Ofstad and H. Tønnessen, *Nationalism: A Study of Identification with People and Power*. “I. Problems and Theoretical Framework.” Oslo, Institute for Social Research, June 1950, mimeographed.



logical process which we call identification: whatever can be known about this general process of identification should furnish insights also into the more special process of nationalist identification.

Or conversely—and this will be the direction of our empirical research, unlike our theoretical speculations—whatever hypotheses can be verified about the dynamics of nationalist identification should contribute insights toward a general theory of identification. We are putting a great deal of our emphasis on this more basic aspect of our study, as it is our conviction that social research can contribute lasting and cumulative knowledge only when it is basic research—basic in the sense that it tries to establish, test, or reformulate a coherent body of general social theory.

The concept of identification in a sense is the central concept in our approach toward understanding nationalism. While almost all of our 63 preliminary hypotheses to be tested deal with nationalist identification, they are mostly derived from theoretical assumptions about a general process of identification. A definition of this concept therefore seems to be called for, even in this brief report. We have not one, but two, definitions of identification, as we operate with positive as well as negative identification:

“A person P is said to *identify positively* with something x to the extent that he is disposed to get satisfaction out of good things happening to x, or dissatisfaction out of bad things happening to x.” We assume, in a sense, an element of altruism in every positive identification, when we add the following sub-definitions: “Good things happening to x” means “things which P considers good for x, instead of or in addition to being good for P himself”, while “Bad things happening to x” means “things which P considers bad for x, instead of or in addition to being bad for P himself”.

“A person P is said to *identify negatively* with something x to the extent that P is disposed to get satisfaction out of bad things happening to x, or dissatisfaction out of good things happening to x.” We assume, as it were, an element of malevolence in every negative identification, by a corresponding pair of sub-definitions.

The most common objects of identification are individuals or groups, or something representing individuals or groups; but we are not excluding the possibility that people at times may identify with things which appear to have no immediate reference to human beings. While we assume that positive identification is a universal process, in the sense that every individual living in a society develops at least *some* identifications with other people or with symbols, we are not assuming that the same necessarily is the case with negative identifications. Nationalist identifications as well as negative identifications with certain foreign nations seem to be widespread in most modern societies, but are not assumed to be universal.

Having introduced our concepts of positive and negative identification, our first task is to find ways of comparing and classifying identifications, and particularly nationalist identifications. A good number of general attitude variables have been defined with this primary purpose in mind. After raising the question of the practicability and usefulness of classifying individuals as more or as less nationalistic, we found that a typology of different patterns of nationalist identifications probably is a prerequisite to a fruitful classification of this sort.

We are especially interested in establishing empirically whether people tend to differ in their nationalist attitudes in the way that some individuals identify primarily with their fellow nationals as people, while others identify more with symbols representing national unity and power (while a third group, no doubt, will combine both orientations in fairly equal proportions). If these two opposite types of nationalist identification can be found, and are found to be common enough to have practical significance, we would call the one type *people-oriented* and the other *power-oriented*.

Our next task will be to inquire into the cases of nationalist attitudes, and especially, provided these types have been found significant, into the origin of people-oriented versus power-oriented nationalist attitudes. We have formulated hypotheses about a good number of possible determinants, trying to make use of the insights and concepts offered by various schools of psychological theory. We will consider the influence of perceptual processes, and ask whether people differ in their general ability to reconstruct psychological fields, and what significance such a difference may have for the incidence and nature of stereotypes, for instance. Next, we will consider the problem



of the effects of reward and punishment in general, and more specifically with respect to social acceptance and rejection. We will be especially interested in trying to establish the probable influence of a *disciplinarian* as opposed to a *liberal* family background in the development of power-oriented versus people-oriented nationalism. Also a few hypotheses about the probable influence of the constitution and politics of the State will be tested, as part of our effort to obtain a comprehensive view of the determinants of nationalist identifications of different types.

If these various factors, or some of them, are found to contribute to the development of different patterns of nationalist attitudes, it may be expected that they will tend to influence attitude developments also in other fields. If it is found, for instance, that a disciplinarian family background tends to promote power-oriented rather than people-oriented nationalist attitudes, then it may be expected that also other kinds of attitudes in the same individuals will tend to be structured in specific ways. Broadly speaking, we will approach the following empirical problem: is it possible to find considerable numbers of individuals who are power-oriented in all or most of their social relationships, and other individuals who are people-oriented with a corresponding consistency? We will speak about authoritarian and democratic personalities, if these patterns can be found; and the rich material presented by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford suggests that these patterns probably can be found.<sup>1</sup> In other words, people-oriented versus power-oriented nationalism may turn out to be manifestations, in most cases, of democratic versus authoritarian personalities. (We expect to find differences in degree rather than absolute, clear-cut differences, of course.)

Our next step, again following the example of Professor Adorno and his team, will be to study some very broad personality characteristics which may be expected to be connected with the development of authoritarian versus democratic personalities, and therefore also may be expected to correlate with power-oriented versus people-oriented nationalist identifications. We are particularly interested in such personality factors as the general ability (low or high) to restructure psychological fields,<sup>2</sup> the general ability to tolerate cognitive and emotional ambiguity,<sup>3</sup> and the general ability to do without out-groups as objects for displacement of aggression. Without going into its theoretical derivation, let me give you as an example one of our hypotheses referring to the last-mentioned personality factor: "Persons who have important power-oriented identifications with the nation, will tend to have more important and hostile negative identifications (with other groups, including other nations), than will those who have important people-oriented identifications with the nation" (hyp. 37).

An important part of our investigations will have reference to the semantical aspects of the promotion and expression of nationalist attitudes, such as the usage and functions of words, slogans and arguments relating to nationalist identification, and above all the functions of pseudo-agreements and pseudo-disagreements.

Our last problem area to be covered is the following: What factors seem to determine, or reveal, the resistance to change of a given nationalist attitude? In formulating 12 hypotheses in this field, we have emphasized such factors as the origin, functions, importance, and structuredness of attitudes, as well as the perceived source and the contents of the conflicting stimuli.

In concluding this report, let me emphasize again that the actual research is still ahead of us, and so is the working out of research techniques. Moreover, our theoretical framework is still only preliminary, and my colleagues in Oslo and I will be very grateful indeed if any one of you have the time and interest to offer your criticisms, whether to this audience now, to me during the following days, or to our team later, by correspondence.

<sup>1</sup> See T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York, Harpers, 1950.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Milton Rokeach, "Generalized Mental Rigidity as a Factor in Ethnocentrism", *J. Abn. and Soc. Psych.* 1948, 43, 259-78.

<sup>3</sup> See E. Frenkel-Brunswik, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable", *J. Personality* 1949, 18, 108-43.



# CHANGING PATTERNS IN MODERN NATIONAL IDEOLOGY

S. OSSOWSKI

## I. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF NATIONHOOD

The League of Nations, created after World War I, was not a league of nations, and the United Nations Organization, created after World War II, is not an organization of nations. Nevertheless the fact that these institutions adopted such names and that the League of Nations even pretended to be an organization of nations is an important social fact, a highly significant symptom of the changes that have been brought about in the social structure of the world and in European mentality since the formation of the Holy Alliance, an Alliance openly directed against nations.

The fictions implied by the names of the League of Nations and the UN are based on several assumptions: (a) that in the modern world governments are representative of nations; (b) that the relation of representation is transitive and that consequently representatives of governments are representatives of nations; (c) that the world, or at any rate the so-called "civilized world", is organized in states on the basis of the principle of self-determination of nations, since this watchword of oppressed peoples of the nineteenth century obtained, in theory, the approval of the Congress of Versailles.

It is evident that nations have come to be considered the main constituents of the social structure of the world. Their importance in world structure is recognized in Marxist circles as well, although Marxists see the basic cause of all social transformations of the world in the class struggle.

Conceptions of "nations" as social groups became standardized all over the world as a result of the activities of modern international institutions, although the delegations seated at the tables of UN and Unesco include representatives of territorial groups which differ in size, origin, and type of social bond as much as the French nation and the Haitian nation, the Swiss and the German, the American (United States) and the Albanian.

The development of individual nations and of their ideology is due not only to the pressure of their interests or the interests of their ruling classes, but also to the influence of certain cultural patterns indicating what a nation ought to be. It is, of course, not only patterns shaped by modern international institutions that have to be taken into account: there are much older patterns of various origins, which interfere with the new ones.

For the new-born nations of nineteenth-century Europe, the French nation with its stress on national language and its tightly unified territory was the exemplary nation. For the new-born nations of Latin America in the same period it was rather the American nation of the United States that played the role of supreme model.

An experiment, perhaps unique in history, was launched with astonishing success in Palestine some years ago: the revival of a language that had been dead for 2,000 years. This idiom of the sacred books was suddenly transformed into a spoken language used in the everyday life of the Jewish population. In this, as well as in a number of other measures taken in Jewish Palestine, we can see the efficiency of a definite pattern: the Jewish people, deprived for such a long time of many attributes which were the normal share of other peoples, are driven by the feeling that in the country of their fore-fathers they should endeavour to be as normal a nation as possible, with a country, a government, and a language of their own. Switzerland has not needed to bother about the unity of language and about a language of its own; but a nation which has only recently acquired independent existence and whose status is not



yet quite secure, naturally tends to conformity with a pattern of national bonds which is most complete.

The same motives brought about the insertion of the article on national language into the Irish constitution.<sup>1</sup> We can probably find them as well in the campaign for the Landsmaal in Norway, elaborated from a Norwegian vernacular as against the language of Ibsen and Bjørnson.

## 2. THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF THE MODERN NATION

In view of the extreme variety of groups which pretend to be nations, it has become obvious that discussions on what external attributes are necessary and sufficient for a social group to be called "nation" are sterile. If we give up the search for external and at the same time universal criteria, we may try to interpret the notion of nation as a correlate of national ideology, defining "nation" by "national ideology", and not vice versa.

To avoid confusion it is advisable to confine the investigation at first to a concrete historical field. This is not difficult to define since we are rather used to treating modern nations as a product of the historical period of the emancipation of the Western bourgeoisie when a liberal and democratic ideology was proclaimed. At that time new patterns of social bond and new conceptions of the sovereign social group, the nation, became arms and *idées forces* of the social movement.

Consequently, from the sociological point of view we shall call "nation" a social group which accepts these patterns, implants them into the consciousness of its members, and tries to play in the structure of the world a certain standardized role: the role of a "nation". This standardized role does not, of course, hinder any nation from aspiring to some exceptional position in the structure of the world and in its history.

A social group which pretends to be a nation must already be bound by some kind of historical tie, but it is not important what the origin of this tie has been: it is not important whether it is the kind that exists in England or in Estonia, Belgium, or Uruguay. Nevertheless such a group must satisfy certain conditions if it is to conform to the standard of nationhood:

1. A nation is a durable territorial group of such size that its cohesion cannot be based on personal contacts. It is not necessarily a territorial group in an ecological sense, but necessarily in an ideological one. The country (fatherland) and the nation are correlates even if the majority of members of the nation are not inhabitants of their country, as in the case of the Irish and the Jewish nations.
2. A nation is an "autotelic" group: its existence and its prosperity is an end in itself. For its existence a nation needs no sanction except its own will. A community consisting of the faithful subjects of a king or a dynasty is not yet a nation. A nation cannot be treated in the same way as inhabitants of a country which is the property of a king. Therefore after the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in France it was not without importance whether the king's title would be "the king of France", as formerly, or "the king of the French" after Napoleon's example ("l'Empereur des Français"). This "autotelic" character finds manifestation in the tendency, typical of every nation, to possess national sovereignty. This explains also, why the birth of modern nations was accompanied by democratic and revolutionary movements.

## 3. CONTRADICTORY CRITERIA OF PARTICIPATION IN A NATIONAL COMMUNITY

Ernest Renan in an essay *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (1882) defined the nation as a spiritual union, the existence of which consists in a daily plebiscite. This definition was opposed to all attempts to define the national bond by external traits. Renan's essay has gained great popularity, but its author had had predecessors among revolutionary

<sup>1</sup> See F. Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*. London, 1944, p. 89.



writers of the preceding period. Italian, Polish, and Russian emigrants in the second quarter of the nineteenth century very often expressed the tendency to consider the nation as a community analogous to a liberal religious group where participation depends only on the conviction of the members. "The fatherland is the faith in the fatherland", said Mazzini; and members of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris at that time held that only in barbaric epochs could people be bound together by the community of blood: in modern society they were bound into nations by the community of ideas.

National plebiscites of the kind organized by Napoleon III and Cavour in the second half of the nineteenth century as well as the plebiscites of the twentieth century, carried out in the name of national self-determination, are more recent examples of the application of this principle to political life.

At the beginning of our century Austrian socialists went still further in this direction. I refer to the proposal made by Otto Bauer and R. Springer for cultural autonomy to be granted to all nations of the Habsburg Empire. According to this proposal nations were to be treated as free associations, even when without relation to any territory: their autonomy was to be a national but not a territorial one. This idea of the Austrian socialists was attacked by the leaders of the Russian revolutionary movement. The principle that belonging to a nation depends on personal conviction has been observed, however, in the U.S.S.R. as well.

We can thus trace the development of this "spiritual" concept of nation from the birth of the first French Republic to the present time. But during the same period we can observe among the masses and their ideological leaders a quite opposite attitude. The same people who advocate the principle of national self-determination are convinced that one cannot choose nationality, at will, as one chooses a political party, that nationality is predetermined for everyone, and that he who changes it breaks ties inherent in his very nature. Even those who expressly profess the Renanian theory of nation do not accept all its logical consequences. They do not doubt, for instance, that the number of inhabitants of Europe is equal to the total of members of all European nations, i.e. they do not suppose that people exist who do not belong to any nation. They behave as if nationality were as necessary an attribute as sex. Still more, they suppose that in some cases national consciousness may be delusive. Yugoslavian patriots think that Macedonians who consider themselves Bulgarians are mistaken, and Bulgarian patriots think the same of Macedonians who believe themselves to be Serbs.

Throughout the whole history of the modern national ideology we can observe the interference of these contradictory criteria of nation-belongingness, and the interference of contradictory opinions as to the nature and extent of national bond.

#### 4. THE OLD AND THE NEW TESTAMENT OF NATIONAL IDEOLOGY

In the history of modern nationalism we encounter two contrasting ideologies. The first one was once represented by such writers as Mazzini, Mickiewicz, Herzen, Lamennais, Michelet: it was the ideology of the watch-words of the Spring of Nations in 1848 and the international *Tribune des Peuples* in 1849. For those people the words "nation" and "country" ("Fatherland") were closely associated with the word "freedom".

The second type of national ideology can be represented by the later writings of Treitschke, by the activity of the Pan-German League, by the *Action française* of Ch. Maurras and Maurice Barrès, by a number of movements in America continuing the traditions of the Know Nothing Party, and after World War I by Fascist writers and propagandists in Italy and other European countries from Spain to Poland and Rumania, by Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, by Nazi educational methods.

The first of these two contrasting social attitudes and social beliefs has been a product of a powerful *liberatory* current. It was first of all an ideology of the oppressed peoples, animated by revolutionary ardour. It was directed against existing governments and against feudal ruling classes. In the first half of the nineteenth century the terms "nation" and "common people" were used synonymously almost everywhere



on the European continent. In Russian there has been only one word (*narod*) for these two notions.

The other fundamental feature of this early national ideology has been the postulate of the brotherhood of nations. "Solidarity of nations against the tyranny of governments", that was the slogan. The propagators of this ideology believed that war and hatred between free nations are impossible: they believed that liberty cannot be isolated since it is the common cause of all peoples. The banners of the Polish insurrections of 1830 and 1863 were adorned with the inscription addressed to the enemy: "For our freedom and for yours." Public notes (*assignats*) issued in 1862 by the Polish Revolutionary Committee carried the signature of Mazzini as a proof of the international solidarity of peoples.

The national ideology of the second type could be considered—if we were to apply the Hegelian schema—as a synthesis of two contradictory tendencies: the old anti-national conservative state ideology and the anti-state revolutionary national ideology. It is a national state ideology. It proclaims the sovereignty of the nation and treats the state as the property, the tool, and at the same time the supreme good of the nation. Its point is directed outwards. Modern nationalists had rid themselves of the principle of the brotherhood of nations and in its place have quite openly adopted the principle of national egoism: "My country, right or wrong." The idea of national revolution against oppressing governments has been replaced by that of war against other nations. Mussolini said in one of his speeches: "Italy in the eyes of the whole world has been a country of brush, chisel, and music. As for myself, I would prefer, instead of pictures and sculptures, to have more banners conquered from the enemy."

Speaking about the "Old and the New Testament" of modern nationalism we cannot forget that the new national ideology, being a product of new economic and political conditions in the world, is nevertheless historically tied to the ideology of the former revolutionary period. In that liberal and humanitarian ideology we can find elements which later on have furnished fuel for aggressive nationalism of the Fascist kind.

The conviction that the nation is an autotelic group was a powerful force, at one time driving revolutionary patriots to struggle against all tyranny. But the same conviction could be as well a substratum of national megalomania. Fichte's *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* are perhaps the most striking example, but even the most ardent champions of the brotherhood of nations in that period have been lured by the vision of some supreme mission of their own nation.<sup>1</sup>

The history of the war started in 1792 by the French Revolution "to bring freedom" to other nations shows how the hatred of tyrants can change its course and include also those who are victims of tyranny. The words of "La Marseillaise" may be taken as a symbol—or rather an expression—of these co-existing attitudes. At the beginning we hear "Contre nous de la tyrannie"! But already two lines later appear "ces féroces soldats".

"Qui vont jusque dans nos bras  
"Égorger nos fils, nos compagnes!"

And the first strophe of this revolutionary song is closed by the exhortation: "Qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons!" And this "impure blood" is not the blood of kings or aristocrats: it is the blood of German, Slav, and Italian peasants, artisans, and workers driven by their rulers to war against revolutionary France.

Elements of primitive tribalism were not eliminated from the national attitude by the lofty humanitarian watchwords of the revolutionary ideology: on the contrary, even then they remained important factors of national cohesion. Several decades later, after having deposited in the store-room of inoffensive remembrances the old patterns of national feeling with their ideas of freedom and brotherhood of nations, under new conditions they would acquire a new role, adopt a new language, and become a powerful factor in shaping the sentiments of peoples.

<sup>1</sup> E.g.: J. Michelet, *Le Peuple*, Paris, 1846; V. Considérant, *Principes du socialisme*, Paris, 1847; G. Mazzini, *La Missione d'Italia ed altri scritti*.



## 5. NATIONAL IDEOLOGY AND CLASS IDEOLOGY

The modern concept of nation was born, as we have said, in a struggle of a social class for emancipation and for dominant position, and was closely connected with the ideology of this class. However, in the course of the next 150 years the relation of national ideology to class ideology has been changing; during that time different social classes were in turn considering themselves to be representatives and guardians of the national ideology.

In the first period the progressive bourgeoisie of Western Europe, preaching its faith in the nation as the sovereign community, considered itself representative of the whole working class. This "working class" (or "industrial class" in St. Simon's terminology) was opposed to and contrasted with the "idle class". The bourgeoisie had, nevertheless, no doubt that its national ideology was the ideology of the whole working class, or rather of the working classes in the broadest sense of the word, including workers and peasants as well as bankers and manufacturers.

In Eastern Europe and other economically backward European countries the situation was somewhat different, but in most cases the propagators of national movements considered themselves to be defenders of the interests of the oppressed classes, especially of the peasants.

The second phase of the relations between the social classes and the nation began after 1848. The Western proletariat became conscious of its class position and began to see its main enemy in the bourgeoisie with which, till that time, it had often fought under the same banners.

The breach between the national and the proletarian ideology then became final. The proletariat found its programme of struggle in the "Communist Manifesto". The watchword "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" could still be reconciled with the early liberatory national ideology which had preached the brotherhood of peoples, but this watchword was accompanied by another one: "A proletarian has no country." The hostile attitude of the proletariat toward national ideology was strengthened by the fact that in this period nationalism, with its slogan of national solidarity, had in the hands of the bourgeoisie and of the state become a powerful tool in the struggle against socialism and the labour movements. The cosmopolitan attitude of proletarians spread all over Europe. About 1880 Warynski, one of the leaders of the Polish proletariat, condemned those Polish socialists who put the struggle for Poland's independence first in their programme.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in view of the imminent war, the left-wing social democrats exhorted the proletariat of all countries not to join the army, and in each country to fight against the government. In 1915 the left-wing conference at Zimmerwald condemned the "social patriots" who had yielded to nationalist appeals and taken part in the war.

Nevertheless, since the end of the nineteenth century, certain social processes were preparing a new change in the history of the class aspect of national ideology.

- (1) The spreading of education resulted in increased participation of the peasant and worker masses in national culture, and this had probably contributed to the fact that in 1914, among the majority of European workers, Italy excepted, national solidarity proved stronger than international class solidarity.
- (2) At the same time the revolutionary wing of the proletariat, which was preparing for the seizure of power, found itself in a position analogous to that of the "tiers état" at the end of the eighteenth century. Tending to represent the interests of the vast majority of the population or even the whole community, it consequently had not only to form its own government but also to care for the entire heritage of the past, national culture included. Lenin, who had been one of the firmest leaders of the group of communists who followed Rosa Luxemburg. He defended the principle of self-determination of nations, propagated the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed nations, and wrote an essay on the national pride of the Russian people. These patriotic tendencies of the proletarian ideology grew stronger and stronger after the creation of the great proletarian state. Indeed, workers



and peasants had to defend it on battlefields against foreign invasion, as if following the example of the *sans culottes* of 1799.

If 100 years ago a proletarian had no country, now the communists emphasize the cosmopolitan character of the possessing classes and point out that now it is the capitalist who has no country and is therefore capable of speculating against the interests of the nation to which he formally belongs, and even of selling arms to its enemies during the war.

- (3) The third factor in the ideological changes discussed, is the struggle of colonial peoples for liberty. Their fight against foreign oppression is most often both a national struggle and a class struggle.

As a result of these processes we witness the revival of the old revolutionary pattern of national ideology. The cause of national freedom and national culture is closely connected with the cause of class emancipation and social justice. The feelings of solidarity of nations reappear as components in the patriotic attitude of the masses. And a French communist writer like Garaudy expects that the communist revolution in France will bring about a new Renaissance of the French national culture.

## 6. ACTUAL PROBLEMS

We have tried to analyse and compare a number of conflicting patterns of national bond, national territory, and the position of nations among other nations and other social groups. We looked for these patterns in the history of the last 150 years and, occasionally, in the much remoter past. This, however, was not for the sake of historical interest only: we hoped that our considerations would be of use for the investigation of the social reality of the post-war world, since most of these conflicting patterns have not lost actuality till the present day.

Sometimes people continue to believe that national bond is a matter of habit, sentiments, or will, and at other times they are convinced that it is inborn. Quite recently millions of people were made to believe, by propaganda and by force, that it is a question of race. We witness a recent revival, in a new form, of the old revolutionary ideology of the brotherhood of nations, and we still have before our eyes the nationalist patterns of the extreme Fascist type, which has left deep traces in the minds of the present generation in spite of conscious efforts to eradicate them. Finally, in contemporary ideological disputes we can observe the conflict of two contradictory views on relations between the class and the nation, which can be summarized in two phrases: (a) national ideology as opposed to the proletarian ideology; (b) national ideology as included in the modern proletarian ideology. Those who profess the second opinion are prone to speak rather of patriotic ideology or tendencies than of national ones, in order to avoid any association with middle class nationalism.

Instead of the awaited peace, the last war has been followed by a new division of the world into two enemy camps. And this division of the world has a *double aspect*. Is it a conflict of nations or of ideas? It seems to be a conflict of nations, as long as we identify nations with states or treat certain nations as bearers of one set of ideas and other nations as bearers of another set of ideas; as long as we look at the voting in the UN Assembly; and as long as we try to explain the existing conflict in terms of historical aspirations of certain nations and draw on the map the line dividing the two camps. But at the same time we know that the line of division is not that of state frontiers. When we read speeches delivered at international congresses for peace, when we think of two hostile international organizations of trade unions or of two hostile international organizations of youth, when we learn about the effects of class struggle in the post-war Hungary or Czechoslovakia, or about internal tension in France and in Italy, when we think of long bloody struggles in Greece and China, the same conflict appears to us to be a conflict of ideas, connected with different class interests and different visions of the future of mankind.

Such ideological wars, like old religious wars, cross state and national boundaries and can be even more violent and fierce than national wars. The civil wars in Spain, Greece, and China prove that there is an undue simplification in the statement that modern national antagonisms alone have inherited the whole vehemence of former religious wars.



## 7. SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES

The problems connected with conflicting patterns in modern national ideology, which I have tried to present in this paper, may suggest many subjects for sociological research.

1. In the last years, hundreds of millions of colonial peoples in Asia have attained national emancipation in the form of more or less independent states. Colonial peoples in Africa hope to follow this example sooner or later. The great Chinese nation has lived for several decades in a state of continuous tension and suspense, and is now going through a fundamental transformation of its social structure. How and in what measure are the formation of new nations and the transformation of the old ones influenced by European patterns? How do indigenous cultural patterns react on European patterns of national bond? It would be extremely instructive to compare, on the basis of a thorough research, the attitudes of the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa, which are now becoming nations, with the attitudes of young European nations struggling for emancipation at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
2. Another set of problems concerns first of all the European world. People who head the hostile camps and hold a power much greater than any autocrat or governing body has ever possessed in the past, are devoting great efforts to the utilization, as weapons in the present struggle, of various cultural patterns charged with emotional loads. We have plenty of opportunity to observe how they endeavour to win for their cause popular habits of thinking and feeling. It seems consequently that cultural patterns have not lost their strength even in the atomic era. And here we face the problem: how powerful is now, in various parts of the world, the idea of nation, so much exploited by both camps as an *idée force*, and how does it interfere with other powerful social ideas? How do the old patterns look under the new conditions? How do they influence the social attitudes of people who are under the pressure of the international tension on the one side and on the other side of the line are splitting the world apart?

## SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RACE RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND

E. BEAGLEHOLE

In many parts of the world the relations between people of diverse cultural backgrounds have led to those race prejudices which are so familiar to the student of the Negro problem in the United States, or to the anthropologist investigating cultural change in South Africa. Many studies have been made of the origin, growth and operation of race prejudice and of the relation between this prejudice and the biological facts of race. Sociologists are by now fairly familiar with the outlines of this problem as it has its unique variations in certain trouble areas in the world. However, cultural contact has not invariably led to the development of race prejudice and, as the recent 1949 Unesco conference of experts on Race emphasized, situations in which people of different cultural backgrounds have interacted without the development of abiding race prejudice are as deserving of study as those more spectacular situations where race prejudice has been common. From the one situation as much as from the other the social scientist may hope to learn a great deal.

New Zealand is a small country and may have few reasons to be known internationally, but the fact that it is now relatively free of race prejudice—even though two peoples of widely different cultural backgrounds met and fought each other bitterly—should make it worth while to study the development of race relations here in order to understand the reasons for the relative absence of race prejudice. This short paper



represents a preliminary outline of a situation in which more extensive sociological investigation is needed.

Anthropologists and sociologists have worked out sets of variables that may be applied to culture contact situations in order to analyse the subsequent processes of change. For the present purpose some of Keesing's variables or factors may be used,<sup>1</sup> and the course of race relations in New Zealand analysed in terms of these variables, to show how far the lack of continuing and deep-seated race prejudice may be explained as owing to the operation of these sociological factors.

1. The numerical factor. Captain Cook rediscovered New Zealand in 1769. Thereafter for 40 or more years white contact was limited to a few traders, sealers, whalers, adventurers and runaways from New South Wales who touched here and there along the coast but only occasionally tried to settle in the new country. Not until missionaries arrived at the end of 1814 and an effective mission commenced in 1823, were effective attempts made to introduce a new faith and a new civilization to the Maori people of New Zealand. Cook estimated a Maori population in 1769 of about 200,000, but with the arrival of white traders and the sale of muskets and powder this number was reduced considerably by an orgy of bloodshed and slaughter. The Maoris turned their previously rather innocuous warfare into a series of violent campaigns of conquest against tribal neighbours. In 1800 there were about 100 Europeans in the whole of New Zealand, by 1839 about 2,000. In 1841 organized emigration was commenced, so that by 1851 there were 26,707 Europeans in the country and over 100,000 Maoris. The subsequent change in the relative proportion of Europeans and Maoris resulted in the percentage of Maoris to Europeans dropping rapidly from a figure close to 100 in 1857 to 15.9 in 1874, thereafter falling more rapidly still to the lowest point of 4.69 in 1921. Since this date, owing to a more rapid increase of the Maori population as compared with the European, the Maori percentage has risen to 6.17. Not more than 50 per cent of the Maori population is now of full Maori blood. The percentage of Maoris to Europeans varies from one part of New Zealand to another: the range is from 12.14 per cent in the Auckland province to an average of 0.58 per cent for the whole of the South Island.

The natural increase-rate of the Maoris at present is about two and a half times greater than it is for Europeans. It is clear that the proportions of Maoris to Europeans will increase substantially over the next two generations, provided the results of the natural increase-rate of the two peoples are not altered materially by large-scale European emigration into New Zealand.

The influence of this numerical factor on the course of race relations in New Zealand is implicit in the data just mentioned. From about 1850 to 1860 Maoris outnumbered or were equal in numbers to the Europeans and race relations, exacerbated by Maoris. European wars just before and just after this period, were at times bitter, hostile and unhappy. After the wars of 1865 and the unlocking of Maori lands, the Maoris rapidly declined in numbers while the Europeans rapidly increased. The Maoris were no longer a threat to European supremacy. They became a kind of rural proletariat, in succeeding years race relations became more harmonious, bitterness gradually died away. With the change of direction in Maori population that occurred about 1900, and with a new development in Maori self-consciousness partly determined by population changes, race relations over the past 50 years have remained relatively harmonious and, other things being equal, will remain so; though a change is possible when the increase in Maori population results in a greater demand on the part of the Maori for an increased share in the power of the country.

2. Locality factor. When the first European settlement took place, about 100,000 Maoris were together controlling the 66 odd million acres that make up New Zealand. By purchase and other means, legal and not so legal, the European settlers gradually acquired control of large areas of this land. By 1891 the Maori had lost control of 55 million of these acres; by 1945 all that remained to him was about four and a half million acres, or 6.8 per cent of the total acreage of the country. It has been estimated that the amount of land now remaining in Maori ownership is

<sup>1</sup> See Keesing, F. M., "Some Notes on Acculturation Study", *Proceedings, Sixth Pacific Science Congress, Berkeley, 1940*, Vol. 4, pp. 59-63.



sufficient to support one quarter of the present Maori population at a reasonable standard of living. The remainder of the population must look to other types of occupation than farming for their welfare.<sup>1</sup>

Alienation of Maori lands was one very important cause of the Maori-European wars of the period 1845 to 1865. The Maori realized that he was losing his lands rapidly and he fought in desperation to retain some measure of control. He was unsuccessful. Thus race relations in the middle years of the nineteenth century were worsened by the struggles over land, and in the latter part of the century by the Maori's knowledge that they were becoming a dispossessed people. That race relations did not remain at a low ebb was owing partly to the fact that many Maori tribes had a hinterland to retire to, in which European cultural pressure had for some years little influence, and partly to a lightening of European pressure on the land as it became obvious to the European that, for the time being at least, he had enough land under his control for all immediate purposes. Finally, through the inter-operation of the numerical and the locality factors the loss of Maori land was partially offset by a decrease of Maori population, so that the Maoris of, say, 1891 probably had little objective reason for feeling frustrated and hemmed in on land that was decreasing hardly more rapidly than the population itself.

3. Migration factor. Though many Maori tribes lost during the nineteenth century substantial parts of their tribal lands, most tribes were able to remain in occupation of those lands that they owned by tradition or had conquered by their own efforts between the time of first trading contacts and effective European settlement. From time to time after the establishment of European political control, proposals and plans were advanced to set aside for sole Maori occupancy certain districts as Maori reservations; these plans were never put into effect. As a result, there was never any upheaval caused in Maori life by forcible migration to, or being hemmed in on, reservation areas. Today the concentration of the Maoris in some districts in New Zealand is largely owing to the fact that these districts still possess the greater proportion of remaining Maori lands, which may now be alienated only with the greatest difficulty. The factor of forced migration at the will of an alien invader and the consequent necessity to settle in a new habitat, which in other parts of the world have impaired race relations, have not therefore had any effective influence on New Zealand race relations.

4. "Race" factor. Both Maori and European possessed, of course, visible physical characteristics that might have become the symbols of race prejudice, had these visible marks not been submerged by other behavioural characteristics which tended to make visible marks signs of superiority rather than of inferiority. The Maori, with his brown skin colouring, heavy tattooing, tall, impressive stature, and wide face, was easily distinguishable from the pale skin-colour and dress of the European. But initial contacts between Maori and European resulted in the development of feelings of mutual respect and admiration. Both peoples learned to admire and respect the other for industriousness, intelligence, bravery, generosity, courage. Christianity, which soon took firm root among the Maori, also played a part in this mutual respect by its emphasis on the brotherhood of man and the equality of all peoples.

During the troublous times when disputes over land were at their height, the European's respect for the Maori was temporarily submerged, at least among those Europeans most anxious for land and therefore most frustrated by their inability to get ownership of land<sup>2</sup>. But this attribution of inferiority to the Maori, which became most pronounced in the middle fifties, was only a temporary aberration. British soldiers in subsequent Maori-European wars re-learned the fact that they were fighting a courageous, skilful, intelligent and humane enemy. Thus visible physical marks have become signs of respect rather than signs of inferiority, and this respect has been substantiated anew by the fighting qualities displayed by the Maoris in two world wars.

On the whole, therefore, the European has always had more respect for the Maori

<sup>1</sup> See Sutherland, I. L. G., (ed.) *The Maori People Today*, Wellington, 1940, pp. 190-91; also. Sutherland, I. L. G., "Maori and Pakeha", in Belshaw, H., (ed.), *New Zealand*, Berkeley 1947 Ch. III, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation, see Miller, H., *New Zealand*, London, 1950, p. 62.



than a feeling of superiority. This respect has made possible a very considerable and continuous intermarriage between Maoris and Europeans. The result has been a general decrease in the distribution of outstanding visible physical marks and a tendency to pay little attention to those marks that are apparent.

5. Factor of momentum. The first 50 years of race relations in New Zealand were marked by the impact of two aggressive groups upon each other. In the first part of this 50 years, the Maoris were an aggressive majority gradually coming to uneasy terms with an aggressive European minority. In the second period, the European, helped by migration, by the depopulation resulting from the severe inter-tribal Maori wars and by the impact of new diseases on the Maori, gradually became an aggressive majority, bitterly eager for land, impinging on an aggressive Maori minority equally eager to preserve its control over land and its own way of life. But aggression on both sides, as already mentioned, lead only to temporary impairment of race relations, because the aggression was almost always accompanied by feelings of respect.

After the Maoris were defeated on the battlefield and had accepted defeat, they became a passive minority, and, retiring to isolated lands, lived a life largely away from Europeans and European contact. They were passive as long as they were not interfered with. Interference often brought forth passive resistance, occasionally active temporary aggression, which, allied to messianic cults and Maori revivalist movements, between 1865 and 1868, left a trail of European and Maori dead across the countryside. Messianic and faith-healing cults, peculiar blends of Maori faith and Bible dogma, have persisted well into the present century, but new and recent stirrings among the Maori people have tended to be channelled more into social and political movements than into religion.

Varying momentum in the culture contact situation over the past 100 years has characterized the phases of the cycle of race relations. Race prejudice has been strongest when the momentum of contact has been greatest in both peoples, and has died away when momentum has slackened. The pressure of culture contact has itself been the complex result of the interaction of the numerical, locality and migration factors which in combination have given rise to economic aggression and warfare on the part of the Europeans, with reciprocal warfare and passive resistance by the Maoris. For a short period in the 'forties and early' fifties, both peoples worked together with an interlocking momentum that gave economic prosperity to both peoples and resulted in widespread economic and social progress. The integration of interests did not last and was soon broken by an economic slump and by increased European pressure on Maori lands.

6. Factor of effective contact. The initial contact "front" in New Zealand was limited to small areas and largely peopled on the European side by traders in the north, sealers and whalers in the south. All three occupational groups mixed freely and easily with the Maoris. Intermarriage was common and the children of such marriages were accorded due status by both parent groups. The missionaries, pursuing their calling throughout the land, also mixed freely with the Maoris, but intermarriage was rare. Later-coming settlers and after them soldiers mixed freely. The contact front widened considerably with each new move of settlers, many of whom took Maori wives, and apart from periods of warfare and subsequent Maori passive resistance, free mingling of the two peoples has been the rule rather than the exception. Intermarriage has tended to take place somewhat frequently between European men and Maori women. It is less common between European women and Maori men, partly because more men than women came to New Zealand as settlers, and partly because, in more recent times, the Maoris have tended to overweight the lowest socio-economic strata and, therefore, Maori men have found relatively few European women of their own socio-economic class to marry.

Persons of mixed blood have not been subjected to any social or economic disability, nor to any social prejudice. They have been able to choose to live with, and as, Maoris and thus think of themselves as Maoris, or else to move away from Maori villages and live as Europeans. Or again, they have been able to move freely back and forwards between the two cultures.

7. Factor of prestige. Although the Maoris tended to value highly the technical resources and the Christian spiritual values of the missionaries, they did not learn



to think that all their own values and ways of life were, by comparison, inferior or contemptible. Nor did they come to think of the Europeans as being superior socially and themselves an inferior people. What of their own culture they found inferior they dropped, for instance cannibalism and polygamy, but what they found satisfactory they clung to, for instance, tribal or group ownership of land, their own language, arts and crafts and some forms of social organization. Thus in measuring themselves and their culture against that of the European, they found themselves the equal of the European. Race relations, then, tended to be built on the assumption made by both Maori and European that as people each were equal and their cultures, though different, were suited to equal though different peoples.

Today the Maori still tends to find his own culture—a blend of European technology, Christian religion, Maori social forms, loyalties and value-systems—more satisfying and therefore more highly valued than New Zealand European culture with its characteristic value-systems.

8. Factor of compatibility. That there was a common cultural meeting ground between Maori and European from the beginnings of European contact onwards is shown by the way in which the Maori learned new religious rituals and theology; learned, too, new arts of trade, agriculture, and refined his own art of war. His status system with its complicated mixture of ascribed and achieved statuses was not unlike some aspects of the status system of the European settlers. Both peoples therefore had a fairly common ground of understanding and compatibility, specially after the Maori had made adjustments in the technological and religious aspects of his culture. However much the European might at times find the Maori hard to understand, and however often the Maori might be puzzled by what were to him clear discrepancies between European profession and practice (hardly recognized as such by the empirical Englishmen of the day), nonetheless the Maori did not generally find the values of European society uncongenial.

Finding many convenient and satisfying values in the European way of life, and living himself in a culture that was adaptable to change rather than rigidly resistant to change in its values and structure, the Maori was able to meet European pressure by conforming to the demands of a European spiritual and economic life. It was only after defeat on the battlefield with a consequent loss of land and, to a degree, of self respect and prestige, that the Maori retired for many years into himself, resisting further changes, magnifying a golden age in the past and becoming a psychologically disorganized people.

Today there exists among the Maori people a consciously fostered movement, the aim of which seems to be a revival of the prestige of Maori culture: specifically of Maori arts and crafts, some aspects of Maori social organization and a somewhat nationalistic spirit of Maori independence. The implicit purpose of the movement is a protest against the idea that the future of the Maori lies in a complete submergence in, and assimilation to, New Zealand culture. Whether the movement represents no more than a temporary halting on the path that leads to assimilation or whether it represents a genuine and permanent attempt to stabilize Maori culture so that in future two peoples will live side by side, not becoming one people, is at the moment hard to tell. The European however seems prepared to watch sympathetically and will, one suspects, try to carry out whatever collective decision the Maori, in his wisdom, feels it necessary to make. The decision itself will determine how far further compatibility is discovered by the Maori in a European way of life or how far, on the other hand, the limits of congruence have been reached.

Race attitudes in New Zealand today are not a simple resultant of the operation of one single sociological or psychological factor. A number of sociological variables have been functioning during 100 years or more of contact between the two peoples. At particular periods now one, now another variable may be singled out for detailed study because it may seem to hold the key to a particular period. Today, with Maori and European both history-conscious, race attitudes are a rather delicate precipitate of sociological factors acting inter-relatedly through a long period of dynamically changing withdrawals and meetings between the two peoples.

The precipitate itself is probably unstable. Comparing New Zealand with South Africa, race relations in New Zealand appear today uniformly harmonious. Shifting



focus and studying the New Zealand situation in close detail, one is conscious of a continually shifting balance of social and psychological forces which seems to determine temporary variations for better and for worse in the reciprocal attitudes of the two peoples. On the whole, the European attitude, based on its reading of history, is a compound of guilt and pride: pride in the Maoris because of the courageous resistance they offered in the past to European aggression; guilt for injustices done the Maori in the desperate attempt to unlock Maori lands for European settlement. The Maori attitude is also one of pride: pride in the aggressive resistance of tribal forefathers. In addition there appears to be a quiet determination to improve the Maori social, economic and political position while European sympathy is so apparent and so genuine.

Whether the future of New Zealand is to lie in the hands of one people or of two, the outlook is not unpromising. Probably the majority of New Zealanders would both like and expect to see even greater equality between Maori and European; probably the majority of them do not think of the world as basically hazardous, evil and dangerous—therefore scape-goatism and projected hostilities are likely to be relatively insignificant psychological factors influencing the course of race attitudes.<sup>1</sup> Knowledge that historically functioning variables such as these have determined present practices helps us to predict the immediate future. The prediction may be more in the nature of an informed guess than of a scientifically validated prediction. But where sociology is able to make even informed guesses, progress has been achieved over previous methods of guessing on the basis of ignorance, prejudice or wishful thinking.

## RESEARCH ON THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ADAPTATION OF IMMIGRANTS

S. N. EISENSTADT

This project is intended, in the first instance, to provide a preliminary framework for discussion of the problem. Although it is derived from our research on adaptation of immigrants in Israel, it is designed so as to be adaptable to conditions in different countries. It is, thus, not limited to the circumstances of any country, but could be a basis for co-operative research in different places. There are two aspects to the study, one concerned with continuous fieldwork and systematic observations in a variety of contemporary settings, and the other concerned with comparative historical material.

It seems best to begin by developing a widely applicable set of indices for measuring the adaptation of immigrants. These proposed indices are based on a broad definition of "adaptation" as the effective capacity to perform successfully those social roles inherent in the social structure of the new country which circumstances require of them. The use of the two words "effective" and "capacity" is made here in order to indicate the two main determinants of adaptation, namely the immigrants' own predisposition to perform the new roles and the possibilities extended to them by the new social structure. If this definition be accepted, then the set of indices would include: (a) clear indications of the degree of performance of these roles, and (b) various basic manifestations which impede this performance and are clear indications of unsuccessful performance.

The following criteria will provide a basis for the requisite indices:

- (1) The extent of stable relations with the "old" inhabitants and participation in existing social organizations and associations. We shall clearly need an accurate

<sup>1</sup> The problem is more complicated, of course, than the text summary would suggest. For a more detailed analysis of current race attitudes from a sociopsychological viewpoint, see Beaglehole, E. and P., *Some Modern Maoris*, New Zealand Council for Educational Research, 1946, pp. 55-62, 298-321.



account of the immigrants' various social relations—at work, in leisure-time activities, informal friendships, etc.

The first criterion would include two main aspects of immigrants' social relations: (a) their composition—the degree of participation of "old" inhabitants, and (b) their duration and stability.

It should also take into account the immigrants' participation in existing social organizations. Here further subsidiary aspects may be studied: (a) where the immigrants are freely participating in existing organizations and associations, or (b) where existing types of associations are multiplied among the immigrants with or without some degree of participation by "old" inhabitants, or (c) where new types of associations are evolved in which "old" and "new" are participating, and (d) where immigrants maintain their own associations which are not moulded according to the types existing in the new country. (See 5 below.)

- (2) The extent of successful performance of the roles inherent in the new social structure, for example, in occupation and civic life and, in particular, the comparative degree of knowledge of the new language.
- (3) The extent of deviant behaviour—juvenile delinquency, crime, alcoholism, etc.
- (4) The extent of personal and group aggression, including various manifestations of aggression towards the new social structure. They may be either of an individual character or be organized in different degrees in the form of physical or verbal aggression, demonstration, etc. We may classify them according to the contents of the complaints expressed in them and according to the various images and symbols of the new country in them.
- (5) The extent of social segregation of the immigrants, either voluntary or enforced. This is closely related to (1) above. Special attention would be paid here to the development and maintenance of various symbols of group identification—identification relating to the immigrant group and the new country.

Throughout the study a differentiation should be made between different age-groups, specially between adults, adolescents and children, as their powers of adaptation might considerably vary. Among children special attention would be paid to "groups", "gangs", etc., and among adolescents also to heterosexual relations leading up to courtship and marriage.

These seem to be the main criteria of the degree of adaptability. Here they are set out only in the most general way. The various specific details would be worked out according to local circumstances.

The next step is the analysis of various conditions under which different degrees of adaptation take place. Such analysis should be based on a general framework of propositions and hypotheses. While the specific hypotheses should be stated during the actual execution of the research, a general framework is essential from the beginning. The basic, most general proposition is that "the degree of adaptation is determined by the relation between the immigrants' levels of aspiration and the degree of their realizability in the new setting". This proposition assumes that the main factors determining the degree of adaptation are: (a) the social and psychological structure of the immigrants; (b) the socio-psychological structure of the new country and the relations between (a) and (b).

These relations have, of course, to be specified in greater detail, as economic, political, cultural, etc.

- (1) Economic. Three main types of relations may be distinguished here:
  - (a) A high level of aspiration with small possibilities of realization. These may be due to different conditions such as a very high ratio of immigrants in relation to the old inhabitants, with no corresponding ratio of expansion of the economic system; or a small number of open, unoccupied roles at the aspired level and an enforced lowering of the level of occupation and income; or a low degree of predisposition to occupational transformation and change among the immigrants, with consequent "freezing" of the level of aspiration; or social and cultural barriers and small degree of identification between the old inhabitants and the immigrants, with a high degree of monopolization of strategic power roles and institutions.
  - (b) Compatibility between the levels of aspiration and the possibilities of their



realization. The existence of this compatibility is correlated with an expanding economic system with a continuous extension and opening of new roles and with a great dependence on new manpower, or a high degree of predisposition to occupational change among the immigrants and a high degree of mutual identification between the immigrants and the old inhabitants.

- (c) An economic system which *compels* the immigrants to try to achieve roles either higher than their levels of aspiration or incompatible with their own abilities. This "compulsion" may be due to the following conditions: a low, fixed level of aspiration which it is impossible to maintain in a different type of economic structure, e.g. the transplantation of peasant communities into an industrial setting, or to a high level of aspiration which is not realizable owing to the lack of psychological and social abilities among the immigrants to perform their new roles.
- (2) Political and cultural. The main configurations here are more or less similar to those classified under "economic" and may be focussed on the following points:
  - (a) The degree of formal political equality granted to the immigrants and their importance as supporters of the holders of political power and those competing for it.
  - (b) The degree of mutual social and cultural identification and acceptance. Here the possibility of establishing mutual primary, informal relations and groups is of great importance.
  - (c) The degree of force prevailing in the structural relation between the immigrants and the old inhabitants.

The foregoing assumes that the degree of initial cultural and social similarity and/or mutual identification between the immigrants and the old inhabitants are of crucial importance for adaptation. This becomes most evident when the degree of similarity is very small. In such cases the immigrants' predisposition to change and accept the new roles becomes a major determinant of the degree of adaptation.

Among the various factors determining predisposition to change, the following would appear to be important: firstly, the degree of social and psychological insecurity which has caused the immigration (tentatively it may be suggested that the greater the level of insecurity, the smaller the predisposition to change and the higher the clinging to the "old" ways as symbols of security); secondly, the social and demographic structuring of the immigration process—marital status, individual or group immigration (immigration of families, whole neighbourhoods, etc.)

In the case of a high level of security the breaking up of "old" social relations may enhance the predisposition to change, while in the case of a low level of security such a breaking up may lower the level even more and consequently also the predisposition to change.

Thirdly, the immigrants' basic social orientation—whether it is centred on the new or old country. It is centred on the old country when immigration is just a temporary expedient for improving the conditions in the "old" country. Various degrees of such orientation may be discerned in different situations.

These seem to be the factors whose interactions determine different types and degrees of adaptation of immigrants.

On the basis of these preliminary propositions more definite hypotheses would be evolved, according to the different stages and places of research. Each hypothesis would try to formulate the conditions obtaining in different countries, under which any definite type and degree of adaptation takes place.

A set of such specific tentative hypotheses has been evolved in our research project on the adaptation of immigrants in Israel, and they are given here as one example of more specific derivations from our general propositions. These hypotheses have been generally substantiated by subsequent research.<sup>1</sup>

- (1) The degree of adaptability is positively related to the development of new primary groups in which the immigration takes place, which are positively oriented towards

<sup>1</sup> The hypotheses outlined here served as a starting point of the research on adaptation of immigrants in Israel. Throughout the execution of the research, these hypotheses were modified and elaborated and a detailed analysis of the results will be published separately. Here only the basic framework is given.



the new country and which provide a high degree of social and psychological security for the immigrants. The degree of adaptability is smaller whenever the immigration takes place in pre-existing primary groups and is inversely related to an initial level of insecurity among the immigrants. The predisposition to change among the immigrants is highest in the first case and lowest in the second. So, for example, membership in Zionist youth-movements, "pioneers" groups, etc., makes for a high predisposition to change, and adaptability, while ex-DP camp inmates show the lowest degree of adaptability.

- (2) Immigration in the pre-existing social groups conduces to relatively high adaptability when the levels of aspiration are low and there exists a possibility of continuation of the old occupational structure in the new country. (For instance, among some of the unskilled labourers or artisans of Oriental Jewry, among villagers, etc.)
- (3) When only the first of these conditions exists we may witness a high degree of personal and social disorganization—juvenile delinquency, crime, etc., and very poor performance of social roles, occupational instability, poor school performances, little participation in social activities, unstable relations, etc.
- (4) Immigration in the pre-existing social groups connected with a high level of aspiration conduces to relatively high adaptation when: (a) there exist appropriate economic possibilities; (b) there exist a high degree of initial social and cultural similarity between the old and new immigrants, and (c) when there exist a mutual identification with a high degree of social interpenetration.
- (5) When these three conditions (or some of them) are lacking, then a high degree of inter-group tension, aggressiveness and self-segregation develops.
- (6) A high degree of adaptation is closely correlated with an appropriate expansion of the institutional and organizational structure of the "old society". New schools, municipal councils, medical services, etc., which are adequately staffed—constitute a necessary condition of successful adaptation. They are not, however, sufficient. The following conditions are necessary for a successful adaptation:
  - (a) Less emphasis on formal-institutional behaviour on the part of the "old inhabitants" performing various roles in these institutions, and a more free, personal-primary attitude towards the new immigrants.
  - (b) The *practising* of social and institutional equality towards the new immigrants in the distribution of rights and duties within the institutions and in maintaining social relations with them outside the organizations.
  - (c) The elevation of new immigrants to the positions of responsibility and power within these institutions and full participation in decisions and policy-making.
- (7) The degree of institutional adaptation is inversely related to a "traditional" (non-rational) social and cultural structure of the immigrants. The negative effects may be overcome if the institutions act through pre-existing social groups and relations.

Our research has shown that these propositions can be operationally tested and defined. It is assumed that all these factors can also be recorded and classified through observations, interviews, statistical data, etc., stemming from different cultural milieus. In each country the first step in every such research would be a statistical inventory of the community under study and a survey of the prevailing social, economic and cultural structure.

The next step would be to evolve and compare or reformulate the various techniques. A common operational and observational language has to be developed for the following set of problems which constitute a "condensed" list of categories based on our previous analyses:

- (1) Number of immigrants, age-composition, family structure.
- (2) Occupational and economic status in the "old" and the new country.
- (3) National, ethnic and religious composition.
- (4) The principal types of social structure and relations in the old and the new countries.
- (5) The main cultural goals and symbols in the old and new countries.
- (6) Educational level.
- (7) The causes of immigration.



- (8) The aims of the immigrants.
- (8) Their hopes and aspirations in the new country.
- (9) The "image" they had of the new country and its relation to reality.
- (10) The main cultural goals and symbols in the old and new countries.

# THE EFFECT OF MIGRATIONS ON CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE CASE OF SWITZERLAND

J.-M. LECHNER

## PRELIMINARY REMARK

In order to facilitate the study of this subject, we have chosen a method advocated by Auguste Comte—that of "anatomical" analysis—and we shall follow it up with a "physiological" description.

Even though this sociological method is well suited to the study of our particular theme, we do not claim that it is applicable in all cases. The plan we have adopted makes it possible to observe, in actual motion, a development of which many Swiss themselves are not aware. The Zürich Congress of Sociology may perhaps find it interesting to consider a Swiss problem that Europe cannot ignore.

## 1. ANATOMY

### 1. *Cultural and Demographic Data*

For several years Switzerland has been a cause of great surprise. How can a nation composed of French-, German-, Italian- and Romansch-speaking people of Protestants and Catholics, of peasants, workmen, artisans, tradesmen and industrialists, succeed in preserving its internal stability whilst the whole of Europe is shaken by wars of religious, cultural or social origin? Superficial observers might attribute Swiss composure to a special kind of mental superiority which keeps the citizens and authorities aloof from European conflicts. From afar, it is easy to imagine Switzerland as a country governed by people devoted to the cause of a Swiss "inter-cantonal", official culture. Fortunately, nothing of the kind has occurred. Swiss calmness is that of a microcosm which is peculiarly stirred by various powerful currents.

Economic laws, and technology, have caused a general increase in the population and have concentrated it in certain parts of the country. This growth and movement of the population took place at an irregular rate between 1850 and 1941.<sup>1</sup> The cantons of Zürich and Basle-City have, demographically speaking, grown steadily; the population of the former has trebled, while that of the latter has increased six-fold. That of the Geneva canton, owing to a steady rise between 1850 and 1920 and despite the economic crisis which lasted from 1920 to 1941, is, in 1950, three times greater than it was in 1850.

In the light of these figures one can visualize the somewhat uneasy atmosphere in which the contact of the three great European cultures took place in Switzerland. It is possible accurately to follow migratory movements in Switzerland, thanks to the *droit d'origine*. Every Swiss citizen belongs to a *commune*; he has a cantonal

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mr. Charles Bruschweiler's substantial booklet *The Evolution of the Population and Alterations in its Composition according to Basic Groups in the Cantons, from 1850 to 1941*, Berne, 1949.



tonal and a federal status. The *droit d'origine* can never be lost; the registers of the *commune* of origin contain full information as to those belonging to it (subsequent domiciles, family status, death). The *droit d'origine* is hereditary from one generation to another, with no limit as to time, and irrespective of domicile. International migration has resulted in almost 500 Swiss having left their place of origin, for every 1,000 who have remained in it.

If we were to look at the problem in the opposite way, we should find that in 1950, for every 1,000 natives of Geneva residing in that town, there were 1,540 Swiss from other cantons, i.e. almost seven times as many as in 1850. The cantons of Thurgau, Basle, Zürich as well as Neuchâtel, Schaffhausen and Solothurn also have a strong attraction for the other inhabitants of the country.

## 2. Legal Data

The Federal Constitution of 1848 amended, in part, the right of domicile. Any citizen, whatever his canton or *commune* of origin, was given the right to settle wherever he wished in Switzerland. Moreover, while guaranteeing other individual rights, the Constitution allowed all citizens to ply their trade in any part of the Confederation. On the other hand, the *communes* and cantons lost the right they once possessed to admit whom they liked to their territories. However, while freedom of domicile has found its place in the Constitution, the basic principle of "assistance" still reflects the decisions of the early Federal Diets of the fifteenth century: the *commune* of origin must assist its natives, wherever they may be. The rigidity of this rule has, nevertheless, since been lessened in several ways. Thus the principle of the "place of origin" has been superseded by that of the "place of residence", under an inter-cantonal agreement to which 14 cantons of eastern Switzerland (including Zürich, Basle, Berne, Lucerne, Grisons and Ticino) and one French-speaking canton, Neuchâtel, are parties. The other French-speaking cantons, which unlike Neuchâtel, have among their population more immigrants from other parts of Switzerland than natives, did not participate in the agreement.

A canton which refuses to assist those of its needy natives that reside outside it must agree to their repatriation. The right of domicile, therefore, is subject to certain restrictions. Hence the general principles underlying the freedom of "coming and going"—to use an expression coined by French constituents—and the right to settle conflict to some extent with cantonal and communal sovereignty. Internal migration in Switzerland can only be understood if the two factors are borne in mind.

## 3. Moral Data

Imaginative persons might think that Switzerland was a melting pot in which different civilizations mixed and deduce that this cultural blend would one day produce a new civilization quite unlike the original ones. We think it difficult to accept such a conclusion.

The different civilizations pervading the cantons are well defined entities that adhere, so far as possible, to their own language and religion. The *communes* generally appoint the local schoolmaster, preferably from among their own citizens. Public education is exclusively a cantonal affair, and the Confederation's role is confined to maintaining and administering the Federal Polytechnical School at Zürich. The cantonal authorities are, therefore, quite free to decide on the language or languages, the form (lay or religious) and the organization of the different levels of education. The result is not an "interpenetration" of cultures, but a "juxtaposition" of separate cultural and religious entities, which preserves the purity and vitality of traditional intellectual characteristics, literary and artistic expression and local custom. It does not exclude cantonal collaboration in certain fields, like the moral, intellectual and manual re-education of delinquent or potentially delinquent youth.

Science brings together, within national associations, the research workers of the various Swiss faculties, higher schools and universities. The press, the film and the radio are effective means of communication and help to harmonize the various tendencies of Swiss public opinion.



#### 4. *Economic Data*

We can give here only a brief outline of the natural factors of Swiss economy. The Jura region, whose soil is chalky and permeable while its climate is mainly continental, is not well adapted to agriculture. The plateau is very uneven and has varying economic potentialities, of which, however, the local peasants make excellent use. The Alps, divided into regions radiating around the St. Gothard, comprise large areas which, though totally unproductive, have provided a fertile ground for the national genius.

Although separated by their origins and cultures, the Swiss are united in their efforts to exploit the soil and natural resources of their country (tourism, water-power) and to turn to good account the different activities in which they excel (food industries, precision metallurgy, watch-making, banking and insurance). The various populations, in which there are so many conflicting elements, have succeeded in forgetting what divides them. Necessity has forced them to unite in order to acquire foreign markets and to maintain, along with sound public finance, the country's credit and political independence, which are close to the heart of every canton. The cantons keenly felt their economic weakness at the beginning of the last century and were compelled to allow the Confederation—in order of importance—to unify civil, penal and contract law, to run the postal and telegraph services and the railways, and to organize national defence, customs and external relations.

A certain number of matters, however—legal procedure, the police, education and relief—remain outside the control of the Federal authorities. And while the need to safeguard the country's actual existence has obliged each of its parts to contract a marriage of convenience with the Confederation, the heart has not lost all its rights in that union.

## II. PHYSIOLOGY

### 1. *Historical Data*

An analysis of facts and figures does not absolve us from a reference to history. The history of periods of war or peace is written by nations which either hate one another or, on the contrary, try to achieve mutual understanding. In the latter case, how do peoples belonging to different civilizations receive each others' emigrants? The Swiss cantons have always tried to keep their traditional cultural values intact. There is an example. As early as the thirteenth century, wars provoked, in areas adjacent to Switzerland, sporadic migrations of very poor peasant populations which lived on begging and looting. The frontier cantons of the old Confederation had to organize a special police force, known as *Betteljäger* or beggar-hunters, to cope with these undesirables. Thus, as in the great battles in which the Confederates distinguished themselves, the old Confederation protected both its integrity and its existence. Again, during the Thirty Years' War which devastated Central Europe, the cantons provided sanctuary for refugees, in limited numbers; the barrenness of the soil and the primitive state of their incipient industrial economy did not allow them to admit "drones" whose presence would have imperilled their stability. The artisans and merchants with assured prospects were able to settle not only in Basle, Zürich and—to a certain extent—in Berne, but more especially in Neuchâtel and Geneva, which were allied to the cantons. In fact, Geneva owes its prosperity—which is amazing if one considers its geographical position and the smallness of its area—to its generous hospitality to Protestant exiles from all over the world.

From the cultural point of view, the original Switzerland was a Confederation of distinctly Germanic states. Its official language was South German. The 13 Alemannic cantons had, even in the eighteenth century, some subject districts. Sometimes, the town aristocracies or oligarchies ruled by divine right over the rural populations. The subjects, however cultured they might be, took no part in government, which remained a privilege of certain families. Thus, in old Switzerland, the French or Italian-speaking territories (Vaud, the Freiburg *bailliages*, the *dizains* (districts) of



the Lower Valais, or the Ticino) were generally "subject provinces", and their natives remained subjects, wherever in the country they settled. For that reason, emigrants mostly sought to settle on the periphery of Swiss territory. A large number of Confederate craftsmen came to live in Geneva in the years immediately before and after the Reformation (1536). They remained there, although the status of citizen was a privilege it was increasingly difficult to acquire.

The revolutionary storm at the end of the eighteenth century, and the French occupation, resulted in an artificial, centralized State, the Swiss Republic, where all citizens enjoyed equal rights. This situation did not last; the Act of Mediation revived the cantons, though not all the old inequalities.

The triumph of radicalism in 1848 led, among other things, to the proclamation of freedom of movement and residence. Internal migration then assumed fresh importance and significance. From 1800 onwards, the introduction of mechanical spinning and weaving and the building of machinery led many people to move to country areas where water-power was available. After 1848, however, the population drifted towards the towns, and so the earlier balance was completely destroyed.

Movements of population in Switzerland seem to follow a general pattern that is found in Europe as a whole. Populations in the North-East move gradually towards the South-West, while migration in the opposite direction is extremely rare. The German Swiss are attracted to French Switzerland and are quite glad to settle there.

## 2. *Assimilation of Migrants*

We will take, as our examples, French Switzerland and Italian Switzerland. The Cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud and Freiburg receive a large number of immigrants from Berne, who constitute between 40 and 55 per cent of the Confederate population in those three cantons. Valais and Geneva also receive a fair proportion (24 to 22 per cent). Of the 13,600 Swiss domiciled in the Ticino, 17.2 per cent are from Berne and 16 per cent from Zürich. The Bernese are not the only German Swiss to settle in French Switzerland. In Geneva, for example, the number of people whose culture is not the local culture is estimated to be as high as 30,000-40,000. In certain districts of Vaud, so much real estate has been bought by German Swiss that there are whole villages where French is no longer spoken. In the Ticino, the authorities have been obliged to prohibit posters and signs in German.

The problem is more serious in Geneva, Neuchâtel and the Ticino, and in the Canton of Vaud, than it is in Freiburg, the Valais or Berne, which are bilingual cantons. Schools in the Latin cantons have always continued to teach in French or Italian and to implant in the population a single culture again either French or Italian, despite the representations of new arrivals. Hence in towns like Geneva, Lausanne or Neuchâtel immigrants are completely assimilated after two generations, if not after the first. Owing to the use of French in schools, which often imposes a very hard task on the teachers, the immigrants come to forget their mother tongue. But the Cantonal authorities do endeavour, by using the most modern and effective methods, to preserve the rich cultural heritage of the various parts of the country. And people from Berne or Lucerne, who are residents in French Switzerland of two or three generations' standing, are constantly heard to refer proudly to their native town or village, although they no longer remember any *Schwyzerdütsch*.

## 3. *Naturalization*

Some cantons have "naturalized" large numbers of citizens who have been living on their territory for many years. Basle-City, for instance, increased the number of its citizens in this way by 100 per cent between 1910 and 1941. Geneva has not adopted the same policy, and the number of its inhabitants has increased by only 30 per cent. Sociologists seeking an explanation will note that "family disintegration" is very widespread in Geneva. It is due to the fact that a large proportion of the population has almost no common religion or culture and is ill-adapted to the economic fluctuations and moral influences of a big town that is French in culture. That is why it is more difficult in Geneva than in Basle to bestow citizenship (which provides new citizens



with a definite status) upon large numbers of people. It should be noted in this connexion that cantonal naturalization does not involve loss of citizenship in the previous place of origin. One may accordingly meet a person who is simultaneously a citizen of Brunnen (Schwyz), Thun (Berne) and Satigny (Geneva).

#### 4. *Juxtaposition of Cultures*

This double or triple nationality is the most typical feature of Swiss "culture". The three civilizations live peacefully side by side, without obstructing or opposing one another. They maintain their original characteristics, but without any desire for territorial gain. Their geographical frontiers are clearly marked. Each *commune* sees to its own existence and, when the language spoken by the majority changes, the Canton remains the last bastion for the defence, through education, of its original culture.

In Switzerland, the soil is poor, the country is mountainous and places are sometimes impossible to reach. Poverty lurks outside every door and the Swiss have always fought against it, forgetting their disagreements and striving for economic union. In former times, the rulers of the country found the diversity of cultures and religions no less an obstacle than the poverty of, and lack of uniformity in, the soil. The various cantons have exerted great efforts to make a success of the "marriage of convenience", from the point of view not only of material but also of moral resources. The authorities have not tried to conjure up new and artificial products which could have been used by propaganda to create a new "Swiss culture". It was not necessary. The cantons have enough in common, if only their desire for independence and thirst for freedom, for strong "family ties", consistent with the spirit of the Confederation, to be formed between the most outstanding representatives of intellectual and artistic circles.

The names of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Pestalozzi suffice to show that the ideal of altruism has always thrived in Switzerland. That is why Henry Dunant aroused so sympathetic a response throughout the country when he founded the Red Cross. A common inheritance links the various cantons together—a love of the same places, the legend of William Tell, the story of the Grütli oath, and battles fought for the country's independence. These legends or historical events—portrayed by painters, dramatized by authors of *Festspiels*, and brought to life by folksongs—form a patriotic and spiritual heritage that is closely guarded in the heart of every citizen. Moreover, the literature of French Switzerland, which is impregnated with the moral theme and the puritan influence of Calvin, Bèze, Vinet and Amiel and owes so much to Zwingli and Gotthelf, has become accessible to German Swiss through good translations. We may mention, here, the name of Ramuz. In the same way, the French Swiss have access to German-Swiss literature.

No racial conflict, therefore—and it might have been a sharp one—has arisen, thanks to the mutual understanding and good will of the various leaders. This does not mean, however, that every type of artistic work is accepted blindly. We shall not mention the works or names of Swiss artists that are beloved throughout the country. Their name is legion, and we should merely tire our readers, who know them well enough. For more than 600 years now, the Confederation has been a reality that extends far beyond the sphere of literature, music and the visual arts. A good definition is that of the musicologist and folksong expert, Paul Budry, who said: "Switzerland is a geographical accident, which the Swiss have transformed into a moral stronghold and, indeed, a mystic force."<sup>1</sup>

### III. CONCLUSIONS

To terminate this brief outline, we would stress certain facts demonstrated by the experience of Switzerland: (a) the geographical immutability of different cultural

<sup>1</sup> "La Suisse qui chante" (Songs of Switzerland). *Illustrated History of the Folksong, Choral Singing and the Festspiel in Switzerland*. Lausanne, 1932, p. 9.



regions; (b) the advantage of full freedom of internal migration (except where social welfare is concerned), which has obtained for a hundred years; (c) the gradual nature of such migration, which rarely takes place suddenly; (d) the high degree of assimilation, in the immigrants' new home.

In addition to these four basic factors, there are other positive psychological and social ones—the memory of common struggles against the same external dangers; common residence in a country held together by very strong economic ties; mutual respect for historical, moral and religious values which transcend any single civilization; and the common ideal of individual freedom.

The Swiss experiment is not perfect, and although it has now lasted for more than 650 years, it is still unfinished. Can the experiment one day be turned to account for the rest of Europe, ravaged as it is by war and hatred between the nations? We hope so, but are not sanguine. The first lesson to be learned from Swiss experience is that any international committee appointed to consider, at a European level, the problems we have faced must be filled with a true sense of humility. It would be necessary to make a more thorough study of the process of European migration, of the obstacles to freedom of movement and residence, of the assimilation of migrants, and of the psychological and material conditions essential to assimilation.

Swiss experience shows that only the ideal of altruism excluding all personal or national ambition, can strengthen the bonds between nations. The spirit of any individual culture can only truly enrich a country if it guides it towards the ideal of international collaboration. It has been Switzerland's aim for many years to put that ideal into practice, both among its own cantons and, on a very modest scale, in its relations with its powerful neighbours.

From these few pages, written in haste on a very complex subject, two conclusions can be drawn: (a) involuntarily, Switzerland has solved what may be called today "the problem of internal migration" through that very liberal measure, freedom of movement and residence, which in its turn is qualified by a somewhat illiberal measure relating to the repatriation of destitute persons; (b) the cantons in which immigrants settle have preserved their own culture, owing to the power of assimilation exercised by the centres that attract the immigrants.

We will now attempt to draw a rough, general comparison between the situation in Switzerland and that in Europe.

First of all, we will take the similarities.

- (1) Europe is a group of States, cultures and customs that easily come into conflict with each other.
- (2) The standard of living in the different States is not the same, nor have they all the same love of work; hence, costs of production vary from North to South.

We will now take the dissimilarities.

- (1) Economic union, the abolition of customs barriers and right to freedom of movement and residence are not characteristic of the European States in the way that they are of the Swiss cantons. Although some States have a small population while others are over-populated, there is no compensatory migration process between them.
- (2) There are more sovereign States in Europe than there are independent units in Switzerland. Assimilation is a more difficult process in a large country with a population which fails to understand newcomers and either stiffens against them or receives them with passive weakness. In either case, there is no natural assimilation, and the result is a number of irredentist minorities.
- (3) There has been no freedom of movement and residence in Europe for 36 years. Artificial economic and customs barriers have resulted first in disagreements and then in murderous wars. As a consequence of these wars, displaced persons have been added to the number of voluntary emigrants. Thus Europe, in its slow evolution towards unity, is suddenly faced with a vast complication with which Switzerland has never had to deal.
- (4) Unlike the Swiss cantons, the States of Europe are not bound together by a common past; except by the humanists, they have never been made to feel any real unity. Although moral unity in Europe can come about only through a sustained effort of will, the political discord between European States and the semi-chaotic condition of their general economic relations prevents them from trying the basic Swiss



experiment which has been successful since 1848—the introduction of a single currency, a customs union and a single system of communications.

- (5) Although certain values are dear to all Europeans, and literary and artistic treasures have accumulated on our peninsula, no European spirit seems to have emerged sufficiently strong to make the nations set aside their sterile differences and really feel the desire and need for a true European Federation. In this connexion, the great national associations of students and teachers, the workers' and employers' unions, and the economic and utility associations might organize exchanges, courses or joint meetings with a view to inspiring, through constant and repeated personal contacts, that spirit of confidence which must prevail before any grave decisions are taken. There are not enough of such contacts in Europe and the various national associations do not seem very keen to collaborate. Such few favourable signs as have appeared cannot in any way be compared with the enthusiasm shown a century ago by the student associations and gymnastic, choral or shooting societies in the Swiss cantons, or by the members of the New Swiss Society. The Switzerland of 1848 was the product of a great spontaneous movement that swept away the objections even of those who held most firmly to the idea of cantonal sovereignty.

If a united Europe emerged today, it would be the result more of the secret efforts of politicians than of the strong and open determination of all the peoples to come together. Europe is still only a "geographical" reality. It inspires no real devotion. The sovereign States of Europe are concerned more with playing a subtle and dangerous political game than with achieving something solid, based on honesty and integrity.

## THE SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN FINLAND

HEIKKI WARIS and VIENO JYRKILÄ

A problem as timely as that of the displaced people of the post-war world could be presented from several points of view—from the political, welfare or the administrative angle. The approach of this paper is purely sociological, with particular emphasis on the stages of adjustment of the displaced people in their new environments. Also presented are some of the methodological problems encountered in field studies which have engaged the attention of the authors since 1948.

It seems appropriate to start with some general definitions before proceeding to the more specific Finnish problems. Distinction must first be made between the three different categories of human migrants, viz the refugee, the displaced person, and the emigrant. A refugee is a person whose migration has been compulsory and whose destination is another country. He usually shares his fate with a large group of other migrants. Some refugees may intend to return to their home country; others, to stay in their new domiciles. A displaced person is one whose migration, either compulsory or partly voluntary, has taken place within his own country. The experience is usually common to a large group of people. Some of the displaced people intend, if possible, to return. Others may decide to remain in their new homes. The difference between the refugee and the DP is slight. The former moves to a foreign country: the latter, within his own country. The emigrant stands in strong contrast to these two. His emigration is voluntary. It may be an individual move or in the company of very small groups. It is characterized by an intention to stay in the country of destination which is, invariably, a foreign country.

There are no sharp dividing lines between these three types of migrants. In fact, there is considerable overlapping as, e.g., in the case of refugee and displaced person.



The three types represent different aspects of migration and they are all motivated by different factors. A refugee differs from an emigrant in his attitude towards the home country as well as the new domicile. Likewise, a displaced person looks towards his own future in a way different from the way an emigrant looks at it.

The difference between these three types of migrants should not be over-emphasized. There are factors which have a similar effect upon the attitudes of refugees, displaced people and emigrants alike. Examples are found in the differences in living standards of the old and the new country and in the differences in cultural attitudes between the peoples in the two countries. Refugees from the Baltic countries in Sweden, displaced people from former German territory and the emigrants from Southern Europe in the United States all share the same attitude of inferiority. At the same time there are professional people in a foreign country or a new part of their own country who are strongly dominated by their sense of superiority. These economic and cultural differences provide the limiting framework within which refugee, DP, or emigrant must seek possibilities of adjustment to his new environment.

There are two sociological concepts which must be clearly understood when dealing with social adjustment of the displaced people. Accommodation covers the adjustment of persons or groups with a residue of antagonism, who work together in spite of latent hostility. Assimilation may be defined as a "process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories and sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated in a common cultural life". (Park & Burgess).

When assessing the degree of adjustment of displaced people it is useful to remember that assimilation is not a one-way social process. It is a mutual interpenetration and fusion of culture traits and a process which is inherently unconscious.

## DISPLACED PEOPLE AFTER WORLD WAR II

Population transfers have probably been more numerous during and after World War II than ever before. The temporary evacuation of mothers and children from cities threatened with bombardment, the transfer of families from the theatres of war, the displacement of peoples from territories ceded to the enemy and the movement of refugees from countries or provinces conquered by the enemy are common to most countries. The permanency of displacement has varied considerably and has affected, accordingly, the policy of adjustment adopted by the governments concerned. Problems of temporary and permanent housing, of welfare and employment have arisen simultaneously with problems of long-term resettlement policies.

During the second world war, Finland was afflicted for more than five years, from 1939 to 1945. Under the terms of the armistice concluded in September 1944 it was compelled to cede to the U.S.S.R. large territories of its eastern borderlands. A total of 420,000 persons from the territories ceded (or 11 per cent of the total population) moved during the war and after the armistice to western Finland. The surrender of land and the migration of displaced people forced a policy of resettlement and re-employment upon Finland. The five years which have passed since the armistice have witnessed the first phase of adjustment of these displaced people. The relatively peaceful conditions which have prevailed in Finland provide an environment in which it is possible to investigate the processes of accommodation and assimilation which are taking place. An intensive sociological study of these processes among the Finnish people may prove useful for many problems of practical policy in other countries facing the same tasks. At the same time and from a scientific point of view, investigation of the Finnish situation may throw light on some of the fundamental human processes of accommodation and assimilation.

## METHOD OF STUDY OF THE DISPLACED PEOPLE IN FINLAND

On the cessation of hostilities and with the armistice of September 1944, the entire population of the territories ceded to the U.S.S.R. surrendered all of their immovable



properties and in many cases, most of their movable goods as well. The Finnish State adopted the policy in May 1945 of compensating all evacuated people in proportion to their losses. A graduated system of compensation was decided upon, whereby those who owned smaller properties were compensated in full, while compensation diminished steadily as wealth increased. Our study concerns itself mostly with displaced rural people from ceded Karelia. If the Finnish State had not helped them through compensation and other means, they could not have continued their traditional pursuits. For this purpose the State passed sweeping laws, whereby it acquired both cultivated and cultivable land by compulsion from private farms and large industrial corporations. Together with extensive state-owned land this is being transferred to the displaced farmers. Of the holdings, taken from these three groups, 40 per cent were so-called "cold" farms—farms where actual production was less than 10 per cent of the potential production—60 per cent were farms ready or nearly ready for complete occupation. Most displaced people, of course, lacked housing and other farm buildings. Land alone, therefore, was not enough. The State has assisted economically in a variety of material ways, but only in an elementary fashion, e.g., through leaving the construction of a farm house largely to the initiative of a family, has it assisted psychologically.

When the Social Science Research Bureau began its study of the assimilation of displaced people, it divided them into urban and rural groups. In addition to using official statistics, which are very rich, material has been gathered in the field. A number of sample areas for field work have been selected.

The field work undertaken has been concerned mostly with attitude assessment (a) among the displaced persons (b) among the inhabitants of the reception areas. Because the economic background is regarded as of primary importance for the adjustment of displaced people, data have been collected about their living conditions. Since it is impossible to understand the position of displaced people without relating it to the prior inhabitants of the reception areas, data have also been collected on this question.

Fieldwork fell into three parts. The first concerned the rural population of Karelia. It took the form of a quota sample opinion poll conducted throughout southern Finland among evacuated people and the inhabitants of the receiving areas. Both groups have been recorded according to the criteria of age, sex, profession and density of displaced persons. In addition, religion and the economic geography of the home locality of the displaced people have been considered.

Anyone familiar with the human geography of Karelia can distinguish three distinct areas. North-Eastern Karelia, beyond Lake Ladoga and bounded by the Russian border, was occupied by Greek Orthodox farmers. The landscape, dominated by forest, was broken only occasionally by a patch of farmland and its modest complex of unpainted buildings. Forest work yielded earnings which were important in the weekly budget. To the south-west, the human landscape opened in wider areas of cultivated land, dotted here and there with painted buildings set in small gardens. The Lutheran church succeeds to the Orthodox church. This is Middle Karelia. The third region is the more familiar Karelian Isthmus, Southern Karelia, dominated by the city of Viipuri, distinguished economically from the two other areas by its trading relations, its fisheries and even its tourist industry. Because the cultural background of these three areas has been so different, distinction in the treatment of their evacuees has been made throughout this study.

In the resettlement programme which, in the case of rural displaced people, was based on a State-directed plan, there can also be distinguished three major reception areas. These have been planned by the State to accommodate the displaced persons from the three Karelian regions. The North-Eastern Karelians have been received into North-Eastern Finland, a dominantly forested area lending itself to the cold farms. The Isthmian Karelians have moved to South-Western Finland, an area of old-established cultivation possessing the best land in the country. The peoples of Middle Karelia have gone to Middle Finland. In all these reception areas the major part of the resettlement of Karelians was, by the end of 1949, completed with less than 10 per cent of the DPs still awaiting their farms. In this respect there was no distinction of importance between different regions in the reception areas.



As the second part of the study, two sample rural areas have been selected for detailed treatment. One is in colonial Finland, the other in metropolitan Finland. One is an area of Greek Orthodox evacuees, one an area of Lutheran evacuees. The directed interview method has been employed.

The third part of the survey concerned an industrial area in South-Western Finland. Here, an attempt has been made to assess the attitudes of industrial evacuees (a) in comparison with the attitudes of displaced peoples from rural areas (b) in comparison with the attitudes of voluntary immigrants from the rural surroundings to the urban areas.

## RESULTS

Though the great bulk of the material collected during the investigations remains unanalysed, several initial results are given here. They concern, first, the attitude of displaced people to living conditions; secondly, the social friction arising from cultural difference in a reception area.

The appreciation of living conditions is drawn from the quota sample opinion poll. The following table gives some results.

| Area                   | Better in<br>reception<br>area than in | Similar in<br>reception area<br>evacuation area | Worse in<br>reception<br>area | No<br>answer |
|------------------------|--|---|-------------------------------|--------------|
| N.E. Karelia . . .     | 5 %                                    | 37 %  | 57 %                          | 1 %          |
| Middle Karelia . . .   | 2 %                                    | 29 %  | 66 %                          | 3 %          |
| Isthmian Karelia . . . | 4 %                                    | 31 %  | 62 %                          | 3 %          |

In more than half the cases the living conditions are regarded as worse in the reception than in the evacuation area. They were worst of all for the Middle Karelians who come from the richest part of the ceded area. Reception conditions were best for the North-Eastern Karelians who formerly inhabited the poorest area. As an example of the differing reactions, comments from these two Karelian groups may be quoted. The North-Eastern Karelians, especially those settled on cold farms, commented on lack of pastureland, poor, stony and undrained soils, etc. Those from Middle and Isthmian Karelia complained mostly of economic and physical privations. For example, lack of money, lack of stock, lack of "everything", necessity of beginning from the beginning, too small compensation, mounting debts, etc. These two groups of comments comprise two-thirds of all comments among all three groups of Karelians. The third group of comments among North-Eastern and Middle Karelians is on lack of supplementary earnings, and among Isthmian Karelians on the small sized farms.

The same people were asked which difficulties they regarded as the worst. Practical difficulties such as housing and building shortages, delay in waiting for the new farms, lack of choice in work, continuous movement from one place to another in the interim were cited as the greatest problems. The North-Eastern Karelians assessed these difficulties as high as 71 per cent, the Isthmian Karelians at 67 per cent, the Middle Karelians at 58 per cent.

Practical difficulties, however, are complemented by psychological difficulties. An example is selected here from the material amassed by the direct interview method. The question is that of the Orthodox faith in the midst of a Lutheran community, i.e., it concerns a group of people from North-Eastern Karelia who were bound to the Orthodox faith over 600 years ago.

These North-Eastern Karelians were transplanted in September 1944 with their Orthodox faith and related cultural heritage to the strongly Lutheran and pietistic environment of North-Eastern Finland. Friction resulted and we have tried to measure its strength by assessing the percentage of the local population favourably, unfavourably or neutrally disposed towards the Greek Orthodox evacuees. About three-fifths of the prior inhabitants of North-Eastern Finland showed an unfavourable



reaction, one-fifth a favourable reaction, one fifth were neutrally disposed. In order to control these responses, evacuees were asked their opinions regarding the behaviour of the local inhabitants. The following table assesses the reactions of the two groups :

|                     | <i>Local reaction<br/>to displaced<br/>Orthodox Karelians</i> | <i>Reaction of<br/>displaced Karelians to<br/>local reaction</i> |
|---------------------|---|--|
| Positive . . . . .  | 21 %  | 11 %   |
| Negative . . . . .  | 57 %  | 64 %   |
| Undecided . . . . . | 22 %  | 25 %   |

If the reaction of the local inhabitants to displaced Orthodox Karelians is examined in closer detail, it is discovered that the major points of objection cover manners and customs. For example, strong objections was taken to the burial customs, particularly the giving of food to the deceased and the arraying of the deceased in his or her best clothes. It must be emphasized that differences in dogma did not enter into the picture. If so, the narrowness of the gulf between the faiths might have been realized. Instead, the Lutheran community considers itself to be superior and prevents the assimilation of any families which continue to practice traditional customs.

These are only a few examples of the adjustment problems encountered in our study of displaced people in Finland. The study is as yet uncompleted and we are working on further findings from our field work. We have made an effort to measure the degree and intensity of assimilation among these people who all belong to the same nationality, among whom cultural divergencies are insignificant. The similarities of cultural background and the common heritage of all Finnish people have greatly contributed to a successful resettlement policy during a period of only five years. This fortunate fact, on the other hand, makes a scientific study of assimilation much more difficult. The differences found in public opinion polls and in intensive interviews are often too small to be measured.

The tentative results, however, seem to justify the use, in speaking of the adjustment of our displaced people, of the term acculturation to denote the nature of adjustment. We, too, have found that "individuals reared in one culture and transferred to another take the behaviour patterns of the second society". This acculturation takes places with regard to refugees, displaced people and emigrants, wherever they move from one country to another. To measure this process of acculturation and define its nature is an interesting task for modern sociology.



P A R T I I

THE WORLD CONGRESS  
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

*Opening address by*

QUINCY WRIGHT

At this first meeting of the International Political Science Association it seems worth while to reflect for a moment on the conditions and purposes which have brought it into existence, on the concepts we assume, and the methods we adopt, and on the importance which may be attributed to our deliberations now and in the future.

In opening the conference which met a year ago under the auspices of Unesco to establish our Association, Mr. Torres Bodet, Director General of Unesco, said: "What can be more essential or urgent for the future of mankind than a scientific study of government? Is there anything that touches more nearly the whole essence of Unesco's effort to establish peace in the minds of men and to prepare a life worthy of mankind?" He then alluded to "Fascism" as "the wrong side of an unprecedented technical refinement in methods of government. . . . What polluted these regimes from top to bottom was the uncontrolled use of effective techniques without the slightest regard for human worth". He added: "Since political science aims in the last resort at improving human relationships, its great object is to realize more satisfactory human relations in face of the dangers of war and totalitarianism which our generation has experienced. The conditions which have led to these experiences are world-wide, so the science of politics must be world-wide". As Professor Duverger said in responding to Mr. Torres Bodet's address, "While all the sciences are to some extent international, political science is much more so than the other sciences."

The conditions which have brought our Association into existence are the corruption of politics by inhuman tyranny and total war which have brought and may again bring disastrous consequences to all sections of the world. The purpose which inspires our Association is to eliminate these corruptions by the universal application of scientific method in dealing with political problems.

But is a science of politics possible? Can observation, analysis, reason, and logic encompass the emotional convictions and the group conflicts which seem the essence of politics? Is not politics an art of social creation? Is it not the growing edge of history, undetermined, either by that which has preceded or by that which is desired? Can it be explained either by history or by philosophy? How can science, which induces generalizations from past observation and experiment, or which deduces conclusions from postulates or hypotheses, deal with politics which seeks to escape the past, to transcend logic, and to compromise principles?

I recall an account of the pleasure which Lord Salisbury, British Foreign Secretary in the 1890's, derived from the discomfiture of lawyers and historians when he created the condominium of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, ignoring all precedents and the legal logic which demanded that sovereignty be located



somewhere. One sees similar creations in the mandate system, the trusteeship system, the minority system, in fact in the League of Nations and the United Nations themselves. One sees such creations in national constitutions—the British constitution which arose from the peaceful revolution of 1689, owing much to the political invention of John Locke, the constitution of the United States created in 1787 to which the inventive ability of James Madison contributed so much. One sees such a creative effort, I may add, in the recent proposals of the French, Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman for a pooling of European coal and iron resources. If the essence of politics is creation and invention, does it not lie in the realm of art rather than of science? Are not its achievements syntheses of unique situations insusceptible of the analysis, generalization and inference characteristic of science?

The best answer to this question is perhaps that given by Professor Duverger a year ago when he alluded to the sophists' argument that motion did not exist. Socrates answered by rising and walking. Political science also has been walking since that time. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Macchiavelli, Marsilius of Padua, Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu, Hamilton, Jefferson, de Tocqueville, Bryce, Graham Wallas and many others did not argue whether there can be a political science but contributed to making it.

The notion that art and science are contradictory is based on too narrow a conception of each. Art is action to achieve purposes but neither the purposes nor the action are insusceptible of guidance by knowledge and understanding. Science is not the discovery and formulation of absolute laws, eternal and universal, but the application of intelligence and tested methods to the prediction and control of events. It is clearly possible to deal with political problems more or less intelligently, to apply to them more or less of the methods which, experience has demonstrated, assure a high probability of correct prediction and control.

The painter, who seeks to communicate his inspired state of mind to the public that will view his accomplishment, profits by knowing the characteristics of his pigments, the physics of colour combinations, the anatomy of the human body, the psychology of the human mind, and the principles of harmonious composition and spatial arrangement. His creative inspiration may be difficult to analyse, but even that may be in some measure explained by his past patterns of thought and his experiences, and in some measure influenced by his present observations and reflections and by his very effort to communicate to others through his art.

The social sciences differ from the natural sciences in that the individuals and groups of which they treat are susceptible of influence by the generalizations of the advancing science itself. Heavenly bodies do not change their behaviour because of the generalizations of astronomy, but human beings and groups may change their behaviour because of the generalizations of political scientists, economists and sociologists. To a greater degree than in the natural sciences, the social sciences must take into account the "feed back" of their conclusions upon the behaviour patterns which they formulate from data of the past. Social scientists, as citizens, cannot, therefore, ignore the consequences of the generalizations which they make. Mannheim has pointed out that social science must move hand in hand with social practice. This is particularly true of political science. The professor's arm-chair can never be far removed from the statesman's desk.

Politics differs from the other social arts—economics, law, administration, social service, public health, education—in that its essence is conflict. Both opposition and co-operation figure in all social relations, but most of the social



arts are founded on the assumption of co-operation toward particular common ends such as production, justice, order, welfare, health or the transmission of, and adaptation of individuals to, a culture. Politics on the other hand is based upon the assumption of opposition. Its essence is the creation, maintenance, and development of human groups against the opposition of other groups. The creation, maintenance and development of a human group may be opposed by the inadequacy of natural resources, by the difficulties of communication or by the lack of administrative organs and procedures, but unless these difficulties are accompanied by the opposition of other groups which struggle for the same resources, erect barriers in the way of communication, and frustrate the functioning of administrative organs, there is no political problem.

Since the human mind seeks to order itself and to project that order into the world, it is natural that it should feel that the cure for political problems is to destroy politics. If group oppositions could be eliminated, if all men could achieve a common faith, a common understanding, a common loyalty, a common culture which transcended and obliterated all competing faiths, opinions, loyalties and cultures, there could be no politics and men would revert to a golden age of peace and harmony, a garden of Eden before the serpent had introduced the apple of discord.

This is a happy dream which in practice is not so happy. It is in fact the inspiration for totalitarian tyrannies, for wars of conquest, for inquisitions, and for concentration camps. It is the irony of human existence that it is man's very aspiration for perfect peace and harmony that inspires his most inhuman barbarities. The effort to destroy opposition and to impose harmony actually encourages and augments opposition and increases conflict. The Marxist idea of a classless society in which the state has withered away may in practice develop a ruthless tyranny with millions in forced labour camps, with a great differentiation in the food rations of classes of workers, with nations subjected by the coercion of a unitary party, with an unprecedented augmentation of state power, and with continuous cold war, threatening hostilities which would destroy civilization.

The political scientist has emancipated himself from this dream of perfection and so has prepared himself for improving the lot of mankind in a world in which political problems will always exist, which in fact would become stagnant, unprogressive, and unendurable if they did not.

It is the nature of groups, even such small groups as families, to have within them opposition as well as co-operation. As the size of the group increases and the conditions of its parts become more varied, these oppositions become more difficult to deal with. The art of politics must be practiced within the family, within the village, and within the nation, but the most difficult and most important application of the art is within the world community. Within that group we can anticipate the continued existence of states and nations; churches and religions; cultural and strategic regions; ideological and reformist movements and parties; international organizations; business corporations; professional, cultural, educational, scientific and ideological associations; and other groups of widely distributed membership and activities. Each of these groups has assumptions, purposes and ideals which occasionally bring it into opposition with other groups within it, above it or parallel to it. In the face of these oppositions each group will employ the art of politics to have its way.

It is the supreme art of politics to deal with these oppositions so that the greatest group of all, mankind as a whole, shall exist, prosper and progress. While the art of politics will be practised by the leaders of each particular



group to forward its particular aims against internal and external oppositions, the political scientist, like all scientists, strives to make his generalizations as universal as possible. The whole is greater than the parts. It is only if the human group as a whole is in a measure ordered and predictable—and this is especially true in our interdependent and shrinking world—that all the parts can maximize the achievement of their own objectives. As the Director-General of Unesco said a year ago: "All really scientific research in the field of political science must be inspired by the predominant consideration of truly human values which the art of government must enhance, since disregard of those values will inevitably result in annihilating its own purpose and entering into contradiction with itself."

If the art of politics is practised, as Macchiavelli suggested it should be, to increase the power of the prince without regard to the claims of other princes or of the world, it will be self-defeating. Groups have, it is true, expanded at the expense of others. Empires formed by conquest have lasted for generations. But they have done so only if they have in some degree understood and served those whom they absorbed. The ruins which today distinguish large areas of Europe and Asia are testimony to the self-defeating character of politics which seeks to give absolute validity in the temporal world to the policies and doctrines of any limited group.

War is not today politics carried on by other means, as Clausewitz defined it. Aggressive war is today the failure and corruption of politics, for it is self-defeating. Political science must demonstrate the methods of politics which can today be successful for lesser groups, because they can be applied without abandoning the demand mankind now makes that the rights of individuals and the rights of nations be respected—and which can be successful for the great society itself, because they can be applied without ignoring the claims and demands of lesser groups and of individuals. Politics, if it is to succeed, cannot picture a group as a hierarchical structure nor can it be guided by rational deduction from general principles. It must picture each group as an equilibrium among regional and functional sub-groups and, except in the case of the world society itself, among parallel groups and super groups. The citizen or politician of each group must be guided, with due consideration for the exigencies of continually changing circumstances and conditions, by the purpose to maintain not only the existence and policies of his group but also the basic equilibria both internal and external upon which the success of that effort depends. The citizen and politician of every group must today be in some measure a world citizen and a world statesman.

How political science will develop as our Association expands its influence to local associations in all areas of the world, I cannot say, but I think our programme for the coming week manifests a broad conception of the methods which have been found useful in the past. In the United States, where political science has been a recognized academic discipline for two generations, the subject is characteristically divided into five fields: political theory, politics and opinion, public administration, public law and comparative government, and international relations. The last includes the application of the other four to the problems of the world community as a whole. Our programme during the next week extends into all the other four fields of political science with special reference to international affairs.

The question of minorities will lead us into fundamental problems of political theory. What are the reasons for, and justifications of, the inequalities which have often lent peculiar savagery to politics—such inequalities as colonial dependency; the subordination of national minorities; discriminations



against particular races, nationalities, classes and ideologies? These problems raise the fundamental issue of political theory between the democratic demand for equality and the aristocratic demand for the recognition of differences. The United Nations has had to consider these theories in dealing with trusteeships, in supervising the administration of non-self-governing peoples, and in seeking to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

The problem of a Western European Union will lead us into the field of public law and organization. How can Western Europe or any other region or community be organized so as to promote the common interests of its people, with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of coercion, under the conditions of cultural, economic, legal and political diversity which exist among the groups which compose it? This is a problem faced in the making and development of every political constitution, most notably the constitution of the world community embodied in the United Nations Charter and the fundamental instruments of its specialized agencies.

The discussion of electoral systems will lead us to the fundamental problems of politics and opinion, for an electoral system both reflects public opinion and creates the conditions for the formation of that opinion. Sub-groups exist within every political group, and they seek to utilize the existing electoral system to further their ends, but the electoral system itself influences the formation and the relative power of such groups. Thus the entire system of politics within the group as a whole is profoundly affected by the characteristics of the electoral system.

Our discussion of planning will face us with the fundamental problem of public administration—how precisely, comprehensively and inflexibly can political purposes be formulated in terms of time, space and function? Public administration assumes that laws and policies have been established, and concerns itself with the efficient maintenance of these laws and the efficient realization of these policies. Modern free governments have generally been dominated by the effort to maintain laws which apply equally to all, protecting accepted rights and thus creating conditions within which men and organizations can plan and act without unduly trenching upon the planning and action of others. When emphasis shifts from the creation by government of such a framework, to planning and action by the government itself, the freedom of lesser groups to plan and to act is in danger. The state, instead of seeking to maximize the freedom of individuals, seeks to maximize the realization of social objectives. The state is conceived as a hierarchy of ends and means rather than as an equilibrium of competing ends. The question of who determines what are the important social objectives, and what is their order of priority, becomes all important. If planning is carried to extremes, administration supersedes politics, and the society becomes a totalitarian Leviathan. The problem of planning is, therefore, in no small degree the problem of determining the proper scope of its application. The complications of modern society, with its rapid changes and the high degree of interdependence of its parts, requires a greater degree of government intervention than was necessary in the simply agricultural societies which were the ideal of Thomas Jefferson. Yet an excessively planned society, as experience has amply shown, endangers international peace and human liberty. Individual and group freedoms to plan and to act for themselves, and to engage in politics to promote their aims against the opposition of others, are no less essential to



peace, justice and progress in the varied and shrinking world of today than they were in the slower and looser world of the past. The problem is to define the areas where the group as a whole must act, not only to maintain the framework of common law, but also to perform services which it alone can perform, and to prevent abuses which cannot be prevented by common law. Planning has a role, but it also has dangers if too comprehensive, too inflexible, or too long ranged.

That these great problems can be discussed in a spirit of science is demonstrated by the papers we have before us. These papers suggest, and I believe our discussions at this and subsequent conferences will confirm, that there can be a political science, that it can be universal in scope, and that it can contribute much—if indeed it is not indispensable—for advancing both human and national ends under the conditions of the modern world.

I was recently examining in Munich works of art which had survived the destruction of the Alte Pinakothek and are now exhibited in the Haus der Kunst, which was once a club of Hitler's officers and is now a club for American officers. I was impressed by a striking picture by Tintoretto which depicts Mars seeking to invade the domestic felicity of Venus and Vulcan. Classical mythology recognized some sort of relationship between war on the one hand and love and industry on the other. The disposition of men and groups to oppose, to conquer and to destroy one another, and to establish domination and government over others is opposed, but is also in a sense favoured, by the disposition to unite, to co-operate, to generate, and to construct in the interest of prosperity and posterity. The scientific study of Mars leads to political science, of Venus and Vulcan to the sciences of population and technology. War has destroyed population but it has also sometimes built conditions for the increase of population. The needs of population have curbed wars but they have also caused wars. If reason can bridle Venus and prevent the increase of the human race beyond the capacity of even advanced technology to provide each of its members with a civilized standard of living, may not reason also bridle Mars and confine the conflicts, inevitable among the diverse values, cultures and policies of human groups, to methods which will permit the universal society of man to survive, to prosper, and to progress?

That is the problem of political science. It is the problem to which this conference is devoted and to which we hope and expect that our Association can in the future make important contributions.



# A. THE MINIMUM CONDITIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND PERMANENT UNION OF STATES

## THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS TO A UNION OF STATES

K. C. WHEARE

It is almost impossible to discuss this question profitably in the abstract. A great deal, if not everything, depends upon the intentions, the opinions, and the resources of the states actually concerned. A minimum cannot be laid down without some regard to what states are prepared to accept, and what they are able to perform. A minimum effective for one group of states and for one time might not be effective for other states and for other times. It is, therefore, with this proviso, which is admittedly a very comprehensive qualification, that the subject is discussed in the following pages. It is necessary to emphasise also that the general statements made in the following discussions are all subject to the exceptions that particular cases provide and are made with that knowledge in mind.

The minimum of powers which must be allocated by the states to a common government are those in respect of external affairs, defence (including the armed forces), and the raising and spending of the finance necessary for these two purposes. A few words may be said about each of these.

It should need little argument to support the assertion that the control of external affairs and defence should be handed to the common government. If it is thought desirable to have a *government* at all, it must have these powers. It is not satisfactory to have the one without the other. The control of external affairs without control of the armed forces is empty; the control of the armed forces without the control of external affairs is blind. One or two questions arise, however, about the extent of the control which the government of the Union must have.

The control of defence must include within itself the control of all the armed forces in the Union. This need not preclude the raising of armed forces by the states themselves, but it should be stipulated that this power may be exercised only with the permission of the parliament and government of the Union. The power of the Union over armed forces should be potentially supreme and exclusive. The states should enjoy no independent right to raise and maintain armed forces. The control of defence will extend much further, of course, than the mere control of armed forces. It will include all those measures necessary both to prepare for war, to wage war, and to carry out the difficult process of the transition from war to peace after hostilities have ceased. Experience in federations shows that the defence power is a very wide power, especially under modern conditions, and that, although there may be a good deal of argument about the proper limits of the defence power, especially in time of peace, states which give up this power to a Union have given up a great deal.



The control of external relations raises similar problems. Here again, as with defence, it is perfectly possible for the constituent states to have relations with states outside the Union, but it must be based upon the understanding that the parliament and government of the Union has a veto on their activities. A good deal of flexibility may be desirable and possible in the arrangements which the constituent states may wish to make with other states and the Union may benefit considerably from this variety, but there should rest with the Union the potential power of supreme and exclusive control in external affairs, if it should choose to exercise it.

A more difficult problem arises when we consider the nature of the treaty-making power of the Union. It will be appreciated that in the conduct of external relations, agreements and treaties must be made with foreign states. There are two processes involved here—first, the making of the treaty, by negotiation, signature and ratification, and second, the execution or carrying into effect of the treaty by the parties concerned. It is to be understood that the power to control external relations includes not only the power to make treaties but also the power to execute them, if necessary by passing legislation bringing the law of the Union into line with what has been agreed upon in the treaty. At first sight perhaps the answer would seem to be “yes”. It is important, however, to see what consequences follow. Treaties nowadays cover a wide range of subjects. They are not confined to matters of alliance and defence in war. They go even beyond mere matters of trade and commerce between countries. They include now a variety of social questions, such as hours and conditions of labour, rates of wages, standards of living, civil and political rights, educational and cultural standards. Through the activities of such organizations as the ILO, Unesco, and the various councils and commissions of UN, nations are negotiating agreements upon almost every important aspect of social life. If, then, we say that the power of the Union to control external affairs includes not only the power to make treaties on this wide range of matters, but also to carry them into effect, then the Union gains authority to legislate upon almost every matter of importance within its frontiers. It is true that these legislative powers would extend only to the carrying into effect of the provisions of the treaty, but treaties may be concluded in very wide and vague terms, and in any case they can deal precisely and legitimately with matters of considerable importance.

It is essential, therefore, in discussing the allocation of powers to the Union to decide whether it is wise to grant, under cover of the control of external affairs, a power which is capable of being used by the Union parliament to legislate upon a range of matters the extent of which is determined not by explicit clauses in a Constitution but by the willingness of some foreign state to make a treaty with the Union government. It is not an easy question to settle. It must seem ridiculous at first sight to suggest that the Union government could be empowered to make treaties but to deny to it the powers necessary to carry its pledged word into effect. In the federal systems of the United States, Switzerland and Australia, the parliament of the Union has power to carry treaties into effect and thus to make laws upon matters which, in the absence of a treaty, it might not be competent to regulate. In Canada, the parliament of the Union is able to carry some treaties into effect, whatever their subject matter, but not others, and the lack of a complete power has been much criticized.

In spite of the practice of the existing federations, however, and in spite of the admitted difficulties, it seems best, in considering the *minimum* powers that must be handed over to a Union to say that the Union parliament should



not be entitled to legislate in implementation of a treaty upon any matters upon which it would not be authorized to legislate in the absence of a treaty. A Union could operate effectively on these conditions. No doubt if a wider power over external affairs were given, that would have certain advantages, but the question for consideration here concerns the minimum. It is certain, moreover, that unless some restrictions of this kind were placed upon the powers of the Union to control external affairs, states would be reluctant to join. They would be handing a blank cheque to the Union government. Defence is a wide enough power to surrender, with all its unforeseen and unforeseeable implications and ramifications; if states are to be asked to surrender still further fields under the heading of external affairs, surely they will be reluctant to join the Union? In spite of the admitted difficulties that must arise, therefore, when the government of the Union is required to negotiate with foreign governments, without being able to guarantee that what it promises can be performed, it seems proper to assert that the control of external affairs could be and probably should be limited in this way in a Union of states.

It is perhaps necessary to emphasize that the power of the Union to control external relations will include the power to regulate external trade, imports and exports, and the customs tariff. This power must carry with it not only the power to make agreements on these matters with foreign countries, but also to implement those agreements by legislation. These are considerable powers and they will affect the economic life of the Union in a vital degree. Their exercise is usually accompanied in most federations by a good deal of dispute between those sections of the Union which favour law or no tariffs and those which desire protection against foreign competition. This is a battle which goes on in unitary states however; it is not peculiar to federations. It has a special importance where federation is concerned, however, because one of the obstacles that usually stands in the way of a Union of states, is that they do not wish to give up their independent power to regulate their external trade with foreign countries. There is no reason, however, why special transitional provisions should not be made to preserve certain tariff and trade arrangements to which some member states of the Union attach importance. Nor should it be assumed that the Union government must impose uniform customs duties throughout the Union. Some federal constitutions have imposed upon the Union government the restriction that customs tariffs must be uniform and it is easy to see how states might well make this demand before agreeing to unite. On the other hand, it is also likely that some states might wish to be given special treatment and that a Union would be possible only if variety or discrimination were to be permitted. It should be added that the question whether the Union should be internally a free trade area is a separate matter, about which something will be said later.

From what has been said so far, it will be observed that the power to impose customs duties and import or export charges of various kinds upon goods entering or leaving the Union has been allotted to the potentially supreme and exclusive control of the Union. By this proposal, a power to raise revenue has been conferred upon the Union and it is perhaps appropriate at this stage to consider the financial powers of the Union governments. This matter is, in fact, discussed in detail by Professor James A. Maxwell in a separate paper, and it is necessary here only to note certain points of general principle. A first question of principle which must be considered is whether the power of the Union to raise and to spend money shall be confined only to those purposes for which the Union is entitled to make laws, viz., defence



and external affairs, or whether there should be no restriction upon its powers of raising and spending money. This is a fundamental question. The powers to raise and to spend money carry with them powers of regulation and restriction, of encouragement and coercion. In some federal systems—in particular in Australia, Canada and the United States—these powers have gone far towards making the government of the Union predominant over the governments of the states. Here, let it be emphasized again, we are concerned with minimum powers, and it seems just to assert that the financial powers of the Union should be confined only to those purposes for which the Union is empowered to make laws. This is not to say that great advantages would not follow from giving the Union government power, say to make grants to the states for state purposes, as is done in most federations today. All that is asserted is that a Union could work effectively without such a power.

To finance defence is a tremendous undertaking in these days and it may at times demand a priority over other forms of spending. It seems advisable therefore to suggest that the powers of the Union to tax should not be restricted in any way—no particular form of taxation should be reserved exclusively to the states, or, at any rate, no important form of taxation. Upon this matter however, the paper by Professor Maxwell will give us more guidance.

A word may be said about revenue from the customs tariff. Though this revenue is raised by the Union government, it does not follow that it should be spent by the Union. It is perfectly proper for this revenue to be redistributed to the states upon some plan agreed upon by the states and the Union, and it may well happen that a guarantee of this kind to the states may persuade them to enter the Union more readily.

Thus far, it has been maintained that a Union of states could operate effectively if there were conferred upon the Union government potentially supreme and exclusive control over defence and external affairs—subject to the qualifications upon the scope of these subjects outlined above—and a power to raise and spend money for these purposes, but for these purposes alone. These powers represent the minimum. It may seem that they are too few, and it must be admitted that no Union of states, no federation, has ever been set up with so few. But they are, in modern times, great powers and they influence closely the lives of the citizens. In a time of crisis like the present, a Union government is certain to exercise these powers, and its financial calls upon the citizens of the Union are bound to be great. Though many may wish that additional powers should be conferred upon the Union, it seems clear that these outlined would suffice. That is not to say that more cannot be granted. In this matter everything would depend upon the opinions and interest of the states concerned. It might well be best, however, for a Union to start with these few but great powers, and attain others later by the process of constitutional amendment.

It seems proper here to give some reasons to justify this thesis for this is obviously a matter where opinions legitimately differ. A first objection that might be made, is that no mention is made of inter-state commerce. Who is to control commerce among the several states? It has been proposed that foreign commerce should be controlled by the Union. Is it not most desirable that internal commerce, and particularly inter-state commerce, should also be controlled by the Union? Granted, the two subjects are closely connected—what is done about the one affects the other, and a great deal of difficulty and confusion will arise if the Union has not got control of both. Yet it must be admitted, that a Union could work effectively without being granted the control of inter-state commerce as a whole to the Union. The subject is a



vast one and the development of modern means of communication has brought within its ambit all important aspects of economic life. Probably it is desirable that the Union should have powers over inter-state commerce, even if it does not exercise them fully, but it is not essential.

But if the regulation of inter-state commerce is not to be granted to the Union, are the states to be permitted to put up tariff barriers against each other and to carry on economic wars? Ought not the Constitution to forbid the states to take any action which infringes freedom of trade within the area of the Union? Here again it seems that we have a proposal which is desirable but not absolutely essential. It is true that the experience of all federations appears to be on the side of making the territory of the Union a free trade area, though this does not satisfy all the interests in a Union and that states legislatures are, by one device or another, found to be attempting to protect the industries and products of their own areas. It may well happen that a Union can be formed only if the right of some at least of the states to protect their industries against their neighbours in the Union is continued, if only for a period of years. If this is so, it would appear reasonable to conclude that a Union formed on these conditions *could* be effective, provided the powers already described in the spheres of defence and external affairs were allocated to it.

It may be asked, whether, if the whole subject of inter-state commerce is not to be allocated to the government of the Union, there may not be a very strong case for arguing that some parts of the subject should be so allocated. Are there not some matters in the economic field which transcend the boundaries of states within the Union and must be regulated by the Union if it is to work effectively? Should not currency and coinage be regulated in that way? What about inter-state railways and rivers that flow through a number of states? What about the control of aviation and radio? Of telephones and telegraphs within the Union? The mention of telephones and telegraphs gives a hint of the answer. It may be true that there are matters of common concern to some or all of the states in the Union which could not be effectively controlled by the individual states, but it does not follow from this that they must be controlled by the Union. May there not be scope for co-operative regulation of these matters in the same way as telephones, telegraphs and the postal services, for example, are regulated internationally now? It is possible for many of these very important aspects of inter-state commerce and particularly for aviation and radio, for currency and coinage, to be made the subject of inter-state agreements and for uniform legislation to be adopted on those lines. It does not seem necessary to conclude that they are part of the essential minimum of powers that must be surrendered to the Union. At the same time it must be conceded that, while to surrender inter-state commerce to the Union is open to many objections, to select certain aspects of it, particularly currency, as most desirable for central regulation by the Union, is less liable to objection.

This discussion of the possibility of regulating certain matters by agreement between the states raises the question whether it might not be advisable in any Union for the states, or any two or more of them, to delegate to the Union powers to regulate any matters so far as these states are concerned. This power exists in the Australian Constitution though it has not been used to any extent. But in a Union of states with powers allocated along the lines suggested in this paper, it might happen that in such matters as aviation or radio or currency or inter-state railways, states might agree to delegate to the Union some powers of common regulation. Such a provision would give



flexibility to the allocation of powers and avoid a situation in which the desire of some states for common regulation might be obstructed by others.

Some remarks should be added upon certain assumptions which underlie the conclusions and the propositions set forward somewhat briefly above. It has been assumed that in any Union of states set up there would be provision for the interpretation of the Constitution by a supreme court, that judicial review would prevail. It is assumed, too, that the general trend of judicial review would be to interpret in a liberal manner the powers of the Union to control defence and external affairs. These assumptions are made without much question by those who have lived under or have studied the working of federal union in Canada, Australia and the United States. They may sound strange and improbable to those whose life and studies have been carried on in Europe, where the function of the Courts is viewed differently. It may be, too, that if judicial review were adopted in a Union of states which contained many or a majority of European states, the supreme court of that Union, manned as it would be by many judges trained in the European tradition of the law, might interpret the powers of the Union along different lines from what has been the practice in Anglo-Saxon federations.

These matters are difficult to foresee. It would seem, however, that a fundamental question which must be decided when powers are being allocated is whether there is to be judicial review or not, and, if there is, how it is likely to work in the light of the legal traditions of the states in the Union. If there is to be no judicial review or if a narrow or restrictive view of the powers of the Union is likely to be adopted then it is clear that a much more explicit statement of the powers of the Union than that proposed above should be included in a Constitution. On the experience of judicial review in Anglo-Saxon federations, to grant the Union control of defence and external affairs and of the finance necessary to carry them out, is to grant to the Union very substantial powers. Their nature and implications would be gradually developed by judicial review and the strength of the Union would increase as the years went by.

There are certain other assumptions about the institutions of the Union which have been taken for granted in making proposals about the allocation of powers. Details cannot be discussed, for it is not the business of this paper to consider the organs of the Union. It has been assumed, however, that the Union would operate under a Constitution which would be written and supreme; that the Constitution would not be alterable either by the Union acting alone or by the states acting alone but by some combination of the two, with or without some reference to the people by means of a referendum, as is the case in Switzerland or Australia. It has been assumed, too, that the legislature of the Union would be bicameral and that, on the model of the United States, Switzerland and Australia, for example; the states would be represented equally in one house and according to population in the other. No particular assumption has been made about the form of the executive and of its relation to the legislative body, though there are many reasons for thinking that the arrangements adopted in the Swiss federation are preferable for a Union of the kind proposed than those either of the United States, of Canada and Australia.

It is not possible to be precise about powers unless some account is taken of the institutions through which the powers are to be exercised and amended. In suggesting as a workable minimum the grant of defence, external affairs and the necessary finance to the Union, it has been assumed that there would exist in the Union judicial review, producing somewhat the same results as in Anglo-Saxon federations, and a process of constitutional amendment with



perhaps the same sort of safeguards as in Switzerland. It might be considered preferable, of course, to follow the Swiss model in regard to judicial review, and to give the supreme court power to annul the laws of the states, while obliging it to accept the laws of the Union as valid. It would be left to the judgment of the legislature of the Union, subject to any checks which the electorate might supply, to exercise its powers as it thought fit. In the writer's view it ought not to be expected that a union of states newly brought together can be expected to trust its legislature as the Swiss appear to do, and a provision for judicial review seems essential.

The powers suggested as a workable minimum for the Union in this paper may seem meagre. Experience in the working of federal government shows, however, that these are large powers, and that the financial power that goes with them in times of crisis makes the Union government the predominant power in the country. This increase of powers draws other powers to it in turn, and the problem soon becomes urgent not of strengthening the Union but of saving the states. It is in the light of this experience that these proposals are made. They have been stated briefly and dogmatically, and no one is more conscious than the writer that they are open to many objections and criticisms. But he has placed them before his colleagues as a basis upon which this very complicated and abstract question may be discussed.

## HISTORICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE STUDY OF UNION OF STATES

J. RIVERO

The present paper is designed less to answer the question raised than to offer certain suggestions as to the method whereby it can be resolved satisfactorily.

### I

It should be emphasized, from the outset, that the problem is here approached from the standpoint of the political scientist and not from that of the jurist. The latter reasons from abstract postulates; if he were required to define "the minimum conditions necessary for an effective and permanent union of States", his whole cast of mind would lead him to take as his starting-point the classical concept of the sovereign State and then proceed to examine which of that State's powers would need to be transferred to a higher authority in order to make the latter into a new international entity, without prejudice to the individual identity of each associated State.

In political science, abstract reasoning of this kind cannot be employed; the starting-point must be the facts, from which an attempt must then be made, with the utmost care, to deduce laws. The history of international relations affords us many examples of unions between States; some of them have achieved strength and permanence, while others have broken up after a relatively short period. Either phenomenon is of course largely explainable on purely fortuitous grounds and in terms of mere force of circumstances. May it not be, however, that one at least of the factors making for success or failure has been the way in which the division of powers was operated, the



institutional structure adopted in each instance? At any rate, these seem to be the lines along which political science must seek the answers to the question raised.

It is also necessary to determine with precision the extent of the field to be investigated. The processes whereby "many" have turned into "one" and "compound" States or Unions of States have arisen are by no means identical, and not all of them are relevant to our enquiry.

In the first place, we can omit the long-standing unions—e.g., France or Spain—which have grown up through the centuries around a nucleus such as the Ile de France or Castille. In such cases we have not, strictly speaking, a union of States but the absorption, by an existing State, of principalities which, despite their retention of certain privileges, have nevertheless been incorporated into a unitary system, either by conquest or by marriage and inheritance. Neither the fusing process nor the ultimate structure is characteristic of the free unions now under consideration.

Equally irrelevant to this study is the type of division of powers which has occurred, say, in Brazil, where the unitary preceded the federal State and it was the National Assembly of the unitary State which decided of its own free will to promote its former provinces to the status of Member States. In this instance the division of powers was effected absolutely freely, "from scratch", as it were, without its being necessary to make allowance for the special susceptibilities and attitudes which no sovereign State can afford to neglect when considering union with other States.

The third category we can leave out of account is that of unions, whether imposed by force or achieved by consent, which involve inequality of rights as between the associated States—as, for example, with protectorates.

Lastly, the relevance may be doubted of unions which, like the British Commonwealth of Nations, are the result of a centrifugal process. As the British example shows, in such cases the division of powers can be very flexible, and the institutional framework very tenuous, without danger to the Union; this however is due solely to the strength of the psychological and economic bonds forged in and carried over from long years of association under a system that, institutionally, was more rigid.

The only really relevant examples in history then, are those of independent States that have united on an equal footing and superimposed the common machinery of a Confederation or Federal State on existing national or local institutions.

It must be admitted that such unions are not numerous. Once mention has been made of the confederation of the Swiss cantons, the foundation of the United States and the great federal Dominions (Canada, Australia, and the Union of South Africa), and a few instances from Latin America, the list is practically exhausted, unless we are to include the would-be universal unions—the League of Nations and the United Nations—which reflect attempts at international organization in the two post-war periods.

We can dismiss from our minds the various types of confederation which were the forerunners of German unity; these are too bound up with feudal or at least monarchical forms to constitute relevant precedents. Similarly, in the case of the establishment of the U.S.S.R. the problem of union was given a very special complexion, firstly by centuries of life lived in common, and secondly, by the tactical and doctrinal "unity" of the revolution itself; here it was less a case of fusing a multiplicity of existing entities into one than of preserving, by adapting it to new circumstances, a unity threatened by centrifugal forces.

Even as regards the examples with which we are left, generalization is difficult for three reasons:

- (1) If we consider, firstly, the development of Federal States, the first point we shall note is that in almost every instance the uniting States were young, without a long history behind them and hence without the complexes to which such a past gives rise; that they were relatively small in area or at least sparsely populated; that their economic and social structure was a simple one; that they were broadly homogeneous in population and civilization; and that they were approximately equal in size and power. All these are circumstances calculated to facilitate a union considerably; but they are not present in the case of the most important of the unions conceivable today, that of the States of Europe.
- (2) Secondly, most of the unions in question date from an age when the powers and duties of the State were not what they have since become; this is obvious in the



case of the pact of Grütli, and it is equally true as regards the foundation of the United States and the other unions which followed it in the nineteenth century, the golden age of economic liberalism. To indicate the nature of the changes which have occurred, a single example will suffice. In the nineteenth century, making defence a "federal" responsibility meant surrendering sovereignty to the Union in one definite and clearly demarcated sector only. Today, such a step would involve giving the Union permanent and comprehensive supervisory powers over the whole life of the Member States, their economy, their social policy, and even their internal security; the nature of modern war has completely altered the premises of the question. Hence, any generalization based on historical examples—any contention, for instance, that centralized control of defence is one of the minimum conditions for a Union of States—would amount to an utterly unscientific concentration on similarity of wording, to the exclusion of any regard for the realities to which the words are intended to correspond. Moreover, historical precedents afford not even the beginning of an answer as regards all the new powers and duties of the State (more particularly in social and economic affairs) which have been added to its classical tasks. Yet the former are today quite as important as the latter and present an entirely new set of problems, which cannot be ignored in any division of powers between a Union and its Members.

- (3) The third reservation regarding the use of historical precedents bears more particularly on the "universalist" unions, the League of Nations and the United Nations. For the vast area they cover means that the powers granted them cannot be as great as those of a union of limited territorial extent; the latter can and must have greater powers.

The conclusion to which one is led may be disappointing. For the determination of "the minimum conditions for a Union of States" and, more particularly, of the division of powers between a Union and its members, we can look for little help from the lessons of history; or, if we do refer to them, it can only be with the greatest reservations and in the most critical spirit.

It may even be wondered whether the general question raised can be resolved on lines other than those of abstract legal analysis. Political science, concentrating as it does on the concrete and hence on diversity of circumstances, cannot fail to note that, as compared with previous unions, the union of the States of Europe raises a completely new problem. A problem of the minimum conditions requisite for an effective union of European States exists now; it is however open to question whether the problem of the minimum conditions for an effective and permanent union of States can be solved, or even usefully raised, through the agency of political science.

## II

With this major reservation, and with the proviso that the remarks which follow relate essentially to European union, an attempt will be made to present more constructive comments.

Emphasis should first be placed on the prime importance, in connexion with the foundation of a union, of *institutions*. It might even be said that the minimum condition for an effective and permanent union of States is the creation of a structure in which there is representation, not merely of the governments of the States, but also of the citizens composing the States, without any inter-State distinction.

- (1) No Union can originate and endure except with the consent of the individuals within it; if it were a mere union of States and the individuals composing it felt they had no direct ties with it, it would remain *quasi-diplomatic* in character and lack all solid foundations. This is the most important of the minimum conditions for a Union of States. If the Union is to endure and become more firmly cemented, the individuals within it must be conscious of a double allegiance, first to their own State and then to the Union. This psychological "substratum" is essential; without it, the Union will remain no more than an ideological concept or a



diplomatic manœuvre. If Federal States have endured where a union such as the League of Nations went down in failure, it is essentially because in the first case there has been complete appreciation of the double allegiance, even to the point where loyalty to the Union has overridden loyalty to the State. But how many men and women were there, in the various States, who felt themselves personally members of the League of Nations, having duties towards it in the same way as they had duties towards their own countries?

- (2) While there are many different factors that might contribute to the creation of a "Union patriotism" in the European, it must not be forgotten that he has, throughout the centuries, been accustomed to equating his "motherland" with the "organized State". Hence it is difficult to see how any "European patriotism" can develop in the absence of machinery through which the individual feels himself directly committed and personally represented. A conference of government delegates, even if permanent and possessing effective powers, would only with the greatest difficulty succeed in securing the authority required for establishing a durable Union. The citizen of a particular country will feel himself a citizen of the Union only to the extent that a direct link is established between it and himself. In Federal States, this link takes the form of a House of Representatives which is elected by universal suffrage and exists side by side with the Chamber representing the States. It may be that this arrangement cannot, in that precise form, be applied to Western Europe; it may also be that a suffrage based on representation of the fundamental community units (professions, communes, etc.) would be preferable to universal suffrage of the classical type, which would automatically introduce party rivalries into the Union's organs. But, whatever solution is adopted, it seems safe to assume that the problem as thus stated would be a capital one in the establishment of the Union, and that the latter's future might well depend even more on the structure and basis of its organs than on their actual powers.

With regard to the powers themselves, three comments may be made:

- (1) As to their nature, it appears obvious that the organs of the Union, like those of the Federal State but unlike the Diets of a Confederation, need real powers of decision directly binding upon the people, if the union is to be effective; mere consultative powers would be quite useless, and it would also be altogether inadequate if decisions of the Union's organs only became operative, in any of its States, upon confirmation by those States' Sovereign bodies. The case of the League of Nations is sufficiently illustrative for further comment to be needless.
- (2) As regards the scope of the Union's powers, two points must be borne in mind in connexion with the determination of the affairs that are to be transferred to the Union's jurisdiction. States never unite merely "on principle". They only take the step if impelled thereto by clear necessity, and if circumstances are such that each State no longer feels capable of discharging certain tasks single-handed. We have to define, above all, the elements that go to make up this "common interest" which provides the basis for the Union. Analysing these, we shall discover by a logical process what the powers and duties of the Union shall be; they will include all those powers, but only those powers, that are essential to the end in view. In many cases, States are compelled to unite from considerations of defence; sometimes, the urge is due to economic factors, especially a desire to break down excessive trade barriers between the units concerned. To start a prospective Union on a footing that will ensure its effectiveness, the first essential is to define the needs it is to meet.

Apart from these basic powers and duties, it may be of advantage to transfer to the Union certain powers which, though in themselves secondary, are calculated to have a direct impact on the lives of the individual citizens and thereby build up in them the sense of "double loyalty" to which we have already referred. All the evidence suggests that the development of this feeling is essential to the future of any Union. The latter might accordingly be made responsible for administering, say, some public service (such as postal or railway communications) with which the general public is in frequent touch.

- (3) Lastly, it might be well to give some thought to a third aspect of the question of the



Union's powers—what might be called, for want of a better term, their “exclusive-ness” in specific sectors. In most federal constitutions, powers are divided by categories; certain matters are made the exclusive province of the Union, while others are wholly reserved for the Member States. There is however another method of allocation—exemplified in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.—whereby a distinction is made, in a given field, between decisions of principle, general directives and objects on the one hand, and decisions as to methods of implementation on the other.

Such a procedure, which involves entrusting policy decisions, at least in certain sectors, to the Union and the methods of carrying them out to the States, seems particularly well suited to the situation in Europe and to the conditions of the modern world. It avoids the centralization which, in the case of a Union of States, would bring about an oppressive bureaucratic dictatorship. It also allows the best use to be made of administrative and political talent in the European States, which have the benefit of a long tradition. Lastly, and above all, it might ease the initial transfer of powers to the Union—a transfer which, if “total” (at least in an important field), it might be difficult to get accepted by governments and public opinion in the States. In defence problems, particularly, some such method might prove valuable; the Union must obviously be given extensive powers in this sector, since this is of all matters that which urges the States of Europe in the direction of unity; it is however impossible, given the nature of modern war to which we have referred, to give the Union *exclusive* powers here, since that would mean investing it with full authority over the entire life of its Member States. The drawing of a distinction between policy decisions and implementation would constitute an acceptable compromise, which might serve, likewise, in the economic sphere.

Indulgence is asked for the fragmentary nature of the foregoing remarks, which are, perhaps, more critical than constructive. They do not, no doubt, provide a direct answer to the question raised; but it is hoped that they may at least assist in determining the method whereby political science can contribute to the study of a problem on whose solution the future of civilization must almost certainly depend.

## UNION OF STATES AND PRESENT EUROPEAN CONDITIONS

A. Ross

I regret to say that I am of the opinion that the problem is put in such a way that it is difficult to deal with it intelligently. What is a “Union of States”? A precise answer to this question is obviously the necessary prerequisite for any adequate treatment of the problem. But the fact is that the term as it is used in International Law and Political Science has no definite meaning, being used in relation to a great number of very heterogeneous phenomena. I must admit finding it somewhat astonishing that none of the three reports has made any endeavour to give the term a more precise connotation.

Let me shortly mention the different phenomena which according to current usage may be designated by the term Union of States.

First we have the *federal state*, i.e., the union that has grown up to a new state which, within a limited field, possesses the highest political authority immediately in relation to the citizens, and exercises it in the usual way through legislative, executive and judicial organs, e.g., the U.S.A.

Second, in a *federation of states* there is no such federal government in relation to the



citizens, but the power of diplomatic representation and the treaty-making power has been completely or partially transferred to a common organ—e.g., the Confederation of the 13 American states 1781-1789.

As a third type of union we may mention the so-called *personal unions* constituted through a common head of (usually) two states. In this case there is no real organized joint action, the only link being the identity of persons occupying the position as head of the state, e.g., the Danish-Icelandic Union 1918-44, the Norwegian-Swedish Union 1814-1905.

Fourth we may mention the many different *administrative unions*—e.g., the UPU, Unesco, etc.—which are created for the promotion of international co-operation between, the various administrative agencies of the member states. Organs for the implementation of the co-operative functions are established, without however having any power to take binding decisions.

The *customs unions* such as the Benelux, and the *defence unions* such as the Western European Union and the union created by the Atlantic Pact may formally be considered as special types of administrative union, but they differ materially widely from the common administrative unions through their markedly political character.

As the last and seventh kind of union, we may mention the *universal unions for the maintenance of peace* such as the League of Nations and the United Nations.

I believe that you will agree with me in the opinion that you cannot with sense consider under one head the problems of all those different types of union. Take, for example, the UPU. It is both permanent and effective, although it has neither specific powers, jurisdiction nor financial resources. But clearly it is impossible to put this union on the same footing as, e.g., a federal state, a customs union, a defence union or the UN.

For this reason I think it is necessary to delimit the problem not only to the mainly political unions, but further to such of these as aim at co-operation—e.g., a defence union—and also create a real *community in power and action* in the way of limiting either the independent power of decision directly in relation to the subjects, or the independent power of action in relation to other states or both. That is to say, the investigation is limited to concern the two first mentioned types of union, the *federal state* and the *federation of states*.

Even limited in this way, I find it difficult to deal with the problem abstractly. I feel sure that minimum conditions relating to power, jurisdiction and finance will vary to a high degree with the general historical, political and cultural circumstances and with the objectives which are the “*raison d’être*” for the union. It will therefore be appropriate to put the problem more concretely, e.g., in relation to the *present European conditions*.

Even put in this limited and concrete manner, I think it impossible to give a definite answer to the question by way of drawing a definite line of demarcation indicating what is necessary as a minimum condition and what not (such as Professor Wheare has tried to solve the problem). We must, I believe, confine ourselves to vaguer and more general considerations.

Outside these methodological considerations I have not gone further into the problem and do not pretend to present any solution of it. Let me, just to illustrate my point of view, indicate a single problem of the more general kind which we should be able to deal with.

Such a problem would, e.g., be this: Will it today be possible in the European circle to create a permanent and effective union in the shape of a *pure federation of states*, that is to say a community concerning foreign policy, peace and war, without at the same time creating a federal government with political authority in a limited field directly in relation to the subjects? That is a union of the type of the American Confederation 1781-1789 in contrast to the later American federal state.

I believe we must answer this question in the negative.

First, it is a common historical experience that confederations of states in the past have not been stable. They have either broken up or been changed into a federal state.

Again, in former days it was easier to draw a line between foreign policy peace and war on the one hand and internal administration on the other. Today, as a result of the totality of war, its integration with the economy and all aspects of life, such a



demarcation is impossible. I regret to say that I am afraid Professor Wheare is mistaken when he thinks it possible to separate the internal affairs, especially interstate trade and economy, from the external, and believes that a union with power only in external matters could exist as permanent and effective. That such a distinction may be technically possible is not decisive. The question is: will it work psychologically?

From this point of view we must realize, that if community of peace or war is to be more than a passing, conjectural phenomenon, if this unity in foreign policy is to mean a real and lasting will to share the same fate under all circumstances, it implies a decision of very far-reaching and fateful importance. I find hard to accept that such a fateful scheme should have any prospect of succeeding if the participating peoples were not otherwise intimately united in their political life. If one people says to another: We will stand together with you for life and death in war—but we will not have anything in common with you in our daily life, I cannot believe in the sincerity nor therefore in the permanence and effectiveness of such a union.

For these reasons I think that a permanent union is possible only in the form of a federal state, that there must be a federal government with comprehensive powers also in internal matters. Interstate trade and other interstate economic relations must be under federal authority. You cannot expect peoples to be one day fighting each other economically, and the next day standing together for life and death in war. On this point I seriously disagree with Professor Wheare.

Further there must be common citizenship. This is—in legal terms—the most elementary expression of common allegiance to the union. For the same reasons the various services most immediately affecting the public ought—as Professor Rivero has pointed out in his report—to be under federal administration. I also take it for granted that there must be a judicial organ having supreme power in all disputes between the *member states*. This, and not the question of judicial review of legislation, is the cornerstone in jurisdictional matters.

As to the formulation of the federal powers, I find the idea indicated by Professor Rivero (p. 290-91) very interesting and well in the line with modern ideas of decentralization.

In conclusion, if I have stressed the necessity of a federal government and thus gone much further than Professor Wheare in claims for unification, I, unlike him, see no reason why the treaty-making power without limitation should be transferred to the union, that is the federal government. I see no objection to a division of the treaty-making power corresponding to the division of competence. That means that the union (the federal government) would have competence in matters of foreign policy and those internal matters which have been given over to the federal authorities, and that the member states retain the treaty-making power in all other relations.

## RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION ON PROFESSOR WHEARE'S REPORT

One meeting of the Congress, held on Monday, 4 September from 4.30 to 7 p. m., with Professor Quincy Wright (University of Chicago) in the Chair, was devoted to a discussion of Professor Wheare's report. The reactions of delegates differed considerably: some doubted whether the conditions proposed by Professor Wheare would be adequate for the establishment of a strong Union, others were concerned with the question of finding a balance of power within the Union, and yet others called for particulars regarding the scope of Professor Wheare's minimum requirements.

Professor Akzin (University of Jerusalem, Israel), the first member to speak, discussed the important problem of whether a direct relationship between the individual and the Union, in the sense of giving the latter some direct jurisdiction over the former,



was not an essential condition for any effective international Union. Professor Leoni (Pavia University, Italy) wished to clear up a misunderstanding which he felt might arise out of the wording of the report under discussion. The words "minimum conditions for an effective and permanent Union of States" might suggest that only a few conditions were necessary for an effective and permanent Union of States. As a matter of fact, there were many important minimum conditions: governmental intervention was necessary to raise money if a working federation was to be achieved. But such governmental intervention would have far-reaching repercussions on the economic life of the States of the Federation. It should be realized that the minimum conditions of a good Federation are neither few nor unimportant. Professor Hastad (University of Stockholm), was of the opinion that, if a Union was to be effective, the Federation should have certain powers. The question was not, what were the best conditions, but what were the minimum conditions. What brought the nations together and what was the minimum starting point? Even in time of peace the question of defence was important. If the government was to intervene in economic and defence questions of the Union, it should be able to see that the relevant laws and orders were effective. Professor Antonioli (Innsbruck University, Austria) pointed out that a Union of States was inconceivable without some provision for the interpretation of the constitution by a supreme court. The Austrian High Court of Constitutional Law, a model of such an institution, had since 1920 been functioning most efficiently and successfully in a federated State. It was the only court competent to decide whether an act of the Union or of the States was in conformity with the constitution. It alone was able to repeal an act. All the other courts were obliged to apply an act until it was repealed. The court settled disputes concerning the distribution of responsibilities between Union and States. In a Union, a court to deal with constitutional disputes was the only means of settling clashes of authority by process of law.

Other delegates were primarily concerned with the fundamental principles on which a Union should be based if it was to become a concrete, living reality: three speakers were strongly in favour of such an approach.

Professor Puntambekar (Nagpur University, India) felt that the Union should be considered more important than the States. The basic condition for an effective and permanent Union of States was the appreciation of the common bonds of the Union. The granting and maintenance of a common citizenship were not important for the Union. No rigid minimum and maximum conditions should be established regarding the allocation of powers. The Union should possess some concurrent, co-ordinating and coercive power or jurisdiction. Absolute separation of powers was inadvisable if civil wars were to be avoided. In addition to the problems of defence, foreign affairs and economy, there was the problem of common loyalty and fellowship. The problem should be considered not merely from the point of view of the European States, which tended to be separatist, but from that of the others also.

Professor Bichara Tabbah (Faculty of Law, Beirut), taking the same stand as Professor Rivero in his report, laid emphasis on the great difficulties raised by individual States in connexion with any proposal for a Union of States. States were reluctant to forego even the slightest measure of sovereignty. But to argue on those grounds that union was impossible would be to disregard the sense of world unity to be found among various peoples of the world. Salvation would come from the peoples rather than the States, for they would urge their governments to unite. As emphasized by Mr. Rivero, provision should be made in a union for the representation of peoples as well as of States. With regard to the division of responsibilities, the Union should on no account assume control of education; it should be wary of imposing a uniform culture on different peoples, for standardization of thought, which was bad when limited to a single State, was even more so in the case of a Union of States.

Lastly, Professor Calogeropoulos-Stratis (School of Political Science, Athens, Greece) emphasized that, apart from Unions founded on common nationality (e.g., Germany), any Union, if it was to be permanent and effective, should afford its member States a twofold advantage: a negative advantage, so to speak, in that the Union enabled such States to safeguard their independence against any outside danger and to avoid economic and political isolation; and a positive advantage, in that the Union represented the will of peoples belonging to different States to join together into a



wider community founded upon a similarity of opinions and ideologies and able to engage upon complementary economic activities. Furthermore, it was essential that the machinery of such unions should be rationally designed and, in particular, that the central body should have authority to take decisions, directly binding on the member States, regarding foreign and economic policy and national defence. The other responsibilities of a State could be distributed between the federal bodies and the federated States, except for such matters as should be kept exclusively in the hands of the members of the Union. No Union could endure unless it were founded on mutual political and economic interests and unless it guaranteed individual freedom and social progress.

Although the preceding speakers had been chiefly concerned with the basic prerequisites of a Union, they had also discussed the problem of the optimum distribution of powers. Professor Maranini (University of Florence, Italy) was inclined to think that matter not entirely relevant to the problem on the agenda. As he had understood Professor Wheare's excellent report, it was not concerned with the ideal distribution of powers between the Union and member States. Such an entirely abstract problem would be devoid of any practical meaning. Professor Wheare had considered a very difficult question, namely, the minimum conditions necessary to give a permanent Union of States any chance of survival. Although it had been stated in the abstract, such a question was in point of fact highly practical. There was no denying that Professor Wheare's report made a most valuable contribution to the planning of a possible European Union. If a European Federal Union were established in the near future, politicians might be faced with the necessity of safeguarding the greatest possible number of interests and at the same time guaranteeing to the new political organization a certain vital minimum of authority. And since vested interests might offer powerful, well-nigh insurmountable resistance, it was of the utmost importance to have the clearest possible ideas on that point. Hence the value of Professor Wheare's work and of the current discussion. Professor Wheare had directed attention to a number of functions and powers that it would possibly be useful and even necessary to delegate to the Federal Union at the outset. Admittedly, such powers did not constitute an entirely coherent organic whole, but once the Union was assured of the vital minimum, they might develop further out of the community of interests that would no doubt be fostered by the new political organization. Professor Maranini therefore agreed with the substance of Professor Wheare's arguments, but he felt it necessary to add that the problem of allocation of powers could not be divorced from the problem of the Union's legal organization. Accordingly, certain absolutely indispensable preliminary conditions could be formulated—conditions which concerned the existence rather than the power of the Union. The first condition was that the Union should be able to express its will with the force of law, necessitating the creation of bodies taking majority decisions. The second was the possibility of ensuring uniform interpretation, throughout the Union, involving the need for central judicial control. The third was the direct execution of the Union's will by a federal administration. Such, in the speaker's opinion, were the preliminary requirements, without which it would be fruitless to delegate any power whatsoever to the Union. Convincing proof was afforded by the experience of the League of Nations and of the United Nations.

Professor Chapsal (Institut d'études politiques, University of Paris) stressed the impossibility of separating the question of institutions as such from the question of their functions or powers (e.g., the Schuman plan). The two problems should be considered together. In addition, he called for a clarification of the term "national defence" which had been given a very flexible interpretation. Did it mean nothing more than military measures (such as fixing the duration of military service) or was a more comprehensive meaning attached to the term? In certain countries, the nationalization of war industries had been described solely as a national defence measure. What would be the limits of "national defence" in the scheme under consideration?

Professor Berlia (University of Caen, France) called in doubt the underlying assumption of the discussion. In his opinion there was no universal problem but a series of individual problems. Furthermore, each particular problem assumed different aspects at different times. After the first world war, the over-riding consideration



with regard to a European Union had been the problem of disarmament, whereas, at the present juncture, the problem of re-armament was the foremost concern. Lastly, the word "government" had too broad a meaning. What was required was an examination of specific powers and functions.

Professor Loewenstein (Amherst College, U.S.A.) was far more dubious about the possibility of establishing a Western Union in the near future. One of the essential prerequisites of a federal Union was similarity or homogeneity in the form of government. The combination of States with a widely divergent political organization rendered the Union ineffective and created insuperable tensions. That did not mean that all Member States should have an identical political structure, but, for example, the combination of dictatorial and democratic States was unworkable. Similarity of the form of political government had been inscribed in practically all federal constitutions, such as the American and Swiss Constitutions, the Weimar and Bonn Constitutions in Germany, and those of various Latin American countries. The League of Nations failed because of the incompatibility of democracies and dictatorships. The United Nations Charter failed, for political reasons, to face the issue squarely, and instead used the ambiguous term of peace-loving states. However, recent experience had clearly demonstrated that political homogeneity was not sufficient. It should be extended to the postulate of a similar social structure among the federal States. If the principle of free enterprise prevailed in some States they could not form a successful federal Union with others based on planning or controls. Therein lay one of the basic reasons why, for the time being, and probably for a long time to come, a Western Union was not feasible. Planning for full employment, as in Britain, would, within the Union policies, inevitably conflict with the unmitigated capitalism, tolerating unemployment, which prevailed in others.

Professor Akzin (University of Jerusalem, Israel) was somewhat critical of the type of Union proposed: he considered common defence to be, doubtless, a strong unifying force in any non-universal Union, whether regional or ideological, or based on power-partnership. But on the other hand, such Unions tended to become focal points for mutually hostile blocs, thereby exercising a divisive rather than a unifying influence on a world scale. Would not even a modest and rudimentary Union on a universal basis be preferable to a strongly consolidated regional or ideological Union?

## THE FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

A. MAXWELL

### I. FINANCIAL FEATURES OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM

#### *The Continental Congress*

The issue which pulled the American Colonies into the semblance of union was the need of defending their rights against Great Britain. The formal manifestation of the union was the first Continental Congress which met at Philadelphia in September 1774. Behind this Congress stood a network of local committees—revolutionary bodies outside and apart from the regular political system, which remained in the hands of the British authorities. These committees were created to influence the British Government to change its policy, and when in 1774 they selected the delegates to the Continental



Congress, most of the people were hopeful that a change could be secured. But the gathering of the Congress, a revolutionary body which stemmed from revolutionary bodies, shifted the issue of policy from the 13 individual colonies to the Congress acting for all of them.

The first Continental Congress agreed to strike at British trade by non-importation, non-exportation and non-consumption agreements. In these steps of economic boycott against Great Britain, the Congress was following precedents of earlier acts of resistance such as the Stamp Act Congress of 1765.

Next spring in April 1775 hostilities began at Concord and Lexington, and the Continental Congress which met in May had to face the fact of war. It issued a Declaration of Independence and set to work at preparing a formal plan of confederation. As it turned out, confederation went ahead slowly. A scheme of union was reported by a committee in July 1776. Congress itself debated this scheme for one and a half years and a further three and a half years elapsed before the Articles of Confederation were ratified by the last of the 13 states in March 1781. Therefore the Continental Congress, a revolutionary body resting on no basis of law and with powers which depended entirely upon the tacit consent of the people, was the sole organ of government until March 1781. Since the independence of the United States was acknowledged by Great Britain in September 1782, the Revolutionary war was fought by Americans without any formal constitutional union.

The chief source of revenue of the Congress was the issue of paper money, Continental currency, which was authorized in June 1775, a week after the battle of Bunker Hill. Altogether some \$242 million was authorized with results which are well known. The phrase "not worth a Continental", still heard in the United States, is a relic of this episode. Yet the Continental currency provided in specie value nearly 60 per cent of the total income of the Continental Treasury 1775-1783.

Taxation provided nearly nine per cent but this was levied by the states and not by the Congress. The Congress itself had no independent power of taxation; it requisitioned the states to supply various sums of money and the record of the states in meeting these demands was not good. The Congress made also a few requisitions for specific supplies and these were even more unfortunate. Part of the difficulty arose out of the inherent defects of requisition as a source of revenue, but part arose out of the inadequate system of administration. Until the end of the war the facts as to what each state should pay and what it had paid were badly recorded, and this encouraged delinquency and bickering.

Borrowing at home and abroad supplied nearly 50 per cent of the total income of the Continental Congress during the war period. The foreign loan came mostly from France and were based upon political considerations. France assisted the revolting states in order to weaken Great Britain and not because it believed the loans to be good investments. Domestic loans (60 per cent of the total) were pushed vigorously by the use of state offices, and it is remarkable that so much was secured.

The weak fiscal performance of the Continental Congress does not mean that a more formal union would have resulted in a better system of war finance. The revolting states were quite unprepared to give strong financial powers to a national government, no matter how organized. One reason for the revolution was a complaint over taxation, a complaint which went against all taxes and not merely taxes levied by the British. So sober a person as Benjamin Franklin explained to the French Government that "the contest being upon the very question of taxation, the laying of imposts, unless from



the last necessity, would have been madness".<sup>1</sup> Moreover, revolutionary doctrines were in the air about all types of government authority with a Rhode Island petition declaring that taxes "ought to be free and voluntary".<sup>2</sup>

### *The Articles of Confederation*

In March 1781 the government of the United States passed from the stage of *de facto* to *de jure* when the Articles of Confederation constitutionalized the powers of Congress. The powers of the confederation were, however, very little different from those previously exercised by the Continental Congress. In spite of the common heritage of language, religion, law and government, the states when released from Great Britain were not at once prepared to submerge their animosities and enmities. Exercise of extensive Congressional power was, it appeared, no more acceptable than exercise of power by the British Parliament.

The articles of Confederation, therefore, lodged most power with the states, even giving them a qualified power in matters which were obviously the responsibility of the Congress. For example, Congress had the power "of determining on peace and war" (Article 9), except when a state was "actually invaded by enemies" (Article 6). Congress had the power of entering into treaties, but those could not interfere with the rights of a state to subject foreigners to the same duties as were imposed on its citizens. Among the states themselves the rule was equality, since the vote of each in the Congress was to be the same.

The narrow limitation of the functions of the general government was enormously reinforced by a lack of Congressional power to administer, and especially to finance, its limited duties. The Congress of the Confederation, like the Continental Congress, had no power of its own to levy taxes upon the people. Its expenses were to be assessed upon the several states "in proportion to the value of all land within each state, granted to or surveyed by any person as such land and the buildings and the improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and appoint" (Article 8). The taxes to provide these sums were to be "laid and levied by the authority and direction of the several states".

The effect of these weak financial powers was that Congress lacked the revenue to do even the things which it had the clear constitutional power to do. From 1781 to 1789 Congress ordered the states to pay as requisitions \$6,630,000 in specie and \$8,733,000 in indents; it received \$3,384,000 in specie and \$1,542,000 in indents. The result was, of course, growing arrears; soldiers went unpaid, interest on debt was outstanding until both domestic and foreign creditors were alarmed. The fact that some states, notably New York and Pennsylvania, paid what was asked of them, while others did not, increased the ill-feeling. There was danger of commercial warfare among the states. Congress had no way of regulating interstate commerce or levying tariffs, and some of the states found themselves at odds in this field.

Meanwhile, attempts had been made to strengthen the fiscal powers of the Congress by amendment. But since amendment required unanimous consent, progress by this means was blocked. Thus in 1781 Rhode Island refused to become the thirteenth state to give Congress the right to levy a five

<sup>1</sup> W. G. Sumner, *The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution* (N. Y., 1891), I, 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.



per cent duty on imports. The state legislature gave as a reason for opposition that "she considered it the most precious jewel of sovereignty that no state be called upon to open its purse but by the authority of the state by her own officers". In less fancy language Rhode Island felt that as a state with a large foreign trade, she would buy relatively more than the other states. In 1783 Congress asked for the right to levy a limited range of duties for 25 years, the duties to be collected by state officers and to be used only to pay interest on the public debt. By 1787 12 states signified acceptance of this innocuous measure, but New York was recalcitrant because its treasury was collecting duties on goods imported for use in other states. The feeling grew up among those who desired a strong and united nation that the Articles of Confederation provided the wrong *kind* of government.<sup>1</sup> In its place they wanted a government which could regulate external and interstate trade, control disposal of the western lands, establish the national credit and a national monetary system, settle disputes among the states and provide an adequate system of defence. They were certain that, above all else, Congress needed the power to levy taxes for its own use and through its own officers.

### *The First Decade of the New Constitution*

The new constitution which emerged in 1788 greatly enlarged the financial powers of the new federal government. Congress received the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and exercises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States",<sup>2</sup> which meant that, besides exclusive control over customs, it was to have a concurrent jurisdiction with the states in practically all fields of taxation. To many contemporaries this seemed excessive, and advocates of the plan, while insisting that such a broad federal power was desirable, protested that there was no practical likelihood of its extended use. Thus Hamilton argued that "the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentment of the state government, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administration for local purposes would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power". He went on to affirm that, with the sole exception of duties on foreign trade, the states would retain an independent right to raise revenue "in the most absolute and unqualified sense, and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution".<sup>3</sup> Why, then, was it needful to *give* the national government such a broad power? Because upon it fell the duty of defence. Wars and rebellions were the two "most mortal diseases of society".<sup>4</sup> The expenditures of the national government, if it were blessed by peace, would be small. But since the danger of war was incalculable, the federal power of taxation should not be limited. Even to separate out and divide sources of revenue, with some assigned to the federal government and some to the states, would be to sacrifice "the great interests of the union to the power of the individual states".<sup>5</sup>

Other and less important financial provisions of the Constitution reflected sectional apprehension and the experience of Confederation. For example

<sup>1</sup> Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation* (Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1940), p. 241.

<sup>2</sup> This was subject to the qualification that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States".

<sup>3</sup> *Federalist*, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1888), p. 185.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 286.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.



the levy of export duties was prohibited<sup>1</sup> because of the fear of the South that its great staples (such as tobacco), which were largely sold abroad, might be taxed. Again, the Congress was given the power to levy "direct" taxes, but only by apportioning them among the states "according to their respective members". What was a direct tax? For many decades the assumption was made that a direct tax was merely a requisition upon the states. This device was used in 1789, in 1814, and in 1861, when modest sums were collected with fair success. But as the states became unequal in wealth and income per capita, it became clear that the apportionment of a tax according to population was inequitable. The issue became important only when the Supreme Court in 1895 held that an income tax was a direct tax. This serious limitation upon the financial powers of the federal government was, however, rectified by the 16th amendment to the Constitution which gave Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes on income from whatever source derived without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration".

Let me next review briefly how the fiscal powers of the new government were used in the first decade of its history. What was done mirrored the personal opinions and the genius of Alexander Hamilton, who advocated centralization beyond what most men then thought feasible. I shall concentrate attention on the funding of the debt and on establishment of a national system of excises.

The debt issued by the government of the Confederation had, of course, depreciated during the war period and the disorderly years 1783-1788. A sharp dispute arose between those who felt that a distinction should be drawn in funding the debt between original purchasers of the securities and the speculators who had bought the bonds at a discount by later purchase. Hamilton argued strongly against this discrimination both on the legal ground that under the letter of the contract the bonds had been issued as negotiable, and on the administrative ground that insuperable obstacles stood in the way of equitable discrimination. The simple plan of outright federal assumption would, Hamilton conceded, permit some individuals to make speculative profits; but this danger was irreparable, and to strive to avoid it would not be to secure a more exact justice. In this matter Hamilton had his way.

Much more controversial was the question of debts of the state governments. In favour of federal assumption Hamilton argued that these were war debts—they were "the price of liberty". All public creditors should, in his opinion, be treated alike, as they would not be if the states were left to their own resources. The states were unequal in the debts which they had amassed and in their ability to carry their debts. All of them, however, had been deprived of customs, and therefore of their chief source of revenue. The federal government, equipped with this revenue, could assume the debts without great inconvenience. After a bitter debate, here also Hamilton had his way. The effect of both steps was obviously to interest all holders of war debts in the maintenance of a strong federal government.

Still another centralizing measure inspired by Hamilton was the establishment of a system of federal excises. His purpose was, as he said "to lay hold of so valuable a source of revenue before it was generally preoccupied by the state government".<sup>2</sup> A federal revenue which rested entirely upon the customs would be vulnerable to the impact of war. Congress was sufficiently

<sup>1</sup> Article I, Section IX, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander Hamilton, *Complete Works*, edited by H. Cabot Lodge (N. Y., 1885-86), II, pp. 247-248.



impressed to impose a few excises, particularly upon distilled spirits. One prompt reaction occurred in Western Pennsylvania where a few thousand objectors rose in the so-called Whiskey Rebellion.

These vigorous steps to strengthen the fiscal power of the new federal government were wise. A heavy war debt was brought into order; a revenue system was established and enlarged. With the advantage of hindsight it seems clear that a more cautious programme would have revived the divisive forces inherent in the new federalism.

### *Federal Power up to and after the Civil War*

During the next 60 years the federal government gradually lost ground. Behind this decentralization lay the geographic growth of the nation to the west, which brought into the union new states with new sectional interests. In addition, the old cleavage between the North and the South was deepened by the spread of cotton and slavery. The heterogeneity of the nation appeared to preclude Congressional action on very many important issues. All the leading public men, obsessed with the perplexities of federalism, came to believe that federal functions should be held to a minimum. President Franklin Pierce put the prevalent theory as follows: "The minimum of federal government compatible with the maintenance of national unity and efficient action in our relations with our powers under the general clauses of the Constitution. A spirit of strict deference to the sovereign rights and dignity of every state . . . should characterize all our exercise of the respective powers temporarily vested in us as a sacred trust from the generous confidence of our constituents".<sup>1</sup> Almost the only federal function and expense, apart from the general overhead of government was the national defence, and, except for two brief periods, 1812-1815 and 1846-1848, it was a light burden.

The federal government relied for its revenue almost entirely upon the customs duties which, for most of the 60 years, were so low as to be almost a revenue tariff.<sup>2</sup> The chief financial problem of most Secretaries of the Treasury was that they had an over-abundant revenue and recurrent surpluses. These surpluses were used for the non-controversial purpose of paying off the debt, and in 1835 the federal government was completely debt-free. What then was to be done? The federal revenue came from a tariff as low as the Congress desired; increased federal expenditure was not feasible within the limited range of functions regarded as appropriate. Inevitably schemes for distributing federal money to the states were advanced, and in 1836-1837 one of them was actually put into effect.

The philosophy which held that "the minimum of federal government" and "a strict deference to the sovereign rights and dignity of every state" would hold the nation peaceably together proved to be inefficacious. The sectional rift widened and a civil war ensued which, by its outcome, settled the constitutional debate over supremacy. The Civil War also forced the federal government to exploit many sources of revenue. But within a few years of peace these new taxes were dropped and the federal government, as before 1860, came to rely for its revenue upon customs duties levied at much higher rates than earlier, supplemented by excises on liquor and tobacco.

With World War I this pattern was dislocated once more when the federal

<sup>1</sup> *Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902*, edited by James E. Richardson (Washington, 1903), V, 224.

<sup>2</sup> During the mid-1830's revenue from land and sales surged up, but for the period as a whole this was not an important source.



government developed such sources of revenue as income taxes and death duties. During the 1920's less reversion took place than after the earlier wars and then during the 1930's a marked shift in social philosophy occurred. When economic collapse brought unemployment and destitution on a scale beyond all precedent in American experience, public opinion gradually veered to the view that only the federal government had the fiscal strength to act with success. Responsibilities were assumed by the Congress which in earlier decades had rested upon the state and local governments. World War II reinforced these centralist trends and at present the federal government possesses and exercises powers far beyond what was envisaged in 1789. Yet most emphatically the United States is still a federation and not a unitary country.

### *Use of Grants-in-Aid*

In this evaluation of American federalism from the weak design of Confederation to the strong structure of 1950, a variety of financial devices have played a part. Under the Articles of Confederation the fiscal device which symbolized the strength of the states and the dependence of Congress was the requisition grants made by the component governments to the general government. The Congress had no tax revenue collected by its own officers. It is curious to reflect how far the situation has been reversed in recent years. During the 1930's federal grants to the state and local governments were equal to one-third of state and local tax collections.

The growth of federal grants-in-aid has indeed been one of the most striking fiscal features of the evolution of federalism in the United States. The early federal grants were of land or the proceeds from land sales, and for the most part they were outright donations with no requirements of state-local expenditure and with no federal oversight. Slowly, after the Civil War, many grants for a number of different purposes emerged. By 1929 13 federal grants programmes were in operation, making up 1 1/2 per cent of the state local expenditures. On the one hand the federal government had recognized a federal interest in the performance of a number of functions which, constitutionally or historically, belonged to the states (and localities); on the other hand, the states and localities had felt the pressure arising from a relative shrinkage in their sources of revenue and the expansion of the agenda of government. Grants offered a middle-of-the-road-device, permitting the state and local government to administer a function, subject to federal conditions.

An upsurge in federal grants occurred after 1929, partly through a great expansion of emergency grants attributable to the depression and partly through addition of new grant programmes for welfare purposes. In 1939 federal grants amounted to \$2,910,000,000 and were equal to 40 per cent of state-local tax collections. With World War II, a downward swing in the absolute amount of grants, coupled with a growth in state-local collections, brought the comparable figure to nine per cent. But the post-war swing is upward and, beyond question, grants-in-aid have become an important fiscal device of American federalism.

It should be appreciated that these federal grants are conditional grants. They are given subject to participation by recipient governments in specific expenditures, and to some federal supervision. The federalism of the United States, unlike the federalism of Canada and Australia, has given no countenance to the unconditional grant which has no strings attached.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The United States experimented vaguely with financial devices related to grants, the most important of which is the shared revenue. But it is only a percentage of federal collection



## Generalizations

This sketch of the origins and fiscal development of federalism in the United States suggests a few financial generalizations applicable to the design of a federation of Western Europe. The object is to build a structure not so loose as to be amorphous and not so firm as to be rigid in the face of heterogeneity and growth.

One financial problem which plagued the early years of the federation in the United States was the government debt, particularly the debt of the component states. The Hamiltonian solution was complete federal assumption. In the Canadian federation in 1857 the federal government assumed all provincial debt, but since relative amounts of debt were unequal from province to province, a system of "debt allowance" was devised, with the provincial governments receiving or paying interest to the federal government on the amount by which their actual debt was in excess of, or less than, their debt allowance.

In this respect federation of Western Europe would not need to follow the American or the Canadian precedents. One reason is that the burden of national debt for most of the nations of Western Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden are notable exceptions) is less than before World War II as a result of an increase in the price level and a fall in interest rates. Another reason is that the assumption of debts would require the transfer of financial resources to the government of the federation beyond what is now practicable.

The early experience of the American federation does reveal, however, that the government of a federation must have direct access through its own officers to some important source of revenue. The most obvious and most natural source is customs duties which may be supplemented (as will be elaborated later) by a scheme of grants.

Percentages of Net National Income Devoted to Interest on the National Debt.<sup>1</sup>

|                 | 1937 | 1937-38 | 1948-49 | 1949 | 1949-50 |
|-----------------|------|---------|---------|------|---------|
| Austria. . .    | 2.0  | —       | —       | 0.3  | —       |
| Ireland. . .    | —    | 0.9     | —       | —    | 0.6     |
| Denmark. . .    | 1.2  | —       | —       | 0.7  | —       |
| France. . .     | 4.2  | —       | —       | 1.2  | —       |
| Italy. . .      | —    | 5.2     | —       | —    | 1.5     |
| Sweden. . .     | —    | 0.9     | 1.5     | —    | —       |
| Norway. . .     | —    | 1.8     | 1.8     | —    | —       |
| Belgium. . .    | 1.9  | —       | —       | 3.0  | —       |
| Netherlands. .  | 2.3  | —       | —       | 4.9  | —       |
| United Kingdom. | 4.7  | —       | —       | 5.5  | —       |

from such sources as proceeds of royalties and rentals from mineral leases granted on public lands are turned over to the states, subject to no conditions. The total amount of the shared revenue is relatively small (\$12-13 millions) yearly and instructive generalizations cannot be drawn from this experience of the United States.

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 40.



### *Customs and Excise*

The most obvious source of revenue which a federal government should possess grows out of the right to regulate foreign trade. Control over goods exported to and imported from nations outside the federation is a minimum condition for the establishment of effective federation, and this control provides a means to secure a revenue for the federal government. Duties on export have a long history in Western Europe and possibly some of them might continue after union. But revenue from such a source would be small. Duties on import could, however, be an important source of revenue for the government of a Western Union.

Advocates of Western Union write of the advantages of complete renunciation of duties on goods passing frontiers within the union and assume the establishment of a protective tariff with uniform duties on imports from the rest of the world. The level at which to set such a tariff would be a matter for protracted negotiation. It would not advance discussion to assume that the union might start with customs duties equal to the *average* level of the component nations. If the duties levied before union by France and Italy on item A were aimed entirely at imports from Switzerland, and if after the union such duties vanished, then it would not make sense to count these pre-union duties so as to reach an average duty on item A for the federal union. Whatever the level, some protective duties would certainly be established against the rest of the world, and these duties would bring in some revenue unless they were completely effective in stopping imports.

It is, moreover, proper to assume that the union would levy some duties on imports strictly for revenue purposes. A revenue tariff in logic requires that duties on imports should be matched by equivalent excises on domestic products. The object is, of course, to cancel out the protective effect which import duties by themselves would have. When duties are levied on commodities not produced within the union, and when no nearby substitute is available, matching excises obviously would not be necessary. The relationship between revenue duties and excises has a double application. When an excise is already in force, a matching customs duty is justified; when a customs duty is in force, a matching excise is justified. It follows also that a uniform system of customs duties implies uniform rates of excises on similar commodities throughout the union. Maintenance of different rates of excises on similar commodities would mean that producers paying the higher rates would be at a disadvantage as compared to those paying the lower rates. No such disadvantage would occur, however, from levy of excises on commodities which are the peculiar product of one country.

The application of these rules would lead to certain foreseeable consequences. It would seem that the federal government should collect through its own officers not only customs duties levied at the frontier, but also excise duties levied on equivalent commodities wherever produced. The rules would raise awkward questions when the excisable commodities were produced in some of the component nations by private enterprise and in others by government monopolies. Another probable consequence would be a considerable extension of the coverage of excises, since at present a country which produces exportable commodities is not likely to levy excises upon them, and since many countries have levied customs duties without following the rule of levying matching excises.



Collections from customs and excises levied by the federal union according to the principles outlined above might not unreasonably amount to a sum equal to eight per cent of the national income. At present expenditure for national defence by the nations of Western Europe is approximately six per cent of national income.<sup>1</sup> Since defence would be the major—and costly—function of a western federal union, revenue from customs and excise would appear to be an adequate financial resource. One may, however, speculate that a complete transfer could not be arranged, that expenditure for defence might increase, and that for these and other reasons supplementary sources of revenue for the federal government should be provided.

Before examining what these might be, it is of great importance to notice that, at present, direct economic controls provide obstacles to trade which are at least as important as tariffs. So long as exchange, controls, quotas, allocations, bulk purchases and sales, etc., are maintained, the very concept of a common tariff has little meaning. How complete a removal of direct quantitative controls is necessary before the concept *would* have meaning is debatable. One prerequisite is a mutual convertability of currencies at rates of exchange varying within narrow limits, which means discontinuance of inflation. Another prerequisite is substitution of the price mechanism for the mechanism of direct controls. It would appear also that the important nations would have to come closer together than at present in their policies with respect to the amount of their economic planning under governmental direction. Controls as strict and as extensive as in Great Britain, and as slight as in Belgium, may be incompatible within a federation. Some critics, however, have an exaggerated idea of the amount of uniformity of policies which would be required of component governments in a federation. The fact is that even in the tight federalism of the United States, Australia, and Canada, appreciable differences in the magnitude and the intensity of governmental programmes of the states (provinces) exist and have existed. If, as presumed in this paper, the government of the Western European Union would be concerned mainly with the function of defence, and not at all with programmes of social welfare, very little influence toward equalization of standards of living would be exercised. Differences in wage levels, working conditions, banking systems would continue as in the past.

### *Grants*

Supposing then that a federal union with control over customs and excises has been established, what supplementary source of revenue might be provided? In the federations of the United States, Canada and Australia the major source of revenue for the federal government is now income tax, personal and corporate. Approximately two-thirds of federal tax-receipts come from it, and most economists believe this to be a very desirable development. Not a few, indeed, feel that the case for complete federal assumption of income taxation is strong both for the sake of equity and of elimination of tax conflicts. These developments are, however, of recent origin and they are not relevant for a federation of Western Europe. My view, admittedly superficial, is that the principles and the administration of income taxation between Great

<sup>1</sup> Expenditures for defence in 1949 as percentages of the net national income. (United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 40.) : Belgium, 2.2; Denmark, 1.9; France, 6.7; Ireland, 1.3; Italy, 4.5; Netherlands, 5.8; Norway, 2.8; Sweden, 3.8; United Kingdom, 6.6.



Britain on the one hand, and France and Italy on the other, are extremely different. Even if agreement on basis and principles could be achieved, differences in administration and enforcement could not be reconciled in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the right of a federal government of Western Europe to levy taxes upon income is not inherently connected with its creation and existence as is its right to levy income upon external trade. If it be objected, somewhat academically, that a tax system of customs and excises is regressive, an academic answer is that the net result of such levies by a federal government of Western Europe, in lieu of similar levies by existing national governments, might be a lessening of regression.

The best prospect for a supplementary source of revenue to customs and excises would be grants from the component governments to the federal government. The history of such grants in other federations does not indeed suggest they would necessarily be satisfactory. In the United States before 1788 grants designed as the chief fiscal resource of government of the Confederation were badly distributed and badly paid. The apportionment was according to the value of the land and improvements in each state. Since not even approximate figures were available bickering over apportionment was chronic. In Germany after 1871 grants from the states to the Reich did not work well. The basis for these grants was population which has the great merit of being both objective and ascertainable. It is, however, inequitable when the component states differ markedly in resources. Historical instances need not to be multiplied to make the point that grants *have been* an unsatisfactory source of revenue when the donor governments were numerous, diverse in resources, unequal in their sense of responsibility and in their allegiance to the recipient government. And yet the outcome is quite otherwise when a single donor government makes the grants to numerous recipient governments—as has long been the case in the United States, Canada and Australia. In these latter cases the recipients have an assured source of revenue even when terms have not been nailed down by constitutional provision.

Let me appraise the historical evidence concerning grants in the United States before 1788 to see how applicable it is to the scheme of Western European Union. The present European nations which might be the components of a federal union are dissimilar in many respects to the 13 American states in 1781-1788. The American states were primitive agricultural communities, which, as colonies, had a bad financial record; they had not had and they did not appreciate, the benefits of a stable monetary unit. The nations of Western Europe, on the other hand, are integrated industrial communities with highly developed trade and with a keen appreciation of the value of fiscal probity. Moreover, the situation of the Western European nations now *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world is very unlike that of the American states 170 years ago. The American States had fought a successful war without a federal union and they had no strong fear of aggression from any nation; not only did they feel able to protect themselves against the Indians, but some contemplated aggressive action against the Indians which a federal government might restrain. In short, the compulsions upon the states toward providing financial contributions for the government of the Confederation were slight. On the contrary, external forces push the nations of Western Europe together. The fear of war drives them to build a regional union to provide the safeguards which the United Nations does not provide.

Still another challenge inspires some European statesmen toward Western Union. This is that their people in the near future may suffer either an



absolute fall in the standard of living or lag in securing a higher standard. By creating a large free trade area, efficiency might be stimulated so as to reduce the gap between American and European productivity and thereby prevent any relative or absolute decline in European living standards. The leaders of the United States in the 1780's faced no such challenge.

A better historical analogy than the experience of the American Confederation in the use of grants or requisitions is the experience of the United States after 1789 with "direct" taxation. In 1798, 1814, and 1861 the federal government made requisitions upon the states according to population. In 1798 and 1861 the payments were made slowly; in 1814 they came with reasonable promptness, indicating the effectiveness of an improved federal administration. No further use has been made of this device. But this desuetude is attributable not so much to inability to make collections as to the conviction that levies upon the states according to population are inequitable in view of the disparities among them in per capita wealth and income.

It is, therefore, arguable that a system of contributions from the component countries to the government of the federation of Western Europe would be faithfully and willingly paid, especially if the basis of payment were equitable. Population would not, however, be a satisfactory basis because in Western European nations differences per capita incomes are at present too great: the per capita income in Italy is one-quarter that in Switzerland, or Sweden, or the United Kingdom; that of France is not much more than half that of Switzerland. And if Greece and Austria are included, the disparities are much greater—the per capita income of Greece is perhaps less than one-seventh, and that of Austria not much more than one-quarter that of Switzerland. Equal contributions per capita would, therefore, appear out of the question.

A modern and a fairer basis of contribution would be the respective national incomes. All ordinary taxes, no matter what their form, come out of national income. Component governments would of course, be allowed to raise their contributions by whatever means they pleased, but the *amount* of each contribution should depend on the amount of the national income of each nation in relation to the population.


The national income per head in 1948 was (dollars in 1938 prices): Switzerland, 441; Sweden, 413; United Kingdom, 401; Denmark, 307; Ireland, 287; Belgium-Luxemburg, 287; Norway, 253; Netherlands, 250; France, 228; Italy, 105; Greece, 62.

If this principle is accepted, still another concession to equity is desirable and even necessary. Let it be assumed that the total amount of contributions should equal  $x$  per cent of the total income of the component nations; surely it does not follow that each, rich or poor, should contribute this percentage. A better proposal would be that the contribution percentage should itself be graduated, so that the poorest nation would have a lower figure than the richest, with graduation for the nations between. The variation in percentages, however, should not be too great. A much lower figure for a poor nation than a rich one would tempt the former to underestimate its responsibilities to the federation and the latter to overemphasize the cost to it. Undesirable animosities would develop among members.

As an illustration of the above plan, let it be supposed that the total sum required in contributions amounts to four per cent of the total incomes of the component nations. If the *per capita* income of the federation is \$250, this would mean a contribution of \$10 *per capita*. The contribution of Greece at one extreme might be set at \$5 *per capita*, while that of Switzerland might be



set at \$15. A crude graphic illustration is given below. Obviously the slope of the line is another matter for decision: it could be more or less steep than in the illustration given above.



Some advocates of the Western European Union have stressed—overstressed—the obstacles which the American states had to overcome in order to form a federation in 1788. Clarence Streit, for example, has written: “It seems to me on balance that Union is much easier now than then.”<sup>1</sup> The difficulty—indeed, the impossibility—of striking such a balance is obvious. Yet the opinion of most American historians would, I am sure, tilt the balance the other way.

An excellent survey of the historical background has recently been prepared by Professor John C. Ranney.<sup>2</sup> The cultural, social, and political differences among the American states (colonies) were, he points out, “obvious rather than profound”. In language, customs, political traditions, and ideas, all were distinctly British; in religion all were Protestant, and most were strongly Protestant. The colonies had, moreover, an unusual amount of experience in co-operation under the British Crown, and the idea of federation was a natural outgrowth of the relation of colonies within the empire. Undoubtedly state patriotism was a barrier to union, but surely this was less deep-seated and less founded in history than the present patriotism of the nations of Western Europe.

The balance of economic factors then and now is more difficult to weigh. Certainly the countries of Western Europe are much more interdependent in trade and communication than were the American states. On the other

<sup>1</sup> Clarence Streit, *Union Now* (Harper and Brothers, N. Y., 1938), p. 34.  
<sup>2</sup> “The Bases of American Federalism”, *William and Mary Quarterly*, January 1946. In what follows immediately I have drawn heavily upon this article.



hand, the actual structure of economic nationalism in the way of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and economic controls, is enormously more elaborate now, and has behind it more powerful interests, than in 1788. By the American Revolution the trade regulation imposed by Great Britain was lifted and the states governments did not have the time or the will to impose new controls. In 1950 most of the nations of Western Europe have, as a result of the great depression and the war, imposed numerous controls upon the price mechanism. In some countries, moreover, controls will probably be retained after the war-imposed shortages and dislocations have vanished. In 1950 the doctrine of economic planning exercises very unequal authority over the different European governments. In Great Britain, the current evidence is that the government is unprepared to associate in economic ventures with governments which do not subscribe as fully as it does to public ownership. Pessimism concerning the prospects of achieving Western Union in the face of these obstacles can be only partly relieved by reflecting that the gains in economic productivity within the reach of Western Europe through the removal of economic barriers—so long as the removal is gradual and continuous—exceed by a large margin the gains to be secured in 1788.

In one other major respect the compulsion toward Western Union now exceeds the compulsion operating in 1788. As has been pointed out, the movement for a new constitution in 1787-1788 (as distinct from the movement for Confederation a decade earlier) owed little to military necessity. But nowadays the democracies of Europe, strong in their determination to prevent recurrence of war, are driven toward union as a means of halting aggression. Finally, numerous and hopeful beginnings at co-operation among these nations may indicate a trend the force of which is not yet fully evident.

Let me now attempt a recapitulation. Parallels between the experience of federalism in the United States and the prospects of Western Europe can be no more than suggestive, because the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating in 1788 and now do not match. History stretched before the American States, whereas in Europe history has been writing chapters of antagonism and racial antipathies for centuries. As a counterpart to this unfavourable situation, one can set the compulsion exercised by the fear of external aggression which now pushes Western Europe to unite and which did not so operate upon the American states in 1788. The pressure of economic forces is even more divergent. While the gains to be anticipated from a Western Europe united into one economic area are vast, the system of barriers to trade which requires levelling is intricate and sturdy; and it is buttressed by doctrines as well as by vested interests far beyond what existed in 1788.

What might reasonably be the fiscal requirements of a federal government of Western Europe? The chief expenditure would be for defence, to which one must add a modest sum for the general overhead of government. Welfare expenditures for years to come should be the responsibility of the component governments and not of the federation. And since assumption of debt of the component governments, a step which seemed essential to the launching of federalism in the United States and Canada, does not appear to be necessary, the federal government of Western Europe would not start with heavy expenditures for interest.

The natural and inevitable source of revenue which must belong to a government deserving to be called "federal" is customs, and to this should be added the right to levy, through its own officers, excises on domestic products equivalent to non-productive duties on imports. These two sources of revenue



might well be supplemented by a system of grants from the component governments to the federal government. The grants should be based upon national income in such a way that the contribution per head of the poorer countries would be less than that of the richer. These are, it seems to me, minimum fiscal requirements for a successful federation. They are sufficiently difficult of achievement to occupy fully the minds and hearts of the friends of Western European Union. To aim at more would be Utopian, to aim at less over-cautious.

## RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION OF PROFESSOR MAXWELL'S REPORT

The Congress devoted two meetings to the discussion of Professor Maxwell's report: the first (on Tuesday, 5 September, from 9.30 a.m. to noon) under the chairmanship of Professor Quincy Wright (University of Chicago, U.S.A.), and the second (on Friday, 8 September, from 10 a.m. to noon) under that of Professor Brogan (Cambridge University, United Kingdom). The discussion centred round the three following points: the problems raised by Professor Maxwell's proposals; the possibility of the Union levying taxes over and above the existing customs duties; conditions for the acceptance of financial burdens by the members of the Union.

Professor Vito (University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy) drew attention to the existence of problems which needed to be approached in a more precise way. He agreed that customs duties should be the chief source of revenue for the Union. But in what currency should the funds be paid? He pointed out that in the case of the Federations of English-speaking countries, to which the rapporteur had referred, the problem of currency transferability or convertibility did not arise, as there was a common currency. But in any European Federation, many currencies were neither transferable nor convertible. Therefore monetary control should be included among the minimum powers to be granted to the central authority. The second point: how to spend the funds, was just as important as how to raise them. Whatever might be thought of Keynesian economic policy, it was certain that many countries were aiming at maintaining full employment. The distribution of the funds among member States would affect employment in each of them. It seemed, therefore, necessary that the central authority should also have power to regulate economic and social policy.

Professor Robson (London School of Economics and Political Science) made several remarks:

- (1) (a) Tariff questions introduced conflicts of interest (sectionalism in the U.S.A.) which should be avoided in a Western European Union.  
(b) A European Tariff Union would tend to produce dependence on customs.
- (2) Professor Maxwell had taken national income as a basis of contribution to the federal government and did not sufficiently consider the total revenue raised by a member State for purposes of internal expenditure. *National income per head of population must be combined with taxable capacity.*
- (3) Before forming a Western Union, it would be wise to discuss precautions to be taken in the event of default by a member State in respect of its obligations.

Professor Chester (Nuffield College, Oxford, United Kingdom) drew attention to the monetary duplication of the Union and the necessity of full employment. He did not think that coinage and all monetary power should be left to the States, nor that it was necessary for the Union to have its own currency. Even with a simple monetary system, a participating State would, for instance, feel the impact of an adverse balance of payment with the non-participating countries. A common citizenship would naturally result in complete mobility of the labour force inside the Union. Therefore, if



special attention were not given to the employment problem, some States might be tempted to secede. Professor Chester considered that maintaining full employment was one of the minimum and primary conditions of a Union; obviously [it would increase legislation and would entail a great deal of duplication or even opposition.

Turning to the question of American "sectionalism" discussed earlier in the debate, Dr. Eve Lewis (American Institute, University of Munich) said that followers of the individualistic philosophy and believers in the right of infinite variety in human personality and the right to follow inclination and talent, would hardly expect to invent government machinery which would do away with those human differences. In America a great achievement of government machinery was to allow expression and give full consideration to the many "sectional" interests of the country. Naturally the sheep breeders of the West had different interests from the cattlemen of Texas, and those of the cotton growers of the South might differ from the manufacturers and financiers of the North. But it was exactly in the free expression of those interests through political channels and in the legislatures that compromise measures developed finally into laws. The two political parties and the vigour of American political life, itself, had grown from the free expression of those sectional interests, and the exploration of measures which were, in turn, to become legislation, aimed at achieving national prosperity. Men should not blind themselves to varying human occupational interests, even in building up theories of government machinery, but provide for full and free expression of those interests as well as machinery to govern human beings as they are or as we hope they may become.

Dr. Lewis did not deplore sectionalism in the United States; he applauded it heartily, and recommended it universally. Man must have fierce and local loyalties to be ardent and strong in himself, and those very devotions to his locality, his profession or his "own business" allowed him to understand the same manifestations in others. He would discuss vigorously, consider profoundly, and compromise realistically—if at the time somewhat reluctantly—and would accept with good will a "working solution".

But should Union finances rest mainly on customs duties? Professor Puntambekar (Nagpur University, India) thought not. Up to the present, the meeting had been considering and emphasizing customs duties as the only source of revenue of the Union. But why not add taxes on income earned not in one member State but in all federating States? They should recognize the close economic interrelation of States, as they did their political interdependence. The Union could make grants to States according to their economic needs and ability, thus strengthening the economic bonds between the States. As an example, he mentioned the Union of India where income tax was the chief source of revenue.

Professor Lambert (Lyons University, France) pointed out that the question could not be dealt with from an exclusively technical point of view. As soon as there was a question of financing a Federal Government, not yet firmly established, it was necessary to pay more attention to the psychological effects of any proposed tax than to its economic or financial advantages. Certain taxes were more readily accepted than others. In a recently established Union of States, the States which were sure of popular loyalty would be in a better position to resist the reactions produced by unpopular taxation. A Federation such as that of the United States, strengthened by the outcome of the War of Secession, and able to count more surely than the individual States themselves on popular loyalty, could resort to taxation on income. But, however effective that taxation might be, and however great its technical merits, the newly established Federation could not resort to it without exposing itself to the risk of becoming dangerously unpopular; it would therefore be better for it to levy indirect taxes which, although less desirable from the economic and social point of view, would be felt less heavily by the population. Once the Federation and the States were obliged to levy taxes of various kinds, the psychological effects of such taxes should determine the choice to be made.

Mr. Freymond (Lausanne, Switzerland) then drew attention to the financial problems of Switzerland. Even in that country, no constitutional solution had yet been found with regard to the division of taxation powers between the Confederation and the cantons.



Professor Hastad (Stockholm University, Sweden) said that it was scarcely possible, politically, and in any case not popular, to base such a federation on indirect taxes (customs in Sweden make up only four per cent of the State budget). Decentralization might, however, not be impossible for successful common defence, and funds might come to a certain extent from indirect taxes, though mainly from government grants. They should build up co-operation and not an absolute dogmatic federation. The most important task for political science was not to stress the traditional federal unions, but to investigate different forms of co-operation.

Professor Quincy Wright (University of Chicago, U.S.A.) raised the question whether the broad powers of a federal government to tax and to spend money would not permit of almost unlimited centralization, provided these powers could be exercised. In the experience of the United States, the influence of the central government had been greatly increased by this method, especially in recent years. The Constitutional theory set forth by President Monroe in vetoing the Cumberland Road bill had long since been abandoned. The federal government had made liberal appropriations for the conduct of public welfare projects through government departments or corporations such as TVA, or by "grants-in-aid" to the States, usually on condition that the latter conform to prescribed standards. In theory the States could refuse to accept such grants, but in practice they seldom did.

Professor Gooch (University of Virginia, U.S.A.) agreed with Professor Wright that federal subsidies in the United States on occasion resulted in the invasion by the National Government not only of the sphere of the State but also of that of the localities. The question had been broached on the previous day by speakers who had disagreed whether the central government of a projected Western European Union should or should not have power to levy an income tax. Opposition based on the fear of too great potential control and centralization was entirely comprehensible. It was difficult, however, to avoid the conclusion that, in every instance in which federal "grants-in-aid" had been employed in the United States, standards of performance had improved. Moreover, the subsidy system was sometimes employed in matters recognized as falling within the power of the National Government. A good example was the system of national roads. Here, employment of grants-in-aid actually resulted in decentralization. The whole question was perhaps the most difficult one to be found in American internal politics. For example, in a few years the question of federal subsidies to higher education would probably become a burning one. There would undoubtedly be much understandable opposition, based on fear of interference and other potential ills resulting from great size, but the probability was that introduction of subsidies would result in higher cultural standards.

Professor Brogan (Cambridge University, United Kingdom) noted that, whereas the American Union was a going concern whose integration had been increasing for 150 years, the European Union was as yet a mythical picture. It was important to be realistic about the distribution of powers in a federation. If it had greatly superior financial powers, it might by grants either to States or to other political units induce them to surrender many of their formally reserved political rights. As had been said in America, the federal Union bought political power from the States. (In America, it should be pointed out, "police power" meant the general social and economic controls).

A very important problem was that of the acceptance of financial burdens by the members of the Union. Professor Bichara Tabbah (Faculty of Law, Beirut, Lebanon) pointed out that, although a great deal had been said about political and financial conditions, nothing had been said about psychological conditions, which, after all, were the most important. In order to establish a Union, it was essential that the peoples should desire it; and it was this desire, this social will to live, which must be encouraged. The peoples would first desire the Union in order to resist a common danger. Fear was the beginning of wisdom, but it was merely a negative motive. It was necessary to go further and make the different nations understand that, beyond their own national patrimony, there was a universal artistic, intellectual and spiritual patrimony which it was their duty to preserve. The destruction of a famous library or of art treasures, for instance, would be a misfortune for mankind as a whole. An offence against the dignity of the human person—whoever might be the victim—should



be felt as an offence against all. It was that positive universalist sentiment which must be developed if a Union of States was to become a living reality. Such a task devolved partly upon Unesco.

Professor Bridel (University of Lausanne, Switzerland) drew attention to certain fundamental aspects of the financial problems which would confront the Union of States. From the point of view of public finance, the essential problem would be as follows: should the resources of the Union be adapted to its tasks, or should its tasks and powers be adapted to its resources? In the latter case, the Union might be reduced to impotence, whereas in the former case member States might see the sources of income which were necessary to their own existence gradually exhausted by the demands of the Union. In order to avoid both these risks, efforts must be made to strike a proper balance, and this was extremely difficult in practice. Switzerland, for instance, despite its long experience in Federalism, had not yet found the secret of that balance. The latter seemed hardly possible unless a clear distinction were made between the ordinary and extraordinary resources of the Union. As regards the former, it seemed necessary that certain sources of revenue should be solely and regularly reserved to the Union by the laws under which it was set up. The Union of States would certainly also be a Customs Union, and some taxes at least would be levied not at the frontiers of member States but at the boundary of the Union, for the latter's exclusive benefit. But, as those resources might not always be adequate, provision should be made for cases in which additional contributions would have to be requested from member States. It was indispensable that the decision to levy taxes should not be left entirely to the discretion of the central bodies, and also that the Union's budget should always clearly show the relation between such extraordinary revenue and the special expenditure which it was intended to cover. In other words, not only must the member States and the peoples of the Union know where they stood, but they must also always be in a position to realize the importance and urgency of the undertakings for which such funds were destined. However, it was clear that, though such sincerity with regard to the budget was necessary to convince member States of the need for the special sacrifices required of them, it was not in itself sufficient to produce that conviction, which could only result from voluntary acceptance by the members of the Union of the fact of their interdependence, and from a genuine supranational loyalty.

Professor Wright (University of Chicago, U.S.A.) agreed with Professor Bridel that the transfer of functions to the central government ought not to proceed more rapidly than the transfer to it of a certain measure of the people's loyalty. Whatever its nominal powers, a government could not function unless it commanded the support of public opinion.

The problem of world or European federation was, therefore, primarily a psychological problem—that of increasing the consciousness of world citizenship throughout the world's population. Without that, the world federal government could not raise the money for its grants, whatever its nominal taxing power might be, nor could it exercise other constitutional powers which might have been formally delegated to it.

Professor Maxwell (Clark University, U.S.A.) replied to various questions that had been put to him. It had been asked whether a Federal Union of Western Europe assumed the convertibility of currencies. Professor Maxwell answered in the affirmative, pointing out that achievement of convertibility was a premise of the Marshall Plan, regardless of what happened with respect to political union. However, the establishment of a single currency for a federal union was not one of the minimum conditions. Co-ordination of policy by central banks would be necessary, and possibly that might be achieved through the International Bank and Fund.

Several questioners had felt that it might be better for the government of the Union to have the power to levy income taxes, even if part of the proceeds were allocated as grants to the constituent governments. Professor Maxwell felt that such an enormous power of taxation was not a minimum condition of a successful federation and that a proposal of this sort would be a great impediment to federation. He admitted, however, that, in principle, income tax was the best type of tax.

He was not sure whether a federal Union of Western Europe was, in economic terms, the most desirable aim. It might be that a less all-inclusive approach to



unification, for example, the Schuman Plan, or the plan proposed by Mr. Stikker of the Netherlands, was at least a necessary preliminary. Again, all those schemes might prove impossible to realize, and in the light of history they would appear to have diverted attention from the economic objectives, expressed in the Havana Charter, of multilateral reduction of trade barriers.

## *B. THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON POLITICAL LIFE*

### THE INFLUENCE OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM ON POLITICAL LIFE

M. DUVERGER

It is obvious that the electoral system must influence political life. The radical changes brought about in the structure of various States by the adoption of universal suffrage or the machinery of managed elections, for instance, sufficiently indicate the importance of this factor.

It is, however, extremely difficult to analyse that influence scientifically. The factors conditioning the political life of a country are very closely inter-related, so that any study of the effects of one of those factors considered in isolation is necessarily artificial. All such a study can ever do is to define tendencies, likely to be influenced by the operation of the other factors. In other words, we cannot say that such and such an electoral system leads inevitably to a particular form of political life, but simply that it favours its establishment, that is, reinforces other factors tending in the same direction or weakens those tending in the opposite direction. As a result, no sociological laws we can formulate in this matter can ever be absolute; they are strictly applicable only in ideal conditions of "temperature and pressure", conditions never actually encountered in practice. These laws are therefore valid only so long as we bear in mind that they are relative.

Even with this limitation, it is not yet possible to formulate real sociological laws in this matter, as too little serious study has been devoted to it. In this, as in other respects, political science is still at the hypothesis stage and has as yet no laws. The object of this report is, in fact, to attempt to define some of these hypotheses, which it will be for later specialized research to establish as laws, if they are proved correct, or to invalidate.

#### *Part I. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL PARTIES*

The electoral system affects the political life of a country mainly through the parties. We might almost make a distinction between direct influence (such and such an electoral system tends to a particular form of party organization)



and indirect influence (the organization of the parties, largely due to the electoral system, leads to a particular form of political life); only the first type will be dealt with in this study.

We may take as the starting point of our analysis the three following propositions (which are a little more precise than those we suggested in 1946):

- (1) Proportional representation tends towards a system of many rigid, independent parties.
- (2) The simple majority with a second ballot tends towards a system of many independent but flexible parties.
- (3) The simple majority vote with only one ballot tends towards a two-party system.

These propositions, however, are still only very rough approximations, as we shall see when we consider more closely the influence exercised by the electoral system on the number, structure and inter-relationship of the parties.

#### (a) INFLUENCE ON THE NUMBER OF PARTIES

##### *The Simple Majority Vote with One Ballot*

At first sight, the tendency of the simple majority vote with one ballot to lead to a two-party system seems to be the most clearly established. It is notably illustrated by the Anglo-Saxon countries, in the opposition to the emergence of a third party in the United States of America, and in the elimination of the third party in Great Britain and some of the Dominions.

In this respect, the electoral system seems to work in two different ways: in the pressure it exerts towards the two-party organization, a distinction may be made between the mechanical and the psychological aspects of the problem. The mechanical aspect is the under-representation of the third (that is, the weakest) party, as the percentage of seats it holds is lower than its percentage of votes. Admittedly, in a two-party system, the weaker is always under-represented in relation to the stronger, as we shall see below; but, assuming the existence of a third party, the latter is still more seriously under-represented than the minority party among the other two, as the British instance shows particularly clearly. Up to 1922, the Labour Party was under-represented in relation to the Liberal Party; since that date the position has been reversed (except in 1931, when Labour was going through a serious crisis, and the Conservatives won a crushing victory). The third party is thus placed mechanically at a disadvantage by the electoral system. As long as a new party attempting to compete with the two old-established parties is still weak, the system operates against its growth and opposes its emergence. If, however, it draws ahead of one of its predecessors, that party then falls into third place and the process of elimination is reversed (see Diagram I: The elimination of the Liberal Party in Great Britain, and Diagrams IV and V).

The psychological factor operates on similar lines. When there are three competing under a simple majority system with one ballot, the electors soon parties see that their votes are wasted if they go on voting for the third party, so that their natural tendency is so transfer their votes to the less objectionable of its opponents in order to keep out the worse. This phenomenon of "popularization" works against the new party as long as it is the weakest of the three but, like "under-representation", turns against the less popular of the old parties as soon as the new one draws ahead. It should be noted, however, that the reversal of the movement in these two cases is not always simultaneous, under-



representation generally preceding the transfer of votes (for it is only with the passage of time that the electors realize that one party is declining and transfer their votes to another). This naturally entails a fairly long period of confusion, during which the doubts of electors and changes in the under-represented parties combine to throw the relative strengths of the parties completely out of line; Great Britain experienced such difficulties between 1923 and 1935. The trend of the electoral system towards a two-party representation thus makes its effect felt only over a period (see Diagram II: The return to the two-party system in Great Britain).

In many cases, however, the uncertainties experienced in the interim period induce the parties themselves to return to a two-party system by fusion of the central party with one or other of its rivals (generally also involving a schism in that party, as some of its members prefer to join the opposite party). In Australia, for instance, Liberals and Conservatives combined as early as 1909 in the face of Labour pressure. In New Zealand they waited until 1936 before doing so: from 1913 to 1928, the Liberal Party was steadily declining and therefore likely to disappear naturally; in 1928, there was a sudden revival which put it once more on an equal footing with the Conservatives; but by 1931 the decline was again setting in and the Liberals were falling back into third place; faced with the Labour menace, aggravated by the economic crisis, the Party decided to amalgamate with the Conservatives for the 1935 elections. In the Union of South Africa, the secession of the Nationalists in 1913, combined with the growth of the Labour Party, resulted by 1918 in four more or less equal parties; in view of the danger of such a situation in a system organized on a single majority vote, the old Unionist Party was absorbed into General Smuts' South African Party, while General Hertzog's Nationalist Party concluded an electoral agreement with Labour, which proved fatal to the latter; the two-party system was restored by the joint effects of fusion and elimination.

Some exceptions to this general tendency of the single majority vote to lead to a two-party system should, however, be noted. The most striking instances are those of Denmark (before the introduction of proportional representation) and Canada (at the present moment).

The case of Canada is particularly interesting, because it enables us to define the limitations of the two-party trend under the simple majority system. There are today four major parties in that country: the Unionists (68 seats), the Liberals (125 seats), the Labour Party (32 seats) and an agrarian party (14). The two latter, however, are definitely local in their appeal; the agrarian party was established in Alberta in 1925 under the name of the "United Farmers of Alberta" and in 1935 became the Social Credit Party, but retained its narrow territorial associations. The Labour Party draws its strength mainly from Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia and Ontario. The two-party system, which ceased to exist at the national level in 1921, is thus to be found in practice at the local level; there are four parties in the country but generally only two competing parties in each electoral district. It will be seen that the phenomena described above are encountered only locally: the trend of the electoral system is to have two candidates in each constituency. The establishment of local parties, or a certain localization of the national parties, is thus made possible. In Great Britain itself, there was a remarkably stable Irish party from 1874 to 1918, and there may now be a tendency for the Liberal Party to become mainly a Welsh party.

This phenomenon accounts, to some extent, for the multitude of parties in Denmark before the introduction of proportional representation. Although



there were four nation-wide parties—the Right, the Liberals (Left), the Radicals and the Socialists—there were only two opposing candidates in many of the constituencies; in 1910, this was true of 89 out of 114 constituencies, as compared with 24 in which there were three candidates and one in which there were four. There was, in fact, an appreciable reduction in the number of candidates in comparison with earlier years (296 in 1909, 303 in 1906). In 1913, it is true, the number of candidates suddenly went up again to 314. In only 41 constituencies was there a straight fight; in 55, there were three candidates; in 15, four; and in one, a single candidate. This increase is mainly explained, however, by a desperate effort on the part of the Right to arrest its own decline: it put 88 candidates in the field in 1913, as against 47 in 1910. Nevertheless, its seats fell from 13 to seven, although the total number of votes cast in its favour rose from 64,904 to 81,404 and although the 17,000 additional votes, mainly won from the Liberals, caused the latter to lose 13 seats. In 1910, again, there had been a close electoral agreement between the Radicals and the Socialists, which at that time never ran candidates against each other in any constituency (this agreement was apparently broken in 1913, since 17 Socialists stood against Radicals and seven Radicals against Socialists).

Considering these facts together, we see that, on the eve of the introduction of PR, the simple majority vote was tending to bring about associations between the four Danish parties, separating them into two clearly defined camps: Liberals and the Right, on one side, and Radicals and Socialists, on the other. Within the first group, a process could clearly be seen at work tending to the elimination of the Right in favour of the Liberals (who had already absorbed the “moderates” in 1910); within the second, the tendency was towards union if not actual amalgamation. The two-party trend of the electoral system was retarded by the determination of the party leaders and the electorate’s lack of political experience, which slowed down the process of polarization; but the trend was there nevertheless.

### *Proportional Representation*

It is commonly thought that proportional representation tends to increase the number of political parties. This view has been very ably criticized by Professor H. Tingsten in his report on: “Majoritetsval och proportionalism” (Riksdagens protokoll bihang, 1932, Stockholm).

It is true, for instance, that a consideration of the French parties before 1939 (simple majority, second ballot system) and after 1945 (proportional representation) shows no increase in their number. There was even a decrease to be seen in 1945-1946; since then, however, there have been further splits in the Right, the Radical Party has again become important, and the “Rassemblement du Peuple Français” has come into being, thus more or less restoring the former situation. The Belgian case is perhaps still more striking; in the 50 years that proportional representation has been in operation there, Belgium has had the same three parties as at the outset, and the situation has been scarcely altered at all by the presence of a Communist Party, which is weak. Thus, at first sight, the tendency of proportional representation to lead to a multiplicity of parties is much less definite than the two-party trend of the simple majority system. It is nevertheless a real tendency, but its various aspects need to be carefully distinguished.

The first effect of proportional representation is to preserve existing multiplicity. In this respect, we may compare Belgium and Great Britain.



In the nineteenth century both countries had a strict two-party system with a simple majority vote.<sup>1</sup> In both countries, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the emergence of a Socialist Party destroyed the two-party system. Fifty years later, England, having retained its simple majority vote, is back with its two parties, while the three parties existing in Belgium in 1900 have been preserved by the adoption of PR. From this point of view, a study of the Belgian elections between 1890 and 1914 is extremely interesting. In 1890, owing to the limited suffrage, the Socialists were still unable to gain representation in Parliament; the two-party system was still working. In 1894, with the adoption of universal suffrage, the Socialists won 28 seats, while the Liberal Party dropped from 60 to 20 although it had twice as many electors voting for it as the Socialists; under-representation was operating to its disadvantage. In 1898, the Liberal Party suffered a further decline, going down to 12 seats; on this occasion, polarization had combined with under-representation, as many former Liberals voted Catholic. The process of elimination affecting the Liberal Party had already gone a long way; it was reasonable to think that two or three more elections would see its end. In 1900, however, proportional representation was adopted as the Catholics wished to prevent the annihilation of the Liberal Party in order to avoid being left alone with the Socialists; the number of Liberal seats immediately went up to 33. It was to rise to 42 after the elections of 1902-1904, probably as a result of "depolarization"—the former Liberal electors who had left the party in 1894 to join forces with the Catholic Party returning to their old allegiance once they had grasped the way proportional representation worked—and finally become fixed at 44 or 45 (see Diagram III: The "rescue" of the Liberal Party in Belgium by PR).

This rescue of the Belgian Liberal Party by PR may be compared with that of the Right in Denmark. We have shown that, at the last Danish elections on a simple majority, the process of elimination was beginning to affect it (13 seats in 1910, seven in 1913, in spite of a desperate effort to add to the number of its candidates). In 1918, thanks to proportional representation, the Right gained 16 seats, and in 1920, 28—a figure which remained almost constant until 1947. It will be seen that the revival took place in two stages, as in Belgium, and for the same reasons. At the first election under proportional representation, the increase was mainly due to mechanical factors: the absence of under-representation and the larger number of candidates from the second election onwards, a psychological factor—"depolarization"—also came into play.

The second effect of proportional representation is to foster splinter movements in existing parties. Splits and divisions are not, of course, uncommon under a simple majority system; the English Liberal Party had many, both before and after the rise of Labour. But under that system, divisions are temporary and limited. The two sections either reunite after some time, or one of them joins a rival party; as for example the Liberal Nationals, who are, for practical purposes, members of the Conservative Party. Under a proportional system, on the other hand, seceding groups generally last, as the method of voting prevents the divergent fractions from being crushed by their rivals. It is thus understandable that the introduction of PR has almost always coincided with schisms in old parties, either open and admitted (one old party splitting into two new halves, each laying claim to its succession) or concealed (an allegedly new party being constituted with some of the leaders and rank

<sup>1</sup> We shall discuss below the fact that the Belgian majority system included arrangements for a second vote (see page 321).



and file of an old party which, however, still continues in existence). In Switzerland, for instance, the introduction of PR resulted in the emergence of the "peasant and bourgeois" party, which was for practical purposes a secession from the Radicals, in 1919. In Sweden it took some years (1911-1920) for an agrarian party, really resulting from a schism in the Conservative Party, to develop, while in 1924 the Liberal Party split into two branches (which admittedly were reunited in 1936, but more through the disappearance of one of them than by a real union). In Norway, proportional representation brought about simultaneously a schism in the Socialists, who divided into a right and a left (not to reunite until 1927), and two secessions from the Liberal left, in the establishment of the "Radical Democrats", who won two seats, and the sudden growth of the small agrarian party which had come into being at the previous elections and had so far been very weak (it went up from 36,493 to 118,657 votes, and from three to 17 seats).

This second effect of proportional representation is, however, rather limited. Generally speaking, PR keeps more or less unchanged the party structure in being at the time of its introduction. It never has the disruptive effect that some attribute to it; in most cases, the schisms mentioned took the form of the splitting of a large party into two others, which have maintained their positions through subsequent elections. The tendency towards multiplicity shows less in the division of old parties than in the establishment of new ones; and, even so, this third result of PR applies mainly to the smaller parties, which is quite natural, as the main bodies of opinion still follow the traditional parties. It is because some people have overlooked this distinction that they have been able, with apparent truth, to deny that PR increases the number of parties. Another reason is that most of the systems of proportional representation actually in force have taken precautions to avoid the development of small parties which is the natural result of the system; we know, for instance, that the Hondt method, and that of the highest average, which are used in most of the countries where PR is applied, are definitely detrimental to the small parties and thus tend to cancel the results of proportional representation. The same may be said of the Netherlands system, which excludes all lists not securing at least 75 per cent of the quotient from the distribution of remaining votes. In fact, there is no full system of proportional representation anywhere, not so much because of the technical difficulties in applying it, which are comparatively easy to solve, as because of its political consequences, and particularly its tendency to foster the growth of more or less insignificant and more or less fluctuating groups.

Nevertheless, this fundamental tendency always forces through the obstructions raised in its path. It will suffice, in the present context, to give a few typical examples. In Norway, at the first proportional election held in 1921, two small new parties appeared, the Radical Democrats with two seats and the Socialists of the right with eight; in 1924, a third party came to join them, the Communists, with six seats; in 1927, a fourth, the Liberals with one seat; in 1933, a fifth and sixth, the Social Party and the Christian Democrats, each with one seat. The other Scandinavian countries have followed a similar line of development. This phenomenon is still more marked in the Netherlands. At the first proportional elections in 1918, 10 new parties each gained a seat, in spite of the 75 per cent block (Economic League, Independent Socialist Party, Communist Party, Neutral Party, Social Christians, Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, League of National Defence, Rural Party, Party of the Middle Classes); in 1922, an eleventh party appeared (Dissident Catholic Party); in 1925, a twelfth and a thirteenth were added (Political Reform Party



and Calvinist Reform Party); in 1929 came a fourteenth (Independent Party); in 1933 a fifteenth and sixteenth (Social Revolutionaries and Fascists); and lastly, with the appearance of the National Socialist Party in 1937, the number of splinter groups developed as a result of proportional representation between 1918 and 1939 reached the grand total of 17. It will be seen, moreover, that these are not really local parties, owing their strength to the personality of a particular candidate; as Frederick S. A. Huart has shown in his article in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, the system of proportional representation applied in the Netherlands—which means that for practical purposes the country is treated as a single electoral district—has given birth to small parties of nation-wide instead of merely local appeal.

These figures, however, do not really give a true picture of the facts; they need to be supplemented by a table showing the number of parties which have run candidates at the elections. In the Netherlands, for instance, the number went up from 37 to 53 from one election to another (1929 to 1933). In Switzerland, 67 parties presented lists in various cantons between 1919 and 1939; 26 of these parties were represented in the National Council at one time or another. These instances may be compared with those of the Weimar Republic in Germany, and of Czechoslovakia from 1919 to 1939, which are the classic examples.

### *The Second Ballot*

The exact consequences of the second ballot in an election by simple majority are much more difficult to detail than those of the single ballot or of proportional representation. As far as we know, no general study of this matter has been made; incidentally, the field is very difficult to investigate, as electoral statistics are generally badly designed for this purpose. We shall therefore have to confine ourselves for the moment to a few brief notes and one or two very tentative suggestions.

Theoretically, it would seem that the second ballot must encourage the proliferation of parties, as the splitting up of similar tendencies does not compromise their total representation, since they always have an opportunity to regroup for the second ballot. The phenomena of "polarization" and "under-representation" described above do not operate in this instance, or operate only at the second ballot, each party standing an equal chance at the first. Practical observation in the countries which have employed the second ballot appears to confirm this theoretical hypothesis. In France, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands, the second ballot has reflected the multiplicity of parties in forms which, incidentally, differ quite widely: in Germany and in France, there has been a very distinct tendency towards splintering, particularly on the right, while in Switzerland and the Netherlands, opinion has still generally been divided among a few large parties, although there have been more than two of them. But this might perhaps be regarded as due to the influence of differing national temperaments.

Certain individual cases cannot be brought into line. Before the introduction of PR there was a second ballot in Norway but not in Denmark; there were, however, fewer parties in the former (three) than in the latter (four). It would be a mistake, of course, to consider the state of the parties in relation to the electoral system at one particular time only in the political life of the country; observations, if they are to be reliable, should cover a fairly long period and mark the general trend of development; anyone who described the



British party system, for instance, on the basis of the 1931 election alone would give an entirely false idea of it. From this point of view, we have seen that, as a result of the single ballot system, the numerous Danish parties apparently tended to coalesce into two major groups. On the other hand, the three-party Norwegian system was showing a tendency to develop into a four-party system as a result of the emergence of the agrarian party in 1918; it should be added that both the right and the left contained several different factions which did not always collaborate with one another, this in itself being a fairly clear indication of the existence of a trend towards multiplicity. It is difficult to formulate any more definite conclusions, as the period of observation is too short; the only Norwegian elections which can be studied for this purpose are those of 1906, 1909, 1912, 1915 and 1918. The official statistics state, however, that in 1906 the lines of demarcation between the parties were not clearly fixed, and that it was almost impossible to distribute the votes among them that year; in the end, therefore, the analysis is necessarily confined to four general elections, which is manifestly not enough to go on.

There are not the same difficulties in studying the case of Belgium, which is also an exception to the general trend. Up to 1894, as we know, there was a rigid two-party system in that country, and the emergence of Socialism at that date initiated the gradual elimination of the Liberal Party, which was later checked by proportional representation. Yet the second ballot was in use. Unlike the French system, this was admittedly a limited second ballot: only the candidates at the head of the poll were still eligible, and their numbers were restricted to twice the number of seats to be filled. This feature, however, does not appear to affect the issue: in Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, the second ballot was also limited, but there was no visible tendency towards a two-party system. The distinction between the position in law and the position in fact seems more interesting; while the Belgian electoral law made provision for a second ballot, it was in practice scarcely ever used, as there were only two opposing parties. This illustrates the interdependence of political phenomena; while the electoral system may influence the organization of the parties, that in turn may affect the system. In Belgium, the two-party organization thus operated against the second ballot.

But this is simply to state the problem in other terms; what we have to discover is why the possibility of a second ballot did not bring about the break-up of the traditional parties. The solution is no doubt to be found in the internal structure of those parties. All observers have been struck by the great originality of the Belgian parties in the second half of the nineteenth century; all have described their close coherence and discipline, and the complex hierarchy of committees which they kept in being throughout the country. At that time, no other European country had such a highly developed party system, not even Great Britain or Germany. This strong internal structure made it possible for the Belgian parties successfully to withstand the disruptive pressure of the second ballot, by preventing the secessions to which it might have given rise. Such a regimentation of the electors was, on the other hand, an obstacle to the development of new parties, which found it difficult to set up a rival machine, especially as, for practical purposes, the system of voting on lists prevented independent candidates from standing. In this way, the powerful organization of the Belgian parties, and the fact that there were only two of them, made the legal provision for a second ballot a dead letter, which explains the similarity between the political life of Belgium and that of the Anglo-Saxon countries, based on a single ballot and election by a simple majority.



(b) INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTIES AND ON THEIR INTER-RELATIONSHIP

The case of Belgium shows the connexion between the internal structure of the parties and the electoral system. That of Denmark, on the other hand, shows the part played by the electoral system in promoting alliances and inter-dependency between certain parties. Both these points deserve special consideration.

Unfortunately, scarcely any precise information is available on these matters, as internal party organization and party coalitions have so far received very little attention, and are not reflected in electoral statistics. We shall therefore have to confine ourselves to a few somewhat disconnected remarks, indicating general lines which may be helpful in later research work.

*The Internal Structure of the Parties*

Sociological phenomena differing widely from one another are in fact described by the generic term "parties". There is a very great difference between the structure of the British parties in the nineteenth century and that of the British parties of the present day, as there is between the contemporary American and French parties and, in France in 1950, between the "Parti Republicain de la Liberté", the Radicals, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. There are many factors—historical, geographical, economic and social—to explain the difference. The electoral factor is one of those which has received least consideration, but it is not one of the least important.

The essential difference here seems to be not so much between the system of proportional representation and the simple majority system, as between the system of voting for a list and the system of voting for one candidate, while the provision for a second ballot is also of considerable importance.

(A) In the first place, it might be said that voting for lists brings about a strengthening, and voting for individuals a weakening, of the party structure. There are, however, many exceptions to this general rule. There is a satisfactory rational explanation for it. When an individual is elected in a relatively small constituency, the candidate's personality is of capital importance; a member may thus build up such a strong position in his own constituency that it becomes a sort of fief from which he cannot be dislodged. As his re-election depends on himself and not on the party to which he owes allegiance (under the Third Republic in France many members of Parliament frequently changed their party and went on being re-elected time and again), it is understandable that the party structure cannot be very strong. Each member may have a well organized local election committee, but as this is entirely under the domination of the member, it will hardly accept directions from a central office. In Parliament, on the other hand, there will be very little discipline among the party groups, as each member is far more concerned about the possible repercussions of his vote in his own constituency than about the instructions issued by the party leaders. In the last resort, the system of voting for individual candidates thus tends to bring about the formation of loosely knit parliamentary groups, with a highly decentralized electoral organization, so that the parties—having a very weak administrative machinery, matched by very loose social ties—end by expressing no more than general tendencies of opinion.

Voting for a list, or "general ticket" (*scrutin de liste*) on the contrary, is



essentially a collective operation, pushing personalities into the background in favour of the group to which they belong, that is, the party. The practice of placing certain candidates at the head of the list, of course, always reintroduces an element of individual prestige; but it also presupposes a certain readiness on the part of those at the foot of the list to follow their leader. The fact that the constituency covered by the election is wider acts in the same way: the elector has less direct acquaintance with the candidate, which makes the political label of the list, and hence of the party, a preponderant factor. The logical conclusion is the system of fixed lists, whereby candidates are submitted in an unchangeable order determining their election (in practice, this system is applied only under proportional representation); the dominion of the party over the member then becomes enormous. The member's re-election depends on his being again included on the list in a suitable position and, as this rests with the party to decide, parliamentary discipline is very strict. As the success of the lists is also secured by the general party propaganda far more than by local considerations, centralization proceeds apace. This then leads to a rigid party system; a term often used in France is "monolithic parties". If the splitting up of the individual's vote among different parties is allowed, however—which is a normal practice under the system of election from lists by simple majority, but which is exceptional under proportional representation—there is less rigidity and the personal factor again comes into play. Nevertheless, as experience shows that relatively little use is made of the split vote, the party structure remains strong. Practical observation generally confirms the main lines of this reasoning. The French example is particularly striking from this point of view. Since the list system was adopted in 1945, with practically no splitting of votes and with candidates presented in a fixed order, the structure of the political parties has been completely transformed; the flexible and undisciplined associations of the Third Republic have given way to the rigid and disciplined parties of the Fourth. The short life of the two Constituent Assemblies (seven months), which explains their members' constant concern with the question of their re-election, incidentally brought out the importance of the influence exercised by the electoral system. The elections on the list system in 1919-1924 and—to go further back—in 1871 and 1848, seem to have had a similar influence, although the possibility of splitting the individual vote meant that the tendency to strengthen the party structure was less marked; in the 1919 elections, for instance, the "Bloc National" was achieved by means of the agreement between the executive committees of the moderate groups, whose influence, which had been negligible in the single-member ballots before the war, suddenly became very considerable. The example of Belgium may also be quoted, where the list system led to the establishment of parties with a very strong organization long before proportional representation was adopted.

- (B) The existence or non-existence of the second ballot also seems to play a very important part. Under the majority system pure and simple, independent candidates are dangerous, as there is a risk that they may influence the voting to the advantage of the opponents with whom their disagreements are greatest; there will therefore necessarily be fewer of them, either because of the political wisdom of the candidates themselves or because of that of the electors, who will "polarize" their votes.

When the influence of both factors tends in the same direction, it is



reasonable to suppose that it will be more marked. This explains the general tendency of proportional representation (with voting for lists and the single ballot) to strengthen the party structure. It also explains the special weakness of party structure in France prior to 1939, by reason of the joint effect of single-member constituencies and the second ballot. It explains the strengthening of the structure between 1919 and 1928 by the combination of the list and the single ballot, although the splitting of votes reduced the effect of both these factors. It might even explain the strength of the Belgian parties before 1900, as the second ballot provided for in the law was in fact hardly ever held in practice.

There are, however, quite a number of exceptions. The most typical is that of Great Britain. In spite of the single-member elections, the discipline of the parliamentary parties is strong, and the parties in general are highly centralized. The fact that there is no second ballot probably accounts in part for these features, but that explanation, by itself, is insufficient. Moreover, it may be noted that, generally speaking, within any one country at any given time, there are very great variations in the structure of the parties, although the ballot system is uniform for all; we know, for instance, that the parties of the left are more strongly organized than those of the right. The almost completely identical structure of the Communist parties in all countries, in spite of the variety of electoral systems, should likewise be emphasized. These examples indicate the limitations of the influence exercised by the electoral system; the influence of the ballot seems to be greater with regard to the number of parties than to their internal structure.

### *The Inter-Relationship of the Parties*

The problem of the inter-relationship of the parties, and of the alliances they may form among themselves, has so far scarcely been studied systematically. It is, however, of very great importance under a multiparty system, as only by contracting alliances is it generally possible to secure a sufficient majority to form a government. A distinction should be made between two types of party alliances: governmental alliances and electoral alliances. The latter generally tend to continue, being converted into the former; but the contrary is not true. Under proportional representation, in particular, we find alliances for the purposes of government alone, with no corresponding electoral alliance, and these are naturally much more easily broken.

In this sphere, the influence of the ballot system is obviously preponderant. It seems to be sufficiently clearly marked to enable us to sum it up in definite rules. Theoretically, the double ballot majority system tends to lead to the formation of close alliances, while proportional representation tends to complete independence. The consequences of the majority system with a single ballot vary greatly, according to the number of parties involved; under a two-party system it leads to complete independence, but under a multi-party system the trend is towards close and strong alliances. These rules obviously apply only to electoral alliances. Alliances for the purposes of government in the strict sense seem to be associated with the existence of numerous parties; they are therefore likely to be found under proportional representation, where there are many parties but no electoral alliances. These very general tendencies, however, are often much modified in practice.

(A) There is no doubt that the tendency of the system of majority election with a double ballot is to foster close alliances. The machinery of the



system itself in fact makes it necessary, at the second ballot, for the parties with least votes to withdraw in favour of those with most, within each major "spiritual family". A distinction is made in France between withdrawal pure and simple and standing down in favour of another when the retiring candidate calls upon his electors to transfer their votes to one of his rivals whom he indicates by name. Between these two extremes there are in fact hundreds of nuances and subtle variants; there are many ways of withdrawing and many degrees of warmth in the advocacy of a former opponent! It is obviously natural, however, before the ballot, for candidates with similar interests to agree on which of them will waive their claims or withdraw at the second ballot.

Practical observation confirms this reasoning. In all the countries where the second ballot has been used, we can find more or less obvious signs of electoral alliances. In Germany, for instance, there was the famous coalition formed by Bismarck in the German elections of 1887, which was a definite and formal alliance; there have been others, less famous and less spectacular, both before and since. In France, the double ballot system has been in use so long that its full effect has been felt: memories of the "Cartel des Gauches" or Radical Coalition of 1928 and 1932, and of the Popular Front of 1936, are fresh in all our minds, as is that of their predecessor the Radical Bloc of 1902. In Norway, the right and the left have generally allied against the Socialists since 1906; at the 1915 elections, they collaborated so closely that it is difficult to separate the votes they received in the electoral statistics. In the Netherlands, alliances were regularly formed until proportional representation was introduced; there was the Catholic-Liberal coalition from 1848 to 1868, opposed by a weaker coalition of Conservatives and Calvinists; in 1869, there was a change of partners (the Catholics collaborating with the Calvinists and the Conservatives tending to disappear); and from 1905 onwards, there was an electoral agreement between the Liberals and the Radicals.

It is difficult to specify exactly what influence special ballot procedure may have on the formation of alliances. The effect of restricting the second ballot to the candidates having the most votes (practised in Germany and the Netherlands) does not seem to have been very different from that of admitting all candidates to the second ballot (as in the French and Norwegian systems). In theory, it seems, on the one hand, to make formal alliances useless by compelling the candidates with least votes to withdraw; but, on the other, it tends to foster them, by obliging the parties of the weaker side to agree on a single candidate at the first ballot in order to be able to take part in the second. Only a thorough study of each individual case could reveal the respective consequences of these two factors. Similarly, the difference between a double ballot system combined with voting for a list or with voting for a single candidate is not clearly apparent to the observer.

If the system of voting on a list promotes centralization and party discipline, it seems probable that at the same time it strengthens alliances between the parties, for the example of France shows that the extreme decentralization of the French parties and the great weakness of their internal structure was one of the principal factors causing the rapid dissolution of electoral alliances.

In most cases an electoral alliance tends to continue in parliament, either in the form of a government coalition or in an opposition alliance



—the latter, incidentally, being less common. It is thus possible to achieve a stable, well-organized political system rather like the two-party one: instead of two large unified parties, there are two “federations of parties” facing one another, their strength depending largely on the state of discipline and organization in the constituent parties. When the parties are weak and undisciplined, parliamentary coalitions soon break up, although they may afterwards come into being again for election purposes. Between 1928 and 1940, France on several occasions gave a curious exhibition of alliances at the second ballot rapidly dissolved in the government but reappearing in almost exactly the same form at the next election.

- (B) The majority election with a single ballot seems to exercise an odd influence on electoral alliances; its effect is entirely different when it is found in conjunction with a two-party system and when with a multi-party system. In the former case, the very idea of electoral alliances is rationally impossible to entertain; if the two parties were to form one, there would be only one candidate left, and the election would become a sort of plebiscite, completely altering the nature of the political system. We must always, however, be careful not to draw absolute conclusions in political science: the example of the Union of South Africa from 1931 to 1940 shows that electoral alliances are possible under a two-party majority system without involving a complete upheaval in the political structure. But this is a very exceptional case.

If, on the contrary, we have the single-ballot system and, as a result of special circumstances, a number of different parties, there will be a tendency to form very strong alliances, much closer than the alliances formed for the purposes of the second ballot, as it is then necessary to divide out the constituencies before the election, in order to allow the electors to concentrate their votes on the single candidate supported by the coalition. This obviously entails a much fuller measure of agreement than is the case if, owing to the second ballot, candidates can stand freely at the first; in the one case, the electors are really responsible for the division of the seats among the allied parties; in the other, the party leaders. It is therefore more difficult to reach an alliance, but once it is concluded it calls for far closer collaboration. Moreover, the pressure of the electoral system conducive to the formation of such alliances is much stronger; in the absence of agreement, the ballot will inevitably tend to eliminate the surplus parties, until the two-party system is finally re-established.

Several examples of such collaboration for the purposes of elections might be quoted. We have already spoken of the agreement between the Radicals and the Socialists in Denmark at the 1910 elections (also noting its dissolution in 1913). Nearer the present day, mention might be made of the coalitions in Great Britain at the elections of 1918, 1931 and 1935; the pact concluded in 1924 in the Union of South Africa between the Nationalist (Hertzog) and Labour Parties, etc. It is, incidentally, extremely interesting to follow the development of these alliances: they seem generally to result in a final amalgamation of the parties, whereby the weaker member of the coalition is absorbed. The British instance is a typical case. Although the Liberal-National Party may seek to preserve the appearance of separate existence, it is in fact almost wholly absorbed into the Conservative Party. At the same time, the number of its representatives is steadily decreasing, and there is no doubt that the only



people who have benefited from the alliance are the Tories. The case of the Labour Party in South Africa is even more striking: although it was on the upgrade after the 1918 elections, its electoral pact with the Nationalists was fatal to it, in spite of the fact that the two together were victorious. Split into two groups and crushingly defeated at the 1929 elections, it has lost all influence.

It thus appears that, in coalitions formed under the system of elections by simple majority with a single ballot, the partners are very far from equal; these coalitions tend to the formation of satellite blocs rather than alliances. Under this electoral system, the "third parties" are therefore offered the hard alternative of being eliminated by the ballot system or absorbed as a result of forming coalitions. It is understandable, considering all things, that coalitions are less common than the outright amalgamation of parties.

- (C) Theoretically, proportional representation gives rise to no special problems in the matter of electoral alliances: the natural tendency of the system is to do away with such alliances, as it removes the reason for them. As this system very seldom gives any one party an absolute majority (cf. p. 336), it nevertheless necessitates alliances in the government. Incidentally, one of the more serious defects of the system is that it engenders such completely different situations at the polls and in the government; at one moment, the parties are entirely independent, while the next, they are compelled to collaborate. In the ordinary way this makes it more difficult to form parliamentary coalitions, and keeps the governmental majority in a constant state of uncertainty. These points are illustrated by the case of the Netherlands, where the government majorities seem to have been much less strong and lasting under proportional representation than under the system of majority elections with a second ballot. The case of France is probably less conclusive, as the weakness of party organization under the double ballot system worked against the tendency to strengthen alliances, while its rigidity since proportional representation was adopted now counters the tendency towards disintegration; nevertheless, it is fairly clear that governments have been even more unstable since 1946.

Practical experience does not always confirm these conclusions about the strict independence of the parties for electoral purposes under proportional representation. It is in fact uncommon to find proportional representation in full operation, and the most frequent modification of it encountered tends to favour the large parties and to militate against the small ones. The result is that coalitions leading to the formation of joint lists, or "friendly arrangements" concluded for the distribution of remaining or "unused" votes, may prove quite profitable. Under the electoral legislation of some countries they are in fact deliberately fostered. The French system between 1919 and 1924, for instance, had an obvious trend toward coalitions: by their alliance in 1919, the parties of the Right were able to carry the day against the disunited Left; in 1924, on the other hand, the Left in coalition was able to beat the Right, where disagreement was rife, although the difference in the number of votes each received was nothing like so great as the difference in the results of the election. It will be noted, however, that these alliances formed under a proportional system are due precisely to the fact that the system has been adulterated; if proportional representation is fully applied, it tends to make the parties completely independent of one another.



## Part II. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND REPRESENTATION

In the theory of democracy, the person elected is considered to be the representative of the elector, in the legal sense of the term; the effect of the election is to give the former a mandate from the latter to speak and act on his behalf in the ordering of public business. The word "representation" is not, in the present context, taken in this traditional sense; it refers not to a situation in law but to a state of affairs. For our purposes, the elected member represents the elector not in the sense that an agent represents his principal but in the sense that a picture represents a landscape; representation connotes nothing more than the resemblance between the political opinions of the nation and those of the members of Parliament it has chosen.

In this sphere, the electoral system has a tremendous but as yet ill-defined influence. Politicians have long been aware of this fact, and they generally consider the ballot system less from the point of view of its possible effect on the number and structure of the political parties, than from that of its influence on the distribution of the available seats among them, every government majority constantly striving to adopt the combination which is most likely to keep it at the head of affairs. The simplest form this tendency takes is what the Americans call "gerrymandering" (changing the boundaries of electoral districts), but the present variety of electoral systems now offers a very wide range of processes capable of adaptation to suit many situations.

The point of view from which we are considering the matter in this report is less utilitarian. Our object is to direct research to the problem of the accuracy of political representation, by assessing the degree of similarity between public opinion and parliamentary opinion under different electoral systems. Having considered the question in general and, as it were, in the absolute, we shall go on to try to determine how sensitive each system is to variations of opinion with the passage of time.

### (a) ACCURACY OF REPRESENTATION

#### *The Representation of the Parties*

At first sight, there seems to be a very simple method of assessing how accurate representation is: to compare the percentage of the seats and the percentage of the votes gained by each party. If the two coincide, it will be taken that the representation is accurate; the first is higher than the second, we shall have "over-representation"; if it is lower, "under-representation". This type of investigation is not really conclusive; we shall show below that the numerical representation of the parties is very different from the real representation of public opinion. If, however, we confine ourselves to the former (as is generally done), it is possible to achieve a fairly exact correlation between the electoral system and the accuracy of representation.

(A) By definition, proportional representation is obviously the system ensuring the greatest accuracy; it is in fact designed for that purpose. The practical changes which have been made in PR in operation, however, often reduce its accuracy. If a perfectly accurate result were to be obtained, it would be necessary either for the whole country to be regarded as one constituency, or for the distribution of the remaining or "unused" votes to be made on a nation-wide basis. Various political



reasons generally lead to the rejection of both these methods in favour of others less conformable with the purity of the system. There is then a disparity between the proportion of seats and the proportion of votes, which varies according to the system adopted for the distribution of "unused" votes, the frame-work of the constituencies, the possibility of splitting votes or making "friendly arrangements", etc. This disparity is quite small in certain countries and quite large in others. An instance of minor disparity is provided by Switzerland, according to the table published in the official statistics, which gives a picture of the distribution of seats in the National Council after the 1947 elections according to various varieties of proportional distribution. There seems to be less accurate representation under the Norwegian system. In France, the inaccuracy is still more marked, and certain parties—such as the Radicals and the "Rassemblement des Gauches"—are very seriously handicapped by the electoral system.

- (B) Nevertheless, the disparity is infinitely smaller under proportional representation than when election is by a simple majority with one ballot, which leads to a maximum inaccuracy in the numerical representation. One constant tendency is to be noted in this connexion whenever there are only two parties: the majority party is over-represented and the minority party under-represented. This is not a very serious matter: it simply means that the differences of opinion among the electorate are accentuated, as we shall show below. But if this electoral system is found in conjunction with a number of parties, the representation may be more arbitrary, even though it still more or less follows the same general line: any party which has more votes than its nearest rival is theoretically over-represented in relation to the latter, i.e., either more "over-represented" or less "under-represented" than the other.

If, however, the difference between the numbers of votes is very small, the representation may, in exceptional cases, be completely distorted: the party with the smallest number of votes may secure the most seats, and vice versa. This happened, for instance, in Great Britain in January 1910, when the Liberals won 275 seats with 43.1 per cent of the votes, and the Conservatives 273 seats with 47 per cent. It happened again in 1929, when the Labour Party won 289 seats with 37.5 per cent of the votes and the Conservatives 262 with 37.97 per cent. This situation may arise even under a two-party scheme. The opponents of the simple majority with a single ballot naturally seize upon such cases to show the absurdity of the system, but they generally neglect to stress that they are quite exceptional.

When there are a number of parties, the inaccuracy of representation to which the majority system gives rise is clearly very serious. But it should not be forgotten that the natural tendency is for the inaccuracy to correct itself, as the phenomena of over or under-representation it brings in its train are the main factors in bringing about a return to two-party organization. Diagram IV shows clearly how the system has operated against the Liberals from the time they fell into third place in Great Britain. Even so, it shows only the gross difference between the percentage of votes and that of seats won by each party. An adjusted table, in which the difference is calculated in relation to the votes secured by each party, is still more significant (see Diagram V).

- (C) It is practically impossible to specify what are the exact effects of the second ballot on the representation of the parties, owing to the change of



opinion in comparison with the first ballot implied on the part of the electors who transfer their votes to the most acceptable rival. It is generally said that the second ballot reduces the differences which result from the simple majority system with a single ballot. From the purely numerical point of view there is some doubt on this point; if the number of votes secured by the parties at the first ballot is compared with the total number of seats they secure after the second, considerable disparities are found. These are, of course, generally less obvious than the exceptional anomalies sometimes resulting from the simple majority system; but they seem to be comparable with the average anomalies of that system. They may even be considered more serious because of the trend they induce, for the actual size of the difference matters less than its direction. Under a single ballot system with two parties, however great the over-representation of the majority party and the under-representation of the minority party may be, neither usually alters the general picture of the division of opinion. When there is a second ballot, on the other hand, the overall picture is completely distorted: the number of votes obtained by the respective parties no longer determines the trend of the disparities in their representation, but their political positions and the alliances between them. Generally speaking, the second ballot is favourable to the centre and unfavourable to the extremes—i.e., the former is over-represented and the latter under-represented. The political history of the Third Republic in France is a good illustration of this rule, signs of whose operation can, incidentally, be seen in almost all the systems where there are two ballots: the Netherlands, Norway, and Germany. It is interesting to see the reproduction of the table drawn up by Mr. Georges Lachapelle for the French elections in 1932, which shows clearly the general trend of the system (see Diagram VI).

Obviously, if the final percentage of the seats is compared with the percentage of votes secured in the second ballot, the disparity disappears completely; that is, of course, the reason for the system. It may then be claimed that it secures a more accurate representation than the single ballot system; but to do so implies a serious error of method. It is in fact only from the first ballot that we may derive a picture of the distribution of votes among the parties comparable with that produced by the single ballot majority system or by proportional representation. The second ballot entails an obligatory regrouping of votes which makes it impossible to distinguish their political colour. It is certainly a distortion of the truth to count as Radical the Communist votes which were transferred to the "Valoisien" or Radical candidates at the second ballot during the 1936 elections in France because they headed the Popular Front. The votes cast at the second ballot are divided according to tendency instead of according to party; but this takes us from the idea of party representation to what we might, for want of a better name, call the representation of opinion.

### *The Representation of Opinion*

The distribution of votes among the political parties is merely a means for the expression of public opinion; it is not, as is commonly implied, public opinion itself. It is frequently said, for example, that proportional representation gives as exact a "snapshot" as possible of public opinion; in fact it merely ensures a fairly accurate transference to parliamentary representation of the



distribution of votes among the political parties. There is still, however, the problem of discovering whether that distribution itself is a true reflection of public opinion properly speaking. Political representation thus comprises two successive operations, which should be clearly distinguished:

the expression of public opinion in the distribution of votes among the candidates at elections (which we call "representation of opinion" in the strict sense);

the reflection of this distribution of the votes in the distribution of the seats (which we call "representation of the parties").

While some research has already been done on the influence of the electoral system on the accuracy of the latter, its effect on the former has scarcely ever been methodically considered, although one is at least as important as the other. It is, however, much more difficult to analyse, for there are no statistics to go on; it would be necessary to employ the public opinion poll (Gallup system) in direct connexion with the elections, not with the object of predicting the result (as is the usual practice) but in order to enable a comparison to be made between the political views of the electors and the votes cast for a particular party; it would then be possible to make a comparatively accurate assessment of the extent to which the latter distort the expression of the former. By comparing results in the different countries, classified according to the method of election in use, it would be possible to make a numerical analysis of the effect of the electoral system on the representation of opinion, similar to that we have made of its effect on the representation of the parties. Unfortunately, too little conclusive work has so far been done in this field for it to be taken into account in this report; we shall thus have to make use of more empirical and therefore less precise methods of observation, and the conclusions formulated will be largely conjectural.

(A) The first point to which attention should be drawn is the problem of the geographical localization of opinion; several aspects of this problem have to be considered. We have already referred to one when we considered the local parties which may exist under the simple majority system with a single ballot. The tendency towards a two-party set-up inherent in this electoral system appears mainly within the separate constituencies, and the result is that several parties may exist side by side over the country as a whole so long as only two of them are concerned in the contest in each constituency. The small parties are therefore able to survive at the national level because they are major parties in certain regions, whether they be autonomist or regionalist parties (Irish nationalists, Slovak parties in Czechoslovakia, etc.), large national parties of the future gaining strength in areas where the population is particularly inclined in their favour (Socialist parties in industrial towns), or large national parties of the past driven back into local redoubts by the inevitable process of elimination we have described (the Liberal Party in Great Britain at the present time).

These results may be stated in general terms, for the outcome of the simple majority procedure is to make the candidate who heads the poll responsible for representing the whole of a region, irrespective of the votes cast for the other candidates; in these circumstances, minorities can secure representation on the national level only because they constitute the majority in certain constituencies. The effect is that the majority vote accentuates geographical divisions of opinion: it might even be said that it tends to convert a national current of opinion (that is, one which is found throughout the country) into a regional opinion, as its only chance



of representation is in those parts of the country where its strength is greatest. The case of the United States of America is particularly striking in this respect, but this is so well-known that we need not dwell on the point.

Proportional representation, on the other hand, has precisely the opposite effect; opinions which have close local associations tend to permeate the whole nation because of the opportunity to secure representation even in regions where they are very much in the minority. The tendency is most marked when the proportional system is nearest to perfection; it is fostered, in particular, by the distribution of remaining or unused votes on a national basis, and by all systems the practical effect of which is to treat the whole country as a single electoral district. For instance, in the countries which have adopted PR after having been used to the majority system, we can see a sort of gradual "nationalization" of opinion. We have already drawn attention to this phenomenon in the Netherlands; it is equally striking in Switzerland, Belgium, etc.

It is difficult to say which of these two tendencies—nationalization resulting from PR and localization brought about by the simple majority system—gives the truer expression of public opinion. Both distort it, though in opposite ways, the first by minimizing and the second by strengthening the local features of opinion. With regard to the political importance of the phenomenon, proportional representation tends to foster national unity (or more accurately national uniformity), and the simple majority vote accentuates local divergencies. The consequences may be good or bad, according to the particular situation of each party. In France, proportional representation seems to have accentuated the tendency towards centralization and uniformity, which is regrettable. In Belgium, on the other hand, it mitigates the rivalry between the Flemings and the Walloons, which might be exacerbated if the country went back to the majority system, as that would tend to accentuate both the Flemish features of the Catholic party and the Walloon tendency of the Socialist party, and to convert both of them into autonomist parties. In the United States of America, the majority system intensifies the opposition between North and South, and strengthens the individuality of the latter.

A comparison of the two maps prepared by François Goguel for the *Encyclopédie politique de la France et du Monde* (second edition, 1950), one of which shows the results of the proportional elections to the National Assembly and the other those of the elections to the Council of the Republic which are, for practical purposes, by the majority system, clearly demonstrates the differences with regard to the geographical localization of opinions: the opposition between the North and the South of the country is striking in the second but can hardly be seen at all in the first.

The problem of the geographical localization of opinions also occurs in another form, completely different from that dealt with above. Two types of factors are always at work in determining the political complexion of the citizens: individual factors and general factors—or, we might also say, personal factors and ideological factors, although the two lines of demarcation do not by any means coincide exactly. It is, incidentally, difficult to make a distinction between the two types, for they are usually closely and unconsciously intermingled; to do so, it would be necessary to apply all the resources of social psycho-analysis. At all events, the



question is to define the influence of the electoral system on each of these categories, as certain methods of balloting foster the local factors in opinion as against the national factors, and vice versa. The practical importance of the problem is readily apparent: the policy of a parliament will be profoundly different if its members have been elected for local reasons or because of their views on the great problems of the nation as a whole. The difference here is not between proportional representation and the simple majority system, but between the election of a single candidate and the election of a list—the first being a possibility under PR (the transferable vote) and the second often found under the simple majority system. In a single-member constituency “parish pump politics” are naturally in the forefront; the list system, on the other hand, brings in a wider field where local points of view balance and check one another, so that general considerations occupy an important position. It should also be added that the single member system, being more personal, gives more scope for individual undertakings and attributes great importance to the candidate’s local associations, naturally inclining him to keep his eyes fixed on the narrow area from which he hails; but the list system reduces the personal factor (which disappears almost entirely when the order of candidates on the list is fixed by the party) and compels the elector to vote for a party rather than for personalities, that is to say, for a system of ideas and an organization on a national scale rather than for the champions of local interests.

Practical observation confirms these conclusions. There is no doubt that the system of voting for lists based on the departments (which, since 1945, has taken the place of the election of individual members for each *arrondissement* in France) has greatly helped to widen the political horizon of both members of parliament and members of the government; it should however be noted that the credit for this should not go to the proportional system itself, as is usually thought. On the contrary, the fact that the American Congress is so much concerned with purely local matters—so often far removed from the world responsibilities which the United States has to shoulder—is largely due to the smallness of the electoral districts and the corresponding system of voting for single members. Other factors, however, come into play, which may profoundly alter the overall results and, in particular, the degree of centralization in the parties; Great Britain, in spite of its retention of the individual election and its small constituencies, does not exhibit the usual faults of the system. This is probably to be explained by the combination of the two-party system and the centralized organization of each party: for the first reason, it is extremely difficult for a candidate to enter a contest on his own without the support of the great traditional groups; for the second, the candidate’s nomination depends very much on the action of the central committee of the party, which means that he cannot confine his interests to local affairs. Incidentally, the second factor is far more important than the first, as we may see from the example of the United States, where the decentralization of the parties in no way restrains the tendency to concentrate on local questions, in spite of the two-party system.

- (B) The influence of the electoral system on the divisions of public opinion is no less important. Many other factors (psychological, religious, ideological, economic, etc.), of course, here come into play; but the electoral factor is not to be overlooked, for it may either accentuate or restrain the



influence of these other factors. In this connexion, we must remember the conclusions we reached with regard to the influence of the ballot system on the number of political parties. The manifest result of the majority vote with a single ballot, with its tendency to foster the two-party system, is to cut out the secondary divisions of opinion, crystallizing public feeling around two main competing trends; while proportional representation fosters the proliferation of shades of opinion by allowing each to set up its own separate party.

It is generally concluded that PR gives a more accurate reflection of opinion, and that the simple majority with a single ballot seriously distorts it. The matter is not quite so simple. It is not certain that the accentuation of differences in opinion resulting from proportional representation, as a consequence of its tendency to the multiplication of parties and of the independence it confers on them, gives a truer picture of the facts than the simplified view obtained under the majority system. It may be wondered whether public opinion does not in fact tend to split into two great rival factions, each, of course, containing a multitude of shades of opinion but each fairly sharply outlined. It is interesting, in this connexion, to find that much the same conclusions have been reached in widely differing studies. Some sociologists suggest that a distinction should be made between two fundamental political temperaments (the "radical" and "conservative"); the Marxists conceive of the dynamics of society as a struggle between two great opposing classes; and the founders of electoral geography in France recognize, behind the apparent multiplicity of political opinions in our country, an enduring fundamental opposition between the Right and the Left, between order and movement.

As a consequence, even admitting that the defect of the majority system is that it tends to eliminate minor divergencies within each "spiritual family", the system has the essential merit of giving an accurate reflection of the general antagonism between them; the proportional system, on the other hand, has a serious defect in that it completely obscures this fundamental cleavage of opinion and unduly exaggerates disagreements over details. On the whole, the latter is probably a far less accurate means of representing opinion than the former, contrary to the belief generally held. From this point of view, the second ballot system has a certain advantage, in that it makes it possible at the same time—as a result of the alliances formed at the second ballot—to reflect the fundamental division into two camps as well as the minor conflicts within each of the major groups of opinion. It should be noted, incidentally, that a two-party system would produce the same result if the structure of each party remained so flexible as to permit the development and co-existence of diverse factions.

Another aspect of the problem relates to the width of the gulf between the opposing currents of opinion; on this point the same confusion as we have already seen between the representation of the parties and the representation of opinion gives rise to similar errors. It is commonly said that proportional representation has the advantage of reducing this gulf, by breaking up the great opposing groups into several fractions, whereas the majority system pure and simple leads to the system of two blocs, i.e., to the sharpest possible opposition. This statement confuses the numerical differences in party representation in parliament with the depth of political divergency. In reality the respective effects of PR and the majority systems are the exact opposite of what is commonly believed.



Holcombe, in his article in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, has noted that the parties tended to draw closer together under a two-party system (normally resulting from a single ballot election), but does not go into the factors bringing about this growing similarity. They are fairly easy to define. We may take as a specific example the case of Great Britain at the present day, leaving out of account the Liberal Party which is no longer important. Who will decide whether the Conservatives or the Labour Party win at the elections? Not their out-and-out supporters, who will naturally vote for them in any event, if they have no opportunity to vote for another party further to the right or further to the left, but the two or three million moderate Englishmen and women, standing politically in the centre, who sometimes vote Conservative and sometimes Labour. To win these votes, the Conservative Party will be compelled to tone down its Conservatism and the Labour Party its Socialism, both adopting a calm and reassuring tone. Both will have to put forward middle-of-the-road policies, therefore essentially similar to one another; we thus have the paradox that the centre influences the whole parliamentary life of a country, in which the electoral system is such as to prevent the formation of a central party. The result is the manifest diminution of the gulf between political opinions. The myth of the "two blocs", which is so firmly cherished in France, does not square with the facts. We may compare the British case with that of the proportional system in France. In the ordinary way, each party can increase its representation only at the expense of its immediate neighbours: the Communists at the expense of the Socialists, the Popular Republicans at the expense of the Moderate Radicals or the RPF, etc. This means that each will endeavour to stress the difference of detail between itself and its closest rivals instead of drawing attention to their underlying similarity, and the result will be to aggravate political divisions and to add to the number of points on which there is disagreement.

We might attempt to complete this analysis by demonstrating that the second ballot, which works to the advantage of the centre parties as far as numerical representation is concerned, is much less favourable to them with regard to the representation of opinion itself. For most of the elected members of the centre get in at the second ballot, some with the support of the right, some with the support of the left. The centre parties thus tend to be perpetually torn between two opposing poles. They are reduced to framing a policy now of the right and now of the left, in an attempt to restrain both tendencies. The case of the Radical party under the Third Republic would be an excellent illustration of this tendency. But, in the absence of more numerous and definite supporting evidence, these remarks should be considered merely as provisional hypotheses subject to revision.

- (C) The essential problem is that of the extent to which public opinion and the governmental majority coincide, as it is on that, in the last resort, that the democratic system depends. In this connexion, a fundamental distinction should be drawn between an "automatic" and a "fluid" majority. When the seats are so distributed among the parties that there can be no doubt about the majority of one of them, which is thus unaffected by what the members may do or by parliamentary intrigues there is an "automatic" majority. On the other hand, when several parties have almost equal numbers of votes and none of them can form a government by itself, the establishment of a majority depends to a large



extent on the decisions of the members and the party leaders, public opinion having no direct influence in the matter; there is thus a "fluid" majority. Only the first system is in line with the traditional idea of democracy; the second leads in practice to a hybrid of democracy and oligarchy, where the people are simply called upon to determine by their votes the strength wielded by the respective party leaders.

In this sphere, the electoral system exercises a most important influence, which may be described as follows: the simple majority vote with a single ballot tends to produce an automatic majority imposed by public opinion; proportional representation, a fluid majority; and the second ballot system, a semi-fluid majority.

To take the case of a British election, on the morrow of the poll the country knows which party will take power, and what the majority is, with no possibility of doubt; one party forms the government and the other the opposition. The only times when the system has been thrown out of gear were from 1918 to 1935, owing to the temporary existence of three parties—brought to an end by the electoral system itself—or during the wars, when national governments were formed—in fact, in exceptional circumstances. In normal times, in every country where a two-party system has grown up as a result of election by simple majority, the governmental majority is imposed on Parliament by public opinion. Admittedly, the ballot system may artificially increase the majority, but it does not really distort it. The electoral system acts as a sort of magnifying glass, emphasizing the separation between the majority and the opposition.

To take, for purposes of comparison, a system of proportional representation such as that used in France, any, or almost any, majority is possible. In the present Assembly there might be:

- (1) A majority of the centre SFIO ("Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière"), MRP, Radicals, and a few moderates, which has in fact been governing, under different names, since 6 May 1947.
- (2) A three-party majority similar to that in the two Constituent Assemblies (Communists, SFIO, MRP), which formed the government until 6 May 1947.
- (3) A "popular front" majority like that of 1936 (Communists, SFIO, and a few "progressive" Radicals).
- (4) A moderate majority including parties from the extreme right to the SFIO (even taking in a few Socialists of Ramadier's following).

The choice between these four combinations does not depend on the electorate but on the trend of events in Parliament; all the people can do is to change the number of combinations, and the probabilities of forming certain of them, by the percentage of seats they allot to each party. Similar phenomena can be seen in most States which have adopted proportional representation, save in the exceptional cases where one party wins an absolute majority of seats. If one party just fails to secure a majority, observation shows that the parliament retains a great measure of freedom (as witness recent events in Belgium) unless the party in question has gained a dominating position in the political life of the country, e.g., the Socialist parties in Scandinavia. In any event, such cases are rarely encountered and do not represent the normal tendency of the proportional system.

When there is a second ballot, there is bound to be less freedom in the formation of the majority, owing to the interdependence of the parties and



the electoral alliances they are obliged to contract. The case of France from 1938 to 1939 shows nevertheless that there was still large scope for different parliamentary combinations; in many of the legislative assemblies a majority of the left gave way, after two years in power, to a majority described by the name of "National Union", with leanings towards the right. But the prospect of fresh alliances at the second ballot once more tended to incline the government towards the left on the eve of the elections. Moreover, in most of the other countries which have used the second ballot system—as in France before the 1914 war—the majorities have generally been more stable and more closely in line with the results of the ballot. The ballot itself was, however, influenced by the various alliances, and the result was very different from the system of automatic majorities deriving from the single ballot.

(b) SENSITIVITY TO VARIATIONS OF OPINION

The problem may be stated in the following form: does a given electoral system tend to accentuate or to minimize variations in public opinion? In the first case, it will be described as a sensitive (and unstable) system; in the second, as an insensitive (and stable) system.

The main difficulty in solving the question lies in the fact that there are many categories of variations in opinion, and that the extent to which the electoral system reacts varies from category to category. In this connexion, there is a fundamental distinction between variations within the traditional divisions of opinion and the emergence of more or less lasting new currents. The influence of the electoral system may then be summed up as follows:

- (1) Proportional representation is insensitive to variations in traditional opinions and extremely sensitive to new currents emerging, even when they are weak and of short duration.
- (2) The ordinary majority system with a single ballot is highly sensitive to variations in traditional opinions, but insensitive to new currents unless they are strong and lasting.
- (3) The simple majority system with a second ballot is comparatively insensitive both to variations in traditional opinions and to the emergence of new trends.

As always, these propositions merely express general basic tendencies which are liable to suffer profound changes through the operation of other factors. There are thus many exceptions to these rules.

*Variations in Traditional Opinions*

By this term, we mean changes in the distribution of votes among the usual parties at successive elections, excluding a sudden change in the position of one of them, only to be explained by the appearance of a really new movement. The electoral system will be described as insensitive if it tends to minimize such changes, that is, to reduce the difference in the number of seats in relation to the number of votes. A sensitive system, on the other hand, will accentuate that difference.

- (A) In this respect, the stabilizing effect of proportional representation is obvious. In principle, of course, it should merely produce an exact reflection of the different distribution of votes in two elections in the distribution of the seats. In practice, as the principles of proportional representation are not applied in full, this difference is attenuated.



Moreover, even if PR could be fully applied, it would still remain an insensitive system. For, apart from the mechanical effect due to the practical impossibility of representing a very small difference in the number of votes in the distribution of the seats, the stability of the system rests on a sociological factor—the fact that under a well-established political regime, and in a country long accustomed to democracy, traditional opinions vary little and the division of votes among the usual parties is always almost very much the same. One of the more interesting results of the research which has been done on electoral geography has been the discovery of this intrinsic permanence of political views.

By their nature, then, the movements of opinion are very slight and can only be clearly recorded by amplifying devices similar, in fact, to the seismographs which amplify oscillations of the earth's crust imperceptible to sense. By faithfully reflecting the distribution of votes in that of the seats without accentuating its variations, proportional representation thus ends by crystallizing the political system. It is extremely instructive, in this context, to study the graphs showing the respective strengths of the parties from one election to another. Under a proportional system, these graphs are practically horizontal, showing very little variation. A particularly good instance is that of the Netherlands from 1919 to 1939 (see diagram VII); in this naturally stable country, a ballot system also tending to stability results in almost complete immobility. The cases of Switzerland and Belgium are probably almost identical.

In some instances, however, long-term movements can be seen, provided they are very marked. An example is the rise of the Socialist parties in Scandinavia which brought them to their present dominating position (see diagram VIII); the Swedish case is particularly typical. It is difficult to say, in this instance, whether the method of ballot magnified or minimized this growth; it probably restrained it in one way by postponing the time when the Scandinavian Labour Parties secured an absolute authority—which they would have got more quickly under a simple majority system with one ballot, as we shall describe below. But there are grounds for supposing that it helped the movement on in another way, by perpetuating the weakening of the other parties: a process which would have been less marked under a majority system. It is evident that the statements previously made about the stabilizing effect of PR must not be taken too strictly; over a very long period it is possible that it may amplify, instead of minimizing, the deep-seated movements of traditional opinion. But it also retards such movements on both the up-grade and the down-grade.

- (B) The natural results of the majority vote with a single ballot are very different. The graphs showing variations in the number of seats obtained by the parties under this system move sharply up and down in a highly characteristic way (see diagram IX, A). A comparison of these with the graphs showing the percentage of votes reveals a very distinct difference in the scope of the disparities. Comparison of the percentages of seats and percentages of votes in Great Britain between 1918 and 1950 is very significant in this respect, even though the presence of the Liberal Party profoundly affected the system (see diagram IX, A and B). The general operation of the amplifying process is simple; it is the result of the combination of the two tendencies analysed above towards the "over-representation" of the majority party and the "under-representation" of the minority party. In normal conditions—that is, when the simple majority



system with a single ballot is found in conjunction with a two-party organization, in accordance with its natural tendency—it suggests a sort of political seismograph, capable of recording variations of opinion which would otherwise be imperceptible. From the purely theoretical point of view, as we have seen, the effect might be described as a distortion of opinion, but, from the practical point of view, it must be admitted that the system has the advantage of preventing the natural tendency of public opinion to remain static, without falsifying the general trend of its variations. It may be advanced as a criticism that, for practical purposes, the transference of one-tenth of the votes is enough to change the whole political complexion of Great Britain; but it would be interesting to investigate the social and intellectual composition of that tenth in relation to the other nine-tenths. It might be found that it represents the most vital and advanced section of the population, the section which is, in the last resort, the most competent politically, as it is able to learn from experience in deciding how to vote, and places confidence in a party because of its work in the past, and subject to approval of its behaviour in the future; while the other nine-tenths are unaffected by the practical results achieved and vote because of a traditional attachment to a particular party, to which they are prepared to surrender all their powers. In this case, the advantage of the system would be that it reintroduces the idea of quality into democracy, which is too much inclined to fall under the domination of quantity. When the simple majority system with a single ballot is found in conjunction with a large number of parties, the results of the system are much less satisfactory; the seismograph is thrown out of gear and distorts the variations of opinion instead of amplifying them. It should not, however, be forgotten that this distortion generally acts only in one direction (to the detriment of the third party) and thus tends to restore the two-party system which is the essential characteristic of this regime.

- (C) It is not easy to specify how the second ballot affects the sensitivity of a system to variations in opinion. There is no doubt that it tends to have a stabilizing action. The case of France illustrates this quite clearly: a study of the results of each poll shows that the second ballot has always toned down the changes of opinion which were disclosed by the first. Comparison of the period from 1919 to 1924 with that from 1928 to 1936 shows that the variations among the body of electors were not much greater in the former than in the latter but that they were reflected in Parliament by very sharp changes in the majorities in the first case, owing to the single ballot system, while, in the second, the changes were far less clearly marked because of the second ballot.

The reason for this stabilizing effect seems to be the preponderant influence of the central parties under such a ballot system. Moreover, within each of the main political groups, the system causes votes to be attracted to the least extreme party at the second ballot, as it is generally in a better position than its more extreme colleagues in view of the usual preponderance of moderate over fanatical electors. In addition, some of the parties of the centre have a foot in either camp, irrespective of the national electoral agreements; some French Radicals have always owed their election to the support of the Right, while others have benefited because candidates of the Left have withdrawn in their favour. The party which can appeal to both provides the common ground where differences of opinion may be reconciled, and acts as a shock-absorber. The stabilizing



influence of the centre party, which is very marked in France, is also to be seen in other countries; in the late nineteenth century the Liberal parties operated in this way in face of the development of Socialism. In most cases, however, the effect was less marked, and closer electoral alliances prevented such a bipartisan appeal. The second ballot then lost much of its stabilizing effect. In fact, if the many parties to which the system gives rise coalesce to form two great coalitions in which discipline is strict, and which are clearly separated from one another, there is a definite resemblance to the two-party system; while it is possible for the moderations of opinion to find expression within each of the two tendencies, the distribution of votes among them is amplified by the electoral system as it is under a two-party regime. Diagram X, in which the votes gained by the Netherlands parties belonging to each electoral coalition have been added together, is interesting in this respect; the sharp up-and-down movements of the graph suggest a two-party system.

It will be seen that the effects of the second ballot tend to be felt in two directions, and that the general proposition set out above can be accepted only with reservations.

### *Sensitivity to New Currents of Opinion*

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between new currents of opinion and variations in the traditional divisions of opinion. There is scarcely any doubt, of course, about mushroom growths, such as Boulangism in France in the nineteenth century and Rexism in Belgium before the 1939 war. But in the case of a genuine and lasting movement, how can we state the precise moment at which it ceases to be new and becomes traditional? We have discussed the development of Socialism in Scandinavia from 1914 to 1939: did it represent the emergence of a new current or the natural development of a traditional view? At the outset probably the former; in the end, certainly the latter. We must be wary of attributing any universal application to a classification whose only value is to facilitate research.

In particular, the idea of a new movement of opinion and that of a new party do not absolutely coincide. A party such as the PRL in France does not denote any new feature in public opinion; on the other hand, the sudden expansion of an old party often reflects the influence of a new current in public opinion. The rise of the Communist parties in Western Europe immediately after the Liberation is very significant in this respect.

(A) On this understanding, there seems to be no doubt about the stabilizing effect of the second ballot. Any new party anxious to make its appeal to the electors finds itself faced with the dilemma of either acting alone, and therefore being crushed between the rival coalitions, or joining one of them, thereby losing much of its independence and its novelty, and enjoying no particular advantage in the distribution of seats; because a new candidate generally wins less votes than the older ones and therefore has little chance of remaining in the running at the second ballot. If the second ballot system is found in conjunction with individual elections, i.e., with small constituencies conducive to the formation of private electoral property, as it were, we find the maximum insensitivity in the system; the new party is compelled to put veteran candidates into the field if it is to have any real chance of success, but it then loses its novelty.

The French case is a good illustration of the profoundly conservative effect of the second ballot. There is, for instance, the history of the



Communist Party from 1928 to 1939. At the beginning (1928-1936), it went to the polls quite alone, declining even to withdraw its candidates at the second ballot; it thus preserved the full purity and originality of its message, but it was soundly beaten (in 1928, with 1,063,943 votes at the first ballot, it gained a total of 14 seats whereas the Socialists, with 1,698,084 votes, won 99); in 1936, it joined the Popular Front coalition and as a result won 72 seats, but this represents a period of very definite "bourgeois contamination" and of at least external similarity to the traditional parties. At the same time, we find that vital and energetic movements such as the "Action Française", the "Croix de Feu", or the "Parti Social Français" were quite unable to get representatives into Parliament. The fate of the SFIO Socialist Party also provides food for thought in considering the consequences of the second ballot with respect to new trends of opinion. The constant need to collaborate with the "bourgeois parties" for election purposes has always tended to sap its individuality and to bring it closer in spirit and interests to the latter; there is no doubt that the electoral system is largely responsible for the decline of Socialism in France.

In short, the second ballot is an essentially conservative force. It automatically eliminates any superficial and ephemeral new currents of ideas; when they are lasting and deep-rooted, it hampers their representation in parliament and, at the same time, steadily saps their originality and tends to bring them into line with the traditional parties. The gradual abatement of the dynamic energy of a party is, of course, a phenomenon encountered everywhere; but the second ballot system tends to speed up the process.

- (B) It is extremely difficult to say what are the results in this respect of the simple majority system with a single ballot. On the one hand, it seems to have a conservative effect—even more so than the second ballot system—raising an impassable barrier to the progress of all new movements, owing to the power of the two great blocs it brings into being; the case of the United States of America and the impossibility of forming a third party in that country may be cited in this connexion. On the other, there is evidence that it definitely favoured the development of the Socialist parties in the early nineteenth century, and that the first countries in which those parties actually came to power were the very ones in which the simple majority system with a single ballot was in force: Australia and New Zealand. What is the explanation for this apparent contradiction? It is largely due to local circumstances which cannot be defined in general terms, and is unconnected with the electoral system. It is also to be explained by the nature and the strength of the new currents of opinion. So long as they remain weak and uncertain, the system ruthlessly excludes them from representation in parliament; their potential supporters do not waste votes on them, for fear of helping their least desirable opponents to victory. There is thus an absolute barrier to the progress of all those swift and superficial switches of opinion which sometimes sweep over a nation.

But assuming that a new party—such as the Labour Party—gains some strength in a particular constituency, at the next election the more moderate of the Liberal electors will fall back on the Conservative candidate through fear of Socialism, while the more radical will join with Labour. This double process of polarization initiates the elimination of the Liberal Party, which will be accelerated by any Labour successes, for



under-representation will also come into play as soon as the Liberal candidates fall back into third place. The situation is quite different from that typical of the second ballot system. In a French constituency, up to 1939, the fact that the Socialist Party gained a substantial number of votes did not deprive the Radical candidate of his more moderate supporters, but rather the reverse, for a number of electors from the Right began to consider the Radical the less dangerous opponent, as being a buckler against the Socialist. The effect of polarization was to the advantage of the centre, deferring the new party's access to power, while, at the same time, the necessity for the new party to form alliances with the older ones lessened its originality.

The single ballot system is thus much less conservative than it is often said to be; it may, in fact, speed up the growth of a new party as soon as it achieves a certain strength and may rapidly bring it into the place of the second party. From then on, however, its results are similar to those of the election with two ballots; it accelerates the natural "ageing" of the new party in the same way, i.e., by tending to foster its similarity to its principal rival among the older parties; we have already described the fundamental pressure impelling the two main parties to grow alike as a result of the need for middle-of-the-road policies in the electoral strife.

- (C) The system of proportional representation is extremely sensitive to new movements, whether they are ephemeral flights of superficial emotion or deep-rooted and lasting currents; in this respect, there is a curious contrast with the system's lack of sensitivity to variations in the traditional forms of opinion and the resulting crystallization of the old parties. Belgium, where the number of seats held by the great traditional parties varied very little from 1919 to 1939, is the most striking instance of the speed with which the proportional system reacts to momentary bursts of enthusiasm: the extraordinary success of the Rexist Party in 1936, when it won 21 seats (out of 202), followed by its abrupt collapse in 1939 (four seats), would have been inconceivable under a simple majority system with either one or two ballots. It is surely interesting, in this connexion, to note that the growth of Fascism throughout Europe was visible in electoral results only in the quiet northern democracies (Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries) where, however, the real strength of the movement was apparently much less than in France; in the one case, PR was in operation, in the other, a simple majority system.


Turning to the consideration of more profound and lasting new movements, the observed results are equally conclusive. From 1919 to 1933, the development of Communism in Germany was fostered by the proportional system, whereas in France it was definitely retarded by the majority system. Immediately after the war, in 1945, it was paralysed in Great Britain with its majority elections, but clearly apparent throughout Western Europe where proportional representation was in force. It is also very probable that the rise of Nazism would have been far slower and far less important in Germany if the majority system had been continued in that country; the relative indifference of the Empire to new movements of opinion is in striking contrast to the extreme sensitivity of the Weimar Republic (cf. the very interesting comparison in diagram XI). Similarly, the agrarian parties were unable to gain representation in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland until the proportional system was introduced. The development of the MRP in France in 1945-1946 is




also very typical; it would never, with a majority vote, have expanded to such an extent. Incidentally, the "Rassemblement du Peuple Français" is likely to rise in the same way at the next elections if the proportional system is retained.

There is no doubt about the existence of this phenomenon. The explanation should, it seems, be sought in the fact that proportional representation is essentially "passive". It records the changes taking place among the electorate without either amplifying or minimizing them; this accounts for its failure to react to variations among the traditional parties, which are naturally slight (the stability of PR reflecting in this case the natural stability of public opinion), and also for its extreme sensitivity to new movements which, being full of enthusiasm, are generally more clearly marked. In contrast, the simple majority system with a single ballot is "active", as it amplifies changes of the first type and minimizes those of the second.






I. THE ELIMINATION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY IN GREAT BRITAIN




II. THE RETURN TO THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN GREAT BRITAIN. The Irish Nationalists have been omitted from 1906 to 1918






III. THE "RESCUE" OF THE LIBERAL PARTY IN BELGIUM BY P.R.





IV. DISPARITY BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND THAT OF THE SEATS OBTAINED BY THE PARTIES IN GREAT BRITAIN. (Gross figures)






V. DISPARITY BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND THAT OF THE SEATS OBTAINED BY THE PARTIES IN GREAT BRITAIN. (Adjusted figures, related to the percentage of votes)




VI. INACCURACY OF THE SECOND BALLOT SYSTEM (French elections in 1932)  
(according to G. Lachapelle, *Régimes électoraux*, p. 163)

| Parties                                     | Number<br>of votes<br>gained | Numbers<br>of seats | Full. P.R. | Difference |
|---|------------------------------|---------------------|------------|------------|
| Conservative and<br>U.R.D. (Right). . . . . | 1 316 219                    | 81                  | 86         | + 5        |
| Independents. . . . .                       | 499 236                      | 28                  | 32         | + 4        |
| Popular Democrats. . . . .                  | 309 336                      | 16                  | 20         | + 4        |
| Left Republicans. . . . .                   | 1 299 936                    | 72                  | 82         | + 10       |
| Independent Radicals. . . . .               | 955 990                      | 62                  | 60         | — 2        |
| Radical Socialists. . . . .                 | 1 836 991                    | 157                 | 115        | — 42       |
| Republican Socialists. . . . .              | 515 176                      | 37                  | 33         | — 4        |
| Socialists. . . . .                         | 1 964 384                    | 129                 | 122        | — 7        |
| Socialists-Communists . . . . .             | 78 472                       | 11                  | 5          | — 6        |
| Communists . . . . .                        | 796 630                      | 12                  | 50         | + 38       |




VII. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL "RESISTANCE TO CHANGE": VARIATIONS IN THE STATE OF THE PARTIES IN THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE AND AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF P.R. (From G. Lachapelle, *Régimes électoraux*, p. 163)






VIII. THE RISE OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY TO A DOMINATING POSITION IN SWEDEN, FROM 1911 TO 1948, UNDER P.R.





IX. AMPLIFICATION OF VARIATIONS IN THE TRADITIONAL FORMS OF OPINION AS A RESULT OF THE SIMPLE MAJORITY SYSTEM WITH A SINGLE BALLOT. (English case)






X. PARTY ALLIANCES IN THE NETHERLANDS (1888-1913)

In 1894, there was irregular collaboration between two Radicals and Liberals. Liberal secessions also took place. The majority was therefor variable.  
 In 1908, the Socialists withdrew their support from the Liberal government, which then had only 45 votes against 48. A Christian government was formed before the elections of 1909. The Socialists still refused to take part in the government, but, in general, kept up their alliance with the Liberals and supported them with their votes.





XI. STABILITY OF THE P.R. SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES. INSTABILITY WITH RESPECT TO NEW MOVEMENTS. (German case, 1920-1933)



# IN SUPPORT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

A. DAMI

I have read with the greatest interest Professor Duverger's distinguished report on "The Influence of the Electoral System on Political Life". It is an excellent and most absorbing document, especially for those interested in political science and electoral theory.

I would venture, however, as a convinced supporter of proportional representation, to explain briefly why I still hold firmly by the principle of electoral justice based on the rule: number of seats in proportion to the number of votes.

To come straight away to the crux of the matter, I would say that, while I am quite prepared to agree to modifying the system by introducing a minimum vote (of five per cent, seven per cent or ten per cent) and, still more readily, to the exclusion of any list which fails to obtain the *quota*—although I still see no objection to the representation of small parties, as Mr. Duverger's table for the Netherlands entitled "The Multiplication of Small Parties by PR" shows clearly that these small parties have never obtained more than 13 seats out of 100, in all—I am absolutely against the system of fixed party lists in use in France, where it leads, in fact, to a caricature of proportional representation. The elector is quite unable, in principle, to make any change in the list, even in the numerical order of the candidates; in order to change the order, the majority of electors would have to decide on a different order, an event which in practice never occurs, as it is scarcely conceivable that a majority of the electors should be able to reach agreement in advance throughout any one Department. Secondly, and still more important, the elector is not allowed to split his vote. The result is that all the candidates on the list in fact get the same number of votes, and that they are thus elected in the order determined by the party committee. I call this a caricature of proportional representation, since the most wholehearted supporters of the system never intended to deprive the elector of his freedom of choice, not only among different lists but within each individual list, leaving the selection of successful candidates entirely in the hands of the party committees instead of in those of the electors. In Switzerland, we have not only the possibility of splitting the individual vote among different parties, and what is known as "*latoisage*" (striking out names), but also the cumulative vote (possibility of casting more than one vote for one candidate). And, whatever objections may be raised to the last mentioned procedure, which is not particularly democratic (especially if there are already "cumulative" candidates on the list), it is nevertheless true that in Switzerland and other countries using the proportional system, the elector is free to cast his vote as he pleases and the candidates on each list which have secured most votes are elected. I am surprised that Mr. François Goguel, in his excellent report on the French system, when speaking of proportional representation in comparison with the double ballot majority system, refers only to fixed lists, as if no other system were possible, and makes no mention of true proportional representation. One of the first things we have to do is to explain this system to the French; we shall thus at one stroke do away with the major criticism they advance against the proportional system—that it brings about party dictatorship and government by the party committees.

Moreover the majority system itself is no safeguard against the domination of the committees; under the Third Republic, that domination was very definite and, in the United States of America, nothing can be done without the endorsement of the parties and their conventions. Once the candidates have been nominated by the majority, the minority has not even the right to vote on election day for its own candidates, as their names appear on no list.



Another defect of the French system is due to the fact that the constituencies are too small (for practical purposes, identical with the Departments, certain populous departments having been split up). It is, however, selfevident that PR can be really effective only in constituencies returning at least eight or 10 members; the more members there are, the fewer remaining or "unused" votes there will be and the less those votes will matter. In Switzerland, when elections to the National Council are held, PR works perfectly in the big cantons of Zürich and Berne which return more than 30 members; it is less satisfactory in the medium-sized cantons; and not satisfactory at all in such cantons as Uri, which elect only one member. It thus seems that, instead of splitting up Departments which were thought to be too large, France would have done better to group together Departments which were too small.

On this understanding, however, and subject to these two provisos (large constituencies and respect for the freedom of the elector), proportional representation does not, as is too often alleged, "favour" any party in any circumstances. Mr. Duverger himself, after several references in his report to the "amplification" due to the proportional system (with special reference to new trends) in contrast to the stabilization of a given situation, waters down his argument and in fact contradicts himself, because at the end of his paper, he concludes that PR records the changes taking place among the electorate "without either amplifying or minimizing them" and, in another context, actually refers to the "stabilizing effect" of PR. It is thus not even true that PR is, as stated in this report, mainly sensitive to the emergence of new trends. It reflects the facts whatever they may be: stability or change. We may note at this point—leaving aside any question of merit, even in regard to the Nazis—that it is not true that the proportional system of the Weimar Republic, being "sensitive to new movements of opinion", helped the accession to power of National Socialism. Mr. Hermens' conclusions that PR killed the Republic, which have incidentally already been criticized by Mr. Soulier in his report, are wrong in two respects. In the first place (since the number of members depends on that of the voters), because the Nazi Party, mainly recruited from among the young electors, began by associating its representatives in the Reichstag with those of other parties, whose decline, if any, was at that time imperceptible; and in the second place, still more important, because the majority system, far from preventing Hitler's accession by "sweeping him off the parliamentary scene", would have brought him to power two years earlier, in 1930. I was in Germany at that time and can speak from what I saw. In the vast majority of constituencies, whether returning one or several members, the Nazis would have gained—and in fact did gain—a relative majority of votes (from approximately 25 to 45 per cent of the votes in different cases). There were then two possibilities: either to elect candidates straight away with a relative majority, in which event the Nazis would have gained almost all the seats in the Reichstag; or to hold a second ballot, in which event there was no possibility of an absolute majority at the first ballot (except where Hitler had already got it) or of an effective coalition to counter-balance the National Socialists at the second ballot, for the very good reason that there was no chance of associating the Populists, the Catholic Centre or the German Nationalists with the Communists; the Communists were at that time already the third most important German party, far ahead of their nearest rivals and immediately following the Socialists. In fact, the Communist candidate in many cases headed the anti-Nazi poll at the first ballot, so that the others should have withdrawn in his favour; that also, however, was inconceivable. Thus no anti-Hitler coalition, either among the people or in the Reichstag, was possible without the aid of the Communists, as in almost all the constituencies the Communist and Nazi votes together were far in excess of the absolute majority.

Nor is it true that PR makes it impossible to form a parliamentary majority, or more accurately, it is not PR which is at fault. Either one party, or group of parties, immediately obtains an absolute majority of the votes and therefore of the seats, in which event PR provides that majority at least as well as and perhaps better than the majority system with single or several-member constituencies; or no party or group of parties obtains such a majority, in which event it is quite as likely that it will be impossible to form a parliamentary majority under the simple majority system of election as under proportional representation; in either case it may happen that the results in the different constituencies cancel out and balance. The so-called "majority" system has never



made the formation of a parliamentary majority certain; any such mathematical certainty would be possible only under a two-party system and, even then, the English instance shows that whenever the result of the elections has been a divided House consisting of two almost equal groups—in spite of the two-party system and when the third party has been reduced to negligible size—it has been necessary to hold a fresh election the same year or the next. This was so in 1910 and 1921—to go no further back than the twentieth century—and it will probably be so again after the 1950 elections. The difference in the numbers of seats held by the two parties is in fact either seven or 18, depending on whether or not the Liberal seats are counted; this difference does not even give a proper reflection of the real difference between the votes received by Labour and Conservatives (three per cent), while PR would have reflected it exactly; and yet they say that the proportional system reduces differences and prevents the formation of a majority! We thus find the apparently—but only apparently so—paradoxical situation that even the majority system with a single ballot and a relative majority, even under a two-party system, may produce a parliament divided exactly in halves, where there is therefore no majority or an infinitesimal majority. The result is that the election has to begin all over again, and a small difference in the votes in a particular constituency may then either form, or reverse, a working majority.

Another case, just as conclusive, is that of France: how did the majority system which was in force all through the Third Republic (except in 1919 and 1924) ensure the existence of a parliamentary majority? Governments fell like ninepins—still faster than in Germany under the Weimar Republic, which is generally the butt of every criticism. The very fact that there were no parties worthy of the name, and that the members of parliament were elected, as it were, in their own right, enabled the latter to vote now for one side, now for the other, passing constantly from camp to camp.

Mr. Goguel himself shows in his report that PR does not in fact produce the mass of splinter parties which it is wrongly said to do: four or five parties at the outside have any real chance of representation in the constituencies as a whole or, more accurately, in the largest constituencies.

The system of electing single members may be criticized for favouring large private interests and therefore the formation of subservient groups; what is more serious, it does not even secure the geographical representation of local political interests or climate, which is at once the aim and boast of the system. The mere phrase “to look for a constituency”, the possibility of a candidate’s changing his constituency from one House to another and in some cases even from one ballot to another, clearly show how much weight need be attached to this claim that the system promotes a “federal” type of organization. It is said that the French wish to “get to know their members of parliament”. Apart from the fact that any such intimate acquaintance would be impossible in France except within the cantons or sub-districts, rather than the *arrondissements* (which would not be feasible), it is difficult to see how the return to the majority system, combined with voting for lists, towards which France seems to be moving, could restore it, since the Department would still be the constituency. Moreover, the Coty scheme, which seems likely to be adopted in the end, provides that an absolute majority must be obtained at each of the two ballots, failing which the proportional system will again come into play; instead of forming alliances at the second ballot, therefore, the parties will zealously maintain their views and keep their candidates in the field, in the reasonable hope that they will at least secure representation in proportion to their importance.

When we speak of the “domination of the party committees”, the first point for criticism should in fact be the second ballot system, which makes possible and indeed necessary the most cynical alliances and the most shameful bargaining at the second ballot. It is impossible for the opinion of the country to change in a fortnight but, in that same fortnight, the party committees may radically alter the parliamentary make-up. Lastly, these alliances are, by definition, formed to oppose something or someone; it is because of them that it has been said that the French always vote “against” instead of “in favour”.

In France after the Liberation the parties were able, for the first time, thanks to a full system of proportional representation, to go to the polls under their own flags, that



is, without concluding alliances (for from 1919 to 1924 the system of PR was very much toned down, with its "bonuses" for an absolute, and even for a relative majority), and, also for the first time in the history of the French parliament, three great "monolithic" parties by themselves occupied almost all the parliamentary benches; and this is what they call the "mass of splinter parties", the proliferation of parties due to PR!

The fact that since that time the situation has grown worse, as a result of secessions and regroupings within the parties and the emergence of the RPF—not only in the country but in the Assembly, owing to the number of desertions to that party—and, above all, of the Communists' withdrawal from the government, is due, need we repeat, to parliamentary events for which PR is no more responsible than any other electoral system, since the events in question took place *after* the elections. There is in fact nothing to guarantee the survival of purely electoral coalitions in a parliament; nor is there anything to guarantee that the alliances concluded in individual Departments will be matched by others similar in parliament. Under the Third Republic with its majority system, too, we saw not only perpetual changes in the majority but the perpetual movement of members of parliament from one group to another, not to speak of the cases in which a member founded his own group after the election, sometimes consisting of himself alone.

Lastly, Mr. Duverger states—orally, for it is the opposite of the conclusion to be drawn from his report—that the line of demarcation between the parties is much more definite under a system with single-member constituencies (and, generally, a simple majority) than under a proportional system. I would venture to maintain the contrary view.

The Swiss parties are clearly differentiated, and the same applies to the French parties since PR was introduced. They are "rigid", to use Mr. Duverger's own expression. Under the system in force during the Third Republic, however, it was impossible in many cases to say to what party a member belonged. There were many small groups constantly undergoing changes; there was a swarm of "non-party men": several simply called themselves Republicans. And moreover, as a survival of the past, all the parties of the Right called themselves "Left" or at any rate "Republican" or "Progressive"; it was impossible for the uninitiated to appreciate the shade of difference between the Left Republicans and the Republican Left or between the Independent Left and the Left Independents. In actual fact there was no such shade of difference; everything depended on the "independent" temper of the members: parliament consisted of personalities and hangers-on rather than of parties. If, however, there is to be any real democracy, it can only be embodied in the parties. And for my part I would rather have to choose between doctrines and ideas than between men.

It should be added that at the present time, in view of the existence of Communism, we have not two but at least three opposing tendencies throughout most of Europe (Communism, Socialism and Middle Class Liberalism in the wide sense of the term), and in fact four if we count the "reactionary" parties proper (represented in France by the RPF and the PRL). In these circumstances, a majority system would completely distort the picture in the different parliaments, by compelling the electors to unite against reaction, or against Communism either at the first ballot (as in England) or at the second. The gravitation towards the centre which worked to the advantage of the Radicals under the Third Republic and which, it seems, should in future work to the advantage of the Socialists, becomes impossible as soon as either of those two parties is too weak to form the nucleus of an absolute majority against the two extreme parties, whether or not in coalition.

On the other hand, what seems to me to be most instructive in Mr. Duverger's report is what he says about what might be called the repercussion of the electoral system, that is, not the influence of political habits on the system but the influence in the other direction; the clearest example is the case of England, where the two-party system has brought about the decline of the Liberal Party, a decline which was also apparent in the Netherlands and Belgium, where, however, the party was saved at the last moment by PR. This influence in fact works in two ways: firstly, the effect of the two-party system is gradually to eliminate any party occupying the third place, even if it has previously been the first or second; secondly; it reduces the representation of such a party in another way, owing to the fact that its supporters lose hope and transfer



their votes to one of the two main parties in order to avoid wasting them. The result is a further reduction, at a later stage, in the representation of the third party. The electoral system does the rest: the Liberal Party in England, with nine per cent of the total vote, now has only  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the total seats.

It remains to determine how this process of psychological alienation comes about; how, and at what moment, does the elector realize or sense, firstly, that a new party is likely to move up into first or second place and, secondly, that his own party has dropped into third place, thus losing its chances of success, so that he will do well to abandon it if he is not to waste his vote?

I should like to end by replying to our colleague who has reproached us, Mr. Duverger and most of the speakers, for discussing the electoral system as if it were something existing in its own right, operating, as it were, *in vacuo* and quite distinct from political life and, above all, from life itself; everything depends, he said on social conditions, and politics cannot be separated from the rest of the country's life. My reply is that, at least under a proportional system, the elections do in fact reflect all the conditions of a country, including, and most important, its social conditions; for instance, in an agricultural country, the elections will bring to power the peasant party or parties representing agricultural interests; in an industrial country, they will [reflect] the predominance of working-class interests, and so on.

## ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM

G. PERTICONE

The question which the Congress has to study is essentially that of the influence of the legal and technical features of the electoral system on party organization, the political behaviour of the electors, public opinion and, lastly, the political system of a country.

To put the question in this form indicates a definite attachment to the old view which was concerned exclusively with the effect of institutions on political life and behaviour and overlooked the effect which men may exercise, by their action, on those same institutions. This view, which is an integral feature of liberal philosophy, and which informed the whole memorable struggle for the introduction of universal suffrage, was never challenged while that philosophy held sway in democratic countries. It was believed that suitable technical precautions to ensure a genuinely free vote were enough to create almost automatically conditions in which the operation of the political system would satisfy both the logic and the practical requirements of the democratic principle.

I do not think that the experience of these post-war years can be regarded as confirming this view. It does not seem that any electoral system, even if it guarantees the fullest possible freedom at the polls, automatically ensures the triumph of democracy in the internal administration of the parties, the guidance of public opinion or the operations of government. At first sight, it seems difficult to question that a form of organization, based on a system of wide political and civil liberties, and including provision for a free vote, universal suffrage and proportional representation, is democratic. But the situation seems rather different when we consider the structure and administration of the political parties, whose internal organization does not display the characteristic features of the democratic system of which they form a part. The free organization of the State in general is in contrast with the authoritarian system in force within the parties. The civil liberties to which lip service is paid have had no effect on the internal organization of the subsidiary party groups. In the end, it becomes clear that these two conflicting systems cannot continue to exist side by side and that one or other must go under.



According to the tenets of liberalism, to secure the exercise of freedom would necessarily lead to the real enjoyment of freedom; the free institutions of the State, for instance, should effectively influence the party institutions, making their spirit more liberal and their operations more democratic. This is not at all what actually happens, however; we find that a constant pressure is exercised by the authoritarian party system on the liberal State system, leading finally to the loss of freedom when the party comes to power and its authoritarianism becomes the basis of the government. At that point, only one political colour is possible; the other parties disappear one by one, as do all free institutions. The electoral system, even if it remains liberal in appearance, is quickly bent to serve the new circumstances of political life; in countries where the secret ballot is still nominally in force, voting papers are in fact open to inspection.

When this stage is reached, even if the electoral system is on paper, still technically perfect, it is no more than a mask. The control exercised by public opinion no longer means anything, as there is no guarantee of its free exercise, and no criticism is tolerated. Those who then protest, in the name of democracy, against the suppression of all liberties are immediately accused of treachery and expelled from participation in public affairs in the name of an authority which has crushed freedom. We thus come, in the end, to the institution of what is generally known as "mass rule".

"Mass rule" may be defined as an order on which no liberal influence can be exercised either by the political institutions of the country in general or by the electoral system in particular. "Mass rule" is a form of government in which individual initiative, individual criticism and, in short, the point of view of the individual or of minor groups are considered only so long as they are in line with the political trend imposed by the governmental authority. The will of the community is no longer the direct expression of the will of the people as individuals, voiced in secret. It is indistinguishable from the statements in which the leaders express their own will. Individual opinions are of no importance except when the leader's statements reflect more or less obscure currents running through the basic mass. These statements may be put forward as an exact reflection of the wishes of the mass, but we must be wary lest those wishes are in fact no more than the emotional and irrational reactions of the mass to the slogans suggested and imposed by the leaders. Here we find the introduction into politics of a factor whose importance, though evident, is difficult to assess—the disingenuous presentation of the aims pursued by the leaders at the apex of the pyramid as the alleged demands of the base, i.e., the mass.

Some countries have already set their feet on this slippery slope, and it is difficult to see how, without an effort from within, they can arrest the impetus carrying them to destruction. In others, warning has been given and there is still a chance of stopping the trend of events and preventing the accession to power of the "mass rule" system, which begins with the change from a regime in which there are many parties to one in which there is only one.

The point at which the process can still be stopped is very clearly to be seen in the history of each country. It is the point at which the two parallel systems of the State and the political party, which have been closely related, clearly diverge. It is the point at which the organization of the party sets into the mould of *authority*, while the State continues to operate in accordance with the principle of *liberty*, which is typical of modern civilization. It is absurd and inconsistent that many contemporary constitutions, based on the solemn declaration of the principles of freedom and the rights of the individual, and making the political party the arbiter in the direction of public affairs, make no provision for regulating the functions of the party in conformity with existing institutions. The Italian constitution is an example of this inconsistency.

It is obvious that, if the political party is allowed to organize and develop in accordance with authoritarian principles which are excluded from the legal organization of the democratic State, conflict is inevitable, and the only outcome can be the triumph of one or other of the opposing forces. If we are to save the principle of freedom from being forced to yield to the constant and growing pressure of the principle of authority in this conflict—which we cannot hope to avoid since it is already engaged in many countries—authoritarianism must be eradicated from contemporary party life as it has already been, for the present, from the life of the modern State. We must prevent



the system of mass rule from gaining a footing in the party in defiance of the State; more accurately, we must find some form of political system by which the common people may be brought to play a part in public life without sacrificing that freedom which it is the duty of the State to defend.

It is therefore essential that some means should be found, by legislation, of schooling the political parties by giving them a prescribed place in the constitutional system of the State, and that, in politics, individuals and groups should be able to express their will within the party without coming up against obstacles which are no longer raised within the State. If the dogmatic principle of authority is once admitted within the party, there is no longer any point in preserving the principle of freedom in the organization of governmental power, or in recognizing all the traditional values such as the right of criticism and freedom of opinion for individuals and competent associations; the principle of liberalism cannot survive in such circumstances and must rapidly give way to its opposite.

This is the lesson political theorists may learn from contemporary history.

Reverting to our own subject : if the electoral system is to exercise its natural influence on party organization and the political regime, the State must defend the principles of freedom, that is, the respect for the will of the individual, which the political party is striving to root out in certain countries as it has already done in many others.

## SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

S. S. NILSON

In the excellent book on *The Influence of Electoral Systems on Political Life* presented by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, there are a few statements for which the reasons adduced do not seem sufficiently strong.

In particular this may be so with regard to the chapter on the Weimar Republic. Rather too much importance seems to have been attributed there to the views of F. A. Hermens, whose book on Proportional Representation contains many propositions of doubtful validity. For instance, Hermens tries to calculate the probable results of the 1930 Reichstag election on the assumption that the Anglo-Saxon majority system had been introduced just before it took place, the various parties receiving the same number of votes as they actually secured under PR. He finds that the Nazis would have obtained only 48 out of 400 deputies, a share corresponding to less than two-thirds of what they actually did get. However, Hermens makes no attempt to calculate the effects of an introduction of the majority system at the next general election, when Hitler got about 38 per cent of the votes (and of the seats, under PR). The results of such a calculation are interesting. One may follow the method used by Hermens, dividing the whole of Germany into 400 constituencies of about equal size. On the assumption that the majority system had been introduced just before the election, the probable outcome would have been: all the smaller parties would have been wiped out and the National Socialists would have secured more than 240 out of the 400 seats, the Catholics obtaining about 100, the Social Democrats about 40, and the Communists about 20 seats. In other words, while the introduction of the majority system in 1930 would probably have retarded the growth of Nazism, its introduction two years later might have provided Hitler with a huge Reichstag majority.

It may be said that neither of these calculations is of any great interest, as they tell us nothing about the effects of the majority system *in the long run*. However, the long-term effects may never have time to manifest themselves in a country where anti-democratic forces are strong. Because of the haphazard working of this electoral system, governmental power may at any time be thrown into the hands of men who will not



permit another free election. Thus if the majority system had been introduced at the beginning of the Weimar period, a reactionary party of the extreme Right would perhaps have obtained a Reichstag majority some time around 1924, which might well have meant the end of free elections.

In another way too, Proportional Representation may entail less danger than the majority system in countries where political passion runs high. Majority elections tend to produce two large "blocs", thereby destroying the independent middle element. Perhaps some of the smaller parties which are given a chance under PR may be able to bridge the gulf between the two extremes? It has been contended, however, that the majority system will tend to mean moderation in politics, whereas PR has the opposite effect of increasing bitterness and dogmatic antagonism. Mr. Duverger follows very definitely this line of thought. Many people believe, he says (*L'influence des systèmes électoraux*, page 43) that a dangerous situation would arise if two large "blocs" came to confront each other on the political arena of such a country as France; but he dismisses the belief as a simple "myth". The generally moderate character of political life in Anglo-Saxon countries is supposed to furnish a proof. It cannot be shown, however, that this moderation is mainly due to electoral arrangements. The political atmosphere is just as peaceful in a number of North European countries which introduced PR a long time ago.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, in countries where the political climate is not one of moderation, an electoral system which favours the growth of two large "blocs" may constitute a real danger. Perhaps the tragic history of the Spanish Republic in the 1930's is an illustration of this. After two elections under the majority system, the right and the left were irrevocably opposed. An independent middle party, strong enough to carry on government, might have been of some use in that situation.

Not inconceivably, an electoral system which contributes to an increase of moderation when the political climate is predominantly moderate, may have the opposite effect of increasing antagonism and tension when circumstances are different. The effects of electoral system *under varying social conditions* may well be a subject for further research.

## SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION ON PROFESSOR DUVERGER'S REPORT

Professor Duverger's report was discussed by the Congress at meetings on Tuesday, 5 September, from 4.30 to 7 p.m. (with Professor Brogan, Cambridge University, in the chair), and Thursday, 7 September, from 4 to 6 p.m. (with Professor Barents, Amsterdam University, in the chair). In the course of the debate, the comparative effects of the various methods of balloting were considered, and also the actual bearing of the electoral system on the political life of a country.

As regards the bearing of electoral systems on political life, Professor Tesauro (Naples University, Italy) thought that it was impossible to formulate general conclusions. The factors conditioning political life were closely inter-related but they differed from one country to another. Such factors included the general political situation of the country as well as the cultural level and political wisdom of the electorate. Fundamentally

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Duverger says that the Fascists scored more electoral victories in these countries than in France, where the real strength of Fascism was greater. In most of the northern democracies the electoral success of fascism was negligible, however, the Belgian Rexists providing almost the only exception. And it is a question whether the electoral weakness of French Fascists was not due quite as much to the peculiar delimitation of French electoral districts after 1927 as to the double-balloting system with its effect of favouring the middle parties (described by Mr. Duverger). It is well known that certain urban populations were greatly discriminated against. Such "gerrymandering" whether for good or for evil, is incompatible with PR. It would have been interesting to see a numerical estimate of the importance of this factor.



differing systems might indeed, in a given situation, produce the same results, while the same system applied in differing situations might produce entirely opposite results. To illustrate his argument, Professor Tesauro mentioned the latest elections in Italy, for seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The system used for the Chamber was proportional representation, and for the Senate the one-member system. The percentage of seats obtained by the parties in both Houses was practically the same. This instance showed that the application of two different systems in the same political situation could lead to almost identical results.

Professor Calogeropoulos-Stratis (School of Political Science, Athens, Greece) was of opinion that the political repercussions of the various political systems were not identical in all countries. Certain theoretical deductions might of course be made, but the efficacy of electoral systems was dependent in the first place on political awareness within the country and in the second place on the structure and strength of the competing political parties. Account should also be taken of the atmosphere of genuineness and freedom in which the election took place. Everything depended, in short, on the extent to which democratic principles were respected and safeguarded.

Professor Chapsal (Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Paris) pointed out that the most convincing experiments seemed to be changes in the electoral system employed in a given country; comparisons between the results obtained in such cases were more conclusive than comparisons between the results obtained in different countries, which might have been influenced by other factors.

Fairly clear differences of opinion were revealed at the Congress with regard to the comparative effects of electoral systems.

Professor Akzin (Jerusalem University, Israel) wondered whether a study had been made of the extent to which active participation of the electorate in the elections had been stimulated by one or another of the different systems. He further drew attention to the problem of the intellectual and moral standard of representatives in legislative and municipal bodies. Curiously enough, a great many people in the United States advocated a change from majority to proportional representation in the hope of raising thereby the personal level of politicians. On the other hand, in many European countries, where proportional representation prevailed, one heard voices in favour of the majority system, again in the hope that this would result in a higher level of politicians. In Israel, those who wanted to change from proportional representation to the majority system did so because they hoped thereby to reduce the number of parties, their trend toward dogmatism and the power of party executives.

Professor Dunner (Grinnell College, U.S.A.) preferred the plurality system as practised in Britain and the United States to the continental practice of proportional representation. He believed that the plurality principle tended to minimize class and doctrinal attitudes and caused the voter to think in terms of the national welfare as a whole. He stated that Hitler would probably not have come to power in Germany, had the Weimar Republic used the plurality system rather than the system of proportional representation. He regretted that some Americans in the Allied Military Government of Western Germany used their influence to reintroduce the proportional system, which had automatically led to the resurrection of a multitude of parties, while in the summer of 1945 there had been a fair chance for the Western Germans to express themselves through two major constructive political parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. Professor Dunner emphasized that the electoral system was not a mere mechanical instrumentality; that it had to be recognized not only as the expression of a political attitude but also as an institutional framework which created a political climate and attitude.

Dr. Verkade (Unesco Programme specialist for the British Zone in Germany) thought that, though the disadvantage of the one-ballot majority vote might lie in its possible exaggeration, this danger should not be over-estimated, as a government based on this system had to be careful to maintain its position at the next election.

Professor Pollock (University of Michigan, U.S.A.) commented on the American system of primary elections by which candidates of the same party ran against each other for the various offices to be filled. By this means, the two great parties confronted each other at the general elections with one candidate only for each office. He pointed out that the primary system also used in nearly every American state, had not given



complete satisfaction. In any multi-party country, serious consideration should be given before it was applied.

Certain direct criticisms were made of the arguments advanced by Professor Duverger in his report.

Professor Leoni (Pavia University, Italy) said that Professor Duverger had tried to contrive a system which photographed "public opinion" without defining what "public opinion" was. In many questions of political affairs there was no public opinion as Mr. Lippmann had pointed out. It was, therefore, necessary first to define what we call "public opinion". Here was another instance of the basic importance of semantic questions in sociological studies. Mr. Nilson (Chr. Michelsens Institute, Bergen, Norway) disagreed with Professor Duverger on the question of the effects of the electoral system on public opinion.

Dr. J. N. Khosla (India House, London) considered that at the end of his paper, Professor Duverger might be taxed with over-simplification. Had not proportional representation functioned very satisfactorily in Switzerland and in Scandinavia? Proportional representation could not be applied in India. As far as France was concerned, Mr. Khosla believed that the emphasis should have been on the non-exercise of the right of dissolution, i.e., on the pseudo-parliamentary form of the government, rather than on proportional representation or any other electoral system.

Mr. Gregoire (Belgium) disagreed with Mr. Duverger's statement that, at election times, whilst the simple majority system tended to attract the moderate elements of the electorate, with a resultant diminution of differences between the opposing parties, proportional representation stressed those divergencies. Although this was true when the election was actually taking place, it ceased to be true afterwards. On the contrary, the fighting wing of the victorious party had afterwards to be satisfied, even if this meant deeply shocking the supporters of the other party (e.g., nationalization in Great Britain). Moreover, if a party had not a clear majority, it was obliged to compromise with the fighting wing of the other parties; if it had a clear majority, it was obliged to compromise with its own fighting wing. This might lead to widely differing situations for the minorities.

Dr. Verkade pointed out that though the relationship between equality of representation and stability of government had been stated, it had rightly been stated, on the other hand, that the fact that a big majority in parliament may represent a much smaller majority or even a minority in the country, forces the government to respect the rights and feelings of minorities. In modern society with its tendency to materialism, political parties tended to become petrified, as the apparatus (newspapers, publishing houses, funds) and that of its affiliations (trade unions, health insurance companies, broadcast listeners' associations, co-operative movements, women's and youth groups) became more important than the intellectual or spiritual groups which tended rather to adapt traditional doctrines to modern needs.

Professor Akzin (Jerusalem University, Israel) drew attention to the desirability of avoiding over-simplification in that respect. Professor Akzin believed that, if we did not like the way people voted or thought, the way to change it was through education, but not through the introduction of the electoral system most likely to produce the political results we desired. Government might or might not require stability above all, and stability might or might not be furthered by the majority system. But a representative assembly had other functions than ensuring stability, and one should not seek artificially to destroy its representative character. Too many parties had been the result at times of majority representation and at times of proportional representation. Inflexible dogmatism was indeed more favoured by proportional representation than by majority representation. However, under proportional representation a coalition government was almost inevitable; and coalition spelled compromise, thereby undoing the effects of excessive dogmatism. As for the undue power which proportional representation gave to the party executive, this could be easily overcome by panachage or the transferable vote.

Professor Robson (London School of Economics and Political Science) spoke of the general problem of the electoral system's effect on the parties themselves. The proportional system intensified sectionalism in the party system. Simple majority vote



affected the party system by introducing a certain degree of moderation and achieved a greater unity. The two-party system showed that simple majority voting produced a certain moderation in the government, while exaggerating the representation of the party which gained a majority of the votes.

Professor Ellul (University of Bordeaux, France) dwelt on the influence of voting methods on the party structure.

Professor Chapsal (Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Paris) discussed the extent to which electoral systems might be regarded as cause or effect of the general texture of political life: to give an instance, was English political life to be explained by the British electoral system or vice versa? Undoubtedly, the one affected the other.

The problem as thus defined was of a different nature from those previously considered by delegates and gave the whole discussion a new meaning.

Professor Goriely (University of Brussels, Belgium) presented a general criticism of Professor Duverger's report. Though it had been drafted with the utmost care and contained a mass of information, Professor Goriely doubted whether it really bore out the author's contentions. After undertaking a systematic study of the nature and structure of parties, he had attempted to show how these were dependent on one simple factor which could be considered in isolation, and the simplest factor he could pick upon was the electoral system. Even though Mr. Duverger agreed that such an interpretation was somewhat forced, it was to be feared that he had pushed it too far. It might be permissible to isolate one special factor in public life and to examine its repercussions, but only for a given country at a particular time, and after giving a full analysis of all other factors. Apart from the fact that, as Mr. Duverger recognized, no electoral system could be said to "determine" any way of life, even the more cautious explanation he put forward ("it contributes to its development"), seemed to go too far. Indeed, the same electoral system might, in different circumstances, have totally opposite effects. One might well speculate on the results produced in France, in 1946, by the application of proportional representation or on the effect that the introduction of the double-ballot majority system might have on the forthcoming elections. But, without going too far afield, it seemed difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the life of a given country on the basis of the electoral system—so secondary a factor in the general body of political institutions and practices.

Professor Goriely feared that Mr. Duverger had been guilty of such digression. And so he felt that over-hasty conclusions regarding the virtues of the single-ballot majority system had been drawn from the repercussion of this system on public life in Great Britain. For instance, he asserted that, under this system, parties which in all probability would be reduced to two in number, tended to resemble one another. "Who will decide whether the Conservative or the Labour Party win in the elections? Not their out-and-out supporters . . . but the two or three million moderate Englishmen and women standing politically in the centre, who sometimes vote Conservative and sometimes Labour. To win these votes, the Conservative Party will be compelled to tone down its Conservatism and the Labour Party its Socialism, both adopting a calm and reassuring tone. Both will have to put forward middle-of-the-road policies." That was perfectly true, at least in Great Britain, where it was more important to win over the moderate than the radical element of an electorate. But there were other cases, where the single-ballot majority system had meant the rule of the most rabid demagoguery, which only went to prove that the system did not invariably and in all countries, produce compromises.

What would happen if, in Great Britain, the victory of the Labour Party hung not so much on the support of two or three million wavering moderates as on that of a million or more Communists, or if the Conservative Party had to count on the support of as many Fascists? It was easy to see how, in a country without Great Britain's democratic traditions and a British type of electoral system, small radical minorities could blackmail the larger moderate parties into splitting up into smaller groups. In Professor Goriely's opinion, there was little doubt that, if the single-ballot majority system had been applied in most of the continental countries immediately following the Liberation, the various Socialist parties would have been unable to resist the Communist Party's pressing offers to form a united front, with results totally dissimilar to those in British parliamentary life.



Professor Maranini (University of Florence, Italy), approaching the subject from another angle, discussed the importance of electoral laws in the political life of contemporary Europe. Professor Duverger had presented a searching analysis of the factors conditioning the political life of democracies and the "hypotheses" he had formulated had in many cases been so fully borne out that they might be elevated to the rank of sociological laws. Professor Duverger's conclusions should subsequently be checked against one particular factor to which insufficient attention had been given, namely, the general crisis of disintegration of the European parliamentary democracies. In all countries, the crisis meant that the parliamentary system of government was giving way to the rule of political parties; the centre of gravity of political power was shifting away from the machinery of constitutional government towards the action of such organizations as political parties and trade unions. These organizations, which controlled but were not controlled by the State, often had a structure incompatible with the principle of freedom, the guiding principle of modern civilization. The liberal constitutions, of which the electoral laws examined by Professor Duverger were the most complete expression, were so drastically affected by this development that it was a gross error to regard their present functioning as normal. However, the crisis was not of the same gravity in all countries, for it exerted only an indirect influence on the operation of the American Constitution; that was only to be expected, since the Constitution did not imply parliamentary government and it had evolved a governmental machinery with a strict division of powers and was capable of controlling partisan organizations and of resisting any disloyal demands they might make. The crisis was more marked in the United Kingdom, though on the surface the situation appeared normal, thanks to certain psychological traits of the British people, its conservatism and its political maturity—advantages which were reflected in a more liberal organization of the large parties and trade unions, where the centre of gravity had also slipped away from the State. The readiness of the British Parliament to delegate its legislative powers was symptomatic of the irregular though not alarming situation. The crisis assumed truly disastrous proportions in continental Europe, striking symptoms being the tragedies of Italy and Germany, the weakness of France and the dictatorships of Franco and Salazar. Accordingly, from the methodological point of view, it had to be admitted that since the parliamentary system of government was in varying stages of disintegration, there was no common standard of comparison and many false analogies could be drawn. The findings of the Duverger report might be checked and in some cases even corrected by taking that factor into consideration. The instinctive psychological reaction of public opinion to the breaking up of the system and the perils of civil and international warfare could, in Maranini's opinion, account for a number of developments, and shed light on many abnormalities, some of which he had already mentioned.

Lastly, Dr. Eve Lewis, (American Institute, Germany) had certain interesting comments to make on the operation of the party system. In seeking for terms to clarify for students the reality of the working of the American party system in contrast with multi-party systems or one-party systems, the following explanation suggested itself. The American political parties might be called utility parties. The parties of a multi-party system might be called philosophy parties. Non-American students of the two American parties often found themselves confused by the fact that the ideologies of the two parties are constantly changing.

The utility party had no philosophy of its own to which it would irretrievably cling. The function of the party leaders at any given time was to analyse the desires and aspirations of the greatest possible number of Americans at that particular time, and to offer a political platform incorporating the greatest possible number of planks promising what the party leaders have considered to be the wishes of the people. Thus with the utility party, there was absolutely no reference to any revelation from on high as to "what was best for the people". The party leaders did not set themselves up as a Moses or a Messiah or as being particularly distinguished by the ability to communicate with the unknown or non-existent with regard to what the American should have. The modesty of the American party leaders was basic but not flagrant. Dr. Lewis stated that they simply tried to guess what the most Americans wanted, and the party which guessed best won the elections. The guesses must cover both the issues at stake and personality traits of candidates which would be most appealing at the given time



to the greatest number of voters—the “just one of your boys” trait being the most popular on the local and state and frequently on the national level. The philosophy party, on the other hand, offered the table d’hôte dinner, the *plat du jour*, the pre-planned menu. The philosophy party never acted modestly—each must claim the all-curing, all-comforting packaged panacea. When voting for philosophy party candidates one had to choose from a group of platforms, patterned more after the theories of the steering committee of the parties than after the realities of the life of the voters at that time. Hence the frequent dullness of elections in multi-party countries. The philosophy party was usually the mirror of some individual or group ego as was the one-party in a one-party country. Small wonder the voter realized the futility of political action on their part. Everyone wanted his vote, but only on the condition that the voter conform, fit himself to the philosophy.

Many superficial analysts of American party politics, and all who would see control wrested from the people, thought there should be more “party responsibility”, more development of philosophy rather than utility parties; such a change would be to make the citizen the creature of the party as is perhaps incipient in England, rather than as, at present, the party the creature, to be changed at will, by the voter.



## C. THE ROLE OF THE CITIZEN IN A PLANNED SOCIETY

### THE CITIZEN IN A PLANNED SOCIETY

J. BARENTS

The following paper is no complete and exhaustive treatment of the subject. That would be impossible within the limits prescribed. The idea was to look at the problem of the citizen in a planned society from the political side so as to provide a basis for discussion at the Zürich conference of September 1950. The author intends, indeed, to expand his studies on the subject later on, being deeply convinced that this paper can be but a beginning.

Professor Hillman of the University of Chicago has tackled the problem from the sociological point of view. There has been some exchange of ideas between us to avoid overlapping. In this paper there are deliberate omissions, because the point at issue was of a sociological rather than a political nature and came into Professor Hillman's field of study, e.g. planning in local communities and the participation of the citizen.

The limits of the paper forbade abundant references. This does not mean, of course, that Professor Hayek and Messrs. Wootton, Tocqueville and Keynes, and many others have not been consulted diligently, but the nature of the present paper made it superfluous to explain in a quantity of footnotes how little originality it can claim.

Without adhering to too rigid a definition, it is certainly necessary to give the very general word "planning" a more concrete meaning and to localize the thing called planning in modern society.

Generally speaking, planning is intermediate between a complete *laissez faire* system and a complete collectivist society. In a planned society nothing is left entirely free, i.e. left to private individuals or groups without the intervention of a central authority, and nothing is centrally directed with practically no scope for individual choice and decision. Both extremes need a few words of further definition.

It is usual to call the *laissez faire* system liberalism. Even in the dogmatic terms in which nineteenth-century liberalism expressed itself, however, not all the choice or all the decisions were left to individuals. Partly as a reaction against the excesses of government intervention in the eighteenth century and partly from a sincere belief in a natural harmony of interests that would secure the social values if everybody pursued his own private interests, the older liberalism had restricted the functions of the State as a central authority as much as possible and transferred practically all initiative to private individuals. But there had always been left a certain minimum of indispensable public functions, to be cared for by a largely negative entity, which Lassalle called the "night-watchman State"; matters like roads and bridges, national defence and the water supply were mostly regarded as inevitable attributes of a central authority.

To mark the true extreme of *laissez-faire* we should look, not to liberalism



but to anarchism, which denies on principle any supra-individual authority. It is hardly necessary to discuss the merits and faults of anarchism here, as nearly all experts in sociology and political science are agreed that, apart from certain primitive societies, the system (or lack of it) does not work—in spite of Mr. Herbert Read's and Mr. Carlo Levi's nostalgia. Not even the most radical anarchist can avoid walking in streets that have been paid for out of the collective taxpayer's money. The best we can say about anarchism is that it has become, after a long eclipse, slightly more fashionable again by the recent failures and stupidities of organized governments. It serves mainly as a rallying point for anti-state extremists, and illustrates better than liberalism the extreme case of *laissez-faire* in the literal sense.

Planning, it is evident, has little to do with *laissez-faire* in that extreme sense, although later on we shall have to discuss the amount of "freedom" compatible with planning (and, we may add, necessary as "breathing space" for the human beings on whose behalf all planning takes place). It is not generally agreed, however, that planning has just as little to do with collectivism. The Hayek-Röpke school of thought has tried to maintain that all government intervention is "socialism", that no "middle way" is possible but that any variety of this "socialism", however moderately it may start, must lead inevitably, like national socialism, to a complete collectivist society, with Gestapo and gas-chambers included. Like anarchism, this extreme view of present-day society has become popular with some sections of public opinion, mainly on account of the practical faults and mistakes, in many cases the inevitable drawbacks, of an evolution towards increased government interference in social life. The unreality of this view, can for our purpose be summed up in a few points:

- (a) To say that a "middle way" between complete *laissez-faire* and complete collectivism is either impossible or would lead inevitably down "the road to serfdom" is a dogmatic statement, not warranted by the facts. A look at several countries with "planning" governments shows a certain amount of muddling and quite a lot of muddling-through, but no cases where the disease of "serfdom" is clearly caused by an overdose of planning.
- (b) Investigation of historical and present-day social and political systems shows innumerable shades and varieties, none completely conforming to any abstract, well-divided pattern of "systems".
- (c) As a matter of fact, in the twentieth century a score of countries (Australia and New Zealand, nearly all European countries, and several in the Western Hemisphere—the United States *not* excepted) have experimented with different doses of planning without developing into collectivist states. And, where they have so developed we find several other causes mainly political and psychological, it therefore will not do to accept an explanation partial at the most and to rule out the possibility that in the countries concerned planning has been the effect, rather than the cause, of collectivism.

What political scientists have to do is to accept the "possibility" of a varying amount of central planning, neither making unwarrantable assumptions about its "inevitable" development into collectivism, nor letting the factual inevitability of a minimum amount of planning in present-day society blind them to the consequences that this may have for the democratic structure of society and the position of its citizens. Most people, on looking at their own communities, would agree with what *The Economist* once said about Great Britain (14 February, 1948): "Very few people nowadays would hold that *laissez-faire* could solve the economic problems of the British community, let alone resolve



its social conflicts. And the glimpse that recent years have revealed of the all-planned state has been enough to give all but a tiny minority the creeps. There would be an overwhelming majority of agreement for the Middle Way." Whatever our preferences may be, most of us will agree with the statement of facts. Taking the fact of a certain amount of planning in our society for granted, we have to look at the consequences.

It is important to localize planning in modern society not only as a "middle way" between no planning at all and all-planned States, but as a *trend*. The historical situation in which our society finds itself is characterized, not by a fixed amount of planning which has been there from time immemorial, but by a gradual infiltration of several forms of planning, mainly in the economic sphere, into a society which, rightly or wrongly, still tends to regard itself as being liberal and un-planned. It is very probably this factor which disturbs a far wider group of persons than the direct followers of Professors Hayek and Röpke when they see that the modern government apparatus not only does a good many things which in Jeremy Bentham's day belonged to the *non-agenda*, but expands more and more until, e.g. in Great Britain, some 40 per cent of the national income is spent by the government, in Holland some 30 per cent (although 17 per cent of this is "transferred income" and no more than 13 per cent serves to grease the wheels of government itself). The point under discussion, then is *not* what the citizen's position becomes if there is a night-watchman state (or, possibly, no government at all) which transforms itself overnight into an all-planned, collectivist, totalitarian state, but rather what changes occur in the citizen's position when, in a middle-of-the-road state, where, say, 20 per cent of the national income is "spent" by the government, the latter's growth and expansion result in 40 or even 60 per cent being spent by the government.

This trend means more than that present-day governments have simply taken a liking to central planning and are "meddling" extensively with "private people's business". It means that the societies where the trend operates do not act strictly on the principles of nineteenth-century political philosophy, mostly based on *laissez-faire* assumptions, which still dominate present-day political thought in many of its half-conscious presuppositions. Such States can still be called liberal democracies, but, as we shall see, with certain restrictions.

The special position of planning in present-day society is further accentuated by the fact that several forms and intensifications of central planning have found their origin in the two world wars. Both of these acted as a kind of catalyst, accelerating many times the pace of a development that was already taking place. A modern war with all its technological implications asks for quick results; in different fields of industry, and in the long run in nearly all fields, targets have to be formulated; and what we call planning consists, as Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Arthur Lewis, among others, have very clearly described, of (a) setting targets for production, transport, raw materials, etc.—targets being aims formulated with a view to the available means; and (b) setting up programmes to reach the targets, which implies formulating priorities, working out time-schedules, etc.

It is unavoidable to take this kind of war-time planning out of the private citizen's hands. Oliver Franks rightly emphasizes the importance of co-operating between government and businessmen or other individuals concerned, for neither the planning itself nor the putting of the plans into action can be done with any chance of success from the seclusion of a govern-



ment office. But co-ordination between all the elements, i.e. the overall decisions in a quickly shifting situation in which "friction" losses may entail defeat, must be the work of one central authority. War, as a matter of fact, shows a tremendous increase in the powers of national government—national States being the main units, warring units in this case, as between which modern history is enacted. Democratic States become *de facto* semi-dictatorships; the choice of the dictators—numbering hundreds and even thousands—was made in a more or less democratic way before the war or the state of emergency started, but once the war is on, they act as semi-dictators and will and can give account of their acts only after the war. What limits their dictatorship is the co-operation of the citizens; although many formerly private decisions are taken out of the latter's hands, their willing co-operation (based on agreement with both war aims and the way in which these are furthered) is indispensable for getting results.

Modern war shows, however, a second form of integration of power, which transcends the sphere of the national State and is very significant for the present trend in planning. No sovereign Power, not even the United States or Soviet Russia, is able to win a war on its own. Alliances, often strange alliances, have to be formed and, if defeat is to be avoided and victory is to be gained in the shortest time possible and in the most economic and efficient manner, a certain co-operation is necessary in the conduct of the war. The political and military leaders of allied nations have to co-ordinate their ways of attacking and finally defeating the enemy, and the total resources of these nations have also to be integrated into a kind of centrally planned overall system, built up in the beginning in a very loose and haphazard way, but acting on the same premises as the war-time planning of each nation individually, viz. the necessity of gauging the physical possibilities, of deciding on priorities, and of setting up quantitative "targets" for different sections of the economies concerned and planning by which to reach them; the specializing of defence measures as between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty is a case in point.

The experience of the war leads us naturally to assume that planning is identical with economic planning. Most planning that is being done is planning of economic developments, according to the general scheme, mentioned above, of gauging the possibilities, deciding on priorities, formulating targets and directing the existing factors of production (or factors of transport, etc.) to meet them. Planning is not necessarily economic planning however; neither, for that matter, is government action in general (with which planning is often connected, though it is certainly not identical) exercised only in the economic sectors of society. If *Time* magazine is right, the municipal authorities of Bangkok have a department for kite-flying; and why should future activities in this cultural and educational field not be "planned" instead of being dealt with privately and according to any citizen's likings? There are, in fact, no fixed and *a priori* bounds to "government intervention".

All government regulation of a community's interests has certain economic consequences; not all regulations need bear upon the supply of scarce goods to satisfy material needs (if economics can so be described for a moment). Before there was any large-scale economic planning and government activity in the economic field, the "Night-watchman State" began by regulating police matters; and modern governments tend increasingly to "plan" their educational and cultural policies. They cannot content themselves with making elementary education compulsory and paying for the schools, but have to take



into account, both the potentially available financial resources and the future need of intellectual manpower. And every government which tries to make cultural propaganda abroad has to decide the percentage of its finances it is prepared to devote to that cause, and in what proportion the budget for cultural propaganda so prepared shall be allotted to poets and musicians going abroad, to pamphlets singing the praise of the country, to foreign service broadcasting, etc.

There are practically no relations in a society which cannot be subjected to planning, and in present-day society planning means in most cases regulation by government authorities. In former centuries the inhabitants of seaside villages used to pray in church for a season of many shipwrecks, and from time to time helped Providence a little by putting out false beacon lights. This, too, involved a certain amount of crude planning, but, if these barbarous habits had continued in the present century, in all probability the planning would have been by government (municipal) authorities. In practice the budget for cultural purposes, be it cultural propaganda abroad or arts councils and opera companies at home, is generally the last item in the national budget, financed, so to speak with the last leftover percents of the national budget. But this is just a sad reflection on the cultural level of present-day society.

Planning is a fairly recent phenomenon, although the substance can be found in earlier times. Moreover, the practice of central planning is bound up with the preponderance of government in the form of national states, to such an extent that both concepts, planning in general and government *dirigisme*, have become intimately associated in many minds. The historical context shows indeed that central planning sprang partly from measures of a social kind which the crises of our industrial civilization made necessary, and partly from the demand of total war for quick results with no questions asked. That is what we mean by the modern term "planning", and the historical context makes it clear that the term can only be understood against a background of nineteenth-century liberalism, which has remained its ideological frame of reference although the social circumstances have changed a good deal.

The twentieth century tends to imagine itself, and the nineteenth century was to a certain extent right in regarding itself, as a liberal society, containing either (as in Jeremy Bentham's time) elements of a non-liberal society left over from a previous, still partly feudal, society, or (as in our times) not only containing elements of a non-liberal society, but in some national communities, wholly eliminating liberal traits, with periods of illiberalism extending over half a continent. It is probably an ingrained tendency of the human mind to regard these black-outs as "abnormal" happenings, regrettable but passing flaws in an indestructible fabric of liberal and democratic practice. There is however evidence to suggest that the black spots are neither more abnormal nor, if we but look at the period after 1914, in every respect less numerous, than the liberal and democratic elements. Liberal society has passed from a "normalcy" that was, if not always observed, yet generally respected and tacitly assumed, to a system that is theoretically debatable and in reality only able to survive by being fought for.

It is therefore explicable, although indefensible from the scientific point of view, that planning and government regulation have been regarded as practically identical; both were taken to be deviations from the line of nineteenth-century liberalism, a line which was thought to lead without hesitation into a rosy future of progressive improvements. Evolution and Progress seemed to be the "normal" pattern of history, allowing of exceptions and



deviations, but not of breaks, and excluding the dominance and preponderance of any non-liberal system.

Apart from the negative characteristic of being breaks in the liberal tradition, planning and government regulation have little in common. Most of the regulations that drew an ever increasing part of the economic and social life of many countries into the sphere of government activity came about incidentally, first one and then another sector of economic life seeming to call for measures which only governments could take. Planning pre-supposes something a little different: looking ahead, and adjusting action to what will be needed, on the one hand, and what is psychologically possible, on the other. Again, although planning is often called "*central* planning", for the evident reason that individual choices are guided and co-ordinated, the central authority need not be the national government. It can be, as is increasingly necessary in modern world conditions, supra-national planning; and within a country it can be delegated or left to local and regional, in some cases functional, authorities, as it will be if the democratic principle of self-government (used here as a general term and not in the juridical sense) is to have more than a semblance of reality. The decentralization implied in the second point will be treated by Professor Hillman in his paper; the first point is plainly illustrated in such institutions as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, made necessary because the United States was unwilling to distribute the Marshall Plan funds, with all their economic implications, itself, which the sovereign and independent states of Europe could not manage to do so without resorting to some kind of supra-national organization; the Benelux economic union in *statu nascendi*; and the Schuman Plan for integrating European coal and steel resources under an international authority which can in some cases break through the policies of national governments.

If we want to take a just view of planning, it is necessary to bear both things in mind. Supra-national planning is but in its infancy and has certainly not yet worked out completely satisfactory forms of organization; decentralized government has been in existence longer than any national government, but has partly been neglected, after national government attained its zenith of power, and is partly helpless against the complexities of the political life of modern industrial civilization. Whilst we situate planning against the background of nineteenth-century liberalism with its three characteristics: self-restraint of the State, freedom of the citizens, and the citizen's participation in government, it is useful not to forget that planning has a wider scope than the national State.

The nineteenth-century State, conforming to the then prevalent liberal pattern, did not "do" too much; it left as much freedom as possible to the individual citizen; and thrived on the spontaneous activity of citizens both in economic life and in the governing of themselves (and possibly of others). This section deals with the first aspect.

The State which avoids "doing" too much is the liberal "night-watchman State". It is on the lookout for thieves and punishes them when captured; it lights the streets, though not abundantly; it builds roads, bridges and harbours because without them economic life would be impossible and private initiative obviously cannot provide them. But it would like to remain no more than an umpire, regulating only the external relations of its citizen and preferring to let these go their own way, directed only by the wise self-interest of individuals which the eighteenth century deemed sufficient also to look after the common interest.



The liberal State included a certain amount of unconscious planning, because the roads, bridges and harbours mentioned a moment ago would not, of course, have been built if the authorities in charge had not expected a considerable amount of traffic to pass and had not planned (in Monsieur Jourdain's sense of the word—without knowing that they “planned”) the economic life of the country to continue more or less along these lines. But the liberal State came across real and tangible planning when it met the big corporations into which the individual economics units of the eighteenth century have crystallized since. The pleasant illusions of thousands of individual self-interests “led by an invisible hand” to promote the public interest, vanished when the larger economic units began riding roughshod over private interests and, in the more extreme cases, endangering both the power and the impartiality of the Umpire-State. The trusts and cartels of modern economic life played havoc with the cosy ideals of the liberal community, because they showed modern man to be far more in chains than any old-style liberal had realized, because they weakened the argument against State regulation by showing that they were going to do—and quickly, and in their own manner—what the State used to leave to “private initiative”, and because the excesses of economic power called for an extension of the powers of the Umpire, or at least suggested to public opinion that they should be extended. From this, at first haphazard, growth of government powers sprang the need for *planned* action. Once it was granted that the government should interfere with economic life, it was better to do so with wisdom and foresight than in a completely incidental way. Moreover, the influence of modern war showed that government intervention, though certainly not without disadvantages, was not “impossible” and need not always be destructive of the spontaneous elements in the community, and so cleared the way for much “operational planning” in peacetime.

The second characteristic of nineteenth-century liberalism is the freedom of the citizens. By the designation of “citizens” they are already distinguished from “subjects”. Citizens are not subject *to* a government authority they cannot control and which has more or less absolute powers over them, but (a) the government which governs them “derives its just powers from the consent of the governed”, and (b) they have a private sphere of their own, with “rights” corresponding to the liberties of free citizens.

Connected with both points is the rule of law—a concept of which all the juridical implications need not be treated here, since for our purpose we only want to concentrate on the common denominator of the rule of law and Continental concepts like “Rechtsstaat”. This is *not* equality in the modern sense of the word, used partly in contrast to the word liberty and meaning equality as to the material benefits of society, where as liberty is taken to refer mainly or exclusively to the citizens' political and civil privileges. Equality under the rule of law, however, is equality before the law, i.e. (in Dicey's words) “the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land”. The ordinary law of the land, also in other than Anglo-American systems of law, is a separate entity, independent of the State, and governing the State's as well as private citizen's actions. It takes over part of what we called the umpire function of the State, but at a higher level, and marks off a private sphere for the citizen which the State is either forbidden to touch or where any State action is liable to sharp countermeasures if it oversteps the limits of the law.

The liberties of the citizen are essentially private liberties, which is perfectly



understandable if defence of elementary human rights is meant, but becomes somewhat obsolete when large corporations begin to use and abuse the same liberties to encroach upon other people's liberties.

Personal liberties in the strict sense of the term may also conflict, for example, in children's courts, where the citizen's right to fair and public trial and the liberty of the press to report freely on court proceedings are hardly consistent with the children's interest (and why not call it a "right" or "liberty", too?) in being spared public attention on such an awkward occasion. But the queerest changes in the original liberties came about when, for instance, the freedom of the press, usually regarded as a corollary to the "consent" of the government and which, in Benjamin Franklin's time, meant that every citizen had the right to set up his own printing press and make his private opinions public, developed into a "right" which only persons or corporations with large resources can profitably exercise. Private opinion can hardly be mentioned in this connexion, except as something partly tolerated and partly hemmed in by the Moloch of present-day newspapers and book publishing.

The same can be said of the purely civil (political) right of voting, which, by many modern interpreters of the word "equality", is thought to be illusory as long as the enfranchized citizen is in a state of dire poverty and dependent on others, perhaps even in his voting habits.

The demarcation of a private sphere for the citizen under liberalism may perhaps be partly explained by the earlier origins of a "bourgeois" civilization. Karl von Martin, speaking of Renaissance society, says that in that period the bourgeois citizen, realizing that he was no longer able to defend his political freedom himself, took political control from above as self-evident and concentrated all his efforts on the private sphere for his economic pursuits or humanistic studies and scholarship. Thenceforth, von Martin says, his freedom was a freedom *from* the State—to pursue his own economic or humanistic interests.

And, indeed, freedom is only too often freedom *from* the State. The exceptions are cases where, in smaller communities, the central authority is not looked upon as a Leviathan but rather as a common concern of all citizens and those happy democratic nations where the central government is wise enough not to concentrate all power in its own hands, but to decentralize it, and let local, regional and functional groups decide their own affairs. This brings us to the next section dealing with the participation of citizens in the control of their common affairs.

A government which does not do too much, and a guaranteed sphere of freedom for the citizen: both these characteristics taken together mean that the well-being of the body politic will largely depend on the spontaneous exercise of the individual's talents, the private initiative which liberalism, certainly in Adam Smith's day, thought to be not only perfectly compatible with social interests but, in fact, leading to them and bringing about their promotion. The conviction, sound in itself, that the political power of the State cannot do everything and the concomitant curtailment of the State's activities would probably have paralysed the latter, if practice had not, again, proved stronger than theory. It is, in our context, neither desirable nor possible to follow the gradual extension of government activities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Suffice it to say—and it is important for the planning aspect—that this extension made the citizen's participation necessary in another form than his previous autonomy and independence of the State. In the older view the citizen did not in fact "participate" in the



political affairs of the community; he took part in the social life of the community, but entirely on his own, and furthered social interests with no co-ordination on the part of a central government. As soon as group activities began to be recognized as something different from individual actions and national government greatly extended its prerogatives and activities; and as larger, supra-national planning began to loom on the horizon, the individual's activities could no longer be regarded as taking place in an organizational vacuum, but had to be worked into a more general pattern. In a field where individual and group, state or supra-national activities could and did coincide, the word "participation" denoted the citizen's relations to the kind of work he no longer reserved for his individual activities but had to share with others.

This competition between group and individual activity was accentuated by the fact that the number of conscious and active citizens enormously increased in the nineteenth century. Newspapers, once the intellectual property of a few prominent citizens had begun to be written "by office-boys for office-boys" and, attendant on the extension of elementary education and other hardly less spectacular social innovations, large and formerly unknown groups of people had issued from obscurity and gradually participated in social and public life. In the words of Karl Mannheim a "fundamental democratization" had taken place in a revolutionized society and completely changed the relations between the central authorities and the people they proposed to "plan" for.

Electoral reform and education had brought millions of citizens to power, at least to such power as the ballot-paper confers upon them. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the election of chosen representatives who are at the same time the supreme legislators in the country does little to bridge the gap between the individual citizen and "his" central government. Hans Kelsen has drawn attention to the fact that parliamentary democracy in the usual sense of the word is only democratic in the legislative branch of the body politic, but leaves the remnants of previous autocratic systems of government pretty well undisturbed in the executive and judiciary branches. That was one of the main reasons why the national government, when it came to regulate a large part of the economic life of the country, seemed strangely remote from the citizen—and from time to time a menacing Leviathan. That is also why any central planning would break down, unless the citizen's participation was secured, both in the preparation of plans—a thing no central government, i.e., no group of civil servants, however capable, can ever aspire to do completely on its own; and in translating the plans into reality, a task for which even a dictatorial government needs some not completely passive co-operation. It is probable that the relative freedom at the lower levels of government that is said to exist in the Soviet Union does not mean any significant departure from a, by now, perfectly dictatorial system of government, but (according to the wisdom of a central government) an inevitable integration of spontaneous action into a highly centralized system of government which would otherwise be rigid and unworkable. As Dr. Johnson said: "one man may lead a horse to the water, but twenty cannot make him drink." The same necessity of getting people to contribute to centrally conceived plans, generally but not always originating with the national government, showed itself quite clearly in wartime. It is one of the main lessons of war-time planning Sir Oliver Franks has called attention to.

The experience of wartime shows in what way the three general characteristics of nineteenth-century liberal society had to change and indicates the problems which peace-time planning has to confront.



- (a) The State. War is an overall life-and-death conflict between national States. The very simple consequence is that at the beginning of the war the authority of the State becomes, internally, practically unrestricted and under the conditions of modern totalitarian warfare often semi-dictatorial, and the more so the longer the war lasts. The State then is in a Hobbesian sense all-powerful and, although it may not be literally true of the sovereign Power "that whatsoever he doth it can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be any of them accused of injustice", the elasticity of the *raison d'état* can be stretched so far that in practice not many differences with the subjects of Hobbes monarch remain for the citizens of a modern community to enjoy.

Actually this development need not be inspired at all by Machiavellian motives. The historian of British social policy during the second world war has recently shown how both the government and public opinion became, after 1939, aware with a kind of shock how inadequate hospital facilities were as to quality and quantity, and the consequent planning laid the basis for part of the present national hospital service.

- (b) The second characteristic of the liberal State has changed, too. Technically speaking, the citizens remain citizens, i.e. private persons on whose behalf and through whose representatives public policy is made, and who enjoy a private sphere of their own, guaranteed in the form of certain elementary liberties. But many of these liberties are strictly limited for victory's sake. Free speech is maintained, but not if the speaker airs his views about points of military interest; every citizen keeps the right of criticizing the government, but the reasons for overturning the Cabinet must be many times stronger than in peace-time to bring parliament to such a drastic step; and the usual inviolability of the citizen's person and home and his right to a fair trial can be gravely impaired by the wartime necessity of putting everybody who might be unreliable from a national point of view immediately behind bars. The liberties curtailed, and the extent to which they are so, vary greatly from country to country and from time to time; but it can safely be said that modern total war is, also on the democratic side, less favourable to human freedom than earlier armed conflicts. Even if the British Regulation 18 B can hardly be compared to the almost complete oppression of human liberties in German-occupied countries, there was some reason to be uneasy about it and about its effects.

Perhaps the severest limitation on human freedom is conscription, particularly if we include in this term forced *industrial* mobilization. That is, psychologically speaking, even more annoying to people than military conscription, which is a well-known military necessity. Industrial mobilization, however, cuts just as sharply athwart the ordinary course of civilian life and has to be explained as another aspect of total war and a means to let people participate, were it as Bevin Boys, in the conduct of the war. Industrial conscription is a clear example of the bad psychological effect direct compulsion may have, and explains why even unscrupulous governments, if they are wise, as a general rule prefer the carrot to the stick. On this point the limitations on personal freedom lead to the third characteristic of democratic government, its way of letting people take their share in social action.

- (c) Modern war cannot tolerate, save for the perhaps but apparent cases of commando, guerilla, and partisan warfare, private initiative if this really means taking the initiative into the individual's own hands and acting on



the decision in the same individual way. On the contrary, total war is an all-planned enterprise in which all decisions of any importance have to be planned beforehand and co-ordinated, and therefore, decided at ever higher levels. Psychiatrists even tend to think many unbalanced people like military life because it delivers them from the pressure their day-to-day civilian responsibilities of all kind shoulders them with. This way of integrating the citizen into the overall conduct of the war can for the very reason of its passivity hardly be called participation, and yet two things give this wartime caricature of citizens' participation a distinct advantage over the situation in peace-time. One is the fairly general conviction "we have to", increasingly held as the menace of totalitarian Powers to the common man's usual way of life becomes more apparent; the second one, related to the first, is the clarity of the common purpose. Of course "war aims" are often a debatable subject and during the war any discussion on them is bound to be of a slightly academic character; but what is meant here by common purpose is what Clemenceau meant when he was asked, on taking office in 1917, what his war aims were, and simply replied: "My war aims? Victory!" For a nation the choice between victory or defeat may be survival as a great Power or ruin, with all the attendant good and bad effects for the citizen included, and so victory is the one aim everybody, or nearly everybody, is fighting and toiling for, with other aims at the back of his mind of course, but having them completely subordinated to the winning and ending of the war.

This factor causes a large amount of restricted, but fairly active co-operation of the citizens who have at least not become completely "subjects", as far as their help on the particular spot where they have been put is concerned. It explains also why (apart from the harshness governments indulge in during the war and which makes people think twice before disobeying orders), under the severe restrictions upon the ordinary citizen's freedom and the discipline to which he is subjected, an amount of often magnificent co-operation can generally be expected from them.

Passing from war to peace, we come to the theme of our discussion in a narrower sense—the position of the citizen in a planned society. That position, too, can be envisaged on the basis of the three characteristics of nineteenth-century liberal government. The first aspect, that of the State itself, is dealt with in this section and serves as an introduction to the two other aspects, the freedom of the citizens and their participation in social activities.

The State, then, in a planned society in which most of the planning is done by national governments, has in the citizens' imagination become more of a Moloch than a necessary but restricted instrument created by them for their own convenience, wanting to control its workings for ever (the original assumption of liberal democracy in the minds of its participants). The government does all kinds of odd jobs and, as nothing in this world is done perfectly, by civil servants just as little as by businessmen, it makes far more mistakes than the "night-watchman State" ever did (or could do) and thus lays itself open to a host of criticisms which are in many cases justified. "A crown which had become a football was ceasing to be an arbiter", is the comment a modern British historian makes on the English Kings of the Houses of Lancaster and York in the fifteenth century; our strictures on what *The Economist* called "the all-planned State" can hardly be less severe, even though the techniques of running a dictatorship have made it increasingly easy for the central authorities to keep up a pretence of still being referees; our



strictures on the partially planned State (and that is what we are primarily interested in) must be less severe, because, as we saw on page 367 no inevitable inherent tendency drives it to totalitarianism. We have to take its disadvantages very seriously, however, just because successful planning (a necessary phenomenon) depends to a large extent on seeing its limits and avoiding the pitfalls.

The State in a planned society in which the government is the planning authority runs the risk of "ceasing to be a referee", of losing the umpire-function we spoke about. The moral authority of the State tends to diminish, and history shows an abundance of cases, from the Roman Empire until the second world war, where the decay of moral authority finally led to the impossibility of maintaining authority at all. Without falling into the other extreme of regarding moral authority as the sole and exclusive basis of political power, it is a necessary consequence of the government's business being bound up with human beings, whom it can despise and degrade, but can never do without.

There is no *a priori* reason why the State should have more difficulties in "getting on with the people", the more social activities it takes on itself; on the contrary, there is evidence that matters like factory legislation and social security have anchored the central government far more solidly in the common man's sentiment than all the very loud complaints about the dangers and irritations of a planning and planned State seem to suggest. In fact, it is extremely probable that certain election experiences of the last few years can only be explained if one attaches as much value to the former as to the latter feeling. But certain conditions have to be fulfilled.

The first, obviously, is that the planning has to be done in the interest of the citizens or in what they regard—wrongly, the pessimists say—as their interest. It is a fact that the enormous scope of certain modern social security measures and the intricate workings of the government machinery, which often seem to exclude a thoughtful appreciation of the pros and cons by the ordinary citizen, favour the short-term view over the long-term one. To take again the example of social legislation: apart from certain (fairly numerous) critics who use academic arguments on the disadvantages of particular aspects to defeat the thing itself, there is a disputable but *bona fide* argument which runs along the following lines: too extensive benefits of social security tend to drain the taxpayers' money and to diminish productivity so that in the long run we shall all be worse off, including the present beneficiaries. That might be a real problem, though it is hardly a new one. In all times of history people have tended to be shortsighted and, shortsightedness being no monopoly of the classes recently introduced into civilization by "fundamental democratization", it is the privilege of the leaders of democracy to be slightly wiser than their followers and instruct, guide and (in short) "lead" them.

The second condition of successful planning is that a wise distinction be made between the *central* planning and the innumerable details that are better left to the people for whom and with whom the planning is done. The most important decisions must be taken centrally, but, just as in war-time, no central authority (that is, no human beings clothed in the dignity of a civil servant or a committee of civil servants concerned) is wise, versatile and far-sighted enough to regulate everything in detail. It is, in Karl Mannheim's words, sufficient to co-ordinate the time-tables of the different railway lines without controlling the topics of conversation inside the carriages. If in a certain country a government body is of the opinion that 2.2 children in each family is the right number, the figure must be regarded as a national target and



can hardly be taken as an instruction to individuals. But, looking at the activities of modern State machinery, an observer cannot always escape the impression that these governments are paying "tithe of mint and anise and cummin", even if he would not dare to suggest that they have "omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith". A planning government probably cannot avoid regulating the use, and perhaps the prices, of certain key raw materials in industry; but a government which tries to fix prices for ice cream sodas ends by looking silly.

In order to fulfil this condition a certain amount of self-restraint on the part of government authorities is necessary; the more so as the ever widening fields of State activity and the delegation of general powers which is often necessary in regulating a not yet completely reconnoitred field tend to increase the planner's sense of importance and power.

We shall see in the following paragraphs what adaptations on the side of the citizens are needed to guard against the dangers in the situation. On the side of the government machine, control by existing institutions, in particular, parliament, must be relied upon. The function of parliament in the modern State tends to become less important, and the complexity of present-day government business renders it increasingly difficult for members of parliament to control it in detail; but there is not the slightest reason why a parliament with more or less the same powers that parliaments have always had in democratic communities and with machinery more efficiently equipped for present-day government and business should not exercise full control over the inner workings of the government machine—full control not being control of all imaginable details, as every business manager knows perfectly well. The fact that planning for many spheres of national life is now regarded as a task for the national government adds but one complication, an important and from a democratic point of view extremely healthy one: the necessity of consulting with all kinds of men and social groups to arrive at (a) a workable plan and (b) a good execution of the plan once agreed upon.

Here we must again make a sharp distinction between government regulation and planning. Not only because much planning is already done by other agencies than the State, but because planning involves flexibility. The assumption that planning should start from a hard-and-fast concept of society and lay down rigid rules, never to be changed, for the regulation of certain spheres of social life, makes nonsense of all planning in a dynamic society and applies rather to States of the past in which personal freedom was unknown and an oriental despotism held a society moulded once for all in fixed shapes. Such a concept has little in common with national communities of Western civilization today. Where extreme elasticity is needed, it is doubtful whether government authorities can ever remain flexible enough to adapt their planning to the shifting aspects of the situation. In these cases delegation to functional agencies, set up specially for planning the particular sector of social life concerned, is the obvious solution.

The unadvisability of centring all planning activities in the national State becomes yet more obvious where the activities to be planned cover such a large field that the "centre" cannot be said to be the capital of one national State. Present-day society knows many spheres of interests where co-ordination and central planning are highly necessary, yet no national government is able and powerful enough to regulate matters on its own. This applies, for example, to the co-operation between several American states, prodded by the Federal Government, to organize a scheme like the Tennessee Valley Authority; it applies equally to the schemes for "functional" co-operation between



European nations who are economically and historically in the same boat, but have not yet transformed their ways of governing themselves into a workable system for supra-national consultation and *decision*.

The words "freedom(s) under planning" sufficiently indicate what is one of the main aspects of our theme: the position of the citizen's natural sphere of freedom, with his guaranteed liberties, under a system in which a large number of social activities, much larger than in the liberal society of the nineteenth century, has to be co-ordinated and organized long in advance, i.e. planned, partially withdrawn from the sphere of individual activities and transferred to group agencies, amongst which the State is still the chief one. The principle which must govern the planning-versus-freedom question is extremely simple in its theoretical formulation: no society, not even the most liberal one, is completely free from interference with individual action; that could only be said of a completely anarchical society, which is, logically speaking, hardly a *political* society at all. The policies of planning are a matter of weighing one interest against the other, the "interest" of the citizens' having and keeping the largest possible amount of personal freedom (for with all people some freedom, and with most people a considerable amount of it, is a psychological necessity of life) against the interests which the intended measures of planning are to regulate. This is neither a new nor a sensational problem. It is not new, because, as we saw, the liberties of the citizen, when numerous and actively exercised at the same time, can conflict as well with each other; from a purely theoretical point of view it hardly matters whether the infringement of, say: the "liberty" of the citizen to be tried in an open court of independent judges collides with government planning and with the consequent handling of possible conflicts not by independent judges but by special administrative courts or even by administrative agents, or with some another "liberty of the citizen", the privilege of younger people of not being tried in the presence of annoying onlookers. Historically speaking, all separate liberties were so to say carved out of a society built on the absolute powers of the monarch and his immediate surroundings and on arbitrary decisions. A glance at the works of a late eighteenth-century author, like Adam Smith, is enough to see how the principles of the liberal society which have since become the natural, psychologically undebatable background of political thought were originally meant as spearhead weapons against an all but unrestrained State power (often dynastic).

This state of affairs is not altered if one takes the view (again ingrained with popular political thought) that all government powers must at one time have been "transferred" from the originally completely free citizen to the governing powers set up by him and his fellows after their own liking. Working on that assumption, it is not difficult to construct every bit of government regulation as a consequence, in the sector concerned, of some mysterious transfer of power from the citizens to the central authorities. That, however, is no solution of the real problems at issue. If one is too easily satisfied with the results of democratic control, one comes near the amiable and unrealistic optimism of an eminent Dutch lawyer, who (some forty years ago) stated that administrative law was fully superfluous in a parliamentary democracy, because there the administration should be identical with the citizens and needed no special supervision by administrative law courts.

We have tried earlier to refute the argument that *all* planning and *all* government regulation should lead automatically to collectivism and totalitarianism; it reduces itself *ad absurdum*, because not even the most liberal



society (but only an anarchical society) can be satisfied with regulating nothing at all. Another misunderstanding needed removing, however, before we can proceed to the really besetting problem of the present-day planned society: the mistaken idea that what the communists call "*social* democracy" stands in any opposition to the *political* democracy Western civilization has gradually been adopted since the English, American and French revolutions. Many discussions about "Democracy East and West", mainly trying to reconcile the plain fact that in Soviet Russia political democracy is unknown, with the cherished illusion that that country is a "workers' paradise", have suggested (in as many words or between the lines) that it is possible to build up a "social democracy", consisting of full employment, good labour conditions and a workers' share in the management of the factories, without having, previously or at the same time, a "political democracy" consisting of certain elementary liberties and rights for the citizens. Putting it the other way round, this should mean that in a country where "social democracy" is said to be more fully developed, political democracy and the principles of liberalism can be disregarded, a suggestion that is reinforced by the propaganda attempts of the defenders of "social democracy" to write off all political liberty as sham, whether accompanied by "social democracy" or not. The psychological consequence of these mistaken notions is that some people tend to regard any system of full employment, social security, etc. (especially if it takes the suggestive name of "welfare State") as *per se* inconsistent with civil liberties. Among political scientists it is hardly necessary to underline that "political" and "social" democracy (though I myself prefer a different name for the second concept) are not opposites. The progressive absorption of larger numbers of citizens into the sphere where social legislation provides them with material goods and a feeling of security can be nothing else than a further consequence of their being included in a sphere of civil freedom that began a few centuries ago and developed gradually. In other words, welfare policies—if we may adopt that word—are an extension of the line of political development and not an attempt to deviate from that line or to evade it. It is irrelevant whether one really wishes to lengthen the line into the social sphere or refuses to do so, possibly stopping half-way. The important thing is to see one line as a prolongation of the other.

Once having drawn these lines, we have to consider what consequences for the citizens' freedom follow from the heavy stress which our present-day planned society puts on the social welfare of the citizens. What is called "the welfare State" seems to have become an ineradicable feature of political party programmes. As long as the Republican Party in the United States is accused again and again by its own diehards, of "me-tooism" in welfare policies and as long as the British Conservatives in their election programme attempt to outdo Labour in promises of social security, the facts point in that direction, and we have to face the consequences.

Wherever our personal political sympathies lie, as political scientists we have to face the facts and see the dangers as well as the advantages inherent in the situation that surrounds us. Taken as a matter of political expediency, any welfare programme can, with varying degrees of success, be defended by comparison with other systems, under which, though the citizens' liberties were perhaps slightly better guarded, human welfare was cared for to a lesser extent. Looking somewhat deeper into the matter, however, we see that, if there is indeed a diminishing amount of civil freedom as against an increasing amount of social welfare, this transfer of stress from one set of human interests to another cannot go on indefinitely.



It is clearly impossible to lay down as a fixed *a priori* rule the exact point at which "planning" has to stop in order not to endanger the citizens' liberties too much and frustrate the ultimate aim for which all policy is made: human happiness.

In the next section we shall try to look at the danger inherent in central planning from the side of the citizens as more or less passive "consumers" of the planning regulations, e.g. of social welfare, and to see in what way their more active participation in social life might be brought about. This section considers the limits of central planning as they exist on the side of the planning authority, in particular the national State.

Central planning needs a central apparatus, in other words, a bureaucracy, even if the central planners work in constant consultation with private persons and social groups other than the State. The usual drawbacks of bureaucratic government appear, and it is tempting either to quote Lord Acton again with evident approval, or to declare that power generally is *not* corrupt or even (to judge by some of the more optimistic "planners") is nearly incorruptible. Both statements would be exaggerations. The truth need not lie "in the middle", but there are limits beyond which bureaucratic control, and this applies more strongly to planning, had better not go. As far as I can see, there are mainly three natural limitations to central planning, or to its usefulness.

The first lies in the direction in which Lord Acton pointed. It is easy to overburden people, and after all the planners' expertness does not exclude ordinary human fallibility. "All power corrupts", and war-time experience (never to be treated as the only possible frame of society, but after all the main factual evidence we have to go upon) shows what shortages (rations, queues and other relatively small things) can do to people, and how unbelievably they inflate the bureaucrat's feeling of self-importance and power. This drawback can be lessened by bringing the central authorities into constant face-to-face consultation with other people, and by delegating part of the planning and a large amount of the execution of plans to regional and local authorities and, if possible, to groups of citizens. But the danger exists. For however little justified much of the criticism levelled at bureaucrats usually is, probably no more justified than similar criticism of the professional peculiarities of businessmen, politicians or intellectuals, the central and (in the last resort) decisive power of the planners makes them the most dangerous kind of an already rather dangerous species—the bureaucrat.

The moral overburdening is not the most important, however. Human intellect, foresight and versatility have their limits, too, and they are probably more narrowly circumscribed than moral qualities. The central planners can extend their collective intellectual capacities by working in closely integrated teams and consulting the individual citizens of their particular field of study. But collective work has also its law of diminishing returns, certainly when applied to planning groups: in order to achieve results consultations must go hand in hand with a force of decision and it is for good reasons that most of today's plans (drawn up, to be sure, by tens and perhaps hundreds of planning experts) are seen as one man's main responsibility; thus the name of M. Jean Monnet is the living embodiment of the *Plan de modernisation et d'équipement*.

There is a third reason—but on another level—for caution in central planning and restraint of the planners. It has to do with the psychological reaction of the people to central planning, when it is felt to be a kind of bureaucratic control over the life of the ordinary citizen, and it forms a



transition to the next section. The deplorable fact that many people incline to identify all planning with bureaucratic control by the agencies of the national State was already mentioned above. In recent years it was, also, as a not unnatural consequence of the all-planned State of the second world war, identified with things like shortages and rationbooks, and the central planner assumed in the popular imagination the grim face of the official behind the counter, with its inevitable associations of myopia, loss of perspective and frustration. It may be urged that the right kind of central planning aims at quite different things, tends to widen the citizen's views and to offer him better prospects, etc. But every wise planning expert will know from experiences in recent history with which perhaps he was only passively concerned, that the common citizen's mind has been poisoned against all "planning" (or what he regards as such); he wants to be left alone—and does not sufficiently realise that history, even after a nerve-racking war, seldom permits a generation to lay down the burden of public responsibilities.

Coming to the third aspect, the participation of the citizen in the process of governing and being governed, in particular and, as far as our subject is concerned, the process of planning and being planned-for, our first task is to underline the passive nature, not only of the verbs used here, but of the larger part of the citizen's position in modern civilization. In the last section we saw how the feeling of being oppressed by a powerful, all-regulating bureaucracy precludes a more sober and favourable view of the central planning our civilization simply cannot do without. "Propaganda" and "mass persuasion" are but very partial solutions of the problem, when reduced to a simple contrast between a powerful bureaucracy planning centrally for the citizens, perhaps with their active and personal co-operation, and the silent mass of citizens who feel themselves more or less in the position of "subjects", in this case not of a tyrannical monarch or a Gestapo, but of "their own" government in the exclusively Westminster sense of the word. We can, of course, substitute for "propaganda" the politer word "information", and after past experience may deduct all those cases in which an inept handling of the media of mass communication has hidden from our eyes the extent to which an appropriate film, a domesticated broadcasting system and a public-spirited press can help to acquaint people with the national and international context of everybody's humble private task and to train the citizen to understand the integration of his work into overall plans. But, even so, the limits of the information media are obvious.

In the first place war-time experience has shown that neither central planning, nor propaganda, is altogether palatable to the citizens of a modern democracy. The central planning was stimulated not by wider views of the future of the community, but by the inevitable struggle for its naked survival; propaganda tried too much to make unpleasant things look pleasant and treated adults (who in spite of mass psychologists are, after, all, grown-ups) as children. The result was that neither central planning nor the necessary information about it will get an *a priori* "good press" as long as the memories of these unfortunate instances linger on.

The second restriction on the usefulness of any information is that full citizens of a democratic community not only must be told about the things that happen to them, but want to feel that they take an active part in shaping them.

Some of this, of course, can be handled by channelling the planning policies through the customary parliamentary procedure—granted that members of



parliament will be felt to be the direct representatives of the people, a psychological assumption not always true to the facts. There are, however, important qualifications to the effectiveness of the usual parliamentary procedure for this purpose.

The working time of parliaments is strictly limited. For every item of the agenda there are but a few days or hours available for debate. As there is only a restricted number of days in each parliamentary session, any increase of the government's business results in a corresponding curtailment of the time available for the discussion of each item, so that, for example, the managing of nationalized branches of industry can be discussed only in broad outline unless parliament is willing to make a mockery of its own control by concentrating, when national railways are under discussion, on questions like the late arrival of train number X at station A last Saturday. Government regulations for the social and economic business of the community are steadily increasing despite the disappearance of war-time regulations. Under these circumstances parliament becomes unfit for control, or is not adapted to the new tasks, and it may be seriously asked whether other agencies should not be set up to relieve it of part of these duties, agencies which should combine the business efficiency of the managerial class with the task of democratic control parliament is theoretically expected to exercise.

But no special semi-parliamentary agencies (in the form of parliamentary commissions or other bodies) can bridge the gap between the maximum control that can be exercised from one central point in a political community of millions of individual citizens, and the mass of detail involved in central planning for the whole community. There is but one evident remedy, delegating as much as possible of both the planning and of the putting of plans into effect to smaller groups of citizens; these can be existing regional or local authorities<sup>1</sup> or organizations specially set up for the occasion (Holland worked for some time with a price control system, partially—and not unsuccessfully—delegated to local citizens' committees).

It has already been pointed out, however, that, although large parts of the executive task can be successfully delegated, the essentially "central" character of overall planning makes it possible only to consult experts and interested groups of citizens, but excludes any large-scale decentralization. The remaining decentralization may, to be sure, be important enough. Without wishing to encroach on my sociological colleague's field, I may point to the one example of housing policy; whereas at the end of the second world war it was at first thought that nearly all decisions as to the quantity and quality of houses to be built had to be taken at one central point, it turned out to be perfectly feasible to transfer a large part of the decisions to lower levels—with the advantages of relieving the central bureaucracy, consulting the usually well-informed local experts and, generally, bringing the housing policy nearer to the mass of the citizens.

Apart from regional and local authorities and the special groups to which some real planning can be entrusted, there are in present-day society certain groups which can play an important part in getting public business done: in the first place, the trade unions and co-operatives. It is well-known that the trade unions are in a period of transition, in which their former function of bargaining for their members and, if necessary, getting them out on strike is gradually being replaced by the new function of advising the government on

<sup>1</sup> It is an exaggeration to maintain that "communal freedom" is "the salvation of Europe", but undeniably part of the regeneration of Western democratic values lies in the re-awakening of local democratic practice.



its central planning in the social and economic fields, e.g., on the policy of wages and prices, and helping to put the government's policy, once agreed upon, into effect, mainly by keeping their followers in line. The last function can certainly be extended to more positive and active forms of trade union co-operation, and the unions have two distinct advantages, if they are taken, as it were, into the government's confidence and are willing to act as some of the government's followers in parliament have been doing for years, namely, to translate, explain, defend and excuse the government's policy "downwards", to all those whom they represent.

The trade unions live nearer to the common people, and they represent a large part of exactly those sections of the population which have been more recently integrated into the body of full and conscious citizens. The last point is clear in itself, and explains why central planning is infinitely easier (and in some cases alone possible) with the approval and active co-operation of the trade unions as the working man's representatives. The dangerous tendencies of trade union leaders to create, as a consequence of these new functions, a gap between themselves and their followers (or perhaps to widen a gap that existed already), is a separate subject and cannot be treated here. Some unions, as a matter of fact, lost part of their influence with the workers as a consequence (but perhaps not exclusively as a consequence) of their being fairly constantly friendly to the government. On the other hand there are trade unions (Holland is a case in point) which, after the war, co-operated with the government policy to a point not always easily explainable nor palatable to the ordinary working man, yet gained considerably in membership in the face of a communist-led opposition.

So far we have dealt with central planning on a national scale, and have spoken of local, regional and functional planning as a special case. In the present world situation many problems which ask for planning are of a significance that transcends the national frontiers. For these all the difficulties of national problems exist, *plus* a couple of new ones.

Owing to the number of people concerned, supra-national problems are still further from the cosy sphere of town-meeting debates than are the national ones, and the difficulties of parliamentary control which we meet in national economic planning are only absent because there is as yet no full international parliament—*pace* the enthusiastic followers of institutions like the United Nations Assembly and the Council of Europe. Nobody knows into what kind of full supra-national parliaments institutions like these may grow, and I am quite prepared to give them all the benefits of the doubt as long as we do not expect too much in too short a time. For the first few years, and perhaps for much longer, we are saddled, in the solution of problems of supra-national significance, with committees of experts and councils of Ministers. The latter are obviously unable to do much, so that the brunt has to be borne by the experts, mostly civil servants. The expert's outlook, however admirable, is never completely fitted to the exigencies of democratic policy. This is not only an academic dogma, deduced from the general principles of democracy, but an ascertainable fact. Experience in German-occupied countries with civil servants who were not controlled by their governments in exile has shown that, even where they were under no direct pressure from the occupying powers, their outlook tended to become undemocratic because they did not know and could not see "what the public would not stand". Possibly a beginning of democratic control could be secured by setting up an international control agency from the several parliaments, but that would remain but a quasi-parliamentary (and quasi-democratic) body as long as the parliamen-



tary delegations vote "nationally"—in the wake of their respective Ministers and experts.

Both in the national and in the supra-national sphere the existing framework of democratic institutions is inadequate to meet the needs of an industrial civilization in its modern, highly specialized and comprehensive form. As far as guaranteeing the citizens' liberties is concerned, much can be done to maintain their "freedom under planning" (a) by wise planning with the democratic consultation of groups of experts and interested citizens and (b) by transforming and, if necessary, expanding present institutions; the building of a more complete system of administrative law is one such instance.

As far as the citizen's participation in the affairs of "his" government are concerned, more radical measures will have to be taken against a feeling of political oppression and psychological frustration. The aim of democracy is—and has always been—to open as many perspectives as possible to the citizens of the democratic community. Modern technical means have increasingly brought a number of these perspectives, particularly in the material sphere, within the practical reach of civilized nations. The resulting intricate working of the community's political machinery must not be taken for granted, but must gradually—and in some cases very quickly—be brought to conform with the demands of democracy. A romantic nostalgia for the eighteenth-century town meeting does not help much. A considerable re-building of existing political institutions may be necessary, for the benefit of the citizens concerned. Since all planning is aimed at the citizens' benefit, this concomitant problem is important and even has a kind of priority. The solution may not be easy, but there is no evidence that we cannot find it if we try hard.

## A SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF PLANNED ECONOMY

E. J. WALTER

Professor Emil J. Walter (University of Zürich) presented to the Congress a remarkable report entitled "Necessity and possibility of a systematic classification of the various forms of planned economy", in which a wide variety of economic data are classified in a closely reasoned system. Although this report is in many respects not strictly within the scope of political science, it was felt to be of such outstanding interest as to merit inclusion, in summary form, in the records of the Congress.

### STATE OF THE PROBLEM. DIFFICULTIES OF CLASSIFICATION

One of the first requirements of any science is the creation of an adequate and precise terminology. As this terminology must be clear, simple and free of any ambiguity or self-contradiction, it cannot be drawn up satisfactorily unless the science in question is already reasonably established. In this respect, there still remains much to be done as regards the terminology for economics.

There is much discussion today between the advocates and opponents of planned economy, but the exact meaning of this term is by no means as clear as might be wished.



Many experiments in economic planning have had their starting-point in a system of modern capitalist production, or even in certain cases, in a system of pre-capitalist production; they are described either as the emergence of socialist planned economy or as the establishment of State capitalism, according to each author's point of view. Because there is no universally accepted terminology, any discussion of the relationship between planned and competitive economy all too often founders in misunderstanding and sterile argument.

It is not easy to define good classification and the methods of establishing it. Indeed, any classification is and must be arbitrary, to the extent that it involves the selection of "essential" and deliberately disregards the "unessential" features. If it is to be of any use, classification must be suited to the end in view, and the simpler it is the more surely will this be done; but simplicity must not be the overriding consideration, as certain important features might then tend to be overlooked. Furthermore, classification, to be adequate, must avoid the pitfalls of over hasty generalization and systematization.

A classification system may be worked out by deduction or induction. Although the inductive method is more calculated to assist the progress of economics, this should not rule out classification by deduction, provided it is regarded as provisional and always subject to revision.

The difficulty is to make the classification adopted tally with actual facts; this is especially so in the field with which we are concerned, because of the complexity of economic systems. We must beware of allowing the usual simplified picture of these complex realities to be used exclusively for propaganda purposes. Such a militant propaganda as Lenin's (following the traditional thought-processes of dialectical materialism) presents socialism and planning on the one hand, and imperialism and capitalism on the other hand, as mutually incompatible systems and leaves no room for all the possible intermediate systems, all the basically independent variants. The "terrible simplifiers" are always ready to defend one fixed ideology. The only way of guarding against the dangers of this way of thinking is to adduce sure proof that it is out of touch with reality.

The first task in preparing any classification scheme is to determine whether the objects it will cover are of the same "degree". This logical requirement, as applied to economic systems, means that the one rational method of classifying planned economies is to consider only such systems as are fully developed and have an advanced division of labour, a large volume of exchanges and a fairly highly developed production technique. In other words, our classification should, *a priori*, be confined to modern economies. The process of transition from primitive to capitalist economy raises the problem of chronological classification, whereas we are concerned solely with contemporary economic systems.

We must also stress the limitations of all classification schemes. These are, in themselves, no clue to the real nature of a given economic order. Only empirical and historical research can determine whether the various facts duly selected and classified actually represent the true situation. No new fact is created by an analysis of concepts. Lastly, it should be added that undue detail detracts from the clarity of any classification scheme; in practice, a balance will have to be struck between an over-simplified, over-systematic classification and one with an excessive number of subdivisions designed to cover an infinity of features.

#### DETERMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CLASSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

In Professor Walter's opinion the following three points at least must be taken into consideration when classifying the economic systems of today:

- (1) The means of adapting production to the needs of consumers.
- (2) The ownership of industry (or of the means of production).
- (3) The political structure underlying each particular economic system.

We are thus confronted with a *three-dimensional* classification, in contrast to the usual classification of economic systems which is based on one criterion only—the means of adapting production to the needs of consumers. The application of this single criterion



leads to such simplifications as: free *or* controlled economy, competitive *or* planned economy, free market *or* price control, capitalism *or* socialism. When the problem is stated in this way, any discussion of the central issue of economic and social freedom must be wrongly engaged. This point seems to call for a few remarks on the very concept of freedom.

Freedom, as a concept, may have various connotations. It may be understood in the religious or metaphysical sense, or it may be defined as the opposite of constraint; again, it may be understood as meaning inner or external freedom. These are only a few of the possible subjective interpretations of the concept of freedom. But when it comes to discussing economic systems, this concept must obviously imply freedom to choose between different possibilities. This does not mean that man is free to disregard either biological laws or the necessity for adjusting himself to the requirements of the society into which he is born. However, within the wider setting of economic, social and cultural relations, there are various choices open to him—choices that can be clearly defined and that we, for our part, will call “social freedoms”. Taken as a whole, these social freedoms (the right to establish himself in the place of his choice, the right to open and manage a business, the right to buy and sell freely, the right freely to choose his place and type of work) are the concrete expression of the abstract concept of freedom.

It is, in general, insufficiently appreciated that economic and social freedoms are closely dependent on political freedom. Social freedoms mostly take the form of legal freedoms, and the assertion of rights. Now any organized legal system is the creation of the State, upon which its position as the sovereign social unit and the repository of political power automatically confers the power of making laws. Accordingly, we may distinguish *two basic types* of political systems: (1) the democratic hierarchy of political power, and (2) authoritarian dictatorship. The democratic State, based on legal safeguards, allows of freedom to choose the terms and type of work; but once we have a dictatorship where legal safeguards are replaced by the arbitrary administrative decisions of the police, all such freedom in the labour contract is jeopardized. The loss of personal freedom involves the loss of economic freedom.

While we could thus confine our attention to two characteristics only in order to define the political nature of a given economic system, three concepts at least must be taken into account when determining the conditions of ownership of the means of production. The latter may be in the hands of private capitalists, of co-operatives or of public institutions. In other words, there are three different types of property: that of private capital, co-operative property and nationalized property.

Lastly, when we come to consider economic systems from the standpoint of the adaptation of production to the needs of consumers, none but a typological method can be used, since there is room for a wide variety of systems between the two extremes of planned and competitive economy. To avoid making the classification unwieldy, we may confine our attention to three completely different types: administratively planned economy with total planning by a central body, a mixed economy combining fairly extensive planning with free enterprise in such economic sectors as are not controlled, and, lastly, an entirely free market. The existence of the first and third of these types is generally acknowledged and though the possibility of an intermediate type is questioned in certain quarters, it is difficult to see how such a view can be seriously defended. The economic policy of the British Labour Government, for instance, seems to be in line with this type of mixed economy; it controls the country's economy by both direct and indirect methods, nationalizes branches of production hitherto dominated by monopoly capitalism, and sets out to level incomes through taxation and the extension of social services, but leaves the branches of production carried on by small and medium businesses to adjust themselves to the market fluctuations. It must be added that it is possible to have a wide variety of intermediate systems between the three types described.

It follows from this analysis that any economic system must be characterized by three criteria: *the economic structure*, of which there are three distinct types: administratively planned economy with central control, mixed economy, and free market economy; *the ownership of the means of production*, which may be in the hands of private capital, co-operatives or public institutions; *political freedom*, where we may distinguish between



the democratic State, under which there is no direction of labour, and the authoritarian dictatorship, which in the final analysis means forced labour.

From these three criteria we thus obtain eight characteristics which, in their various combinations, give us a list of eighteen theoretical types of economic systems, as indicated in the following table:

| <i>Political<br/>Structure</i> | <i>Ownership of Means of<br/>Production</i> | <i>Economic<br/>Organization</i> |
|--------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| democratic                     | private                                     | planned                          |
| democratic                     | co-operative                                | planned                          |
| democratic                     | public                                      | planned                          |
| democratic                     | private                                     | mixed                            |
| democratic                     | co-operative                                | mixed                            |
| democratic                     | public                                      | mixed                            |
| democratic                     | private                                     | free market                      |
| democratic                     | co-operative                                | free market                      |
| democratic                     | public                                      | free market                      |
| authoritarian                  | private                                     | planned                          |
| authoritarian                  | co-operative                                | planned                          |
| authoritarian                  | public                                      | planned                          |
| authoritarian                  | private                                     | mixed                            |
| authoritarian                  | co-operative                                | mixed                            |
| authoritarian                  | public                                      | mixed                            |
| authoritarian                  | private                                     | free market                      |
| authoritarian                  | co-operative                                | free market                      |
| authoritarian                  | public                                      | free market                      |

A number of these types are in fact encountered in economic life, but some are in practice rare or even impossible. In theory it is conceivable that a system with an authoritarian political structure and a centrally controlled economy should nevertheless permit free ownership of the means of production, but it is highly improbable that such a system would ever work out in practice. At all events, the classification suggested in the above table illustrates the superficiality of the usual identification of competitive economy with free capitalist economy. There is no obvious reason why State ownership of all the industries of a country should rule out their management by the leaders of industry on the "paying" basis characteristic of the free market, provided that the leaders of industry are unhampered *de jure* and *de facto* in the exercise of their functions and that sales are organized in accordance with the principles of the free market.

We feel we have made it clear that it is not enough to contrast planned economy with free market economy. These two types of economic system are to be found in a wide variety of forms. For a general study of the problem of economic systems, our classification should, for the time being, afford an adequate basis for discussion; but in the case of concrete findings supplied by observers of actual economic facts the distinctions drawn would, no doubt, need to be more elaborate.



## REPORT OF THE DISCUSSION ON PROFESSOR BARENTS' REPORT

Two meetings of the Congress, under the Chairmanship of Professor Bridel (Lausanne University, Switzerland), were devoted to a discussion of Professor Barents' report (Wednesday, 6 September, from 9.30 a.m. to noon, and Friday, 8 September, from 2.30 to 4.30 p.m.). The discussion gave rise to a very interesting exchange of views and showed the need for an even more detailed consideration of the subject, which was one of the main social problems of the twentieth century.

From the beginning, the remarks made by some speakers, emphasizing the spiritual and moral aspects of planning, showed how vast was the subject with which the Congress had to deal.

Professor Puntambekar (Nagpur University, India) made his point of view very clear. He said that the problem should not be considered merely from the point of a planned society. The discussion should rather bear on the place and role of the individual in that society. Planning was indispensable. It was no doubt necessary to proceed from anarchy to planarchy, though only certain aspects of life should be planned. It was also necessary to render unto man what was man's due and not to neglect his creative faculties and spiritual purposes. Totalitarianism in planning was a mechanical conception which regarded man as a means, a mere functionary, and not as an end or a value. Planning should be flexible, not rigid or all-comprehensive. Once the need of planning or of a planned society was accepted, the question remained how to develop the new man or citizen able to create a planned society which would preserve a large measure of freedom for the individual. If this were desirable and possible, then the economic need should not be regarded as the only important one, but the other mental and moral aspects should be considered as more important. Professor Vito (Université du Sacré Cœur Milan, Italy) asked whether Professor Barents' paper really did clarify the role of a citizen in a planned society. Professor Barents' conclusion was that *laissez-faire* policy was no longer possible, but that there should be limits to State interference in economic and social life. This conception belonged to the last century (Bentham) and did not further our understanding of the problem. A question that had to be answered was whether planning did or did not mean transformation of the State. Professor Barents' answer was positive; he believed that private as well as public planning bodies would continue to increase, and suggested that they study the extent to which the structure of political bodies would be transformed. He also said that the modern citizen preferred security—even at the cost of a limitation of his freedom in purely economic decisions—to the more dangerous unlimited freedom. The problem was to determine the essential liberties which should always be respected. He felt that this was fundamentally a moral problem.

The problem of the limitation of planning arose in connexion with the respect for the individual and the defence of the fundamental liberties.

Professor Quincy Wright (Chicago University, U.S.A.) emphasized the danger of too much planning. There would always be planning, as man was a planning animal. Nevertheless, the average individual could not contribute much to planning for the State as a whole, and if the functions of society were planned in detail by the State, the freedom of the average individual to plan his own life and the life of smaller associations and groups in which he was interested would be greatly limited. There was, in fact, a conflict between planning by a group and ensuring the freedom of sub-groups and the individuals within it to plan for themselves. The efficiencies of National planning must be balanced against the value of individual freedom and the freedom of smaller



groups. The question was, therefore, not "what is planning?" but "what should be the limits of planning?"

Professor Alf Ross (Copenhagen University, Denmark) stressed that there was another important kind of planning—private planning. But the question was: who was to do the planning and in what way? The real choice was between public planning under democratic control and private secret planning effected by "big business" according to capitalistic interests. Professor Alf Ross also mentioned the problem of freedom and planning, a topic much discussed in England and Sweden, because of their advanced socialism. He referred to the argument of a Swedish author (Herbert Jöngsten) who pointed out that with comprehensive planning too much corruption arose, and a high concentration of power might lead to abuse, because the socialist State could not renounce the use of its political power. These difficulties could only be overcome by extensive decentralization of planning. But, although account must be taken of those dangers, there was no need to be pessimistic. Some members of the Congress wondered whether it might not be advisable, before going further, to define certain terms more clearly.

Professor Chapsal (Institute of Political Studies, University of Paris) thought that the meaning of the term "planned society" should be defined. The word "plan" had come into fashion and there was a danger of its being used to cover very different matters. It could not, for instance, be inferred from the existence of the "Monnet Plan" that French society was a planned society. Moreover, the criteria used to define the planning aspect of action by the State might well appear open to question. For example, there was talk of State action in the field of education; yet in many countries, such as France, that action was of long standing and dated from the triumph of liberalism in the nineteenth century.

Professor Fethi Celikbas (parliamentary representative for Burdur, Turkey) recommended a more precise and more scientific definition of the word "plan". Private enterprises also drew up plans. A planned society would therefore, presumably, be a society in which a central authority took the place of private enterprise, and administered and controlled the community as a whole. In that case, "planning" would be equivalent to "collectivism". The Monnet Plan in France and the Industrialization Plan in Turkey were simply programmes. Mr. Celikbas hoped that scientists would not be misled by slogans, but would do everything in their power to establish scientific truth. Moreover, he wished to know what organizing principle would govern a planned society. Would there be a central authority, as in U.S.S.R.? Would there be a system in which fluctuations of the market—that is to say clashes of opposing interests—would be kept to a particular pattern with which the distribution of workers between the various kinds of employment would always have to conform? The result then would be a society practising liberal paternalism. Western society of today seemed to be just as far from planning as from liberal paternalism. Western civilization, which was based on respect for the dignity of the individual, was at present trying to advance along the road to peace, security and social justice. He hoped and recommended that the study of the problem would be resumed at the next Congress of the Association, in co-operation with the International Economic Association.

Professor Robson (London School of Economics and Political Science) considered that the discussion had digressed from the main subject. He also thought that the discussion had been disappointing and that they had been talking round the subject. They should neither approve nor deplore planning, but simply face the facts. There were two main streams of governmental planning: (a) in economic matters; (b) in the sphere of town and country planning. The task of the political scientists was to enquire into the technique and practice necessary in the new world of planned society, if the citizen was to regain an effective voice in and influence on the formation of his own life.

Planning in itself did not indicate the object planned for. The individual citizen's views on his personal desires must be elicited in a more detailed manner and the unofficial citizen body must be enabled to play a larger role in the government.

Professor Ellul (Bordeaux University, France) was not convinced either by the distinction proposed between planning and political power or by the idea of a possible limitation of planning.



- (1) Recourse was made to planning for reasons of efficacy. It was possible to conceive of a plan that had been freely discussed depending for its execution on the voluntary co-operation of individuals and private concerns; but plans of that kind were never carried out to an extent of more than 70 per cent. To achieve 100 per cent execution, the plan must be obligatory, and only the State possessed the necessary authority to impose penalties.
- (2) It would be difficult to limit economic planning, for, after all, what was a key industry? Moreover, the co-existence of a free zone and a planned zone would lead—as regards salaries and prices, for instance—to serious abuses, which could only be remedied by an extension of the planned zone.

Dr. Verkade (Unesco specialist for the British Zone in Germany) said that the theory could very well be defended that the general right of voting for parliament was adequate compensation for the increase, in a planned society, of the interference of the centralized State, just as in the time of feudalism, local self-government acted as compensation to the different estates of the realm. The question now raised was: What is the compensation for State interference in the social field? That interference should not be exaggerated; the interference caused by rationing in times of need resulted in much more bureaucracy than planning in the time of plenty, when control over investments could fulfil the role of the price mechanism in the nineteenth century. The only question was: has the State enough authority to enforce that investment control or is the nationalization of a number of very important industrial branches a means of enforcing such control?

Professor Bridel (Lausanne University, Switzerland) wished to explain the significance that should be attached to the Swiss referendum, which was not always fully understood in other countries. A good deal of caution was necessary in estimating the value of the Swiss referendum, particularly with regard to matters of economic policy. In Switzerland, the referendum could be held at the cantonal, communal or federal level; its characteristics were not identical at each of those levels, nor in all parts of the country. Whereas in certain cantons of German-speaking Switzerland all the cantonal laws and many of the financial regulations of the canton or the commune had to be submitted to popular vote, there was no such obligation on the federal level, where the referendum was, in principle, optional and the ballot took place, as a rule, only on the request of at least 30,000 citizens. Moreover, the referendum was not allowable for every measure taken by the federal authorities. (The same remarks applied to several cantons.) The Swiss referendum was therefore a somewhat cumbersome device and would be inadequate to ensure constant control by the people over the economic policy of the government. Whilst a referendum on a simple question was undoubtedly useful, its value was more problematic in the case of complex technical questions, such as are continually raised by controls and planning. In those cases, effective control could be exercised only by qualified representatives. But, as had already been pointed out, parliamentary representation was not very well suited to that kind of control. The latter could be exercised more competently by economic associations (trade unions, employers' associations, agricultural associations, etc.). In fact, such associations were widely consulted by present governments practising paternalism. The defect of this consultation and of the whole system in question was that the representation of citizens by associations was far from meeting those needs of impartiality, justice, equality before the law and openness which the constitution of democratic parliaments was endeavouring to meet. The improvement of professional representation was necessary if planning were not to jeopardize the most notable achievements of representative democracy.

Professor Barents (Amsterdam University, Netherlands) agreed with Professor Puntambekar that spiritual values must be safeguarded and pointed out that planning covered not only the economic field, but also social and cultural activities. School planning was a case in point; it was a remarkable fact that, in Holland, building and organizing schools had not only been a task of the government but to a large extent of religious communities. In Professor Barents' view, it might be possible to consider the transformation of a liberal society into a planned society as a limitation of the freedom of contract, but he was inclined to think that was only one aspect of the development. Professor Ross was right in emphasizing that a great deal of planning had



already been done by private corporations. The main point, of course, was the desirability of future planning—which Professor Quincy Wright denied. Professor Barents agreed with Professor Robson, however, that it was a necessary phenomenon, which need not destroy freedom if wisely used.

It would be necessary to avoid excesses, as even a socialist like himself felt irritated and frustrated by some aspects of present-day over-organization. In reply to Professor Ellul, he did not think that 100 per cent planning was necessary to make planning effective, and he was grateful to Professor Robson for the excellent way in which he had described the new ways of consulting peoples. He did not think that the indispensable minimum of liberal freedom was incompatible with planning, which—for better or worse—was a factor in present-day society.

After thanking the speakers, the Chairman closed the discussion. He observed that the problem of the role and status of the citizen in a planned society was far from being completely covered by the discussions of the present Congress. That problem was one of the most urgent political questions of modern times; it was to be hoped that it would be retained by the International Political Science Association, and that the latter would recommend its careful, detailed study to political scientists throughout the world, giving them every assistance in the co-ordination of their work.



P A R T I I I

JOINT SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
POLITICAL SCIENCE  
AND SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS







# THE ROLE OF THE CITIZEN IN NATIONAL PLANNING

A. HILLMAN

The exercise of the planning function by national governments has many precedents. The conservation of natural resources, such as forests or water power, is for example a widely accepted policy, made effective by specific legislative and administrative measures. Obviously, too, in times of war, when there is a unifying cause, there is large-scale planning in extraordinary forms.

In recent decades, national planning has largely taken the form of economic controls established for the realization of objectives stated in terms of levels of production and consumption and capital formation. In part, these developments have been post-war necessities arising from the problems of physical reconstruction or of control of international trade, but we shall not confine our attention to the emergency phases of national planning. We shall deal with the planning process as it affects relatively large sections of the economy of a nation, with a large degree of co-ordination between the different parts of the programme.<sup>1</sup> While our attention will be directed towards relatively comprehensive and co-ordinated "actions by the State for the purpose of influencing economic variables",<sup>2</sup> we can include in our considerations at some points the experience with segmentalized and partial planning, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.<sup>3</sup> In general, we shall focus attention on situations where the controls are not rigid nor complete. Here Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries are the leading cases in point.

In these nations, planning has been the outgrowth of democratic and of Socialist principles. Their implementation has meant the modification of older Marxist doctrines as Socialist parties have come to power, and the governments have been faced with the necessities of dealing responsibly with urgent situations. The social-political structures now found in Scandinavian countries and Great Britain have not been analysed to any significant extent by Marxist thinkers. These national organizations differ from the "classical" Marxian picture of a Socialist society in that the right of private ownership of the means of production has not been destroyed.<sup>4</sup>

We shall not be discussing here the Socialist philosophy but rather the actual behaviour of individuals in the new situations created by national programmes. We shall leave to the economists the technical analysis of the

<sup>1</sup> Petter Jakob Bjerve "Government Economic Planning and Control", in *Scandinavia between East and West*, edited by Henning Friis, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York, 1950, p. 53. Bjerve distinguishes between control and planning. "The term 'planning' will be applied only to the elaboration of blueprints in advance of the actual control, that is, the devising of ways to perform the control activity."

<sup>2</sup> Allen Barton "International Research Co-operation on the Sociological Problems of Economic Planning", 1949. These "notes" are based on the work of the research group in Oslo, carrying out a project conceived and set in motion by Prof. Paul Lazarsfeld. The plan for this research project is set forth in the *Psychological and Sociological Implications of Economic Planning in Norway*, Oslo, 1949. Some of the individual studies to which reference will be made in this paper are part of this research programme.

<sup>3</sup> Herman Finer, *The TVA: Lessons for International Application*, International Labour Office, Montreal, 1944. David E. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March*, New York, 1944.

<sup>4</sup> The last three sentences are a free translation of a passage on p. 3 of Wilhelm Aubert, *Priskontroll og Rasjonering, Et rettsosjologisk forstudie*, Oslo, June, 1950.



forms of control and their relative effectiveness in attaining desired ends—except in so far as the types of government action affect the relations of individuals to government in the planning process. In this respect, the major alternatives in the exercise of power are the legal and the administrative—either control largely through negative sanctions, or through nationalization and direct administration of economic organization. There is theoretical debate as to whether the choice between these forms is a matter of any consequence, but it can be shown that significant differences result, not only of a technical sort but in the quality of public relationships affected by the type of government control.<sup>1</sup>

In indicating the limits of the treatment of the subject, it is not only the philosophical aspects of Socialism as manifest in national planning that constitute a somewhat distinct subject. There is also the ethical analysis of the meaning of freedom, and the pursuit of this significant but elusive theme would carry us far afield. We need not agree with Barbara Wooton when she denies “the validity, for all practical purposes, of any distinction between what people want to do and what they ‘really’ want to do”, but we can subscribe to her assertion that such distinctions “may be the cloak for some of the most wicked, because the most insidious attacks upon freedom”.<sup>2</sup> Certainly many sophisticated and cunning assaults on the validity of the common-sense concept of freedom by defenders of dictatorships must be recognized as verbal tools in political struggles rather than the objective philosophical analyses they purport to be.

We ought, however, to recognize that deeper motivations are involved, especially what Erich Fromm has pointed out as an underlying trend in the psycho-social insecurity of contemporary man, and the implications of this for comparisons between nations.<sup>3</sup> It is not only the “escape from freedom” which is involved; there are also individual differences in aspirations to leadership. The motives of satisfactions derived by leaders in democratic group processes are important elements in the continuous functioning of political systems; they need to be understood in terms of the personalities involved and of differences in social situations. Within the scope of this paper, we can deal only incidentally with the social psychological factors involved.

We have been asked to discuss the role of the citizen in national planning. This not only assumes the exercise of civil liberties, but also suggests the emergence of new forms of achieving consensus within national political-economic structures. Having indicated some limits to our treatment of the subject, and having localized the contexts which will constitute the framework for our discussion, we shall describe the types of behaviour in which citizens directly or indirectly influence the course of national planning. A preliminary survey of the role played by citizens is provided by an economist:

“In a strict sense the preference scale or social welfare function, upon which the planners base their decisions, is one of their own. In a democratic society of the Scandinavian type, however, there are many channels through which the preferences of planners are influenced and modified by those of the people: the parliament, the political parties, the trade unions and industrial

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. pp. 6ff. Further reference will be made to this study of the attitudes of business men toward government regulations, where the point is developed that the legal type of enforcement, which must be fitted into the existing framework of laws and legal procedures, presents problems which are essentially different from those encountered under direct government administration of economic activities. See also Barbara Ward “Limits of Economic Planning”, *Foreign Affairs*, 27: 246-62, January, 1949.

<sup>2</sup> Barbara Wooton, *Freedom under Planning*, London, 1945, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, London, 1942.



organizations, economic discussions in the newspapers, personal contact between top planners and the voters, and so forth. Thus the planners learn whether or not people are satisfied with the objectives stated, and to what extent people want a change in these objectives. For example, is private consumption being restricted more than reconstruction would justify, or should capital formation be speeded up instead, even at the expense of further restrictions on consumption? Should government consumption be higher and private consumption lower, or vice versa? Should equalization of incomes be carried still further even if such a policy by its adverse effect on incentives can be expected to bring about a decline in production? There can be no doubt that the preference scale of the planners is strongly influenced by people's attitudes toward these broad questions of economic choice. The fact that the government is judged by the people at the elections intensifies this influence."<sup>1</sup>

## I

Certain kinds of action or inaction may be conceived of as *latent* or *negative* influences in the planning process. In any cultural framework, there are mores and beliefs which set broad limits to planning. There is variation between countries in the valuation placed by citizens on political liberties (either specific or generalized), arising from the length and quality of experience of such forms of freedom, and from other national values and traditions. If the choice is between promised benefits of economic planning and the maintenance of civil liberties, there is no question that in some countries the latter will be more highly prized. The choice is not always a clear-cut matter, but even in cases of drift, planners and politicians may have to reckon with resistance by citizens.

When planning goals include increased national production, as is usually the case, a negative attitude on the part of workers is often encountered, based on an unconscious fear of producing too much. Haunting fears of overproduction in relation to limited markets, and of consequent unemployment, act as a brake, counteracting appeals that equate national welfare with increased production. Moreover, the relation between total national production and potential gains to the individual worker seem to him remote and indirect. The old habit of looking for immediate cash benefits, the "What is there in it for me?" attitude of workers, is encountered especially in connexion with new programmes for labour-management collaboration, which will be described below. This attitude is rooted in traditions of conflict, of labour and management interests as fundamentally opposed, and is one of the most pervasive forms of negative action involved in national planning.

Somewhat similar are preferences for certain jobs, which may pose problems for planners. National planning as practised under peace-time conditions does not require forced labour or the assignment of workers to particular jobs. Freedom in the labour market may indeed be affected by pressures such as those exercised through public employment offices, through opportunities afforded for training, or through subsidized or specially created job opportunities.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that restrictions on choice of vocation often exist, because of the industrial requirements in a given locality or because of long-term trends where industries are expanding or contracting, and that

<sup>1</sup> Bjerve, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 69.



this goes on without conscious, over-all, planning. It follows that workers will respond to prospects of better pay and attractive conditions of employment, whether the changing demands are the result of unplanned business fluctuations or of deliberate public policy.<sup>1</sup>

However, planners may not know enough about motivations to adjust the economic incentives, and they may "under conditions of full employment" face special, unanticipated resistance toward certain kinds of work; these are among the latent forms of individual action or resistance which affect the operations of planning. Then there is the part played by fashion and unpredictable factors—for instance the variables in consumer preferences. Planning systems usually avoid any dictation to consumers in detail, but decisions on price control and rationing, as well as forecasts of production to meet consumption needs and the establishment of economic priorities, all make some assumptions about mass preferences. In the absence of exact knowledge, trial-and-error is an inevitable part of planning<sup>2</sup> and constitutes a recognition that persons as well as goods are involved.

Planners may conceive of themselves as independent, objective technicians, but their continued functioning depends in the long run upon the political power of the administration which has established the over-all goals, policies and framework for planning. Planning officials in their technical capacities may try to estimate public reactions, and most certainly politicians, almost by definition, have their eye set on the next election. This means not only consideration of opinion as expressed through the major political parties, as will be noted, but also attention to the role played by non-party or "undecided" voters.<sup>3</sup> In close elections, these marginal voters may hold the balance of power. Analyses of possible shifts in voting—for example, if the Liberal Party in Great Britain had withdrawn from the elections in 1950—are interesting though highly speculative at the best.<sup>4</sup> They do point to the latent but potent influence of a relatively small group of citizens, including the "sporadic" voters, which means that fluctuations in the percentage of total possible votes cast in national elections may be decisive for any given election.<sup>5</sup> The old democratic dictum that each shall count for one and only one in the equality of the ballot box does not preclude the necessity for politicians to give double attention to the whims of women or certain other special categories of voters.

The final type of obviously negative behaviour is the pressure exerted against economic regulations by business men. Even when they accept the general necessity of planning, they may resist because the political power is being exercised by the representatives of labour. Actual inquiry among business men reveals that many feel threatened by the new economic policies, but there is also evidence of confusion and ambivalence in attitudes.<sup>6</sup> More than negativism and resistance, however, are the actual violations of new laws—an accommodation by business men of the planning system to the rules of the game as it has been played.

<sup>1</sup> Wooton, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

<sup>2</sup> Bjerve, op. cit.

<sup>3</sup> Leif Holbaek-Hanssen conducted an opinion survey of 3,200 cases, as part of the Oslo planning project. The results are unpublished. Questions asked included attitudes about government economic policy and voting behaviour in 1945-49.

<sup>4</sup> Nils Andren "Kring det Brittiska Underhusvalet", *Svensk Tidskrift* 37: 213-26 (1950). Mark Abrams "Public Opinion Polls and the British General Election", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1950.

<sup>5</sup> In the Scandinavian countries, the percentage of eligible voters who voted in national elections has increased since 1925 and is now 80 per cent or more.

<sup>6</sup> Fredrik Fostvedt and Erik Rinde, "Notes from an Investigation of the Attitudes and Reactions of Norwegian Business People, 1949".



The opposition of business men to national planning is mitigated by several factors. In time of war or crisis, there is the patriotic appeal to national unity, which undoubtedly has some effect on their behaviour. There is also reason to believe that the operation of the planning system tends to favour existing firms. The system begins with the *status quo* and builds plans within this structure.

The habit of respect for law perhaps plays a part in promoting conformity to regulations, but an empirical study has shown that violators do not think of themselves as criminals. As with other "white collar" criminals, violators of economic regulations are not thought of by themselves or among their associates as moral offenders; people with a general respect for law observance may feel that these specific violations are excusable under the circumstances, sometimes defined as part of a political cold war. On the other hand, the government administration may feel forced to compromise, since it cannot afford to offend the people with economic power and technical competence. Few of the possible sanctions are therefore invoked, and the enforcement process seems at times to have a ceremonial character, rather than being the exercise of the political authority nominally in the hands of the government.<sup>1</sup>

## II

Turning to the more active forms of participation, we shall consider political parties and other forms of voluntary expression by citizens. The assumption that is inherent in what follows is that citizen action in modern societies is largely ineffective unless organized and channeled through social institutions. With reference to political parties, it is appropriate to give special attention to the Labour or Social Democratic parties, mainly because of their decisive role in national planning. For many years in Scandinavian countries these parties have been "stronger than any single party to the right of them. With few exceptions, they have controlled the governments in all three countries throughout the last 15 to 20 years. During the war they were leading members of coalition governments".<sup>2</sup>

The Scandinavian labour parties include not only industrial workers but also to some extent lower middle class people and small farmers. A close connexion has been maintained by the parties with organized labour. There is also some provision for collective affiliation of trade union members with political parties in Sweden and Norway.<sup>3</sup> The leaders of the labour parties and of the trade unions consult with each other informally or through organized forms of collaboration. In general, however, the organizational structures provide for formal independence, and the unions and parties are generally described as having the relationship of equals.<sup>4</sup> This relationship, as we shall note more fully later, is fraught with special significance in view of the responsibility of the majority, governing, party to its special constituency as well as for the general welfare.

<sup>1</sup> Aubert, op. cit. Harold Laski, *Trade Unions in the New Society*, New York, 1949. Laski noted that after five years of Labour government, the private sector of industry still represents 80 per cent of the economy. On the limits of political power, see Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power*, 1934.

<sup>2</sup> Henning Friis, p. 8 in *Scandinavia Between East and West*, op. cit.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Galenson, "Labor and Industrial Relations", in Friis ed., op. cit. p. 123.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 124, Walter Galenson, *Labor in Norway*, Harvard University Press, 1949. Laski, op. cit. In Great Britain the co-operatives are included in the political councils representing unions and the Labour Party.



The vertical transmission of ideas and impulses within political parties is of special interest. Is there initiative from below as well as responsible reporting of actions from party officers to members? Does the rank-and-file participate in forming party policy? On these points, information is scanty and impressionistic. Evidence where available, as to the number of meetings held and the attendance, would not reveal the *quality* of member participation. The conclusion of various observers is that parties do not "inspire more than a small fraction of their membership to political activity, and a few leaders determine policy".<sup>1</sup> There is reason to believe that specific decisions on foreign policy, with all their implications for domestic planning, are made by a small elite in most cases, although the broad outlines must rest on a basis of public opinion.<sup>2</sup>

The participation of the rank-and-file of party members is undoubtedly greater on local issues. Concrete problems of roads and transportation and power projects are of immediate interest. They may give rise to petitions from local units of parties to central committees, which may transmit such expressions of opinion to the ministries or parliamentary committees concerned. Such initiative from below is likelier to affect details than to influence major policies.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to direct contacts between political leaders and members in meetings of various kinds, it is reasonable to suppose that the former, if they are to function effectively, develop means of conducting informal polls of opinion. Their sensitivity to moods and reactions of party members as well as the public at large undoubtedly varies, and their awareness of how they behave in this respect would also differ. Some, we have reason to assume, are systematic and relatively objective about these processes, while for others their skill is an art about which they naturally do not talk much.

One can visualize a ring of lieutenants around the principal leaders, and the former in turn having circles in lower levels of influence and geographical dispersion. In this informal network, there are many possibilities of two-way communication, the quality of which will vary in great part with the receptivity of the leaders. If they are emotionally mature and generally secure enough to tolerate reports of criticism, they are more likely to get helpful information. If excessive ego-demands require constant tributes and praise, the confidantes and the inner circle surrounding leaders may protect their own positions by giving the leader what he wants regardless of accuracy or of consequences.<sup>4</sup> As will be noted with respect to leaders of trade unions, the style of living of political figures also conditions their contacts with representative members of the large voting public. The size of the country and of

<sup>1</sup> Friis, *op. cit.* p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York, 1950.

<sup>3</sup> Per Kleppe, Oslo, has made a study, unpublished, of the backgrounds and ideological development of a large sample of the Labour members of the Norwegian Storting and other Labour leaders. He has been helpful to the writer in describing some of the political processes in Norway to which reference is here made.

<sup>4</sup> The conception of leadership assumed in this discussion emphasizes the "relation of outstanding individuals to group situations. This is a significant departure from the former tendency to account leadership in terms of 'innate' and static traits of forcefulness. In the newer vein, recent research by Helen Jennings and others has used sociometric techniques to analyse choices of leaders and their roles within groups. Such descriptions of effective leadership assume a democratic rather than an autocratic framework of social interaction. The essential test of effectiveness becomes the extent and voluntary character of group participation induced by leaders. It has been suggested that 'central person' be used for the role of catalyst involved in dynamic leadership, as distinguished from the stereotyped notion of decisive inflexible action of the 'strong' leader. An important implication of this newer conception of leadership is that persons can be trained to exercise such roles". A. Hillman, *Community Organization and Planning*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1950, p. 187. Footnotes from original not included.



the major communities are, of course, other factors of significance in the operation of these informal political processes.

Political leaders are often also elected public officials, especially members of the national parliament. The social composition of parliaments is relevant as regards the possibilities of informal communications between politicians and public. It seems reasonable to suppose that a man who gives up a job in a factory or as a farm operator to take a seat in parliament is more likely to retain active and direct contacts with his constituency than are the career office-holders or intellectuals, unless the latter try assiduously and imaginatively to compensate for their relative lack of contacts with typical voters. Studies have been made of the occupational composition of the Norwegian Storting by Arne Bjørnberg, which are discussed in a monograph by Arvid Brodersen. During the period 1903-36, more than one-third of the members of the Storting came from occupations in fishing and agriculture, and a small though increasing proportion could be classified as workers.<sup>1</sup> Later data have not been similarly analysed, but there is reason to believe that a growing high proportion of industrial and agricultural workers and fishermen hold seats in the Storting, compared with relatively more professional and middle class people in other countries, even those with Labour governments. In general, the Scandinavian countries are credited with having attracted to political service, both temporally and on a career basis, people who are representative of all classes.<sup>2</sup> We should recognize in passing, however, that the social origin of a man who comes to devote his whole life to politics is no assurance of his continued identification or association with his class of origin.

The interlocking membership and the ideological and organizational linkage between labour parties and trade unions have already been noted. The usual constitutional requirement in Scandinavian trade unions is for membership voting on new collective-bargaining agreements. This has been somewhat abridged during the war and post-war periods, but this right of members is still regarded as a mark of union democracy. The referendum has also been used for expressions on internal questions of policy and constitutional questions. An analysis of the extent of participation and the results of referendum votes in the chief Swedish trade unions was made by Jörgen Westerståhl, as part of a larger study. With variations evident between unions in this respect, there is an overall average of 54 per cent of the memberships which voted on collective bargaining referenda, and 42 per cent on questions of internal policy.<sup>3</sup>

Trade unions in Norway have been described as having a high turnover in elected officers.<sup>4</sup> A succession of officers is not in itself a complete measure of internal democracy, since a president may die in office or retire voluntarily or a secretary, after years of service, may be advanced to the presidency and thus make room in his former post for some close associate. We have chosen instead to focus attention on the number of unopposed elections, and the size and nature of such opposition to victorious candidates, who in most cases are seeking re-election. Data from 14 national unions in Norway with current memberships of more than 10,000 have been obtained, covering the period

<sup>1</sup> Arvid Brodersen, *Det Politiske Apparat*, Bergen, 1946. Chr. Michelsens Institutt Nr. 19, pp. 27ff.

<sup>2</sup> Friis, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Jörgen Westerståhl, *Svensk Fackföreningsrörelse*, Stockholm, 1945, p. 98.

<sup>4</sup> Galenson, *ibid*, pp. 52-53.



1920-40.<sup>1</sup> In a remarkably high percentage of elections there were candidates opposing some or all candidates on the official slate.

The point has been made that continuity in union offices is necessary if trade union officials are to develop the experience and competence required to function in the complex situations of today.<sup>2</sup> It is natural to expect continuity when one considers that internal political machines are difficult to build up, and that the inside knowledge of the incumbent in office is hard to challenge. As long as all goes well and economic prosperity prevails, union officials can manage to hold on to power. C. W. Mills has postulated a crisis theory of union democracy; "it often proceeds by upsurge and revolution rather than by smoothly operating democratic machinery".<sup>3</sup>

Mills has also stressed the remoteness of union officials from the membership in the United States. The relatively high salaries of national, although not of local, officials enables them to assume middle class standards and positions in the community; there is some evidence that members do not as a rule resent this. In fact, they may vicariously enjoy the conspicuous displays of comfortable living and certain kinds of equality with employers on the part of leaders.<sup>4</sup> This stands in sharp contrast with Scandinavian practice, as to salaries, standards of living and the expectations that union officials will not build any barriers around themselves.<sup>5</sup> Obviously this is due in part to the smaller size of the countries and smaller scale of union operations, but there is also some reflection of differences in conceptions of social mobility and class structure.

Let us proceed to consideration of participation in planning by and through other voluntary organizations and social movements in general. In thinking of organized labour, co-operatives, farmers' organizations and related programmes of adult education as social or popular movements (*folkrörelser*), one must pause to note that though such was their early character, they have now come to correspond essentially also to the concept of social institutions, with some permanence of organization and formality of structure. The reference to them as movements, however, emphasizes that the institutional forms, to have vitality, must rest on widespread popular support. Leaders are, however, disturbed by the evidence of member apathy and tendencies to bureaucracy that may indicate institutional "formalism". The significant role of such organizations in Sweden and neighbouring countries has been emphasized by Gunnar Heckscher. A Nordic conference of social scientists was held in January 1950 to discuss possibilities of research concerning popular movements.<sup>6</sup>

The essentially free character of these organizations accounts for their role as expressions of democratic community forces, and their service function in relation to public administration. Sweden, Norway and other countries have recognized the freedom of associations, and no restrictive laws exist. At the

<sup>1</sup> To be published in a separate article. Cf. Philip Taft's study of certain American unions, "Understanding Union Administration". *Harvard Business Review*, Winter, 1946, and *ibid*, "Opposition to Union Officers in Elections", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February 1944.

<sup>2</sup> Galenson in Friis, *op. cit.* p. 123.

<sup>3</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power*, Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York, 1948, p. 106.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>5</sup> Galenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>6</sup> Gunnar Heckscher, "Pluralist Democracy: The Swedish Experience", *Social Research*, 15, 417-61, Dec. 1948; Gunnar Heckscher *Staten och Organisationerna*, Stockholm, 1946; "Referat från den nordiska konferensen om forskning rörande folkrörelserna på Vår Gård, Saltsjöbaden", 12-14 Jan. 1950, 46 pages, mimeographed; Klaus Sunnan *Organisasjonane og Demokratiet*, Oslo, 1949.



same time, the conception of the sovereignty of government has meant that all voluntary bodies are in a sense subordinate to it. The test of sovereignty may come only in a time of crisis; in particular, governments acting with regard to the general welfare have on various occasions limited the right of unions to strike.<sup>1</sup> On the positive side, voluntary associations are used in official advisory capacities; they are recognized as vehicles for public information; and they may receive some government subsidy for programmes of adult education. This suggests some fundamental questions, to which we shall return in the concluding section: Is the growth in centralized state power a threat to the continued free existence of voluntary organizations? Is there a danger that they may develop into administrative sub-divisions of the state and lose their essential voluntary character, which is the basis of their ability to function as instruments of popular democracy? Can their freedom continue under national planning?

The relations between the organized labour movement and the consumer co-operative movement present some interesting questions in relation to national planning programmes. Scandinavian co-operatives have been strictly neutral politically, while generally friendly to the labour movement and to Labour government policies. In Great Britain, co-operatives have been politically active but allied with the Labour Party; this suggests possibilities both of influencing government programmes, when Labour is in power, as well as of being subservient to the dominant political forces. Proposals for nationalization, such as the case of insurance in Great Britain recently, may constitute a threat to the further development of the co-operative type of mutual ownership. A more general problem is the position of co-operatives under planning, and particularly their possibilities for expansion under systems of controls of imports and of the allocations of materials. Where controls run counter to the co-operative principle of continuous expansion, co-operative organizations and individual leaders have occasionally expected to have their movement recognized as a special kind of private enterprise. The middle way represented by co-operatives is considered to be in essence akin to the purposes of public enterprises, but with a free and voluntary character that provides a safeguard against over-centralization of power.<sup>2</sup> The same questions of bureaucratic tendencies which have been raised with respect to organized labour ought also to be considered in connexion with co-operatives and their claims to being democratic organizations.

The development of labour-management production committees has been an important post-war development in Sweden and Norway.<sup>3</sup> These joint production committees are organized in individual plants and are the result of agreements between national organizations of employers and of labour. Adherence to the agreements is voluntary but widespread. The committees meet at regular intervals, sometimes quarterly, to discuss suggestions which have originated with workers, to receive information about the plans of the management of the industry, and to consider proposals for rationalizing production and for health and safety measures within the plant. The general purpose is to increase industrial production, which is recognized in the basic agreements as being of mutual interest to the owners of industry and to workers. The latter are expected to follow the leadership of their political

<sup>1</sup> Laski, *op. cit.* pp. 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> Thorsten Odhe, "Co-operation in a Collectivist Economy", *Review of International Co-operation*, May 1950, pp. 117-19.

<sup>3</sup> For earlier examples of this sort of development, called works councils, see International Labour Office, *Methods of Collaborating between the Public Authorities, Workers' Organizations and Employers' Organizations*, Geneva, 1940.



representatives in government, and to share in the goals of national planning. However, as was noted earlier in this paper, individual workers tend to look for immediate gains rather than the indirect and potential satisfactions accruing from having a part in the increase of total national industrial output.

These committees organized within plants play a potentially vital, though decentralized, part in national planning. In a strict sense, they are non-political organs but their purposes relate closely to the politically determined goals of planning. Through representatives on these committees, the worker-citizen rather than the voter-citizen has a voice in questions that affect his welfare. Just as the voter is sometimes expected to participate in decisions on complex questions, the worker may find himself taking part in discussions of technical problems which are beyond his competence. To meet this difficulty, labour organizations have developed training programmes, for example courses to help workers understand financial accounting procedures and reports, and in some cases, unions maintain research departments whose staff services assist labour representatives in dealing with economic questions.

An evaluation of the work of these committees would be premature as well as impossible within the scope of this paper, but some suggestions can be made.<sup>1</sup> The obstacle of the workers' habits of thought which has been mentioned is probably greater in Norway than in Sweden, where a more vigorous educational campaign has been carried on to reduce the gap between leaders and members in this respect. Variations in effectiveness are noted in both countries as between different plants. Sometimes the management in larger plants has shown more interest in the work of the committees. In general, the attitude of employers and their willingness to discuss production plans is of crucial significance. If they wish to follow only the letter and not the spirit of the agreements, they can go through the motions of having committees, but their work may be confined to plant safety and other non-controversial questions. The kind of question considered by committees is regarded as a test of their effectiveness. If a large or increasing proportion of the time of the committees is devoted to production problems rather than to health and welfare matters, they can be regarded as serving their intended purpose within the framework of national planning.<sup>2</sup> The ultimate test is whether through the work of these committees industrial production is increased, though the determination of this in most cases presents obvious difficulties.<sup>3</sup>

### III

As we come to look at our subject from the standpoint of government, we see possibilities of citizen participation in the legislative process, and also in administration. Individuals and representatives of organizations are often invited to speak at hearings on proposed legislation. In Sweden, a reference system has been developed, whereby proposals are sent to various national organizations for study and comment, depending on what interests are

<sup>1</sup> A study of the production committees in Norway is now in its final stages. This has been a project of the Social Research Institute, University of Oslo, directed during the past year by Prof. David Krech. A preliminary report of a "pilot" study has been made by Harriet Bog, *En undersøkelse av en del arbeider-representanternes innstilling til og oppfatning av nye institusjonelle forhold innenfor industribedrifter*, Oslo, 1950.

<sup>2</sup> Galenson, op. cit., Bjerve, op. cit. p. 72. Interviews with Harriet Bog and others in Norway, with Tyre Flybo and others in Sweden; interpretative literature of Landsorganisationen and Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund, in Sweden and of Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund, Norway.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Russell W. Davenport "Enterprise for Everyman", *Fortune*, Jan. 1950, reporting on the Scanlon plan of union-management co-operation.



affected.<sup>1</sup> In addition, national departments may ask advice more informally or at earlier stages of work on legislation.

Advisory committees, as an adjunct to government administration, have been developed extensively in the United States. Part of the TVA philosophy of planning and administration has been to decentralize activities and to provide for participation of various interest groups.<sup>2</sup> Community councils or associations, mainly representative of voluntary interests but usually including official participation, are channels for citizen activity which have been developed particularly in the United States and England. Considered as planning agencies in an informal sense, where voluntary co-operation is involved, these councils have developed in recent years and have been encouraged by leaders who are concerned about the functioning of local democracy. While such bodies deal largely with local problems, they may be the starting point for action which affects national legislation or administration.<sup>3</sup>

The experience of the United States with county land use planning in the years 1938-41 is worth noting, because of its unusual stimulation of local citizen participation in the processes of national agricultural planning. It illustrated remarkably the possibilities of team work between technicians or professional specialists and laymen, farmers in this case; the latter predominated numerically in the hundreds of community land use committees which were active.<sup>4</sup> The war-time agencies for price and rent control and the like in the United States and England made use of volunteers, serving both as advisers on policy and as administrators.<sup>5</sup> A comparison may be made between such war-time activities and the provisions claimed to be made in the Soviet Union for the participation of the masses in local administration.<sup>6</sup>

In post-war Norway, an Economic Advisory Council has been active in connexion with national planning. It represents the major economic interest groups in the nation, as well as government officials concerned with price control and economic reconstruction. Questions are presented to the Council by government departments, and the Council may also initiate discussions that fall within its mandate. A variety of questions have been considered since the creation of the Council in 1945, including regular discussions of the National Economic Budget. While actual voting usually follows party lines, there are indications that active discussions have been of advisory service to government officials.

The quantity and quality of reporting by governments is clearly relevant to the question of citizen participation. Are the people given a factual basis for intelligent participation? As regards government information services, what is the attitude expressed or betrayed by administrators and political leaders? Is the task of government conceived of as reducing anxiety and of maintaining internal calm, or is it one of provoking discussion, even excitement? Are the people thought of as masses to be manipulated or are they respected as potential partners in creating public policies?<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> International Labour Office, *op. cit.*, Friis, *op. cit.* p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Hillman, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-1 and *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* Ch. VIII; Sewell Harris, *Community Centers and Associations*, London, 1949.

<sup>4</sup> Hillman, *op. cit.* pp. 44-48.

<sup>5</sup> Wooton, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>6</sup> Edward H. Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1947, pp. 17-19.

<sup>7</sup> The role of pressure groups in general is relevant. With special reference to the influence of groups organized to relate to the work of a particular government agency, see Philip Selznick "The Iron Law of Bureaucracy", *Modern Review*, III, 157-65, particularly the concluding paragraphs. Related to the question previously discussed of the place of voluntary organizations within modern political states is Selznick's statement: "In a socialized democracy,



#### IV

Finally, some tentative generalizations and questions may be stated to focus attention on the points which may be most profitable for further discussion.

- (1) Certain limits of formal political democracy in providing vehicles of citizen participation have been recognized. The work of special advisory committees and the role of voluntary organizations has been noted, as extending the influence of citizens beyond that exercised through the ballot and the machinery for political representation. The labour-management committees are of special significance in providing for participation where economic and political interests tend to be merged. In general, the usual academic distinctions between economic and political have become blurred, if not obliterated, in national planning.
- (2) The emphasis under national planning has been placed on production rather than on distribution. Programmes of social services may seem an important exception, but even here, planners have increasingly placed the emphasis on the volume of national production as setting limits on welfare programmes, as well as on real wage increases. In the work of the labour-management committees, we see most clearly this emphasis on production as a goal of supreme national importance. The position of labour has thus been radically changed from that of a class in conflict to that of a partner in collaboration with employer interests.<sup>1</sup> This, incidentally, is a departure from Marxist principles, just as other aspects of the planning programmes in Great Britain and Scandinavia deviate from the doctrinaire positions that Socialist parties have held in the past or still hold in other countries.<sup>2</sup>
- (3) We see an emergence of a new doctrine of the harmony of economic interests, and we may raise questions as to the consequences. Labour unions have formed their ideologies and developed their functions under conditions of relatively free capitalistic competition, and it is problematic if they can transform themselves to play a vital role under national planning. The fear of government domination of unions and other voluntary organizations has been noted. Will they come to be regarded as organs of the state or as free partners in the pursuit of common interests?<sup>3</sup> Are business labour cartels part of the road to a new form of corporate state?<sup>4</sup>
- (4) In these new national contexts, the question of the right of labour unions to strike assumes crucial significance. In the post-war period, the anti-inflation and pro-production policies of labour governments has put the loyalties of labour unions to severe tests. The governments with a predominantly labour constituency are in a "razor edge" position in relation to the unions and to their responsibilities for the general welfare. Even where self-discipline on the part of organized labour greatly limits the exercise of the right to strike, that right is held in reserve as an assurance of potential independent action by unions.<sup>5</sup>

pressure groups would not be unnecessary; on the contrary they would be indispensable tools for maintaining the coexistence of large scale government intervention and political democracy." p. 165.

<sup>1</sup> Galenson, op. cit., pp. 321-25.

<sup>2</sup> Friis, op. cit., p. 8. Someone has suggested that instead of the "middle way", a proper designation for practices in the Scandinavian countries would be the "miscellaneous way".

<sup>3</sup> Galenson, op. cit. pp. 339-40; Heckscher, *Staten och Organisationerna*, p. 260; Mauritz Bonow *Staten och Kooperationen*, Stockholm, 1950.

<sup>4</sup> Mills, op. cit. p. 229.

<sup>5</sup> Laski, op. cit. pp. 89-90; Galenson, op. cit. p. 321-25; Gerhard Stoltz, *Wage Control in Post-War Norway*, p. 29.



The role of labour union members and of all citizens in accepting conditions of austerity and making sacrifices, which are defined as being in the interest of the nation, is basically a function of national loyalties and traditions. The varying prevalence of habits of obedience to authority and of patterns of conformity to social norms are also relevant factors. The quality of citizenship which is related to the spread of education, income distribution, and the historical development of nations, must be considered as a real factor in accounting for national differences in habits of co-operation and discipline. The role of the citizen in relation to planning is part of larger national and social contexts.<sup>1</sup>

## REPORT OF THE DISCUSSION ON PROFESSOR HILLMAN'S REPORT

The International Political Science Association and the International Sociological Association devoted one of their joint meetings (Wednesday, 6 September, from 4.30 to 7 p.m.) to a discussion of Professor Hillman's report on "The Role of the Citizen in National Planning". The Chairman of the meeting was Professor Bridel (University of Lausanne, Switzerland).

Professor Puntambekar (Nagpur University, India) began with a number of general observations on the concept of "planning" and its implications. His comments dealt mainly with three points:

First point. There should be a continuous contact between the citizen and the planning authority. There were objections to the theory of the tripartite State as propounded by Karl Schmitt, namely, that there were only three elements in a society: (1) the people (non-active and non-political); (2) the state (political but non-active); (3) the party (political and active); and that all the power of the society should be concentrated in a leader of one party. On the contrary, in a planned society all power should not be concentrated in one person or place. The principle of separation of powers as propounded by Montesquieu should be followed, and in order to preserve freedom and check on power, the various aspects of planning should be divided among different regional units and functional groups. It was necessary to think in terms of society in all its aspects and not merely in terms of its economic or political needs. The needs of the individual should be considered—the maintenance of his creative abilities and the freedom of his creative activities. Therefore a decentralization of planning power was necessary and had to be made. The theory of social planning should be based on the conception that society is pluralistic in its nature and composition. The State should be allowed to perform primarily administrative functions. In the other aspects of the planning process, citizens and functional and territorial groups should participate.

Second point. Who was to plan society? It should not be the State alone. The State should obtain the consent of the people and co-operate with political parties, trade unions, co-operative societies, science academies, universities and other voluntary bodies. No doubt the carrying into effect of planning had to be handed over to the government, but if the whole process of planning was to be democratic it should be built up from below. Individual and group initiative should be encouraged and maintained. The State, the University and the Labour Union organized the individual's life. From their points of view, education was necessary and should be general, free and compulsory. But if it failed to make the individual capable of active

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *op. cit.* p. 249; Wooton, *op. cit.* pp. 155-57; Galenson *op. cit.* p. 55.



participation in, and proper understanding of, the planning process and its objects and limits, then democracy would be a failure.

Third point. What should be the place and work of the new citizen? There should be: (a) local, regional and national organizations for planning various aspects of social life, with free admission to everyone and the possibility for all to offer advice and suggestions; (b) advisory and executive committees should be established for co-ordination of the opinions of the citizens and the plans of the experts. Here might be mentioned the importance of the Swiss device of the referendum for ascertaining individual public opinion.

Emphasis should be put on developing a system of pluralistic decentralized planning rather than unitary centralized planning.

Professor Barents (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands), the next speaker, criticized the views expressed by Edward H. Carr in his work on "The Soviet Impact on the Western World" and quoted by Professor Hillman in his report; Professor Barents concluded that social democracy without political democracy was impossible. With regard to labour management relations, he referred to the post-war labour management co-operation in the Netherlands in fixing wages and aiding the Government in economic reconstruction, which had resulted in an unparalleled labour peace in that country.

Professor Quincy Wright (Chicago University, United States of America) asked whether the planning process should be considered as primarily administrative or primarily legislative. In the first case, the planners would seek to co-ordinate and plan activities to achieve maximum efficiency in carrying out policies enacted by the legislature. If, however, planning were considered as a legislative process, the planners would seek to guide legislative policies by broad concepts as to national welfare. In his opinion, if planning were confined to the administrative process, it would be less likely to encroach upon individual liberties.

Professor Melvin (Maryland University, U.S.A.) pointed out that a distinction should be made between two fields of planning: urban planning and land planning. In the U.S. rural planning on a large scale was left to the private initiative of the farmers. The participation of individuals and citizens in social planning would be a great problem in the future for all the nations. For example, a democratic institution 20 centuries old in Korean villages—the *kee*, a co-operative—should have been utilized by U.S. occupation forces after 1945. Planning for the citizen had to be based on the cultural pattern of the people.

Mr. Billy (Paris) then turned to a fresh aspect of the question: the problem of collaboration by employers and workers with the Government in order to ensure the success of the plan. There had been some successful collaboration between the Government, employers and the working classes in the Scandinavian countries, in Great Britain since the war, and in Switzerland during the war. Such co-operation between classes was a phenomenon peculiar to those countries, proving that, contrary to Marxist doctrine, the class struggle was not an inevitable feature of history. The credit for that achievement was probably due to the exceptionally highly developed civic sense of the people of those countries. There was also a very clear trend in their popular education towards co-operation and Socialism. In other countries, leaving aside the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, planning was conceived on rather different lines: (a) it had a specific economic purpose, such as either the reconstruction of a war-devastated country or the introduction of a war economy; (b) it was regarded as a temporary expedient, free enterprise remaining the ideal end of economic policy; (c) it was difficult to carry out because there were no Socialistic traditions in economic matters and the bulk of the population had no faith in the success of the plan; that scepticism was partly due to the great number of projects undertaken and the practical impossibility of co-ordinating them successfully, and partly to the conflict between the economic interests of employers and workers. In some instances, "Organizing Committees" representative of both sides were set up as State planning bodies. Mr. Billy emphasized the difficulties which might be encountered when an attempt was made to plan in the more conservative countries (opposition of the population to the movement of workers and to changing their jobs). In view of all the difficulties to which attention had been drawn, propaganda, direction or compulsion could only serve the planners for a short



time, whereafter there was a likelihood of their meeting with complete misunderstanding and hostility on the part of the workers, employers, or both. The plan was then bound to become a dead letter. Co-operation from the major economic and social interests was therefore essential for the successful conduct of any experiment in planning. The problem was to discover how that co-operation could be secured, and how far it was possible to maintain the processes of democracy in a planned society.

Professor Tapia Moore (Institute of Sociology, University of Chile, Chile) thought it was quite possible. He pointed out that planning did not necessarily mean totalitarianism. A planned society might very well be democratic and, furthermore, ensure the primary prerequisites of modern democracy. For example, Roosevelt's New Deal or Laski's social welfare based on some sort of economic planning showed what might be done to further social progress. Freedom of expression and creative thought were certainly possible within any planned society, i.e. economic planning for modern educational systems, social security, land reform and distribution of the national income could create even greater liberty than was envisaged in Beveridge's four points.

Professor Huzzayen (Farouk I University, Egypt) endorsed that view, drawing the Congress's attention to some of the earliest examples of a planned society, such as the early Egyptian and Islamic societies. That type of planned nationalization gave everybody the utmost possible guarantee of freedom and, on a different plane, made communication between East and West easier. It should not be forgotten that in every planned society the individual should be granted complete spiritual freedom, as in the early Islamic societies.

Professor Hillman (Roosevelt College, United States of America) then summed up, replying to the comments made by the various speakers.

Professor Hillman stated that his task was not to defend planning, and the various conceptions of the meaning of that word, but to describe how consent is developed and how democratic participation takes place in national planning.

## JOINT ROUNDTABLE ON THE ROLE OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The comparative analysis of the influence of ethnical or cultural groups on international relations, which is the subject of the monographs that follow, is one of the studies carried out in 1949 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as part of its Tensions programme. It is prompted by the wish to add to our knowledge of the sociological conditions of international understanding, and thus supply a solid foundation for future work. How far are ethnical or cultural cleavages within a country reflected in its foreign policy and do they condition the participation of that country in joint endeavours to establish a better international order? Is not the influence of dissident minorities likely to dissipate common action and to create tensions within and beyond national frontiers? What factors promote that influence?

A comparative study, it was thought, would bring out the lessons of experience and solve the problem of how to achieve a healthy national cohesiveness and international co-operation without detriment to a cultural diversity which deserves to be respected. This study would find its natural place among the statements bearing upon the subject of the Zurich Congress. It has led to useful exchanges of views between members of the International Sociological Association and members of the International Political Science Association.



Professor Louis Wirth, President of the International Sociological Association, was Chairman of the first session of the Joint Roundtable on the Role of Minorities in International Affairs and delivered the opening address.

Professor Wirth stated that minorities arise whenever groups distinguished from the rest of society by racial or cultural characteristics are set apart, become the objects of differential and inferior treatment, and develop a consciousness of their inferior status. Such a consciousness may be associated with widely different factors, ethnic as well as cultural. A minority may be constituted by a racial group or by migrants who stick to their old nationality. The mere existence of a minority indicates that the larger group has not been fully integrated and all minorities represent different stages of an assimilation process. One stage in this process is that of majority toleration of the minority—a toleration amounting to little more than a suspicion that the other fellow is right. Another stage is that of the militant minority—the minority claims its right to make up a nation of its own and may become aggressive if it does not succeed. International policy towards minorities has changed over the last few decades; after World War I, one of the main points in the peace treaties was the protection of minorities. Since World War II, the protection policy has been disregarded in favour of a more democratic ideal: every article of the Declaration of Human Rights begins with the words “every one”, and no reference is made to any minority rights; it is the assumption that no one can be free if some one is not free.

Professor Pierre de Bie, of the University of Louvain and of the Social Science Department of Unesco, acted as Rapporteur of the joint roundtable and presented a general report on Ethnic and Cultural Cleavages in their Bearing on International Relations.

Professor de Bie first pointed out that the various reports to be presented and discussed were only the preliminary steps towards a systematic attempt to study the influence of ethnic or cultural cleavages within a nation on its international relations. The participants would take advantage of the various discussions and comments to revise their reports and to focus them on points of major interest.

The principal aim in international relations today was the effective participation of the various nations in a peaceful world order. Such participation should be voluntary. All levels and sections of the population within each nation should concern themselves with this participation. The problem of the influence of ethnic or cultural cleavages was only one aspect of the broader problem of the relation between a nation's population composition and its policy toward other nations.

Having stressed how the problem of ethnic or cultural changes was linked with economic, religious, social and political problems and presented wide variations in time and space, Professor de Bie gave an outline of the principal cases of influence of ethnic or cultural cleavages on international relations: (a) the cases where an ethnic or cultural group acts upon the foreign policy of the country to which this group belongs; (b) the cases where the ethnic or cultural group withdraws from taking any active part in foreign policy and shows signs of inertia or even “national introversion”; (c) the cases where ethnic or cultural groups within a nation are utilized by foreign powers for their own particular ends; (d) the influence of discriminatory practices upon the foreign policy and relations of a country in which these practices occur. In each of these cases, particular problems have to be faced by the student aiming at the improvement of international relations. For instance, in (b) how can “national introversion” be changed into “international open-



mindfulness"?—and in (d) it is important to point out how the sincere promotion of an international ideal by a particular country may act as a stimulus for improving group relations inside this country.

The major point emphasized by Professor de Bie was the problem of national integration. He saw international collaboration as a function of well-integrated national bodies. One had, consequently, to find out what conditions were most likely to bring about such integration and to develop within the various segments of each nation the sense of an international democracy, taking into account the existing cultural pluralism. Attention and policy should be devoted to the factors which condition the role and influence of ethnic and cultural groups on foreign relations.

Following on this general report, Dr. Herman Weilenmann, Director of the Voikshochschule, Zürich, presented a report written in collaboration with Messrs. Guiseppe Lepori and David Lasserre on the impact of the ethnical and cultural structure of Switzerland on its foreign relations.

Dr. Weilenmann stated that Swiss policy towards international co-operation was not determined by the diversity of the country's linguistic, ethnic, religious and other groups. This had been confirmed also in the memoranda prepared by D. Lasserre on the French-speaking, and by G. Lepori on the Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland.

Switzerland had no minority problem, because no part of the people was continually overruled by the same majority. The slightest disagreement between the different groups making up the whole of the Swiss people could be measured by the popular vote on amendments to the Constitution and on federal laws subjected to the referendum.

In 53 of the 76 polls which took place between May 1917 and May 1949, a majority in all parts of Switzerland expressed the same opinion. Sixty times the German and the French-speaking voted alike, another 60 times the German and the Italian-speaking voted alike, and 62 times the French and Italian-speaking Swiss cast the same vote. In six of the 16 remaining cases the majority of the German-speaking cantons was overruled by that of the French, Italian and bilingual cantons, so that only in 10 of the 76 polls the total of the votes cast in the 15 German cantons surpassed that of the three French cantons, which were themselves not unanimous in five out of the 10 polls. In these 10 the Italian Swiss voted five times like the German-speaking, and five times like the French-speaking cantons.

Switzerland found her own solution to the problem of nationalities in her federal structure, in the democracy of the small groups which had characterized her from the first day of her existence, and in a national idea based not on any linguistic, ethnic, cultural or other individual or social factor, but solely on the common will of the people.

The Constitution of 1848 declared the different languages spoken by the population as languages of the State and of the Nation, so that every Swiss had the right to use any of these languages, without restriction, in his dealings with the State. Each language group was therefore protected in a double manner: first, by the autonomy of the cantons and *communes*, in which only one language was spoken, even by the local administration (the territorial protection), and second, by the Confederation, in all matters concerning Switzerland as a whole (the individual protection). The same system was applied to guarantee the particularistic tendencies and freedom of expression of groups such as political parties, economic associations, churches, cultural organizations, etc.

In her effort to make the State the image of the people, Switzerland supported diversities instead of repressing them. The existence and coherence



of the Swiss nation was still based on the small groups in which every single person was directly connected with persons having the same wishes and interests, and on the federation of these groups into a unity formed by their own will.

The Chairman, Professor Wirth, took up for scrutiny the question whether the culturally different groups in Switzerland constituted minorities. He considered this to be very much a question of the actual attitudes taken by the groups themselves and quoted the famous saying of the great American sociologist, W. I. Thomas: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." He also drew attention to the significance of the political ideal of federalism for the life and attitudes of the Swiss people.

Professor Marcel Bridel, of the University of Lausanne, did not agree with Dr. Weilenmann and Mr. Lasserre in their statement that the French Swiss and the Italian Swiss were essentially a Latin group, whereas the German Swiss were a Germanic group.

Dr. Weilenmann did not think differences of race important either in history or at the present time.

Professor Walter Filley, of the University of Michigan, took issue with the definition of "minority" given by the Chairman in his opening address. The definition might fit in the cases of the United States and Brazil, but definitely not in the cases of Switzerland, Belgium and Canada; in the latter cases assimilation was not at all wanted by the groups in question. On the contrary they had kept up languages and traditions of their own and had not striven to become assimilated. Professor Filley rejected the use of the term "minority" in these cases and preferred to refer to the culturally different groups in these states as "nationalities".

The Chairman, Professor Wirth, pointed out that the question of minorities was not a question of numbers, but of a peculiar self-consciousness and separatedness from a dominant group.

Professor Georges Smets of Brussels was surprised to find so little mention of the language problem in a discussion of ethnic and cultural groups. The case of Switzerland was a case apart since its three chief languages were at the same time main languages on the European continent: there were consequently no linguistic minorities in Switzerland. But in almost all other European countries minority problems had been closely linked with language difficulties. This had not so much been the case in America. Professor Smets also pointed out the fact that in many cases, as in Switzerland, linguistic cleavages were lessened to a great extent by other social, political or economic cleavages.

Professor de Bie stressed the same fact as regards Belgium, which constituted a unit despite its two languages. In his view, the reason must be sought in the circumstance that political, religious, economic and linguistic groups do not overlap.

Professor Georges Davy, of the University of Paris, warned against the confusion of the biological concept of race with the sociological concept of language and stressed the need for clearer distinctions: (a) between sporadic minorities and minorities tied to a territory; (b) between minorities using a language of wide diffusion and minorities using a minor language.

Dr. Vl. Cervinka of Lausanne asked Dr. Weilenmann whether he thought there was a development toward a centralization of governmental authority in Switzerland.

Dr. Weilenmann did not think there was such a trend and emphasized the necessity of maintaining the federal political structure as a safeguard of cultural variety.



The Second Session of the Joint Roundtable was presided over by Professor Quincy Wright, President of the International Political Science Association, and was devoted to the problem of the ethnic and cultural structure of Belgium.

At the opening of the session, Professor Wright pointed out two important aspects of the definition of a minority: its "visibility", and the stereotypes which were applied to it. A crucial problem in connexion with policy was to know in what conditions either the assimilation solution, or the respect for divergent cultural patterns, should be advocated.

Mr. M. P. Herremans, of the University of Brussels, presented a report on the Flemish question.

There were three different aspects to the Belgian problem, according to whether it was considered from the Flemish or Walloon points of view, or from that of the people of Brussels.

Since the creation of Belgium in 1830, the Flemings had never at any time been a minority in the true sense of the word. The Flemish population, consisting of more than 4,000,000 inhabitants, today represented more than half the total Belgian population of 8,000,000.

Yet for over a century the Flemings had behaved as if they were really a minority. This inferiority complex now seemed to be disappearing. The Flemings had harboured far more resentment against the French language than against the Walloons.

The Flemish movement for the emancipation of the Flemish people had started in about 1850. It had had its ups and downs, with peak periods (and, in a sense, deviations), during the two world wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) and there had been times when it had lost ground, in the years immediately following the two foreign occupations.

From 1930 to 1940, the Flemings had achieved notable progress by obtaining a series of language laws (affecting, in particular, administration, schools, the law-courts and the army) which had given Dutch or Flemish equal status with French. Belgium's two national languages were now theoretically on the same footing. In actual fact, however, there was not yet complete equality, and the Flemish movement at that time aimed at ensuring that theory was put into practice.

This long internal struggle had prevented the Flemings from devoting any serious attention to international problems and important international organizations (the League of Nations, the United Nations, etc.).

The attitude of the great majority of Flemings towards the outside world could be defined as follows: unconditional loyalty to the Vatican, unshakable hostility towards the U.S.S.R., strong sympathy with the Netherlands, distrust of France, indulgence towards Germany, and indifference towards the Anglo-Saxon world—all this, of course, in a varying and by no means uniform degree.

Mr. Georges Goriely, of the University of Brussels, presented part of his extensive report on the impact of the Walloons on the foreign relations of Belgium.

No one today could deny that Belgium was a bi-national State. Some went so far as to dispute the existence of a real Belgian nation over and above the Flemings and the Walloons. The question of the throne had undoubtedly been a great threat to national unity. But the way in which a solution had been found and the country had managed to survive the ordeal of two wars showed that a Belgian national spirit existed, and that centripetal continued to prevail over centrifugal forces.

The particularistic, "anti-Belgian" feeling in certain circles, both Flemish



and Walloon, was a recent development, unthought of half a century ago. It was the result of Flemish claims in the matter of language, which in their turn were the result of the economic and social ills prevalent in Flanders at that time. Until the first world war, the country had been divided on linguistic, not on national issues. Belgium's political unity and her position among the nations had remained intact.

It was only after the first world war that the struggle had begun. A party was formed in Flanders, the *Frontpartij*, which subsequently became the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Union), and declared its intention of breaking away from the Belgian national State. Although it remained in a minority, it influenced certain sections of the Catholic Party. "*Los van Frankrijk*" (freedom from France) was its main slogan, for because of the secret Franco-Belgian military agreement of 1920 it accused Belgium of being a satellite of France.

Belgium's return to neutrality in 1936, although it was in fact only part of the democracies' general policy of "appeasement", was interpreted by its supporters as a concession to Flanders, connected with the need for reconciling the Flemings with the Belgian State.

It was at that point that Walloon national feeling began to grow. Hitherto, it had been only a very pale counterpart of Flemish national feeling. But suddenly the Walloons began to feel that more account was being taken of Flemish claims than of their own, and they no longer felt entirely at home in a State for whose creation they had been mainly responsible. Immediately after the second world war, it was they who showed the greatest signs of particularism. Unexpectedly violent discontent was revealed at the Walloon National Congress at Liège in October 1945. It was a question no longer of a movement among small regional groups, but of a state of mind pervading large sections of the population.

Were the Walloons, now conscious of their nationality, likely to co-operate in future at the international level? The ideology of the Walloon Movement was vague on that point, and contained a number of rather serious contradictions. The very principle of federalism, generally put forward, was full of ambiguities. It was possible that certain enthusiastic supporters of the Movement used the phraseology of internationalism merely to cloak their narrow national aims. But that did not express the deepest feelings of the Walloon people as a whole, with their open and friendly disposition, or of the Movement's leaders, especially those uppermost in the Walloon Economic Council. The latter had realized that the problem with which they were concerned could not be solved in a selfish national spirit, and they attached prime importance to the question of a possible European Federation.

The Chairman then declared the discussion open:

Professor Filley asked why the Flemish people were so much more introverted and on the whole less internationally-minded than the Walloons. Was it not mainly a lack of education? Mr. Herremans replied that the Flemish people had for a long time been kept in a status of social inferiority; thus, until recently, a number of public offices could only be filled by persons who knew French. This situation has now been remedied by various laws. There is a definite trend toward a certain form of federalism.

Professor de Bie regretted that Mr. Goriely had only been able to read part of his report on the Walloon question, thus leaving the impression that the tensions in Belgium were stronger than he actually thought they were. Mr. Goriely agreed, and stated that if his report were read in full, it would be found to be a plea for Belgium rather than an accusation against her.



Mr. A. Billy, observer for the French National Commission of Unesco, stated that he had found in the North of France some documents from the German occupation period showing attempts made by the Germans during World War II to unite Flanders with the North of France.

Mr. Herremans said the Germans had offered the North of France to the Flemish extremists every time they wanted something out of them.

The Third Session of the Joint Roundtable was presided over by Professor Wirth and was devoted to minority problems in Canada and Brazil.

Professor Walter Filley, of the University of Michigan, presented his report on the impact of French Canada on Canadian foreign relations.

Demographically divided into English and French cultural groups, each with a recognized status, Canada is a multi-national state. The French Canadian nationality, numbering three and a half million or one-third of the population, is centred in the Province of Quebec. In addition to its language, this group clings fast to the Catholic faith and its own traditions. Despite constitutional guarantees of language and religious rights and substantial provision for political representation, the *Canadiens* have long been apprehensive of assimilation. Determined to survive as a separate nationality, they manifest insecurity and a collective sense of inferiority in their relations with other Canadians.

French Canada's outlook on external affairs has been dominated by isolationism. Preoccupied with its own problems, it has seen little but danger in the outside world. Its members have no ties of sentiment with either France or Britain: respect for the latter country is tempered by the conviction that involvement in foreign wars has come primarily from the Commonwealth connexion with London. Their resultant opposition to overseas military commitments has not prevented Canada from joining the League of Nations or the United Nations, although it did impel that country's government to seek modifications in collective security arrangements.

Since World War II industrialization, fuller implementation of bi-national principles, the impact of external events and the growth of Canadian nationalism have done much to weaken Quebec's isolationist views. Far-reaching security obligations under the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Pact have been accepted with surprisingly small protest. Yet French Canadian thinking frequently diverges from that of much of the rest of the population: old rivalries and suspicions persist as divisive factors. Skilful and tactful leadership is essential to ensure broad support for projects of international co-operation.

Professor S. V. Puntambekar, of the University of Nagpur, stated that minorities were primarily a problem for democratic countries. Countries ruled by foreigners or dictators had no minority problem: in such countries a minority was either exterminated or developed into a nationality. Only in Europe had peaceful assimilation seemed possible. In other countries, the process was more likely to be one either of forceful assimilation, of segregation with consequent discrimination, of expulsion or finally of extermination. In the case of India, a pluralistic solution had been found to the minority problem.

Professor Rios, of Brazil, wanted to know (a) whether there was any connexion between the cultural pattern of Louisiana and French Canada, and (b) whether the isolationism of French Canada is caused by the predominance of agriculture in its territory.

Professor Filley replied (a) that French culture had practically disappeared in Louisiana and that young French Canadians knew the same would happen



in Canada if Canada became a part of the United States; (b) that the predominance of agriculture in French Canada could not explain all the characteristics of the French Canadians and that industrialization was progressing at great speed.

Professor Jean-Charles Falardeau, of Laval University, Quebec, wanted it to be made clear which minority group was being referred to, since there were several in Canada. In the French Canadian agricultural area, the minority group had the feeling that they had the original right to the land, but were now dominated by invaders. So they fought to maintain their traditional cultural and political status. Two points should be kept in mind: (a) one should not consider the minority as being the "problem group", suggesting that there was nothing wrong on the other side; the whole situation, including the larger group, should be taken into account; (b) the conception of the minority group of its own position should be given careful analysis; how did it define its own situation?

Professor José Arthur Rios, of the University of Rio de Janeiro, then read his report on the Italian minority in Brazil and its impact on Brazilian foreign relations:

Professor Rios summed up his findings as follows:

- (1) The Italian minority in Brazil cannot be studied as a unit, but has to be divided into at least three main groups:
  - (a) the Italians who came to the coffee fazendas of the State of Sao Paulo as labourers and who made up the bulk of the Italian immigration to Brazil;
  - (b) those who were established in the three southern States and became smallholders devoting themselves to subsistence cultures;
  - (c) finally, those who either gave up their work in agriculture and went to cities or who already had urban professions in Italy and came straight to the large centres of Rio and Sao Paulo.
- (2) Their attitudes and reactions toward Italy and the new country were quite different. The assimilation of groups (a) and (b) was much quicker than (c) owing to isolation, composition of its members, kind of occupation, etc.
- (3) In the city of Sao Paulo we had the nearest thing to a minority group. There we had a deeper feeling of the home country together with an élite who did not very easily give up its language and culture. There we also had a common tradition, a strong public opinion which found its outlets through an *intelligentsia*, newspapers, clubs for discussion and social centres.
- (4) Nevertheless, this consciousness of a common origin and of common ties was never strong enough to unite the whole colony and to foster political action. Besides regional differences and the well known individualism of Italians, class cleavages quickly appeared and undermined all attempts at political merging. As an ideology, *Italianita* was never dominant.
- (5) The intervention of the Brazilian Government, owing to irrational fears of an "Italian danger" which never existed, was rather sterile. Even during Fascist attempts at infiltration, the strongest bulwarks against the fifth column were the readiness of the Italian to assimilate Brazilian cultural traits and the powerful influence of the Brazilian elementary school.
- (6) In Brazil, Fascism as a doctrine influenced the Brazilian political élite much more than the Italians and the Italo-Brazilians. This was due not only to the lack of appeal of the doctrine itself but to the impossibility, through all their history, for the Italians as a group to exert any political influence at all. The Brazilian political system prevented any foreigners



coming to positions of leadership. In order to be accepted they had first to adopt the patterns and ideals of the Brazilian *políticos*. This explained why the Italians as a group were never able to express themselves politically and, at the same time, the prosperous political career of some Italo-Brazilians who were able to achieve prestige in the last elections.

In the ensuing discussion, Professor de Bie stated that it might be fruitful to distinguish three kinds of solution to minority problems: assimilation, autonomy and peaceful co-existence. But even when there was co-existence, assimilation did occur as in Brussels, Montreal or French Switzerland.

With reference to Professor Filley's report, he asked why the classical college education in French Canada had proved an obstacle to the development of a political consciousness.

Professor de Bie further suggested that a comparative study of rural versus urban Italians in Brazil might throw light on the question of what factors were most likely to evoke political consciousness in a minority group.

Professor Filley, in reply to Professor de Bie, stated that the centres of education were at the same time the centres of nationalist introversion in French Canada, and that this would be so whether the education were "classical" or "modern".

Professor Filley then asked Professor Rios: (a) Were there any difficulties with the Italian minority when Brazil declared war on the Axis? (b) Were Italians enlisted or recruited for the expeditionary forces sent to Italy from Brazil?

Professor Rios, in reply to Professor de Bie, stated that the urban group of Italians were much more accessible to the propaganda of political parties and thus more likely to develop a minority consciousness.

In reply to Professor Filley, he said there was no difficulty with the Italians in Brazil when war was declared, since Mussolini had put no pressure on Italian emigrants.

Professor Benjamin Akzin, of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, stated that a solution of the minority problem might be sought in the direction of multi-national States in cases where minority groups were geographically concentrated, and in the promotion of mutual adjustment and integration in cases where the minority groups were spread throughout the national territory.

The Fourth Session of the Joint Roundtable was presided over by Professor Louis Wirth and devoted to the problem of minorities in the United States and to the conclusion of the Roundtable.

Professor Louis Wirth was the first speaker and presented his report on Domestic, Ethnic and Racial Tensions and American Foreign Policy.

Analysing in general terms the problem of the impact of domestic tensions on foreign policy, Professor Wirth pointed out three factors that had tended to limit the influence of racial and ethnic minorities on decision-making in the field of international relations: (a) the general emphasis on the unity of the national in-group under the impact of actual or imputed out-group threats; (b) the traditional isolation of foreign policy makers and diplomats from the general public, the long-established secrecy of negotiations and the customary concealment of facts from one's own people no less than from foreign powers; (c) the rigidity and relative irreversibility of foreign policy decisions as compared to domestic ones—all factors contributing to the comparative imperviousness of foreign policy to the play of domestic pressures.

Within the elastic limits thus given, the fluctuations of American public opinion and the internal conflicts of interests within the American people have



exerted considerable influence on the foreign affairs of the United States. Up to the point of actual involvement in foreign war, Americans have been free to propagate their views on foreign issues and bring pressure to bear on their government. The influence of extremist pressure groups has, however, been kept within limits through the strong appeal of the traditional philosophy of foreign policy laid down in Washington's *Farewell Address*: the United States must never be guided by "inveterate antipathies" towards particular nations nor by "passionate attachments" to others. This guiding principle has facilitated a course of foreign policy-making in the interest of the nation as a whole, independent of its constituent racial and ethnic elements.

The existence of racial and ethnic cleavages within the United States may be said to have made its impact on American foreign policy in at least four ways:

- (1) The failure to achieve consensus on the issues of domestic ethnic and racial relations has handicapped U.S. policy on the international level: thus the North-South division on the Negro issue has had its repercussions in the treatment of Orientals on the West Coast and consequently on the entire Asiatic policy of the U.S.
- (2) Domestic hostility towards particular racial or ethnic groups has exerted pressure on U.S. foreign relations with the countries of origin: important instances are the Chinese and the Japanese.
- (3) Immigrant groups have exerted pressure on American foreign policy in favour of their country or their fellow nationals abroad: such was the case with the Chinese, Italians, Jews, Irish, Czechs and Poles.
- (4) Foreign governments have tried to exert pressure on U.S. foreign policy through their former nationals in America: thus Goebbels thought it would be easy to undermine the loyalties of the German-Americans and exploit the social and racial tensions of the United States in order to subvert the government and bring about a revolution.

In conclusion, Professor Wirth said that the experience of the United States provided a telling demonstration of the fact that the best safeguard against the efforts to undermine the primary loyalty of a people of heterogeneous national origins and cultural characteristics was the maintenance of a free society and the adherence to a domestic policy of equality of opportunity for all.

"The unique historical experience of the United States is suggestive of the problems of world organization in that it demonstrates the possibility of peaceful and productive co-existence of peoples with widely differing national and cultural heritages and their ability to achieve, uncoerced, a higher loyalty which has seen their nation through many storms. Granting that the blending of sovereign national States with their different social, economic and political systems and their separate establishments represents a more difficult problem, nevertheless what the United States has to offer from her own historic experience in creating unity out of and amidst diversity cannot be ignored in the similar tasks that face the world today."

The second speaker was Professor Franklin Frazier of Howard University, who presented his report on the impact of the American Negro on U.S. foreign relations.

Negroes have had little direct influence upon the foreign relations of the United States because of their social and mental isolation resulting from: (a) the concentration of Negroes in rural areas, the majority being tenants and share-croppers; (b) their high illiteracy rate; and (c) the system of segregation which has created spatially and socially isolated Negro communities. As the result of the mass migrations from the South to northern cities, beginning with



the first world war, Negroes have become more race-conscious and increasingly identified their struggle with that of other coloured peoples. The Gurvey Movement and the Pan African Conferences were evidences of this changed outlook. Of greater importance has been the Negro's indirect influence upon the foreign relations of the United States. The American Government has not encouraged the immigration of Negroes from the West Indies except during periods of labour shortages. The American system of colour-caste established in the Panama Zone has aroused suspicion and resentment among the peoples of Latin America. The treatment of coloured persons from various countries according to the pattern of Negro-white relations in the United States, even in the nation's capital, has stirred up resentment and cast doubt upon the sincerity of the United States as the protagonist of democracy. The United Nations Organization is increasingly regarded by Negroes as a world court before which they can present their protests against the denial of rights in the United States. Because of the changed relationship of the United States to the rest of the world, in which coloured peoples are exercising more power, and its membership in the United Nations Organization, the American Government through the Voice of America and the appointment of Negroes to dignified positions in its diplomatic services and the gradual integration of Negroes into its armed forces, is endeavouring to convince the world of its sincerity in defending democracy.

There followed a discussion.

Professor Herremans asked whether U.S. Negroes had any influence on U.S. policy with regard to the Belgian Congo.

Professor Frazier stated that the only organization dealing with such matters in the United States was the Council of African Affairs.

Professor de Bie remarked that the report presented by Professor Frazier showed how a group could not become a minority without first becoming conscious of itself as such, a consciousness primarily brought about through urbanization. As Professor Frazier had pointed out, the Negroes in the United States before being urbanized were just a "problem"—after urbanization they became a "minority".

Professor Falardeau urged the need for a more generalized approach to the problem and stressed as a prerequisite that the minority group be viewed both in its broader social setting and in its relation to extra-national poles of attraction; thus in Canada it is possible to distinguish three poles: first, Rome as the centre of the Church, second Paris as the symbol of the old France, third London as the centre of the Commonwealth.

Professor Eliot of Northwestern University asked whether it would not be fruitful to consider in this context the Japanese minority in the United States.

Dr. P. Skov, Copenhagen, then gave a summary of his paper on minority problems submitted to the World Congress of Sociologists.

Dr. Skov was mainly concerned with irredentist minorities, the methods of dealing with them developed in the League of Nations, and the principles laid down for their treatment in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

The Chairman, Professor Wirth, said he was not so naive as to believe in the absolute power of words, but he was nevertheless convinced that a document like the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights would have real consequences and constitute a set of ideals for all men to strive towards; it might inspire and morally oblige national legislatures to improve the status of minorities and remove discriminatory practices.

Dr. W. Verkade of the Unesco office in Frankfort, supported the thesis set forth by Professor Akzin that the solution of minority problems must be sought



either (a) by giving at least cultural autonomy to geographically concentrated minorities, or (b) by promoting assimilation if the minority was spread throughout the country. Dr. Verkade added as a third condition: (c) that the minority itself or most of its members have other aspects in common with the majority-nation. He illustrated this by the way the two minor minority problems in the Netherlands had been solved; the Frisian minority in the North and the Catholic minority in Brabant and Limburg in the South. In both cases partial or even complete assimilation had been achieved without great difficulty, because the members of the minorities were at the same time members of a larger national majority and a balance had been struck between their cravings for regional autonomy and their loyalty to the nation-idea.

Professor B. Tabbah, of the Université St. Joseph, Beirut, discussed in further detail the question of the co-existence of different communities within one State and attacked those who asserted that, when such communities were distributed throughout the territory, the strongest community was bound to *absorb* the others, or that, when each community formed a homogeneous group in a given geographical area, the only solution was a *federation of autonomous communities*. Mr. Tabbah considered that, even if the different communities were dispersed throughout the territory, so long as they could be identified—and not necessarily geographically—they could be granted a certain degree of autonomy in all matters of immediate importance to them (e.g. personal status, education, etc.). As far as education was concerned, the Netherlands could be quoted as a model; in that country, the Protestants and the Catholics each had their own teaching establishments, and the State education budget was divided between them, in proportion to the number of their pupils. In the Lebanon, too, various communities were scattered over the whole territory. These communities enjoyed freedom of education and had their own personal status. Freedom of education there, however, did not mean quite the same thing as it did in the Netherlands, for in the Lebanon there were also State primary schools, which were the only schools financed by the State. This atmosphere of freedom had the great advantage of enabling all the different communities to co-exist without coming into conflict with one another.

Dr. Cervinka of Lausanne gave a survey of minority problems in Czechoslovakia and emphasized the theoretical as well as practical interest of the developments that had taken place in that country. They represented several complete cycles in the process of minority treatment, and offered a remarkable example of the interdependence between ethnic structure and foreign affairs.

Dr. Cervinka traced the history of these relations from the Middle Ages and showed how three cycles had been achieved in the process of minority relations: (a) the conflict of religious minorities after the Thirty Years' War, solved by Catholicization; (b) the problem of the Czechs under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, solved by the dismemberment of the Empire and the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic; and (c) the problem of the Sudeten Germans, finally solved by their deportation to the territory of the Reich they had wanted to join.

Dr. Cervinka in conclusion attempted an explanation of these developments in terms of the analytical scheme he had presented in his paper to the World Congress of Sociologists. He pointed to the absence of values common to and equally adhered to by the groups in question, and showed how the federalist efforts of Masaryk and his disciples had failed as a result of the preponderance of negative relations over positive ones.



P A R T I V

ORGANIZATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES







# SWITZERLAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROGRESS OF ANTHROPOLOGY

M. R. SAUTER

Anthropology is quite a recent science, for it is barely 100 years old. Swiss research workers have consistently contributed to its progress.

It was craniology that first absorbed their attention. As early as 1864, the voluminous *Crania helvetica* of His and Rutimeyer laid the basis for the racial classification of Switzerland, and they were completed in 1894 by Studer and Bannwarth with an atlas of *Crania helvetica antiqua*. At Basle, J. Kollmann undertook many detailed studies and, at the end of the nineteenth century, formulated a theory that the pygmies were a survival of primitive human beings. This theory, although it attracted a number of scientists, has now been abandoned; but it served to arouse general interest in the problem of man's origins.

From Switzerland, which contains more lake-dwellings of the Neolithic and Bronze Ages than any other country, many descriptions of osseous fragments found in its palafittes have supplied us with a mass of documentation that is very valuable for an understanding of Europe's racial evolution. The more recent periods have been dealt with in works by Schwerz, Pittard, Schlaginhaufen and others.

But Swiss anthropology has, from the outset, also concerned itself with modern man. In 1867 P. L. Dunant was studying military statistics to discover the average height of the Swiss; and in 1876 L. Guillaume published the results of his observations on pigmentation in the canton of Neuchâtel. Thereafter, studies of the existing population made such progress that, after reviewing Professor Schlaginhaufen's monumental work on the results of his great survey covering over 35,000 Swiss conscripts (*Anthropologia helvetica*, 1946), Professor H. V. Vallois, of Paris, reached the conclusion that "no country, in Europe or elsewhere, has yet effected, with regard to its own population, anthropological research comparable to that carried out since the beginning of the present century by Swiss scientists" (*L'Anthropologie*, Paris, 1946, p. 333).

The study of foreign populations has been greatly advanced by more than one Swiss research worker. Our knowledge of the Balkans' racial composition, for instance, has been considerably increased thanks to Professor Pittard, who carried out many valuable surveys in that area. In the course of their travels in Asia and Oceania, P. and F. Sarasin and Speiser (anthropologists and ethnographers from Basle) studied several very interesting peoples—Veddahs of Ceylon, and tribes of the Island of Celebes, New Caledonia and the New Hebrides; and Professor Schlaginhaufen is continuing to publish the results of his study of the Melanesian and Micronesian peoples.

As regards the bringing up to date of their methods and knowledge, anthropologists throughout the world are greatly indebted to Rudolf Martin, author of the *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie* (1914, 2nd ed. 1928). Although this scientist was a German, it was while teaching at the University of Zürich



(from 1889 to 1911) that he drew up the plans for this authoritative work.

The more biological and genetic trend of modern anthropology has been emphasized since the establishment of the "Julius Klaus Foundation for Genetic Research, Social Anthropology and Racial Hygiene"; its headquarters are at the University of Zürich's Institute of Anthropology. At the Institute of Geneva, studies have been carried on during the last few years on the correlation between the blood groups of the ABO system and racial characteristics.

To ensure the widest possible dissemination for the works of its specialists, Swiss anthropological science has several reviews at its disposal—the *Archives* of the Julius Klaus Foundation, the *Bulletin of the Swiss Anthropological and Ethnological Society* (Zürich-Berne), and the *Swiss Archives of General Anthropology* (Geneva).

Although this short survey leaves out of account many aspects of anthropological research in Switzerland, it does nevertheless give an idea of the important part played by Swiss scientists in the general progress of anthropology.

## INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THEIR APPLICATIONS TO COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS

*Session from 12 to 15 March 1951*

The International Institute of Political and Social Sciences in their Application to Countries with Different Civilizations (INCIDI), to which the International Social Science Bulletin referred in its autumn 1950 issue (Vol. II, No. 3, pages 380-83), held its Twenty-sixth Session from 12 to 15 March 1951.

Mr. Georges Duhamel of the Académie Française gave the opening address, concluding with the statement that INCIDI brought together nations united by a common civilization and by the spiritual and temporal interests they shared; it marked the first systematic attempt on the part of peoples alive to their responsibilities to save the world—in its search for a new balance of forces—from the chaos into which it had been plunged by dissensions, and to defend it against the new forms of colonialism threatening peoples not yet prepared to play their full part in a world passing through so critical a stage in its history.

The following matters were discussed at the meeting:

*Item 1.* Consideration of the various means of supporting plans for the cultural economic and social development of the under-developed territories.

General report.

Mr. C. Gayet (France), Inspecteur Général des Colonies.

Special reports.

Duke Astuto di Luchesi (Italy) Colonial Governor: "Truman's 4th Point and the development of Africa." "Le point IV Truman et le développement de l'Afrique."

The Right Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones (United Kingdom), formerly Secretary of State for the Colonies: "Plans of cultural, social and economic development in under-developed territories."

Mr. C. Fidel (France), Technical Adviser, Union Française pour l'information Internationale: "Les modes de soutien américains aux pays insuffisamment développés complément de l'effort national de développement dans les territoires français"



d'Afrique" (American help to under-developed countries in support of national endeavours in French territories in Africa).

Mr. Ruwet (Belgium), President of the Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges: "Le plan décennal du Congo-Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi" (The ten-year plan for the Belgian Congo and the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi).

Mr. Torre (France), Assistant Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of French Overseas Territories: "Note au sujet de l'effort d'équipement dans les territoires d'outre-mer dépendant du Ministère de la France d'outre-mer." (Memorandum on the capital equipment of overseas territories under the Ministry of French Overseas Territories).

Mr. van Diffelen (Netherlands), Vice-Chairman of the Netherlands Committee on Technical Assistance to Under-Developed Countries: "Some considerations on the method of technical assistance."

#### CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION<sup>1</sup>

Considering the material and moral progress so rapidly brought about by the strenuous efforts already made to develop backward territories;

Considering the unanimous recognition that attention must be given in the first place to local needs and the necessity of accomplishing simultaneously all aims essential for the attainment of a new stage in the cultural, economic and social development of these territories;

Considering the need for pooling and co-ordinating human efforts and material and financial resources for the fulfilment of the far-reaching schemes now under way;

It is desirable that plans for the development of the backward countries:

- (1) Be carried out energetically and with due regard for local opinion.
- (2) Enjoy the confidence and whole-hearted support of all national and international movements concerned.
- (3) Be widely publicized in order to promote international understanding and collaboration.

Further:

- (1) The plans should be realistic and calculated to bring about economic stability. The permanent overhead costs involved in carrying them out should eventually be covered by the profits from higher production.
- (2) They should be so designed and implemented that the peoples of the territories concerned may be the first to benefit from the increased wealth derived from their development.
- (3) They should be calculated to safeguard against any deterioration of the areas developed, so as to ensure the continuing exploitation of their renewable natural resources.
- (4) The plans should be designed to develop domestic trade, by providing for the employment of skilled local workers, raising the consumers' standard of living, and thus establish a stable economy less dependent on foreign trade.
- (5) The plans cannot succeed without the collaboration of the peoples who are to benefit from them; their interest and support should therefore be canvassed, whilst their ideas and customs should be respected so far as they do not conflict with the needs of modern society; in particular, the creation of a proletariat and unnecessary shifts of population should be avoided, and the greatest care should be taken to adapt the structure of the society to the use of modern production methods and to fit it for economic progress.
- (6) National plans should be internationally co-ordinated. International technical and financial collaboration is desirable for their implementation, necessitating agreements for the refund of capital invested.
- (7) The public should be frankly and regularly informed of the successive stages

<sup>1</sup> These conclusions are neither resolutions nor recommendations; they faithfully sum up the discussions but do not imply that all the views expressed met with the unqualified approval of all present at the meeting. Subject to this formal reservation, the account given here was approved unanimously.



reached in the execution of the plans. Periodical statements should be issued for this purpose; the review *Civilizations* will assist by devoting a section to the subject.

*Item 2.* The development of local leadership in political and social affairs.

General Report.

Mr. Ivor Thomas (United Kingdom), former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies: "The development of local leadership."

Special Reports

Mr. Gaston-Joseph (France), former Conseiller d'État: "L'évolution de l'élite en Afrique Noire" (The development of the leading classes in equatorial Africa).

Dr. P. J. Koets (Netherlands): "The political and social development of the leading classes in Indonesia."

Mr. Marzorati (Belgium), Vice-Gouverneur Général Honoraire du Congo Belge: "Le problème de la formation des élites au Congo Belge" (The problem of training leaders in the Belgian Congo.)

Mr. Mecheri (France) Préfet attaché à la Présidence de l'Union Française: "L'évolution politique des élites autochtones et la Constitution de 1946" (The political development of local leading classes and the Constitution of 1946).

Mr. Sohier (Belgium) Procureur Général Honoraire près la Cour d'Appel, Elisabethville: "Le problème des élites au Congo Belge" (The problem of leadership in the Belgian Congo).

Professor van Lier (Netherlands): "The problem of the political and social élite in the West Indies and the Guianas."

#### CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION<sup>1</sup>

- (1) The aim of the metropolitan nations to help their overseas territories to reach a higher level of life must be achieved by the development of local leadership in all walks of life.
- (2) The rapid development of educational facilities is one of the best means of encouraging leadership.
- (3) Owing to the dangers which follow from the disintegration of customary sanctions, the moral content of the educational system in the overseas territories is of the highest importance; and for this reason it is to be hoped that among other means the closest co-operation will be maintained between territorial governments and the churches.
- (4) Universities, university colleges and other higher educational institutions should be situated in the territories they are designed to serve.
- (5) The educational system should contribute to producing leaders in all walks of life; special emphasis should be put on technical training.
- (6) Education for women is at present inadequate; it should be developed both for their own sakes and for the sake of family unity.
- (7) Educational arrangements should aim at preserving local cultures and using local languages wherever they have value, but where the people themselves desire to learn European languages and to have the Western way of living the opportunity of explaining to them the European conception of society should be welcomed.
- (8) The emergence of leadership implies a background of mass education and community initiative, and social policy should be devoted to this end.
- 9) Educational policy should be fitted into the economic and social background of the country to assure reasonable opportunities of employment.

*Item 3.* Problem of vehicular languages, with special reference to Africa: educational and cultural aspects.

<sup>1</sup> These conclusions are neither resolutions nor recommendations; they faithfully sum up the discussions but do not imply that all the views expressed met with the unqualified approval of all present at the meeting. Subject to this formal reservation, the account given here was approved unanimously.



### *General Report*

Father Charles, S.J. (Belgium); Member of the "Institut Royal Colonial Belge".

### *Special Reports*

Professor J. W. C. Drewes (Netherlands): "A few remarks on the development of Basa-Indonesia."

Father Hulstaert (Belgium): "Les langues indigènes dans l'enseignement" (Indigenous languages in education).

### CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION<sup>1</sup>

- (1) Since languages, like any other custom, are a matter of free choice on the part of those who use them, and no language is in itself a mark of inferior development, the powers responsible for the administration of a territory may intervene in linguistic matters only in the execution of their duty to make provision for adequate education for the whole population and to maintain an efficient administrative system.
- (2) All decisions regarding the use to be made of the vernacular language and the introduction of a European language in schools should take full account of the opinions and wishes of the peoples themselves. Any dictatorial intervention is dangerous and of doubtful legal propriety.
- (3) No linguistic policy should be motivated by an attitude of racial superiority or the desire to keep the local population in a state of intellectual or social subjection.
- (4) Since the wishes of the people differ considerably from one region to another and may be modified in the course of time, no attempt should be made to apply the same methods in all cases indiscriminately.
- (5) None of these conclusions relieves the administrative powers of responsibility for promoting the study of the languages now in use, especially if they seem to be fast dying out.
- (6) The authorities bear a great responsibility in regions where no local language or culture of quality has been developed, and where the people are not capable of making a reasoned choice. In such cases, the local language or dialect will be used as far as possible in primary schools for the rapid impartation of basic elementary knowledge, but the population as a whole will also be given a grounding in some internationally used language.

For secondary and higher education, the medium of instruction will be the internationally used language, but students will be encouraged to use the local language sufficiently to avoid losing touch with the mass of the population.

*Item 4. Civilizations in contact: The experience of the North American continent.*

#### *Reports*

Mr. V. Kaye (Canada), Professor at the University of Ottawa: "Socio-Historical Survey of the two principal Slavonic groups in Canada: Ukrainian and Polish."

Mr. W. Kirkconnell (Canada), President of the University of Acadia: "Historical stratification in Canadian cultures."

Mr. G. Langrod, Professor in the Faculty of Law, Paris: "La situation légale des Indiens aux États-Unis d'Amérique" (The legal situation of the Indians in the United States of America).

*Item 4. Did not give rise to any discussion.*

At the close of the session, Mr. Destombes, representing Unesco, made an important statement concerning the research carried out by that Organization on subjects of interest to the Institute.

INCIDI will hold its Twenty-seventh session in Florence in the first fortnight of June 1952, when it will discuss the general theme: "The drift of population towards urban and industrial centres in the under-developed countries."

<sup>1</sup> These conclusions are neither resolutions nor recommendations; they faithfully sum up the discussions but do not imply that all the views expressed met with the unqualified approval of all present at the meeting. Subject to this formal reservation, the account given here was approved unanimously.



- (1) Political aspect: urbanization and political aspects of mass movements of population.
- (2) Economic aspect: living standards and conditions in rural and urban communities.
- (3) Social aspect: social betterment of the rural classes.
- (4) Cultural aspect: popular education and vocational training.

## THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Committee on Human Development of the University of Chicago serves the dual purpose of providing opportunity for interdepartmental study and promoting interdisciplinary research. It unites into a single field of study and interest three sciences: human behaviour, social organization, and human biology.

The Committee is administered through the Divisions of Social Sciences and Biological Sciences of the University. It is organized under an Executive Committee, of which Professor Robert J. Havighurst is Chairman, comprised of 10 faculty members who hold rank of professor or associate professor in the departments of anthropology, education, psychology, and sociology. These persons devote their time to the Committee on Human Development as well as to the department in which they hold rank. The staff of the Committee also includes several assistant professors and instructors whose primary commitment is to the activities of the Committee.

One of the functions of the organization is to encourage interdepartmental study in various areas of human behaviour. To students who meet its requirements it grants the degrees of Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. Such persons usually follow professional careers in a branch of the social or biological sciences.

The other principal function of the Committee is research, which is carried out by its faculty. In some instances, this research is a co-operative effort by several members of the staff; other research projects may be conducted by individual faculty members. Research is frequently carried out in collaboration with outside agencies and other departments of the University.

One of the research programmes of the Committee was a socio-psychological study of several American Indian tribes. This work examined the social organization of the tribes concerned and the personality development of their members. It was conducted in collaboration with the United States Office of Indian Affairs and the Department of Anthropology of the University of Chicago.

Another project, in which many of the faculty members of the Committee participated, dealt with various aspects of a small city in the midwestern part of the United States. The work lasted 10 years and included intensive study of the social organization of the community, the social participation and adjustment of the aged, the psycho-social development of adolescent members, and the development of moral character in adolescence.

There has been considerable research in the domain of education, with particular attention to cultural bias in mental tests. Following an examination of mental tests in current use in the United States, efforts were made to construct tests based on anthropological and sociological knowledge of the cultural differences between children of high and low socio-economic levels. These new tests have demonstrated the possibility of eliminating, to a great extent, the cultural bias which has characterized mental testing in the United States and elsewhere. This research has made possible the recognition of otherwise undiscovered mental talent in children from under-privileged socio-economic backgrounds.



# THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

The Office of Public Opinion Research, since its organization in 1940, has served as a link between the commercial practice and the academic development of public opinion research. Its objectives are to give scholars the advantage of surveys carried out in non-scholastic circles, to develop the psychological theory underlying opinions for the benefit of both scholars and practitioners, to encourage interdisciplinary studies in the field, to perfect polling methodology, and to make opinion data available in the forms most useful to national and international institutions. Dr. Hadley Cantril, Professor of Psychology, is director.

OPOR activities include:

- (1) *Files and Archives.* A complete set of IBM cards for all polls conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion and the OPOR is on file for use by qualified students. Punch cards on certain other surveys of general interest are also on file. British Institute of Public Opinion cards were duplicated and stored here when London was bombed.

Twenty-three of the biggest survey organizations, in 16 countries, send tabulated results of their polls to the OPOR regularly for filing and use by researchworkers. This information, covering an eleven-year period, was indexed by Mrs. Mildred Strunk and published in the 1,200-page volume *Public Opinion 1935-1946* (Princeton University Press, 1951). It is planned to bring this compilation up to date when funds become available.

- (2) *Research.* Projects completed in past years include:
  - (a) A series of morale studies conducted before and during the war by an interviewing staff organized by OPOR (since discontinued).
  - (b) Methodological studies based on these surveys, published in Cantril: *Gauging Public Opinion*, and in various contributions by staff members to the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.
  - (c) A study of social class identification, published in Centres: *The Psychology of Social Classes*.
  - (d) A study of personal security, by Andie Knudsen.
  - (e) Various other minor studies available to students in the form of graduate and undergraduate theses and journal articles.

Current projects include:

- (a) A series of laboratory experiments, undertaken by members of the staff in collaboration with psychologists at Princeton and other Universities, which are designed to investigate the fundamentals of perception as a basis for understanding public opinion formation, and to validate certain hypotheses concerning motivation, attitudes and social behaviour.
- (b) Collaboration with Unesco in one of its projects for the study of international tensions and stereotypes.
- (3) *Services.* Individual students of political science, psychology, sociology, history and international relations, writers and research workers, and governmental, business and educational organizations have made use of the data available in the OPOR. The office attempts to answer immediately all legitimate requests for routine information which is easily accessible. Where more extensive investigation is necessary, the files are open to students for on-the-spot research; or staff members, if available, may be assigned to work on the project on a fee basis which covers costs.



## THE HELLER COMMITTEE FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics of the University of California was organized in 1923. A considerable portion of the work of this committee has been in the field of costs and standards of living. Several income and expenditure studies were published in the 1930's, for example, *How Mexicans Earn and Live*, (1933), and *Living on a Moderate Income*, a study of the incomes and expenditures of street-car men's and clerks' families (1933). From 1923 to 1949 standard budgets for families at various economic levels were published annually. These budgets are an attempt to define in terms of content and current cost certain current and commonly accepted standards of living. They are not a photographic reproduction of the expenditure pattern of any specific group of families at a particular time or place. Nor are they what the committee thinks "people ought to have".

Other publications of the Heller Committee include studies of unemployment relief and the unemployed in the San Francisco Bay region, standards of relief in California, a study of the organization of the labour market in California, and a study of wartime and post-war earnings in San Francisco. A study of medical expenditures of 455 families in the San Francisco East Bay region is now in press.

The Heller Committee is now securing data for a revision of our standard budgets. An income and expenditure study of upper white collar workers is now under way. This study will provide up-to-date information as to expenditure patterns of this group of our population and will be used as a basis for a revised standard budget. A study now being made by the U.S. Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour Statistics, will provide data for the revision of the Heller Committee's budget for the family of a wage earner.

## THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COMMITTEE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Social Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago is a standing Committee of the Division of Social Sciences. The Committee is charged with the tasks of administering and allocating the University funds budgeted for Social Science research, planning and stimulating broad problems of research, and obtaining such financing for faculty research as may be necessary from various foundations and other sources outside the University.

The Division of the Social Sciences includes not only the various Social Science Departments, but also a number of interdepartmental and interdivisional committees, all of which are concerned with research. A listing of the departments and committees in the Division is perhaps the best summary indication of the scope of the social science research interests represented. Departments: Anthropology, Economics, Education, Geography, History, Home Economics, Political Science, Psychology, and Sociology. Committees: Communication, Human Development, Industrial Relations, International Relations, Nursing Education, Planning, Race Relations, and Social Thought.

In addition, any proposals for research in the Social Sciences initiated in other Divisions or Schools of the University which require further financing from University or outside funds are reviewed by the Committee.

In reviewing the faculty research proposals, the Committee attempts to encourage



co-operative and interdisciplinary undertakings when faculty interests appear to be interrelated, seeks to promote excellence of research design, encourages the focusing of research upon significant problems from a disciplinary or practical point of view, and exerts what influence it can to assure the additive character of the research.

Both the review of individual research projects and the broader planning function of the Committee place it in a position to influence the character of the research in social sciences. In the last analysis, however, the individual faculty member or groups of faculty members determine and are responsible for programming and conducting their own research activities. In general, the Social Science Research Committee is regarded by the faculty as a mechanism through which it can obtain the necessary financial and other forms of assistance to carry on scholarly research activities. As a matter of policy, the Committee neither administers nor directs the specific research projects of the faculty.

The Committee has been in existence continuously since 1923. A summary of the Social Science research activities in the University to 1939 is contained in two volumes, *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research*, by T. V. Smith and L. D. White, and *Eleven Twenty-Six: A Decade of Social Science Research*, by Louis Wirth.

At the present time, group research projects of an interdisciplinary character in the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago are centred in the following organizations within the Division:

Chicago Community Inventory, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Philip M. Hauser, Director. Statistical information service and basic research on various aspects of Chicago Metropolitan structure, including demographic, labour force and local community relations research.

The Committee on Communication, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Bernard Berelson, Chairman. Research into the substantive and theoretical problems of communication, with attention also to methodological problems. Interested in the construction of a theory of communication with relevance to public and private policy decisions.

Committee on Education, Training and Research in Race Relations, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Louis Wirth, Chairman. Research into the problems arising out of the relations between racial, ethnic, religious and cultural groups designed to discover fundamental knowledge about attitudes, personality factors, situational conditions, and social norms affecting the integration of minorities into the larger society. Publishes a quarterly bulletin, *Inventory of Research in Racial and Cultural Relations*.

Committee on Human Development, 5835 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois, R. J. Havighurst, Chairman. Personality development in childhood and adolescence, development of moral character, personal and social adjustment in old age, personality and culture in American and other societies.

Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Tjalling C. Koopmans, Director of Research. Research into those economic problems in which mathematical forms of expression and statistical methods are important aids to a solution. Concerned with econometrics; the formulation with precision of economic theories of practical relevance and the submission of these to statistical tests.

Industrial Relations Center, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, F.H. Harbison and R. K. Burns, Executive Officers. Determinants of types of union-management relations, with particular emphasis on the mass production industries and white collar employees; techniques, methods and materials for education and development of union officers and managerial personnel.

National Opinion Research Center, 4901 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago 15, Illinois, Clyde W. Hart, Director. Research on methodological and technical problems in the field of attitude and opinion study, and on various substantive aspects of opinion and its development, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view.

In addition, there are a large number of individual research projects pursued by individual faculty members, usually as part of individual long range programmes.

The members of the Social Science Research Committee are appointed annually by the Dean of the Division from the Social Science faculty. Dean Ralph W. Tyler,



Professor of Education, serves as Chairman of the Committee, and Associate Dean Philip M. Hauser, Professor of Sociology, serves as its Secretary. Although various facilities are employed, the major portion of the Social Science research activities are concentrated in the Social Science Research Building, located at 1126 East 59 th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

## THE SOCIAL MUSEUM

Founded in 1894 thanks to the generosity of the Count de Chambrun, the Social Museum (*Musée Social*), which under a decree of 31 August 1894 was declared to be an institution of public importance, is a centre for social studies, information and documentation, with its headquarters at 5 rue Las Cases, Paris-7e.

Its aim is to place at the disposal of the public, free of charge, the documents, plans, statutes, etc., of the social institutions and organizations which are endeavouring to improve the moral and material situation of the workers, and to provide all useful information and advice on this subject.

As a study centre, the Social Museum comprises specialized work sections, each of which engages in research on a particular aspect of social activity. These sections are as follows: Social Studies Sections; Town and Rural Hygiene and State Insurance Section; Agricultural Section; Women's Affairs Section and Legal Section.

These studies are completed by surveys carried out in France and other countries. In the past, the Social Museum has organized a number of missions to Germany, the United States, Australia, etc.

It has a library of more than 50,000 volumes and several hundreds of French and foreign periodicals. This library is open to the public free of charge, but has no lending service.

The staff of the Social Museum provide information and advice free of charge.

Lectures are given from time to time by sociologists and economists on current aspects of social economy.

Lastly, the Social Museum publishes a review, *Les cahiers du musée social*, devoted to the main social problems of the day. It also regularly publishes popular handbooks for the general public, such as the Handbook of Family Legislation, the Handbook of Social Insurance and Old Age Pensions, and so forth.



# THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Founded with the support of the  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Since its opening on 14 July 1923, the Academy has ranked among the foremost institutes for higher international studies, and its success becomes more marked every year.

From the academic point of view it is directed by a Curatorium consisting of 12 members selected from various countries.<sup>1</sup> It is administered by a Board of Administration<sup>2</sup> with the assistance of a Finance Committee.

In 1951 the course will last four weeks and will start on Monday, 16 July. Lectures will be given on five days a week, from Monday to Friday, and will in general consist of three lecture periods in the mornings and of one or two seminar sessions on certain afternoons. Tuition will be given either in English or in French.

The Academy grants a diploma to those students who possess the qualifications required by the regulations and pass an examination by an *ad hoc* Examining Board. Moreover, the Academy issues a certificate of attendance to students, certifying their regular attendance at lectures and, where relevant, at seminars.

The Academy's facilities are intended for those who already have some knowledge of international law and wish to complete their study of this science. Candidates for the courses must fill in an application form to be obtained from: The Secretariat (Palais de la Paix, The Hague, Netherlands). Tuition is free.

In 1950, 517 students of 47 different nationalities were enrolled. 214 students received the certificate of attendance. Of 44 candidates for the diploma, 24 were admitted to the examination and 10 were granted the diploma, three of them with honourable mention.

There are a considerable number of fellowships available at the Academy, some of which were endowed by Governments, others by the Board of Administration, and others by learned societies or privately endowed funds such as the Rotary International, universities, etc.

Fellowship-holders are appointed by the Curatorium from among the most deserving candidates, and more particularly from among those who have written books, essays or articles on questions of international law.

<sup>1</sup> The Curatorium. *Chairman*: Professor Gilbert Gidel of the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris. *Members*: H.E. Mr. Alejandro Alvarez, Judge at the International Court of Justice, The Hague; H.E. Mr. Th. Aghnides, ex-Ambassador of Greece, Chairman of the United Nations Consultative Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Lake Success, New York; Professor F. Castberg of Oslo University, Legal Adviser to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. George A. Finch, Adviser to the Carnegie Foundation, Washington, Professor of International Law at Georgetown University; H.E. Mr. Hsu-Mo, Judge at the International Court of Justice, The Hague; H.E. Mr. E.N. van Kleffens, Minister of State, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon of H.M. The Queen of the Netherlands; H.E. Mr. Massimo Pilotti, President of the High Court of the Rome Public Water Supply; H.E. Sir Arnold MacNair, Judge at the International Court of Justice, The Hague; Mr. Paul Ruegger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva; Baron Michel de Taube, Paris, formerly Professor at St. Petersburg University; H.E. Mr. Ch. de Visscher, Judge at the International Court of Justice, The Hague. *Secretary-General of the Academy*: Professor Georges Scelle, Hon. Professor in the Faculty of Law at Paris University; *Chairman's Attaché* for the publication of the *Recueil des Cours*: Mr. P. F. Gonnidec, 17 rue d'Anjou, Paris, 8e.

<sup>2</sup> The Board of Administration. *Chairman*: Jonkheer A.M. Snouck Hurgronje, Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. *Members*: Professor J.P.A. François of the School for Advanced Economic Studies at Rotterdam, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague; H.E. Baron G.C.D. de Hardenbroek, Master of the Royal Household and Lord Chamberlain to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; Mr. S.J.R. de Monchy, former Mayor of The Hague; Mr. C.R.C. Wijckerheld Bisdom, Advocate at the Netherlands Court of Cassation. *Secretary-General*: Major-General J.B. de Jongh, former Director of the Higher School for Military Administration. *Treasurer*: Jonkheer W.H. den Beer Poortugael, Advocate at the Netherlands Court of Cassation.



Facilities for residence are granted to students through the Secretariat of the Association des auditeurs et anciens auditeurs de l'académie (AAA). The principal periodicals of all countries are available to them. They also have access to the famous library of the "Palais de la Paix". Arrangements made by the AAA with various hotels and boarding houses reduce expenses.

The Association does everything in its power to make the students' stay at The Hague as pleasant as possible. It organizes excursions, communal lunches and social evenings. It also gives its members every opportunity for sport.

#### RECUEIL DES COURS

The contents of the lectures delivered at the Academy continue to be successfully published. By the end of 1939, 66 volumes had been published, containing the courses of 1923-1938. By the end of 1950, the courses had been issued up to 1949 (last volume, No. 75). The first 30 volumes were published by Messrs. Hachette, Paris. Since 1931, publication has been taken over by the firm of Recueil Sirey (22 rue Soufflot, Paris), which also sells the volumes containing the 1923-1931 courses.

The *Recueil des Cours* will continue to be issued regularly each year with the least possible delay between the end of the course and the date of publication.

A table of contents for the first 66 volumes of the *Recueil* was published in the spring of 1939 on India paper (about 900 pages).

This table is a valuable instrument for all who are interested in international law, either for professional reasons or purely personally.

#### PROVISIONAL CURRICULUM FOR 1951

##### *Historical Development of International Law*

International Friendship (three lectures). Professor Paridisi, Ordinary professor at the Faculty of Law at Naples.

Frontiers in Latin America (five lectures). Professor Raja Gabaglia of Rio de Janeiro University.

##### *Principles of International Common Law*

General course (ten lectures). Mr. Charles G. Fenwick, Director of the Department of International Law and Organization of the Pan-American Union, Washington.

International neighbourly relations (five lectures). Professor J. Andrassy of Zagreb University.

The Succession of States. Recent aspects (five lectures). Professor Erik Castren, Professor of International Law at Helsinki University.

##### *Administrative, Economic and Financial Law*

The transport of merchandise under international law (five lectures). Mr. Jan Hostie, Honorary legal councillor to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Law of international payments (five lectures). Professor Walther Hug of the Zurich Polytechnical College.

The international aspect of coffee and sugar (five lectures). Rector M. B. Amzalak, Professor of the Higher Institute of Economic and Financial Science, Lisbon.

##### *International Organization*

The United Nations Organization and the International Court of Justice (three lectures). Mr. Yvan Kerno, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Secretariat of the International Agencies (five lectures). Mr. Emile Giraud, member of the Legal Section of the UN Secretariat.



- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its application (five lectures).  
Mr. René Cassin, Vice-President of the Senate, Professor in the Faculty of Law, Paris.
- The prohibition of resort to force. The principle and the problems raised by it (five lectures). Professor Hans Wehberg of the "Institut universitaire des Hautes Etudes internationales", Geneva.
- The Atlantic Pact (three lectures). Professor A. L. Goodhart, K.B.E., K.C., of University College, Oxford.

For all information, apply to the Secretariat of the Academy, Palais de la Paix, Room 50, The Hague, Netherlands.

## THE PANAMANIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION

The Administrative Body of the University of Panama during its session on 13 October 1948, authorized, for the first time in Panama, the establishment of an Institute of Public Opinion, with Carolyn S. Campbell, Professor of Sociology at the University, as Director. The resulting organization, the Panamanian Institute of Public Opinion, has no governmental connexions of any kind; it has no commercial purposes; it is not subject to any restrictions imposed by the University.

### PERSONNEL

- (1) The Director acts as a guide in the activities of each investigation, for instance in the selection of appropriate studies, the preparation of the questionnaires, the establishment of the percentages used in setting up the stratified population sample, the training of the investigators, the actual questioning by the investigators, the tabulation and interpretation of the results, and the publication and distribution of the finished studies.
- (2) A small Working Committee of University students, selected on the basis of ability and interest, is chosen to assist in the formulation of the general plans, and to assist in directing the various activities.
- (3) A larger group of upper-division University students, from the faculties of Sociology and Education, is selected and trained to serve as investigators, under the leadership of the Director and of the Working Committee.

### PURPOSES

The purposes of this organization are primarily academic, that is, to contribute to the formation and enlargement of a body of exact data as regards Panamanian opinions and attitudes, by the use of reliable methods, thus contributing to further knowledge and understanding of how one small part of Latin America thinks. The general acceptance of loose and inaccurate statements and unwarranted generalities as established facts representing "what Panama thinks" has been carried even beyond the point of absurdity. And the lack of any factual information upon which to base a judgment with accuracy and reason makes the situation even more serious. To pursue such studies, with intellectual honesty, irrespective of where they may lead, is our purpose.

Such investigations are undertaken with the hope of understanding better and



more exactly what Panama thinks about its own problems and what Panama thinks about the problems now confronting other peoples and nations. This includes national problems, international affairs, topics of economic, political, social, and educational interest, and problems of human relations and personal adjustments.

#### SELECTION OF TOPICS

The Institute has communicated with numerous persons in official and non-official positions in Panama, soliciting suggestions and recommendations. Many of these have responded, some with extremely useful and interesting suggestions.

A small Working Committee, together with the Director, considers the suggestions submitted, adds suggestions and ideas of their own, and arrives at a decision on the selection of each topic, provided: (1) that the theme be either (a) of interest to Panama specifically, or (b) of general world interest; (2) there are practical possibilities of collecting information on a given topic; (3) the investigation to be undertaken is not too large.

*The questionnaire.* The actual questionnaires used are formulated by the Working Committee and the Director. When possible, some or all of them are pre-tested. This is not always possible. The questionnaire used is limited to not more than one mimeographed sheet. All the questions are framed so as to be answered by "yes" or "no" or by placing an "X" in front of the choice. In addition, space is given for describing other reactions that the interviewee may wish to record.

*Dissemination of information gathered.* Feeling that much of the value of such studies is lost if the results are not available to all persons interested the Panamanian Institute of Public Opinion is publishing the results in both Spanish and English. Those published in Spanish are being distributed to interested individuals and organizations in Panama, to the leading Universities throughout Latin America, and to other organizations concerned with social, cultural, or statistical investigations in Latin America.

The English versions are translations of the original Spanish studies, and are distributed to interested individuals and organizations in the neighbouring Panama Canal Zone, the leading Universities in the United States, other institutes of public opinion in the United States, institutes of public opinion throughout the world, the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C., and Unesco. The Institute hopes that these organizations and individuals will be able to help both in carrying out simultaneous surveys and in the exchange of helpful suggestions and criticisms.

*Work and problems to date.* At the time of writing eight studies have been carried out, and the results are now being published and distributed. Investigations have been made on the following topics: factors in happiness; the problem of Palestine; immigration to Panama; political freedoms; Social Security in Panama; national problems of Panama; international problems; rural teachers in Panama.

## THE TAVISTOCK INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RELATIONS

This independent social research organization is concerned with the study of human relationships in the family, the factory and the small community. It originated in 1946 from military experience of inter-disciplinary work and until 1947 was a department of the Tavistock Clinic, which deals with psychological problems of adults, children and families. The link between Institute and Clinic is maintained, in particular by the common interest in small groups and families.

The Institute's working hypotheses are drawn from clinical psychology and psy-



chiatry; from psycho-analysis and social anthropology; from the social psychology and group dynamics studies of the field theorists; from sociometric theory and techniques; and from more recent work on leaderless and therapeutic groups. Its projects are based on the assumption that the social research worker is himself an inevitable factor in influencing the social behaviour he observes, and that the full implications of the role he takes and the effects of publication of any findings, need careful consideration as part of the design of his work. In most projects the Institute has been invited, after full discussion with all concerned, to take a professional role in assisting with specific problems; but within such relationships there is included a variable research component whose nature and extent is fully agreed with the client organization.

During the past three years projects have been undertaken on such topics as: problems of selection, promotion and training; inter-group relations in varied settings; problems arising from the new Education Act; the design of the medical statistics service in a local health authority; job analysis of nursing auxiliary roles in a group of hospitals; some technical problems of rehabilitation; the development of a new type of family case-work agency; the assessment of safety education films for children; and the design and running of a World Health Organization working conference for public health nurses of different nationalities.

#### CURRENT PROJECTS

The major projects now under way are concerned with problems of industry, of the family and the rural community, and of fact-finding or survey methods.

The current industrial projects with a high research component are concerned, first, with a collaborative study of problems of social development in an engineering factory with 1,500 employees, and secondly, with problems of the communication of technical and social skill by training and conferences. Other industrial projects concern the design of selection, training and promotion schemes for management, technical and other groups.

In the family and community field a study has been made of a small group of villages with economic and population problems; and a recently initiated project is intended to elucidate factors affecting the development of different patterns of family life in an urban setting.

The research in survey and fact-finding methods is designed as a complement to the current methods of existing agencies and to work towards procedures which may be useful, outside the commercial field, in obtaining pictures of community and industrial sub-cultures.

In association with the Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, U.S.A., the Institute publishes a quarterly technical journal, *Human Relations*. A brief report on the Institute's work and development from 1946 to 1950 is available on request to 2 Beaumont Street, London, W.1.







P A R T V

REVIEW OF PERIODICALS AND BOOKS







# DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

## I. UNITED NATIONS

### GENERAL ASSEMBLY

*Everyman's United Nations.* A ready reference to the structure, functions and work of the United Nations and its Related Agencies. Published by the United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1950, Second Edition, 313 pp. (\$1.25).

The United Nations Department of Public Information issues the second edition of this work, which is a real United Nations handbook. It gives a clear and concise analysis of essential documentation on matters affecting the United Nations and Specialized Agencies. The work is completed by a list of Member States and a selective bibliography with references, whenever necessary, to the basic publications of the United Nations.

*Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950.* General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session. Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), United Nations, Lake Success, New York, 1951, 80 pp. (80 cents).

After verification of the credentials of representatives of Member States of UN, the General Assembly proceeded first to various elections: that of its General Committee, of non-permanent members to the Security Council (Brazil, the Netherlands and Turkey), of six members to the Economic and Social Council, and two members to the Trusteeship Council. It then distributed work among its six Committees, an *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and a Joint Second and Third Committee. On the Report of the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted resolutions on appropriate steps to be taken for the restoration of peace in Korea and the establishment of unity for the maintenance of peace. To this end, it decided to establish a Collective Measures Committee and a permanent commission of good offices. It defined the duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities and condemned propaganda against peace. After considering the particular cases of Greece, China and Chinese intervention in Korea, the General Assembly adopted resolutions aimed at preventing an extension of the present conflict.

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was responsible for studying cases of violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, the future of the former Italian colonies, the situation in Palestine and in the Union of South Africa, and relations between the United Nations and Spain. The General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions on all these matters; it decided, in particular, to revoke its 1946 recommendation relating to Spain, to raise Libya to the status of an independent State and to delimit the boundaries of former Italian colonies. The resolutions adopted on the Report of the Second Committee concern the economic situation and especially land reform, full employment and underdeveloped areas. On the reports of the Joint Committee and other Committees meeting with it, the General Assembly adopted resolutions on the organization and operation of the Economic and Social Council and the Specialized Agencies and paid particular attention to problems relating to the rehabilitation of Korea after the suspension of hostilities. After next considering the reports of the Third Committee, the General Assembly adopted resolutions in connexion with the continuing needs of children, refugees, social welfare services, human rights, and freedom of information and speech (press and radio). After recommending, on the report of the Fourth Committee, that the Trusteeship Council should review its methods of work, the General Assembly considered the various measures to be taken in



trusteeship territories and formulated several general recommendations regarding education and economic and social development in those territories; two special resolutions on the Ewe problem and the question of South West Africa were adopted. On the reports of the Fifth Committee, the Financial Report and the accounts of the United Nations were accepted by the General Assembly, which, after approving various appointments and supplementary estimates for the financial year 1950, adopted the scale of assessments for the apportionment of expenses and the Budget for 1951. Resolutions on miscellaneous questions were adopted on the report of the Sixth Committee; in particular, their purpose is to introduce certain changes in the Rules of Procedure and the Statute of the International Law Commission. In conclusion, the General Assembly adopted, without reference to any committee, a number of important resolutions on the representation of China, the continuation in office of the Secretary-General, the admission of the Republic of Indonesia to membership of UN, and the 20-year programme for achieving peace, presented by Mr. Trygve Lie.

*Catalogue of Economic and Social Projects, No. 2.* United Nations, Lake Success, New York, 1950, 515 pp. (\$3.75).

This Catalogue lists, describes and classifies the work undertaken or successfully completed by the Secretariats of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies in the economic and social fields. It covers the period January 1949 to January 1950 and includes continuing projects carried over from previous years, as well as additional projects undertaken, planned or authorized during 1949 and, in so far as possible, those to be initiated in 1950.

*Action to Achieve and Maintain Full Employment and Economic Stability.* General Assembly Fifth Session, Report of the Second Committee (A/1627, 6 December 1950), 10 pp.

After considering the Ecosoc report presented to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly (A/1345), the Second Committee, which had been instructed to consider this report, had before it the following specific proposals: (a) full employment [Ecosoc resolution 290 (XI)]; (b) current world economic situation (doc. A/C.2/L.70); (c) guides or organization and collection of economic data in under-developed countries (doc. A/C.2/L.71), and (d) mechanization and unemployment (doc. A/C.2/L.72).

(1) *Full employment* (cf. doc. A/C.2/L.70 and 73). The Committee proposed the following resolution to the General Assembly: noting the vigorous action taken by Ecosoc in connexion with full employment, considering that the additional studies provided for in Ecosoc resolution 290 (XI) (which is designed to strengthen the resistance of national economies and the international economic structure against the danger of recession) are designed to ensure full employment, both in economically advanced and under-developed countries, the General Assembly invites Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him. (The General Assembly adopted this resolution on 12 December 1950 at its 320th plenary session; cf. doc. A/1708.)

(2) *Current world economic situation.* The Committee proposed the following resolution: The General Assembly, bearing in mind that, as a result of the international events of the last few months, new economic facts have appeared which may unbalance and dislocate the general economic stability and the economic progress of many countries, requests Ecosoc, when examining the world economic situation during its Twelfth Session, to pay special attention to these changes and to study measures designed to secure the uninterrupted progress of programmes of economic stability and development. All Member States are requested to submit to Ecosoc their views concerning the incidence of the present world situation on their economic progress and the prospects of continuing world economic expansion. (The General Assembly adopted this resolution on 13 December 1950 at its 320th plenary session; cf. doc. A/1709.)

(3) *Guides for helping the Governments of under-developed countries to collect and organize economic data.* Ecosoc recommended in resolution 290 (XI) that Governments should furnish the Secretary-General with a wide range of economic and statistical information and invited the ILO to take all feasible steps towards the practical implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth International Conference of



Labour Statisticians in order to facilitate international comparability of employment and unemployment data. The General Assembly should therefore recommend the Secretary-General and Specialized Agencies to prepare material which might serve to guide Governments wishing to make use thereof in their own countries. This documentation should indicate the data needed to provide up-to-date information regarding economic activity, employment, unemployment and under-employment, and the procedures and methods suitable for obtaining and presenting such data. (The General Assembly adopted this resolution on 13 December 1950 at its 320th plenary session; cf. doc. A/1710.)

- (4) *Mechanization and unemployment in under-developed countries*. [Ecosoc resolution 221 E (IX) and para. 22 of Ecosoc resolution 290(XI)]. The Committee proposes to request the Secretary-General to impress upon the group of experts to be appointed by him under paragraph 22 of Ecosoc resolution 290 (XI) the necessity of giving due consideration in the course of their work to: (1) ways and means of preventing any aggravation of the problems of unemployment and under-employment in under-developed countries that may occur as a result of the mechanization of production in certain branches of industry and agriculture; (2) measures of social security designed to ensure that there will be no interruption in the income of workers temporarily unemployed through mechanization or technological progress taking into account the work of the ILO in this field. (The General Assembly adopted this resolution on 13 December 1950, at its 320th plenary session; cf. doc. A/1711.)

(Cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1950, p. 416-7 and No. 4, Winter 1950, p. 592; cf. docs. A/1645, A/1666, A/C.5/441; cf. docs. E/1695, E/1744, E/1748, E/1695/Add. 1-4, E/1698/Add. 1-8, E/L.100, E/1815, E/1698/Add.1-12, E/1815/Add.1/Rev.1, A/C.5/421.)

### *Social Questions*

*United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, Sub-Division of Social Welfare. "Social Welfare Information" Series. Current Literature and National Conferences. 1948. Norway. United Nations, Lake Success, New York, December 1949, 12 pp. (no price).*

This document, which covers the whole of 1948, was drawn up on the basis of information supplied by the Norwegian Government at the request of the United Nations Department of Social Affairs. It gives a list of social welfare publications and national conferences, a French translation of the titles, and the prices in Norwegian crowns. The publications are classified in two groups: (a) books, pamphlets and reports; (b) periodicals, and in 12 categories, according to subject.

*Transfer of Functions of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission. Fifth Session (A/1592, 2 December 1950), 2 pp.*

By a resolution of 1 December 1950 (314th plenary meeting), adopted on the report of the Joint Second and Third Committee and the Fifth Committee, meeting jointly (A/1547), the General Assembly, noting Ecosoc resolutions 262 B (IX) and 333 H (XI) and the resolution adopted on 12 August 1950 by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 4, Winter, 1950, p. 569), approved the plan contained in the report prepared by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the said Commission, on the transfer of its functions to the United Nations. Taking note of the Commission's decision with regard to its residual assets, the General Assembly expressed its appreciation of the Commission's gift to the United Nations of its library and archives, and authorized the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the IPPC, to make arrangements for the transfer of the functions of the Commission to the United Nations before 31 December 1951. The General Assembly lastly paid tribute to the achievements of the IPPC, during the long period of its existence, in the field of the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders.



*Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa.* Fifth Session (A/1604, 4 December 1950), 2 pp.

Recalling its resolutions 44 (I) and 265 (III), having regard to its resolution 103 (I) against racial persecution and discrimination, and bearing in mind resolution 217 (III) on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General Assembly adopted the following resolution at its 315th plenary meeting on 2 December 1950 on the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1548) and after consideration of the communication received from India on 10 July 1950: Considering that a policy of "racial segregation" (*Apartheid*) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination, the General Assembly recommends the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa to proceed, in accordance with resolution 265 (III) on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, to a round-table conference on the basis of their agreed agenda, bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

*Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.* Resolution adopted on 14 December 1950 (A/1751, 19 December 1950), 4 pp.

In view of the report of the Third Committee (doc. A/1682), and considering the desirability of enabling the Governments of States not members of the United Nations to participate in the final stages of the drafting of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (prepared by Ecosoc's *Ad Hoc* Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons), the General Assembly decided at its 325th plenary meeting (Fifth Session) to convene in Geneva (cf. doc. A/C.3/549) a conference of plenipotentiaries to complete the drafting of and to sign the said Convention. The Assembly also recommended to Governments participating in the Conference to take into consideration the draft Convention submitted by Ecosoc and, in particular, the text of the definition of the term "refugee" (Chap. I, Article I; cf. doc. A/C.3/351). All States, both members and non-members of the United Nations, are to be invited to send representatives to this Conference which will be attended by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

[Cf. Ecosoc resolution 248 (IX) B of 8 August 1949, doc. A/1396, E/1112 and Add.1, E/1618, Ecosoc resolution 319 (IX), doc. E/1804 and Corr.1 and 2, E/AC.7/SR. 158 to 165 and 170, E/SR.406 and 407, E/AC.32/L.40, E/1850 and Annex.]

Cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1950, p. 421.

*High Commissioner for Refugees* (Statute of the High Commissioner's Office for Refugees). Resolution adopted on 14 December 1950 (A/1750, 19 December 1950), 2 pp.

Having regard to its resolution 319 A (IV) of 3 December 1949 and the report of the Third Committee (A/1682), the General Assembly, at its 325th plenary meeting, adopted the Statute of the High Commissioner's Office for Refugees and called upon Governments to co-operate with the High Commissioner in the exercise of his functions concerning refugees, especially by: (a) becoming parties to international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and taking the necessary steps for the implementation of such conventions; (b) entering into special agreements with the High Commissioner for the execution of measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection; (c) admitting refugees to their territories, not excluding those in the most destitute categories; (d) assisting the High Commissioner in his efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees; (e) promoting the assimilation of refugees, especially by facilitating their naturalization; (f) providing refugees with travel and all other documents which would facilitate their resettlement; (g) permitting them to transfer their assets; (h) providing the High Commissioner with information concerning the number and condition of refugees, and laws and regulations concerning them (cf. also doc. A/C.3/556 and Annex I).

Under the said Statute, the High Commissioner, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, is responsible at the international level and under the auspices of the United Nations for the protection of refugees covered by the Statute and for endeavouring to find lasting solutions to their problems. He must assist Governments, and (with the approval of the Governments concerned) private organizations, to promote



the voluntary repatriation of these refugees or their assimilation into new national communities.

After consulting with the High Commissioner, Ecosoc may decide to set up an advisory committee for refugees, consisting of representatives of Member States of the United Nations and non-Member States, chosen by Ecosoc because of their interest in the refugee problem and their devotion to that cause.

The High Commissioner's mandate applies to any person (1) who is considered as a refugee under the arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928, or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938 and the Protocol of 14 September 1939, or under the IRO Constitution; (2) who, as a result of events since 1 January 1951, is definitely threatened with persecution on racial, religious, national or political grounds; is obliged to leave the country of which he is a national, and cannot or (from fear or for other reasons unconnected with personal convenience) does not wish to claim protection from that country; or who, having no nationality and being outside the country in which he habitually resides, cannot or (from fear or for other reasons unconnected with personal convenience) does not wish to return to it.

The following fall outside the High Commissioner's competence: any person who (1) voluntarily reverts to the protection of the country of which he is a national; (2) having lost his nationality, has voluntarily regained it; (3) has acquired new nationality; (4) has voluntarily returned to reside in his own country; (5) can no longer invoke the conditions under which he was recognized as a refugee, because those conditions no longer exist; (6) can return to his habitual country of residence, because the circumstances which caused him to become a refugee no longer exist.

The High Commissioner is required to secure the ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, to supervise their application, to take all appropriate measures for the improvement of the lot of refugees, and to encourage the admission of refugees to the territories of the various States, etc.

The High Commissioner is elected by the General Assembly for three years. [Cf. doc. A/1716 of 18 December 1950 on the election of the High Commissioner for Refugees with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General. Attached are the *curricula vitae* of the two candidates, G. J. van Heuven Goedhart (elected High Commissioner) and J. Donald Kingsley (Director-General of IRO). Cf. doc. A/1385, memorandum by the Secretary-General, dated 22 September 1950.]

(Cf. doc. A/1719 of 13 December 1950, report of the Fifth Committee on the budgetary implications of draft resolution A submitted by the Fifth Committee, doc. A/1682.)

### *Legal Problems*

*Statement of Treaties and International Agreements* registered or filed and recorded with the UN Secretariat during October 1950 (ST/LEG/SER.A/44), 45 pp.

The statement in question is issued monthly by the Secretariat's legal Department in pursuance of Article 13 of the Regulations to give effect to Article 102 of the Charter adopted on 14 December 1946 by General Assembly resolution 97 (I).

The statement is divided into three parts: (I) Treaties and international agreements registered; (II) treaties and international agreements filed and recorded; (III) ratifications, accessions, prorogations, etc. concerning treaties and international agreements registered.

During October 1950, treaties and international agreements Nos 918 to 962 were registered; treaties and international agreements Nos. 242 and 243 were filed and recorded; and 17 treaties and agreements were ratified or prorogued.

*Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Second Session.* Fifth Session, Report of the Sixth Committee (A/1639, 8 December 1950; see also A/C.6/L.165 of 4 December 1950), 22 pp.

The Sixth Committee considered in numerical order the first four of the six parts of the Report of the International Law Commission (A/1316) on the work of its Second Session (June-July 1950), namely:



- (a) *General* (desirability of inviting the Commission to review its Statute with the object of recommending revisions thereof to the General Assembly—emoluments of the members of the Commission—extension of their term of office). The Committee recommended the revision of the Commission's Statute, the payment of a special allowance to its members, in addition to travel expenses, and the extension of their term of office by two years (as an exceptional measure).
- (b) *Ways and means of making the evidence of customary international law more readily available.* The Committee expressed its satisfaction at the work accomplished by the Commission and proposed to invite the Secretary-General, in preparing a future programme of work in this field, to consider the recommendations made by the International Law Commission on this subject (paragraphs 90, 91 and 93 of its Report) in the light of the discussions held and the suggestions made thereon in the Sixth Committee.
- (c) *Formulation of the Nürnberg principles* (cf. *Bulletin* Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, p. 563). The Committee proposed that Member States should be invited to furnish observations on the formulation of certain principles, recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and by the judgment of the Tribunal, proposed by the International Law Commission, and requested the Commission, in preparing the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind, to take account of all such observations made on this subject.
- (d) *Proposal for the establishment of international criminal jurisdiction* (cf. *Bulletin* Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, pp. 559-61). The Committee decided that a committee consisting of the representatives of 17 Member States should meet in Geneva in 1951 for the purpose of preparing one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals relating to the establishment and the statute of an international criminal court. Member States are to submit their observations on the above-mentioned committee's future report not later than 1 June 1952 and the question is to be placed on the agenda of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.

The General Assembly, at its 320th plenary meeting on 12 December 1950, adopted the following resolutions relating to the above subjects:

- (a) The International Law Commission is requested to review its Statute with the object of making recommendations to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly concerning revisions of the Statute which may appear desirable, in the light of experience, for the furtherance of the Commission's work (doc. A/1702 dated 13 December 1950); members of the Commission shall be paid travelling expenses, and shall also receive a special allowance, the amount of which shall be determined by the General Assembly (amendment of Article 13 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, doc. A/1703 of 13 December 1950; cf. doc. A/1648 of 9 December 1950); the term of office of the present members of the Commission shall be extended by two years, making a total period of five years from the date of their election (doc. A/1704 of 13 December 1950).
- (b) The Secretary-General is invited, in preparing his future programme of work as regards customary international law, to study the recommendations contained in the report of the International Law Commission and to report on this subject to the General Assembly (doc. A/1705 of 13 December 1950).
- (c) Member States are invited to furnish their observations on the International Law Commission's formulation of the Nürnberg principles (General Assembly Resolutions 95 I and 177 II), and the International Law Commission is requested, in preparing the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind, to take account of the observations made on this formulation by delegations to the General Assembly and of any observations which may have been made by Governments (doc. A/1706 of 13 December 1950).
- (d) As a final decision regarding the setting up of an international criminal court cannot be taken except on the basis of definite proposals, a committee composed of the representatives of 17 Member States will meet in Geneva on 1 August 1951 (doc. A/1707 of 13 December 1950; cf. doc. A/C.5/438 of 8 December 1950 and doc. A/1665 of 11 December 1950 on the financial implications of this resolution).



*Registration and Publication of Treaties and International Agreements.* Report of Sixth Committee (A/1626, 5 December 1950), 5 pp.

The problem of economies which might be effected in connexion with the registration and publication of treaties was considered by the Fifth and Sixth Committees during the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (doc. A/934 and A/1312), and also by the Secretary-General (doc. A/CN.1/R.24, A/1408). The Sixth Committee had before it a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America (doc. A/C.6/L.154) and draft amendments thereto proposed by the United Kingdom (doc. A/C.6/L.156). The discussion centred mainly round the problem of the publication of annexes (complete texts or comprehensive summaries for documents containing details of secondary importance). In the draft resolution which it adopted, the Committee noted the progress achieved in this field; invited all States (Members and non-members of the United Nations), parties to treaties or international agreements subject to publication under Article 12 of the regulations to give effect to Article 102 of the Charter, to provide the Secretary-General, where feasible, with translations in English and French which might be needed for the purposes of such publication; decided that a certificate of registration should be issued to the registering party or agency and also, upon request, to any party to the treaty (amendment to Article 7 of the regulations); decided that the said register should be kept in the English and French languages (amendment to Article 8 of the regulations); requested the Secretary-General to continue, as economically as possible, with less delay and without sacrifice of uniformity in style and record permanence, to publish all treaties in their full and unabridged form, including all annexes, provided however that, in the reproduction of annexes, less expensive methods of reproduction were employed; lastly, requested the Secretary-General regularly to review the free mailing list with a view to its possible reduction.

(Cf. doc. A/1700 of 13 December 1950—resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 320th plenary meeting on 12 December 1950; cf. doc. A/C.5/425 and—for the budgetary implications—doc. A/1652 of 9 December 1950 and A/1662 of 11 December 1950.)

*Memorandum on Soviet Doctrine and Practice with respect to Arbitral Procedure* (prepared by the Secretariat), International Law Commission. Second Session (A/CN.4/36, 21 November 1950), 24 pp.

This memorandum concerns Soviet doctrine, international treaties, commercial agreements, commercial arbitration, peace treaties, and terminology used in Soviet Russia. The Soviet doctrine accepts in principle the settlement of international disputes through arbitration, although it prefers the channels of diplomatic action and conciliation commissions (opinions expressed by Durdenevskii and Krylov; by Kozhevnikov, etc.). But the U.S.S.R. has not adhered to The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Indeed Lenin himself said that no international court of arbitration could, of itself, save mankind from the scourge of imperialist wars (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 281). The record of Soviet practice seems to indicate a preference for the procedure of setting up Mixed Commissions to settle possible disputes, a third party being appointed as "super arbiter". The procedure of arbitration is followed particularly for commercial agreements but, in recent treaties, there is a tendency to replace the word "arbitration" by the expression "*treteiskoe razbiratel'stvo*" (or to add "paritative" to the word "arbitration"). The report contains various terminological data, derived from a comparative study of several Russian dictionaries.

*Memorandum on Soviet Doctrine and Practice with respect to the Law of Treaties* (prepared by the Secretariat), International Law Commission, Second Session (A/CN.4/37), 1 November 1950, 42 pp. (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, p. 562).

The memorandum contains comments on the following subjects: use of the term "treaty" in Soviet doctrine and practice; capacity to make treaties; name given to a treaty in Soviet practice; form of a treaty; authority to conclude a treaty and the plenipotentiary for signature; ratification and date of coming into force; publication, interpretation and denunciation of treaties. Further, the memorandum reviews the



following problems: the *pacta sunt servanda* clause; the effect of later treaties; the effect of governmental changes in signatory countries; the effect of severance of diplomatic relations; the effect of territorial changes; the *rebus sic stantibus* clause; duress; extinction of a party; the effect of war on treaties. The memorandum is based on a series of treaties concluded by the U.S.S.R. since its inception, a review of Soviet literature on international law, and on an analysis of internal Soviet legislation (especially constitutional legislation).

*Memorandum on Soviet Doctrine and Practice with respect to the Régime of the High Seas* (prepared by the Secretariat). International Law Commission, Second Session A/CN.4/38, 21 November 1950), 17 pp. (cf. *Bulletin* Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, p. 562).

This memorandum deals with the problems of freedom of the seas (as a general principle), a definition of the high seas, and jurisdiction over navigation on the high seas, quoting opinions expressed by various Soviet authors (especially Vychnepolsky, Kogevnikov and Lakhtine) and giving illustrations from Soviet practice. The Memorandum establishes the following principles:

- (a) The U.S.S.R. can be classed among those States which recognize the principle of freedom of the seas;
- (b) The Soviet concept of freedom of the seas rejects military control over the seas as a weapon in the struggle for world domination;
- (c) The principle of freedom of the seas does not apply to spaces of water which cannot be reached from the ocean by seagoing vessels ("closed seas");
- (d) Nor does the régime of the high seas apply to the frozen Arctic Ocean. Sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean should attach to the Polar States within the limits of their "sectors of attraction". The proposed legal status of the high seas of the Arctic is, in essence, nearly identical with that of "territorial waters". All lands and islands located in the Northern Frozen Ocean are officially declared the territory of the U.S.S.R.;
- (e) The principle of free access to the high seas gives all countries the right to freedom of navigation, freedom to fish as an industrial occupation, to lay underwater telegraph cables, to exploit the depths of the sea and to fly across it freely in aircraft;
- (f) Soviet books contain criticism of the attempt made by the Institute of International Law (1927, Lausanne) to codify the law of the régime of the high seas.

### *Human Rights*

*Human Rights Day.* Fifth Session (A/1623, 5 December 1950), 1 p.

On the report of the Third Committee (A/1559), the General Assembly at its 317th plenary meeting on 4 December 1950 adopted the resolution inviting all States and interested organizations to adopt 10 December of each year as Human Rights Day. On that day, the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948 should be celebrated everywhere. All the above-mentioned States and organizations should exert increasing efforts in this field of human progress, and bring the said Declaration, which marks a distinct step forward in the march of human progress, to the attention of the peoples of the world.

*Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation: Future Work of the Commission on Human Rights.* Fifth Session (A/1620, 5 December 1950), 4 pp. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 217 (III), the Commission on Human Rights during its 1949 and 1950 sessions gave priority to the preparation of a draft International Covenant on Human Rights and measures for its implementation (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1950, p. 414 and Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, pp. 581 and 582). Ecosoc spent several meetings of its Fifth Session discussing this question, and decided under resolution 303 (XI) to transmit the draft Covenant together with the relevant documentation to the General Assembly for consideration with a view to reaching policy decisions.



After studying the report of the Third Committee (doc. A/1559), the General Assembly in its resolution of 4 December 1950 (317th plenary meeting) considered it essential that the Covenant should include provisions rendering it obligatory for States to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Covenant, and to take the necessary steps, including legislation, to guarantee to everyone the real opportunity of enjoying those rights and freedoms. Consequently, considering that the list of rights in the first 18 articles of the draft Covenant did not contain certain of the most elementary rights and that it must be completed, taking into account the principles and purposes of the Charter, the General Assembly called upon Ecosoc to request the Commission on Human Rights to continue to give priority in its work to the drawing up of a final draft of the Covenant and of measures for its implementation, with a view to submitting a revised draft to the General Assembly at its Sixth Session. The Commission on Human Rights should take into consideration in its work of revision of the draft Covenant the views expressed during its discussion at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly and at the Eleventh Session of Ecosoc, with a view to the addition in the draft Covenant of other rights, in particular those set forth by the U.S.S.R. in document A/C.3/L.96 (cf. docs. A/1576 and A/1559) and by Yugoslavia in document A/C.3/L.92.

Ecosoc is to request the Commission on Human Rights to study a federal State article as well as the ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, and to prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its Sixth Session, to consider the view that the rights and limitations listed in the Covenant should be expressed as clearly as possible; to proceed with the consideration of provisions to be inserted in the draft Covenant or in separate protocols for the receipt and examination of petitions from individuals and organizations with respect to alleged violations of the Covenant; and to take into consideration in its studies of questions relating to petitions and implementation of the Covenant, the proposals presented by Chile (A/C.3/L.81), Ethiopia and France (A/C.3/L.78), Israel (A/C.3/L.91/Rev.1 and A/C.3/L.91/Rev.1/Corr.1) and Uruguay (A/C.3/L.93); and to report to Ecosoc at its Thirteenth Session concerning the above matters. The Secretary-General should at the same time invite Member States to submit their views by 1951 concerning the draft Covenant by 15 February 1951.

Considering finally that the Covenant should be drawn up in the spirit and based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which regards man as a person, to whom civic and political freedoms as well as economic, social and cultural rights indubitably belong; considering that the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent, and that, when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man—the General Assembly decided to include in the Covenant economic, social and cultural rights and an explicit recognition of equality of men and women in related rights, and to call upon Ecosoc to request the Commission on Human Rights to include in the draft Covenant a clear expression of the said rights, and to take such steps as are necessary to obtain the co-operation of other organs of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies in their consideration of such rights.

### *Freedom of Information*

*Freedom of Information.* Volume II. Texts communicated by governments. United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, Lake Success, New York, 1950, 216 pp. (no price).

These volumes contain texts on freedom of information supplied by several governments at the request of the United Nations Department of Social Affairs. In the first chapter, there is a list of constitutional clauses in force in 27 States, in the Belgian Congo and in 14 Argentine provinces.

The second chapter contains the texts of legislative clauses and regulations, classified in four categories: special clauses and regulations concerning the press; special clauses and regulations concerning telecommunications (broadcasting); clauses



concerning media of information contained in penal codes and other legislative texts; special clauses and regulations concerning films.

The third chapter contains judicial clauses clarifying the interpretation and application of legal clauses in eight countries, and the last chapter gives the texts of codes of honour operative in ten countries.

*Freedom of Information.* Fifth Session, resolutions adopted at the 325th plenary meeting on 14 December 1950 (A/1746, 1747, 1748 of 18 December 1950), 2, 1, 2 pp. (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1950, p. 421).

The General Assembly adopted three resolutions at its 325th plenary meeting on 1 December 1950, as follows:

- (1) (A/1748, A/1630) on the *Convention on freedom of information*. Considering its own resolution 313 (IV) and the relevant recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights and that it is impossible to separate freedom of information from the pursuit of the UN's objectives, the General Assembly decided to set up a Committee of representatives of 15 countries with a view to preparing a draft convention on the freedom of information. This Committee was to meet as soon as possible, and at the latest on 1 March 1951. Its draft was to take into consideration the draft approved by the UN Conference on freedom of information of 1948, the text adopted by the General Assembly at its Third Session, Article 14 of the provisional text of the First International Covenant on Human Rights, and the comments in the minutes of the meetings of the Third Committee dealing with this question. Ecosoc was to study the Committee's report at its Thirteenth Session and to call together before 1 February 1952 a conference of plenipotentiaries with a view to drawing up and signing a Convention (cf. docs. A/1667, A/C.5/427, A/C.5.430 and A/1645).
- (2) (A/1746, A/1630) on *interference with radio signals*. Considering Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 44 of the International Telecommunication Convention of 1947; considering that the duly authorized radio operating agencies in some countries are deliberately interfering with the reception by the people of those countries of certain radio signals originating beyond their territories; considering further that peace among nations rests on the goodwill of all peoples and governments—the General Assembly adopted Ecosoc Resolution 306 B (XI); condemned measures of this nature as a denial of the right to information of all persons; and invited Member States to refrain from such interference with the right of their peoples to freedom of information. At the same time, all Governments were invited to refrain from radio broadcasts that would mean unfair attacks or slanders against other peoples anywhere, and in so doing to conform strictly to an ethical conduct in the interest of world peace by reporting facts truly and objectively. Member States were invited to give every possible facility to enable their peoples to learn objectively about the activities of the United Nations in promoting peace and, in particular, to facilitate the reception and transmission of the official UN broadcasts.
- (3) (A/1747, A/1630) on *freedom of information and of the press in exceptional circumstances*. Considering that freedom of information and of the press is one of the fundamental liberties which must be guaranteed and secured; considering the possibility of restrictions being placed on that freedom as a result of, or on the pretext of, exceptional circumstances; the General Assembly recommended all Member States which might find themselves obliged to declare a state of emergency to restrict the freedom of information and of the press only in wholly abnormal circumstances and to the minimum extent warranted by those circumstances.

#### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

*Teaching about the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.* Special Supplement No. 1. Lake Success, New York, July 1950, 76 pp.

In order to make the United Nations Charter and activities more widely known, the Secretary-General of UN and the Director-General of Unesco were requested to submit



to the Council a complete analytical report on the progress achieved in teaching about the United Nations in the educational institutions of Member States.

All the reports from the different countries emphasize the importance of introducing teaching about the United Nations into pre-school and school education, and draw particular attention to the usefulness of the Anglo-Saxon method of organizing debates. Little information has been received on teaching about the United Nations in institutions of higher education. The report reviews efforts made to introduce such teaching into adult education courses and teachers' training courses. It deals separately with teaching about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The second part of the report contains an analysis of the role of non-governmental organizations (special committees, broadcasts, contests, lectures, celebrations). Some 90 organizations have been admitted to consultative status, which enables them to present their views to Ecosoc.

There follows a brief account of the programmes and services of the United Nations and Unesco. As far as the United Nations is concerned, the report draws attention to its objectives and methods (centres for seminar members and conferences, training courses, observance of special days throughout the world . . .). With regard to Unesco, its programme is more especially a university programme; it concentrates on schools and universities, using a system of propaganda competitions, seminars and publications.

The report ends with a series of 10 suggestions regarding propaganda methods to be adopted in carrying out this difficult task.

*Rules for the calling of Non-Governmental Conferences by the Economic and Social Council.* General Assembly, Fifth Session (A/1697), 13 December 1950, 2 pp.

By Resolution 367 (IV) of 3 December 1950, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, after consultation with Ecosoc, draft rules for the calling of non-governmental conferences (cf. A/1632, E/1723). In Resolution 335 (XI) of 20 July 1950, Ecosoc approved the Secretary-General's draft and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly adopted an amended version of the draft rules (A/1333, A/C.6/L.161, 166, 167, 168).

By a resolution of 12 December 1950 (320th plenary meeting), the General Assembly adopted the said rules, under which Ecosoc, after consultation with the Secretary-General, may at any time decide to call a non-governmental conference. When it has decided to do so, it shall prepare the provisional agenda, fix the date and place of the conference, its duration, the number of participants and the method of inviting them, and make the necessary financial arrangements. Under Article 71 of the Charter, national organizations without consultative status may be invited only after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. Ecosoc may decide to entrust the Secretary-General with any of the tasks incumbent upon it under the rules relating to the fixing of the date, place and duration of a non-governmental conference, invitations and any arrangements necessary in connexion with the conference. The Secretary-General shall in any case notify all Members of the United Nations of the Conference, sending them copies of the provisional agenda and informing them of the invitations issued.

### *Social Questions*

*Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.* Report on the meeting of Specialized Agencies and International Organizations concerned with the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, convened under the auspices of the United Nations at Geneva in May 1950; Social Commission, Seventh Session (E/CN.5/223, 20 July 1950), 92 pp.

The first conference of specialized agencies and international organizations interested in the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, held in Paris in August 1948 (doc. E/CN.5/104), adopted a resolution at the close of its session requesting the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations, of a permanent committee of



the specialized agencies and principal organizations invited by the United Nations to co-operate in the task of prevention of crime and treatment of offenders.

In pursuance of the above resolution, representatives of ILO, Unesco and WHO and also of 11 international organizations met in May 1950. The meeting discussed liaison and co-ordination between the specialized agencies, international organizations and the United Nations, and the most appropriate means of ensuring it (especially the establishment of a permanent committee to prevent the accumulation of requests for enquiries, questionnaires, reports and publications, to avoid overlapping of activities and dispersion of effort, and to ensure rational distribution, according to date and place, of conferences and congresses). Discussions also took place on the following subjects: the dissemination of information and the publication of a bulletin by the United Nations, the aims to be achieved (possible rules to be followed, recommendations, conventions, technical assistance), the organization of regional conferences of experts and quinquennial world congresses, the technical aspect of subjects included in the programme, etc.

In a resolution adopted unanimously, the institutions and organizations represented at the meeting decided to continue to offer the Secretary-General of the United Nations their wholehearted co-operation in carrying out the programme of work and plan of action. A Permanent Committee was set up, it being understood that the United Nations Secretariat would ensure the necessary co-ordination. The meeting warmly approved the publication by the United Nations of a periodical on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders. It was agreed that the United Nations Secretariat should be kept informed of the activities of the organizations concerned, as well as of the choice of experts or technical assistants needed to carry out technical and scientific work.

*The Problem of Statelessness.* Information from States on provisions for the avoidance of statelessness (E/1869/Add.1-4, 14-19 December 1950), 2, 1, 2, 2, pp.

In pursuance of Ecosoc's resolution 319 B iii (XI) on means of reducing the number of stateless persons, the Secretary-General has published communications on this subject from the following authorities: the Chilean Government (Add.1), the Government of Ceylon (Add.2), the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (Add.3), the Governments of New Zealand (Add.4), Ecuador (Add.5), and Greece (Add.6). These communications set forth the administrative conditions to be fulfilled by aliens in order to obtain naturalization in the countries concerned, and explain that stateless persons are treated on the same footing as any other foreign national (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1950, p. 412, p. 418, p. 421).

*Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons.* Second Session, August 1950 (E/1850, E/AC/32/8, 25 August 1950), 33 pp.

After considering the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems (E/1618), Ecosoc adopted the following resolution (E/1818): in submitting the said report to the General Assembly, together with the comments of Governments thereon, Ecosoc requests the Secretary-General to reconvene the *Ad Hoc* Committee in order that it may prepare revised texts of its draft agreements in the light of comments of Governments and of Specialized Agencies, and of the discussions and decisions of Ecosoc.

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee contains the Preamble and Article 1 of the "Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees", together with the Committee's comments thereon.

Annex I contains the revised draft Convention, and Annex II the Draft Protocol relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (cf. also the London Agreement of 15 October 1946, given in document E/1112, page 161, relating to travel documents and corresponding in content to Article 23 of the draft Convention; cf. doc. E/1806 of 1 August 1950; first report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee; doc. E/1814 of 10 August 1950; second report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee).



## Human Rights

*Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation: Future Work of the Commission on Human Rights.* Memorandum by the Secretary-General. Twelfth Session (E/1880, 26 December 1950), 8 pp.

As requested by Ecosoc in its resolution 303 D (XI), the Secretary-General transmitted to ILO the proposals for the insertion in the Draft Covenant on Human Rights of the relevant articles on economic and social rights, and made the necessary arrangements for obtaining any collaboration he might think desirable from the other Specialized Agencies. The replies of all the Specialized Agencies were to be submitted to the Commission on Human Rights so that, in accordance with Ecosoc resolution 303 C (XI), it might proceed at its Seventh Session with the consideration of additional covenants and measures dealing with economic, social, cultural, political and other rights and of additional proposed articles.

Replies having been received from ILO, FAO, ICAO, IRO and ITU, as well as from the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Secretary-General published the texts in an Annex to his memorandum (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, pp. 580, 581 and 582).

Since the ILO proposed to send it its report at a later date, and since the other Specialized Agencies made no comment on the principles involved, special attention should be given to the report by IRO. This organization emphasized that, for the refugee, the most important of all the rights provided for under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the right to work, which is the basic prerequisite for his integration in the national community of his country of residence. In its present form, however, the Draft Covenant did not contain two rights which are mentioned in the Universal Declaration and are of great importance for refugees, namely the right of asylum and the right to a nationality. For the refugee, the former is a corollary to the right to live (cf. doc. E/CN.4/392, E/CN.4/353, E/600, para. 48, E/1681, para. 80). The latter (cf. docs. E/1818 and E/CN.4/41/Rev.1, para. 2) is related to the problem of the elimination of *de jure* statelessness. The important category of persons who are stateless *de facto* must also be borne in mind. Steps taken to secure the right to a nationality might not necessarily prove beneficial to the individual, because, while they would result in a reduction of the number of persons who are stateless *de jure*, they might at the same time lead to an increase in the number of persons who are stateless *de facto*, and whose position as regards the enjoyment of human rights is often even more precarious (cf. doc. E/CN.4/41/Rev.1). Hence the incorporation of such rules, desirable as they may be, must depend on the conclusion of an international convention on human rights and on its effective enforcement. In any case, the right to expatriation and to emigration should be safeguarded.

## Economic Problems

*International Action for the Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products.* Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations (E/C.2/280, 4 December 1950), 6 pp.

The Secretary-General received a proposal from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, a non-governmental organization in Category A consultative status, that in accordance with Council resolution 288 (X), the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations should request him to include in the Council's provisional agenda an item on international action for the stabilization of prices of primary products.

In support of this request, the above-mentioned Confederation submitted a memorandum which is reproduced in the present document. It is pointed out that, since the beginning of the war in Korea and the intensification of military defence measures in many countries, a sudden and marked rise has taken place in the wholesale and retail prices of a number of commodities. This has already affected the cost of living and led trade unions in many countries to demand wage adjustments in order to prevent a decline in real wages. An inflationary spiral is in the offing which threatens to increase social tensions, to bring about social and political unrest, and to imperil the policies of



economic stability, full employment, and economic and social progress. This inflationary trend illustrates the need for international action for the stabilization of the prices of primary commodities.

The Confederation suggested that Ecosoc should adopt a resolution inviting the governments of those countries which are large producers or consumers of the most important primary products traded on international markets to conclude international commodity agreements. The purpose of such agreements should be to prevent extreme fluctuations from bringing a continuous element of insecurity and unbalance to the markets and the economy. The resolution should further recommend that participating countries should make contributions to a joint fund which could be used to provide subsidies for the purpose of keeping the prices of primary commodities in balance.

The memorandum is illustrated by three tables showing commodity prices on the New York market between 22 June and 22 September 1950 (percentage increases from 8.9 to 105.2 per cent), the production of natural rubber by countries in 1949, and the production of motor vehicles in 1949.

*Lowering of the Workers' Standard of Living: a Result of War Economy.* Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations (E/C.2/281, 6 December, 1950), 30 pp.

The World Federation of Trade Unions, a non-governmental organization with consultative status in Category A, has proposed to the Secretary-General, in accordance with Resolution 288 (X), that the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations should request him to include in the Council's provisional agenda an item on the lowering of the workers' standard of living as a result of war economy.

The World Federation of Trade Unions' memorandum which is given in the present document, points out that the trend shown in a considerable number of countries towards a war economy is no longer to be doubted, and that its effects are directly and profoundly felt by the mass of the populations, and in the first place by the agricultural and industrial wage-earners. They suffer more than other levels of the population from the rise in prices, the increase in taxation and the reduction of expenditure on social welfare. It is therefore the duty of Ecosoc to determine in its researches the means capable of stopping this dangerous development, and to take effective steps to develop a peace economy and raise the standard of living among the peoples.

The memorandum goes on to give information about the volume of military expenditure in the various countries, the structure of budgets and social expenditure, production of war material, the decrease in the production of consumer goods, the rise in prices, the disequilibrium of production, wage policy, and profits.

In conclusion, the WFTU states that, acting in accordance with their interests and their fundamental aspirations, the workers and their trade union organizations are reaffirming their wish for the development of a peace economy.

*Questionnaire on the Tax Treatment of Foreign Nationals, Assets and Transactions.* Fiscal Commission: Reply by the Governments of Sweden (E/CN.8/46/Add.15, 28 February 1950) and of Canada (E/CN.8/46/Add.18, 6 December 1950), 42 plus 54 pp.

In accordance with Ecosoc Resolution 67 (V), paragraph 2 (m) of 24 July 1947 (doc. E/CN.8/W.19 of 5 August 1948), the Secretary-General has collected the replies to the questionnaire on the tax treatment of foreign nationals, assets and transactions.

The replies of the Governments of the various Member States to the questionnaire have been published as document E/CN.8/46 and addenda.

The two documents in question therefore form part of the series of such replies. They contain detailed information supplied by the Governments of Sweden and Canada concerning direct taxation (on income, on capital gains, on capital and property taxes, on succession and gift taxes, and on capitation and head taxes) and indirect taxation (sales taxes, taxes on transport and means of communication, stamp duties, license and occupational taxes and social security taxes).

*Situation in respect of Ratification of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).* Transport and Communications Commission, Fifth



Session, 19 March 1951. Note by the Secretary-General (E/CN.2/107, 12 December 1950), 3 pp.

At its Third Session, the Transport and Communications Commission drew Ecosoc's attention, in a resolution, to the fact that the Convention establishing IMCO had not yet come into force and that the solution of various urgent and important problems affecting international transport would be greatly facilitated when this Organization started to function.

At its Fourth Session, the Commission was confronted with the same difficulty and recommended to Ecosoc the adoption of a resolution drawing the attention of Member Governments to the desirability of an early establishment of IMCO. That resolution was adopted unanimously by the Economic Committee of Ecosoc in August 1950. During the debate, several members indicated the position and views of their respective Governments on this subject, and the member for the United States pointed out that his Government had ratified the Convention. Certain countries had, however, decided not to ratify until the major maritime Powers (those owning large tonnages of shipping) had reached a decision.

Ecosoc thereupon adopted a resolution instructing the Secretary-General to draw the attention of Member Governments to the fact that the handling of the problems of international transport (especially of the unification of tonnage measurement and the pollution of sea water) was dependent upon the establishment of IMCO, and that an early establishment of the latter was desirable.

In his note the Secretary-General stated that the Convention in question had so far been ratified by Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In the meantime, a number of Specialized Agencies (e.g. ITU, WHO) expressed their regret that IMCO had not yet started work, and hoped that a procedure for shipping, similar to that used by ICAO for aviation, might be adopted in the near future, as soon as IMCO began functioning.

*European Steel Trends in the Setting of the World Market.* Prepared by the Steel Section of the Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, February 1951, 37 pp. (no price). Taking an overall view of world problems, the United Nations study the big economic regions, first isolating them, and then replacing them within the setting of world economy. The European iron and steel industry was the subject of a study presented in 1949, in which the Economic and Social Council studied its evolution and prospects. Since then, statistical data have gradually become available, and certain parts of the original study have now been revised and incorporated in the present pamphlet.

The problem of the European iron and steel industry is considered from the European and the international angles.

The steel production and consumption estimates for 1953 in Europe are corrected. Whereas in 1949 it was expected that there would be a world output of 70,290,000 tons in 1953, present European plans aim at a production total of 74,760,000 tons in 1953, of which 62,230,000 for Western Europe and 11,530,000 for Eastern Europe. These aims will, it seems, be easily attained under present conditions.

European steel consumption in 1953 is estimated at about 60,000,000 tons, of which 11,000,000 in Eastern Europe and 49,000,000 in Western Europe, but rearmament and the application of the Schuman Plan may increase consumption beyond these estimates, the former by increasing demand and the latter by lowering costs.

Nevertheless, a considerable excess of production over consumption may be expected in 1953. In normal circumstances this would be in the neighbourhood of 14,700,000 tons, of which 500,000 in Eastern Europe and 14,200,000 in Western Europe. The problem is here related to the world steel market.

A study of the markets becoming available for European exports shows: (a) that Europe is in process of regaining its pre-war position as regards imports into under-developed countries (on the average 80 per cent of imports into Africa, the Middle and Far East and Latin America); (b) that the most important markets for European steel will be Africa and the Middle East; (c) that total European steel exports in 1953 are estimated at only 6,100,000 tons.

These are all merely estimates, which the future may prove wrong. At the same



time, the Economic and Social Council recalls the measures it recommended in 1949 to promote an increase in European consumption and the winning of new markets, namely a reduction in steel costs, the expansion of scientific research, maximum possible freedom of trade, and restraint on prices.

### *Vocational Training in Public Administration*

*Problems of Public Administration* (Personnel Management). First Seminar (practical course) on Problems of Public Administration. Proposed outline of topics, Parts 1-2-3, (30 October 1950-31 January 1951), 6 pp.

The programme concerned (cf. *Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 4, Winter 1950, pp. 564-65) covers the following subjects: (I) Nature and Scope of Public Personnel Administration. (The Civil Service in the modern State, objectives and characteristics of personnel administration under the "merit system", factors which may hinder the establishment of a civil service based on merit, current trends and issues in public personnel administration, personnel administration as one of the functions of the central executive office.) (II) Organization for Personnel Management. (Types of personnel agencies, functions of personnel agencies, civil service laws and regulations.) (III) Instruments of Personnel Management. (Classification and "compensation" plans, staff rules and regulations, service rating system, pension schemes, forms and records.) (IV) Human Relations in Public Administration. (The human relations approach to personnel administration, morale and co-operation, discipline, public relations.) (V) The Education and Development of Public Personnel. (Training for the public service: pre-entry training; special training programmes: in-service training.) (VI) Methods and Techniques of Personnel Administration. (Techniques: job classification, determination and administration of salaries and salary scales, recruitment and selection, evaluation of employees; codification of staff rules; establishment of pension schemes.) (VII) Personnel Administration as such. ("Dynamics of personnel administration", official supervisor-employee relation, placement, promotion, other forms of personnel action, labour turnover, working hours, leave.) (VIII) Welfare and Security Provisions. (Health and safety programmes, employee service activities, retirement.)

Some of the members of the seminar made a thorough visit of governmental administrative offices at the Federal, State or local levels, and also of various non-governmental bodies. This enabled them to follow individual programmes of work, according to their needs or preferences.

*Report on the Problem of the Human Relations Approach to "Personnel Administration"* by Georges D. Halsey. Programme of vocational training in public administration. First Seminar on Problems of Public Administration (Personnel Management), 14 November 1950, 13 pp.

The author observes that the rules governing human relations, which are based on the principles of the average man's behaviour, always prevail in reality over laws and regulations laid down by governmental authorities. There are not many of these fundamental and particularly simple rules of human behaviour, and they never change. Various forms of human behaviour, desires, fears, the need for moral and, secondly, economic security, are therefore to be attributed primarily to psychological causes. Personnel management, if it is to be sound, must take account of these fundamental factors which the author attempts to list, drawing attention to the overwhelming and decisive importance in all public administration of having a knowledge of the rules governing human relations.

*Report on the Problem of Obstacles to the Establishment and Maintenance of the "Merit System" in Personnel Management*, by Harvey Walker. Programme of vocational training in public administration. First Seminar on Problems of Public Administration (Personnel Management), 2 November 1950, 15 pp.

The author briefly reviews the "merit system", talent, technical competence and professional knowledge, as a basis for recruitment and determining factor in the career of civil servants. He draws attention to the psychological, sociological, legal and



political aspects of the problem and gives a brief historical survey of the application of methods opposed to the "merit system": nepotism, partiality in recruitment, favouritism, political and personal protection. The consideration of administration as a career affects in many ways the selection, promotion and transfer of personnel and is closely bound up with the merit system and its particular technique. Professor Walker shows how difficult it is in practice to apply this system and advocates in "Personnel Management" the use of various scientific methods evolved by means of a comparative study of public administration conducted at the national level.

*Report on Training for Public Service* by Lynton K. Caldwell. United Nations programme of vocational training in public administration. First Seminar on Problems of Public Administration (Personnel Management), 1950, 15 pp.

Mr. Caldwell deals successively in his report with: certain essential characteristics of modern government, the transfer of the problem of training for public service to the international plane, recent trends in this field, training for administrative work in general (in Great Britain, the United States and France), in-service training, contribution of civil service associations to this work, and, lastly, the main problems of training for international civil service. The author illustrates his arguments by many references to the history of public administration on the European continent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He realizes that national institutions cannot be transferred from one country to another, but he stresses the fact that, following the example of the United States at the federal level, the practical results obtained in each country might be shared with the others, in the interests of improving or reforming national or international administration.

*Problem of Personnel for Public Service.* First Seminar on Problems of Public Administration (Personnel Management). Report by Leonard D. White, 31 October 1950, 5 pp.

Professor White (Chicago University) draws attention to the importance of comparative studies in the field of public administration for those who seek to understand the differences between the various national preferences and achievements. It should be realized how enormous are the tasks, accumulated in 2,000 years of history, facing public services today. People everywhere are beginning to recognize the specific character of personnel management and to realize that it is a problem of vital importance to the smooth running of any administrative machinery.

*Problem of Personnel for Public Service.* First Seminar on Problems of Public Administration. Report by Mr. Benedicto Silva, 30 October 1950, 8 pp.

Opening speech of the First Seminar organized as part of the programme of vocational training in public administration. The speech consists of a brief statement of the main problems relating to the recruitment of administrative civil servants, the application of the "merit system", vocational training methods, salaries and allowances. Mr. Silva defines the aims of personnel management in public administration: greater output, economy, excellent morale of staff, cordial relations between civil servants and the public. He then lists 14 conditions conducive to good work by governmental civil servants: technical ability and special talents, feeling of security, prestige, good morale, etc. He stresses the fact that this is a serious economic problem, considering that several States are obliged to devote 75 per cent of their budgets to administrative costs. The United Nations seminars, conceived as part of a long-term personnel programme, should help people to understand the problem and promote international co-operation in this field.

#### *Trusteeship Council*

*Rural Economic Development of the Trust Territories.* General Assembly, Fifth Session (A/1613, 4 December 1950), 1 p.

Recognizing that the equitable distribution and the proper utilization of the land together constitute one of the essential conditions in ensuring, maintaining and



promoting the economic and social advancement of inhabitants of Trust Territories, the General Assembly recommended the Trusteeship Council: (a) to study the prevailing policies, laws and practices which in the Trust Territories relate to land, land utilization and the alienation of land, taking into account the present and future needs of the indigenous inhabitants from the standpoint of the international trusteeship system, and the future economic requirements of the said Territories, as well as the social and economic consequences of the transfer of land to non-indigenous inhabitants; (b) to make such recommendations to the Administering Authorities concerning the prevailing policies and practices mentioned in this study as might be conducive to the economic and social development of these Territories. The Trusteeship Council was requested to report to the following session of the General Assembly on the work done in this connexion.

*Abolition of Corporal Punishment in Trust Territories.* General Assembly, Fifth Session, (A/1615, 4 December 1950), 1 p.

Having regard to the report of the Fourth Committee (doc. A/1546) and recalling Resolution 232 (IV), adopted at its 316th plenary meeting on 2 December 1950, the General Assembly noted the several statements contained in the report of the Trusteeship Council to the effect that corporal punishment was still being applied in Trust Territories, recommended that measures be taken immediately to bring about the complete abolition of such punishment in all Trust Territories, and requested the Administering Authorities of those Territories to report at the following session of the General Assembly on the steps taken by them.

This resolution followed on the Trusteeship Council's recommendation requesting the immediate abolition of corporal punishment in all Trust Territories where it is still applied.

*Trusteeship Council.* Official Records. Fourth Session. Supplement No. 2. United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa: Report on Ruanda-Urundi and related documents. Lake Success, New York, Dec. 1950, 140 pp. (\$1.50).

After an introduction showing how the Mission learnt of the present situation in the territory of Ruanda-Urundi, the first chapter of the report deals with political and administrative questions. It would appear that Belgium has maintained most of the former native political machinery, but that she nevertheless retains the essential attributes of power, while having made the native authorities into efficient and valuable executive organs. The Belgian administration has encouraged the development of the political structure of native society.

The report goes on to make certain recommendations. Education, both of the masses and of their leaders, should be intensified; there should be fuller native participation in the direction of the Territory's affairs; there should be further and more rapid democratization of the political structure; the attitude of paternalism adopted by the European administration should be abandoned. The Council of the Vice-Government-General, an advisory body in which the natives should in principle be represented, has been given less prominence than would be desirable. The Mission recommends that the Belgian Government should make the administrative union with the Belgian Congo more flexible, and effectively distinguish between justice and administration.

Passing on to economic questions, the Mission took geographical factors fully into account: Ruanda-Urundi is a poor country, concerned mainly with agriculture and stock-breeding, and therefore strongly affected by erosion and irregular rainfall. While the Belgian administration has made a considerable effort in this connexion, in the form of drainage, new food crops, etc., the threat of famine persists, and it is proposed to meet it by building silos. Although considerable advances have been made in industrial crops, stock-breeding still presents considerable problems.

There has, however, been great progress in re-forestation, which was particularly urgent, and in fishing. Mining, which is a concession in the hands of European companies, contributes to the State Treasury, which retains a control over the administration of the companies.

Trade is entirely in the hands of Europeans and Asiatics. Native trade might be given more encouragement. The Mission noted the satisfactory state of the road



system, but regretted that maintenance was still largely based on the unpaid work of native communities.

After observing that taxes are collected without much difficulty and do not seem to impose a crushing burden on the natives, the Mission took note of the introduction of savings schemes and of a co-operative movement, and of the fact that a 10-year plan is under consideration.

The third chapter of the report deals with social questions. In it, the Mission tackles the problem of public health, and notes that, despite the progress already made, much still remains to be done, because of the density of the population.

The natives do not appear to suffer from their highly inadequate housing arrangements; a building programme has been begun with very easy terms of payment.

With regard to labour, serious indiscipline is liable to imprisonment; the harshness of the penalties should be diminished. Wages are exceedingly low, but so is the yield of native labour and the desire for possessions. Nevertheless, in the view of the Mission, a rise in wages would act as a very desirable incentive. The use of the whip, still quite common, should be abolished, and it would seem necessary to modify the disciplinary system in the prisons.

There is clearly some discrimination, such as separate living quarters, against Asiatics residing in the Territory; the Mission considered that certain such measures, which were superfluous, might be repealed.

As regards education, there has been great progress: two-thirds of the children of school-age now attend school. The most important work in primary education has been done by religious bodies, either subsidized or not. It would be possible, whilst taking account of this work, to open some new secular government schools in addition to the denominational schools, so as to give complete freedom of conscience. It would also be advisable to make religious classes optional throughout. By contrast, secondary education is manifestly inadequate. The only school at Astrida has a mere 201 pupils. While the question is still premature, advanced education can temporarily be provided by the facilities offered to natives who wish to study in Belgium. Technical and vocational training is still embryonic. The training of teachers is inadequate; and teaching for girls should be brought to equality with teaching for boys, which is at present far in advance.

Finally, the UN Mission briefly summarizes its conclusions on the results of the visit, publishing as annexes various documents relating to its terms of reference, as well as the texts, together with the Mission's observations on them, of twelve petitions received by it.

*Trusteeship Council. Official Records. Fifth Session. United Nations, Lake Success, N.Y., 1950, XVIII. 327 pp. (\$3.50).*

This bilingual annex contains the documents relating to six items of the Agenda discussed at the Fifth Session of the Security Council. Item 4 of that Agenda was an examination of annual reports on the administration of Trust Territories; the Annex contains the reports relating to New Guinea, Nauru and the Pacific Islands. There follows the text of a number of petitions presented to the Council by various persons or associations, relating in particular to Tanganyika, Ruandi-Urundi, Togoland and New Guinea. Item 7 of the agenda—reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa—occasioned the publication of numerous petitions in addition to the report itself, accompanied by observations from the United Kingdom Government or the administering authority. A memorandum prepared by the Secretariat on the revision of the rules of procedure is the only document under Item 9 of the agenda. The documents relating to the next item—Administrative Unions affecting Trust Territories—are as follows: the report of the Committee on Administrative Unions, observations of the United Kingdom Government on that report, a draft resolution presented by Mexico and the U.S.A., and amendments to that draft presented by the Philippines and Australia. Under Item II of the Agenda—Educational Advancement in Trust Territories—the Annex contains a joint memorandum from Belgium, France and the United Kingdom on the proposal for a Trust Territory university in Africa, and a report by the Committee for higher education in Trust Territories. Lastly, a note by the Secretary-General and a draft resolution submitted by the Philippines relate to the question of South-West Africa, which was added to the agenda during the session.



## THE SECRETARIAT

*UNO Administrative Tribunal.* Rules of the UNAT adopted by the Tribunal on 7 June 1950, General Assembly (A/CN.5/1 of 15 June 1950), 13 pp.

By its resolution of 24 November 1949 (4th Session, 225th plenary meeting), the General Assembly set up the "UN Administrative Tribunal" whose Statute came into force on 1 January 1950 (doc. A/1142). The Tribunal is an international legal body having limited administrative jurisdiction both as regards persons (it exists solely for conflicts between international officials and the Administration) and matter (it is intended solely to decide on the non-observance of the conditions or contracts of employment of those officials, the terms "contract" and "conditions of employment" being taken to mean all provisions of the Statute and rules in force at the time of the alleged non-observance, including the provisions governing staff pensions).

In accordance with the provisions of the said Statute, the UNAT drew up its own rules for the organization of the Tribunal, its ordinary and extraordinary plenary sessions, its procedure (oral or written), and applications made to it. The UNAT elects a President and two Vice-Presidents each year from among its members, who are appointed by the General Assembly. Ordinary plenary sessions are held once a year. The President designates the three members of the Tribunal who constitute the Tribunal for the purpose of sitting in each particular case or group of cases. Application for proceedings before the Tribunal is made on the basis of the form given in Annex I, in one of the five official UN languages, and the Administration delivers its answer to the Tribunal within 30 days from the receipt of the application. Oral proceedings are held if the presiding member so decides or if either party so requests; they may include the presentation and examination of witnesses or experts, as well as oral argument by the parties concerned.

Annex II gives a model form of application for *intervention* by persons to whom the Tribunal is open under paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal, on the ground that they have a right which may be affected by the judgment to be given (cf. doc. A/CN.5/3 on the competence of the Tribunal to award costs).

*Permanent Staff Regulations of the United Nations.* Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, Fifth Session (A/1360, 13 September 1950), 24 pp.

Acting on more than four years of experience in administering the UN Secretariat and in co-ordinating international agencies, the Secretary-General, in agreement with the Specialized Agencies, has drawn up a Common model of Permanent Staff Regulations (cf. docs. A/435, A.C.5/331, Co-ord./Civil Service/2/Rev.1). He points out the obvious advantages of establishing permanent conditions of employment and the rights, duties and obligations of the Secretariat's personnel. He also suggests the need for training a unified international administration which would enable the various agencies to co-ordinate their staff policy and thus to avoid inequalities in the terms and conditions of employment, as well as competition between different administrations in the recruitment of personnel. This uniformity should be as complete as possible, it being understood that, in view of their diversity of structure, the Specialized Agencies draw up their own complementary rules to the basic fundamental regulations wherever more detailed or specific provision would appear desirable.

The common pattern of staff regulations, which was drafted with the agreement in principle of all branches of the UN's present administrative system, consists of 12 articles on general matters: duties, obligations and privileges; classification of posts and staff; salaries and related allowances; appointment and promotion; annual and special leave; social security; travel and removal expenses; staff relations; separation from service; disciplinary measures; appeals; and general provisions. These are all general principles which should guide the Secretary-General in the recruitment of staff, the direction of administration, and the establishment of any staff regulations.

The obligations of service are based in principle on unilateral *appointment* which forms the starting point for the civil servant's career; no amendment of the Statute can prejudice the *acquired rights* of any member of the staff.

The annex contains a comparative table of the proposed Permanent Staff Regulations and the Provisional Staff Regulations of UN. [General Assembly resolution 13



(I), amended by resolutions 82 C (I), 161 (II) and 352 (IV)] (Cf. doc. A/1731 of 14 December 1950. Report of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly postponing the study of the permanent staff regulations to the Sixth Ordinary Session of the General Assembly.)

*Staff Rules.* Secretary-General's Bulletin No. 81, Rev. 2 (ST/AFS/SGB/81/Rev. 2, of 1 January 1951), 72 pp.

The UN Secretary-General published a complete set of new staff rules for the Secretariat, which came into force on 1 January 1951. These superseded the Staff Rules previously published in the Administrative Manual. They contained more detail than previously and were divided into several paragraphs. In particular, Chapters 12 and 14 relating to manual workers and consultants disappeared and were incorporated into the new Chapters 1-11.

The Rules fall under the following chapter headings: (1) Duties and responsibilities (Rules 2-19). (2) Salaries and related allowances (Rules 20-49). (3) Appointment and probation (Rules 50-69). (4) Promotions (Rules 70-74). (5) Leave (Rules 75-99). (6) Separations (Rules 100-119). (7) Travel (Rules 120-134). (8) Staff Committee (Rules 135-139). (9) Disciplinary measures and Joint Disciplinary Committee (Rules 140-144). (10) Joint Appeals Board (Rules 145-149). (11) Staff Welfare (Rules 150-159). (12) — (13) Personnel specifically engaged for conferences and other short term services (Rules 170-179). (14) — (15) Personnel of missions and the field service (Rules 190-199). (16) Personnel at established offices away from headquarters (Rules 200-9). (17) Personnel engaged as technical assistance experts (Rules 210-19). (18) Miscellaneous Provisions (Rules 220-229).

*Salary, allowance and leave systems of the United Nations.* Budget estimates for the financial year 1951. Report of the Secretary-General (A/1378, 19 September 1950), General Assembly, Fifth Session, 39 pp.

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its Third Session, the Secretary-General submitted a complete report on the salary, allowance and leave systems (cf. Doc. A/C.5/331/Add.1 of 15 November 1949) and in the present document presents his recommendations and conclusions concerning the problems raised in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and in that of the Committee of Experts on salary, allowance and leave systems (doc. A/C.5/331). In accordance with the views of the Fifth Committee (doc. A/1232), the Secretary-General modified certain administrative policies and procedures consistent with the present Staff Regulations; in addition, he commented on the recommendations of the Committees and himself submitted recommendations to the General Assembly.

The following six major points are set out: (1) the organization and classification of staff; (2) salary levels for internationally and locally recruited staff; (3) arrangements for the transition from the old to the new salary scales (maintenance of the old ceiling and date of application of the new scale to present staff); (4) frequency of home leave (every 2 or every 3 years); (5) repatriation grants and expatriation allowances; (6) rental allowance.

Annexed to the report are a summary of the principal recommendations concerning the salary, allowance and leave systems of the UN (recommendations of the Committee of Experts of 31 October 1949, A/C.5/331; recommendations of the Advisory Committee of 1950, A/1312 and A/1313; Secretary-General's original observations of 19 November 1949, A/C.5/331/Add.1; and Secretary-General's observations of 19 September 1950); the report of the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions, and the statements made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

*Report on the recruitment methods and standards for the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.* International Civil Service Advisory Board (Co-ord./Civil Service/2/Rev.1), 1950, 40 pp.

At its meeting on 13 February 1946, the General Assembly decided on the setting up of an International Civil Service Commission by the Secretary-General, to advise on



methods of recruitment by the Secretariat and on the adoption of common standards of recruitment in the Secretariat and the Specialized Agencies of UN. At its Fourth Session, the Advisory Committee on Co-ordination agreed on the establishment of an International Civil Service Advisory Board for the purpose of contributing to the improvement of recruitment and related phases of personnel administration in the international organizations. The Board advises not only the United Nations, but also ILO, FAO, Unesco, ICAO, etc.

In its detailed report, the Board gives its views in the form of advice on general recruitment policy, promotion as a means of filling posts, internal organization for recruitment, qualification standards, the search for candidates and their evaluation, and inter-agency transfers and promotions. It recognizes the difficulty inherent in certain tasks, but far from abandoning them on those grounds, it points out their great urgency. Outstanding men and women are needed if international organizations are to make a vital contribution to solving the complex and tremendously important problems which now confront the world. As regards recruitment, the Board recommends the maintenance of a proper balance between professional competence and geographical distribution. It further recommends the adoption of common recruiting standards for all agencies, without insisting on an identical system for all of them; and the adoption of the recommendations of the Expert Committee on salary, allowance and leave systems as to the organization and classification of staff (doc. A/C.5/331), which is summarized in the present document; finally, it calls for complete independence for the administrative Heads in recruiting staff.

## II. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

### INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

*Report of the Technical Aid Committee.* Governing Body, 113th Session, Brussels, November 1950 (G.B. 113/14/29), 14 pp.

The Committee studied the following problems:

- (a) ILO information on the development of the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme (G.B. 113/T.A.C./D.1), more particularly on the opening phases of its application: receipt of funds, co-ordination between participating organizations, effective assistance given.
- (b) Technical Assistance in ILO's spheres of interest (G.B. 113/T.A.C./D.2).
- (c) The ILO regular and special fellowships scheme (G.B. 113/T.A.C./D.3); choice of fellowship-holders in the non-self-governing territories; co-ordination of the programme with other fellowship schemes; monthly reports by fellowship-holders; travel allowances for fellowship-holders in the receiving countries. There are 27 regular fellowships for 1951 (of which three are awarded to natives of non-self-governing Trustee Territories under the control of the Netherlands, Portugal or New Zealand); there are 12 special fellowships for 1951. The annex gives details of the fellowship schemes, technical working groups for fellowships, travel for fellowship-holders, exchange programmes for European countries, etc.

*International Labour Conference.* Industrial Relations. I. Collective Agreements. Geneva 1951, 71 pp. (no price).

II. Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration. Geneva 1951, 71 pp. (no price). The International Labour Conference, at its Thirty-third Session (June 1950), decided to include the question of industrial relations in the agenda of its following session. The Office accordingly sent the text of two draft regulations on this subject to the Governments of Member States. The report contains the replies of 30 Governments and their draft recommendations, taking account of amendments and comments made in those replies. With regard to collective agreements, 12 Governments declared that they considered the Office's text satisfactory, and the 18 others have proposed various amendments; some of them informed the Office that they would prefer the formula of an international convention to that of a recommendation; four Member States



disagreed with the procedure of collective agreements; the word "representatives", as applied to workers' organizations, would give rise to many difficulties when working out a definition of agreements. The text of the draft recommendation relating to the effects of collective agreements both on the signatories thereto and on third parties is contrary in many cases to the laws in force in the different countries; the extension of agreements by means of regulations was rejected by seven countries, including the U.S.A. and Canada; arbitration in connexion with interpretation was also rejected by five countries. The text relating to supervision of the application of collective agreements did not satisfy several governments, partly because it left no place for labour inspectors, and partly because it provided, in the last resort, for governmental supervision. With regard to voluntary conciliation and arbitration, 16 countries were in favour of the Office's text and only 14 presented comments. Once again, Luxembourg and Poland considered that the regulations should take the form of a convention rather than a recommendation; various other countries desired certain terms in the six paragraphs on voluntary conciliation and arbitration to be changed or made clearer, but none of them—with the possible exception of Turkey, where conciliation and arbitration are compulsory—opposed the actual principle; Belgium and India proposed new paragraphs.

The report then regroups the various replies by subject, in order to reach practical conclusions. Of eight Governments in favour of a convention, three proposed that the regulations should take the form both of a convention and of a recommendation. The different paragraphs are next reviewed in the light of opinions expressed by Governments. The Governments of the U.S.A., India and Belgium suggested new provisions concerning the power of enforcement of arbitral decisions and their weight before a tribunal. On the basis of replies received from Member States, the Office submitted a draft recommendation to the Conference for its consideration; this draft is of necessity somewhat general, considering the volume and diversity of the measures taken in each country in connexion with industrial relations; in order to allow for the diversity of national regulations, the text presented is extremely flexible. In the first place, as 22 out of 30 countries made no objection to the form of the recommendation on the regulation of collective agreements, the Office preferred it to that of a convention, which was requested by only eight countries. On the other hand, it met minority suggestions on a number of definite points; whenever it was unable to do so, it explains why. The draft recommendation on voluntary conciliation and arbitration has hardly been changed. The report ends by giving the texts, in English and French, of the two draft recommendations, to be submitted to the General Conference of the International Labour Organization at its Thirty-fourth Session in June 1951.

*Methods of Establishing Labour Output Statistics.* Geneva, 1951, 155 pp. (3 Swiss francs). This report was prepared by the ILO for the Seventh International Conference of Labour Statisticians (Geneva, September 1949). After emphasizing the general importance of labour output, "the corner-stone of future economy", the report draws attention to the desirability, for particular processes, separate industries and whole countries, of possessing the most accurate statistics possible on differences and variations of labour output.

The report lists and analyses the main factors affecting the level of labour output: general factors, such as temperature, the use of more advanced or less advanced techniques, changes in the composition of products, the variable proportion of production of factories with a low output; technical factors connected with organization, such as the degree to which output capacity is used, the size of the undertaking, its equipment, fittings, the standardization of products, the length of working days or weeks, human factors: qualifications of workers, remuneration systems, organized competition, restrictive practices of trade unions.

The report adopts as a definition of labour output the general concept of "relationship of production to the corresponding amount of work done" and examines the problems raised by the amount of work, defined as "a mental or physical effort made over a certain length of time". Although the duration of the effort made can be measured, it is generally impossible to measure its quality. Therefore it is not entirely satisfactory to express it in terms of man-hours or man-years.



Whilst the distinction between direct and indirect work, although an inaccurate concept, seems justified by greater accuracy of results, the concept of "incorporated work", although theoretically interesting, can hardly be used, owing to measurement difficulties.

The concepts of "*per capita* production" and "man-hours" serve different purposes: the former is used to measure output in order to determine changes in the volume of production, the productive capacity of workers or production costs in labour units; the second is used to estimate labour needs or future national revenue. The heterogeneity of labour is a major obstacle to any accurate study of output.

Problems raised by the measurement of production vary according to whether it is a question of products or services: the latter can be measured only in, often inadequate, terms of value.

The specification of products in itself is often difficult: a sack of cement today has not the same composition that it had 50 years ago. Supposing, however, that specification problems were solved, it would still be necessary to take account of all the factors involved, which is tantamount to defining the product: overlappings are nevertheless frequent.

To assist comparisons between establishments varying in degree of integration, the value of net production can be used, but this concept is unsatisfactory in measuring absolute output. Generally speaking, the more detailed the classification adopted, the more information will be provided by the analysis. At the manufacturing firm level, measurements based on production processes are often preferable to measurements based on products.

If the production cycle is long, measurements worked out on the basis of short periods are valueless; the problem of measuring heterogeneous productions can be solved by adopting certain coefficients of balance.

Two general concepts of labour output exist: according to the first, output is considered as a specific characteristic of a product, an undertaking or an industry; in this case, averages for a group of components remain unchanged when particular outputs remain unchanged. According to the second concept, balance indices, the choice of which depends upon many factors, are attributed to particular outputs.

After reviewing these factors and different computation methods, the report shows how useful it is to compare production and labour indices; it lists the difficulties encountered in certain non-manufacturing industries, and draws attention to the considerable margin of inaccuracy involved in calculating the labour output of a nation.

Several special investigations, conducted in the United States, are then analysed from the point of view of methods used for the collection of data and their conversion into statistics.

One chapter deals with international comparisons, which raise not only the difficulties already mentioned but also certain special problems: different structures, conjuncture, choice of a conversion rate, etc. Enquiries restricted to certain sectors escape some of these difficulties.

After explaining that, for the purpose of assisting interpretation, output data should be accompanied by as much relevant information as possible, the report ends by putting forward a number of recommendations on definitions of measured quantities, computation processes, computation periods, conditions for the conducting of special enquiries, and the publication of data on labour output.

An Annex to the report contains a mathematical analysis of formulae of labour output, the text of the resolution adopted by the Seventh International Conference of Labour Statisticians, and a selection of references.

*Hours of Work in Coal Mines.* Coal Mines Committee. Fourth Session. Geneva, 1951, 46 pp.

In April 1949, the Coal Mines Committee of the International Labour Organization proposed the revision of Convention No. 46 limiting hours of work in coal mines. The Governing Body sent a note on this subject, drafted by the International Labour Office, to the Governments of Member States. The first part of the report contains comments sent by 30 Governments. Fourteen countries admitted that it was necessary



to revise the Convention, but, in some cases, they expressed very considerable reservations as to the desirability of such revision. Three others included general comments in their replies: the U.S.A. observed that the Convention had not been ratified by countries with a substantial amount of coal production and requested that its provisions should be made more flexible; Norway declined to take any position, owing to the special conditions in the Spitzberg mines; the Netherlands maintained its earlier position with regard to the question of spreadover; 15 countries refrained from expressing any definite views on the revision, as those in process of rapid industrial development (Chile, Turkey) could hardly reduce hours of work in the mines, owing to their low output. Owing to the country's federal constitution, Canada's position was a special one. Governments were more or less equally divided on the question of whether the Convention should be partially or completely revised; certain countries, France, for example, owing to the expected early settlement of problems raised by the Schuman plan, expressed doubts regarding the desirability of the revision. In the second part of the report particular clauses likely to be revised are reviewed. Certain countries were not in agreement on the actual definition of coal mines, nor on bringing surface workers within the scope of the Convention. There were almost as many different suggestions as there were replies on the question of the minimum working day and working week. Fourteen countries were in favour of greater elasticity in the clauses concerning the prohibition of employment on underground work on Sundays and legal public holidays, and 12 countries called for a re-examination of exceptions and the articles on overtime. Eleven Governments thought that the international convention could best be applied by means of collective agreements rather than by regulations. This was opposed by Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. With the exception of the Union of South Africa, all countries considered that it should be possible for the Convention to be suspended in case of exceptional economic circumstances; 23 replies contained requests for a guarantee that the Convention would be applied by the other countries concerned. The report ends with a study of two detailed points, calculation of time spent in the mine, and unhealthy workplaces. Appendices to the report contain the text of the letter notifying Member States of the decision taken by ILO's Governing Body, and the text of Convention No. 46 (23 Articles).

*Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee. Record of the Second Session.* Geneva, 1951, 157 pp. (no price).

The record contains an account of the proceedings of the Committee's Second Session in Rome in March 1949, attended by 102 delegates from 19 countries. After Count Sforza and Mr. Fanfani had extended a welcome to delegates on behalf of the Italian Government, and the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Committee had returned their thanks, the general discussion was opened. The Assistant Secretary-General made a statement on methods of work and briefly commented on the four reports submitted to the Committee; after the election of the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Altman, Government delegate, Poland, described the building industry in his country and emphasized the advantages of a planned economic system which was able to prevent crises liable to lead to a boom such as that of 1919-20. The third sitting opened with the appointment of three Sub-Committees, as recommended by the Steering Committee. Mr. Holoffe, Employers' delegate, Belgium, then read an employers' joint declaration on stability of employment in the industries covered by the Committee. Sir Harold Emmerson, Government delegate, United Kingdom, gave an account of progress achieved in his country in the fields of building and public works. Mr. Coppock, Workers' delegate, United Kingdom, spoke on the social aspect of the same problem, namely that of industrial relations and training. The last speaker at that sitting, Mr. Holoffe, suggested, in the light of experience in Belgium, ways of persuading private persons to invest in building. After speeches by Mr. Baryla, Workers' delegate, Poland, who paid tribute to social achievements in his country, Mr. Nijhoff, Government delegate, Netherlands, drew attention to the international aspects of the problems under discussion, and Mr. Tyler, Workers' delegate, Union of South Africa, explained the difficulties encountered in his country: unemployment and lack of organization of apprenticeship. Mr. Cingolani, Government delegate, Italy, confined himself almost entirely to analysing the situation of the Italian building



industry, whereas his Norwegian colleague, Mr. Bojer, drew the Committee's attention to problems of a general nature: seasonal unemployment and new techniques of prefabrication. The fifth sitting opened with speeches by Messrs. Reynolds, Government delegate, United States, and Kaine, Workers' delegate, Australia, who briefly gave a picture of the building industry in their respective countries. Mr. Agostini, Workers' delegate, Italy, gave a general picture of Italian industry, emphasizing the high proportion of unemployed—13 per cent to 14 per cent of the working population—which he attributed to the lack of any governmental plan. Messrs. Agnibhoj and Tripathi described India's special difficulties due to the lack of organization of the building industry in their country, and Mr. Dubinski, Employers' delegate, Poland, contrasted the situation of India with that of Poland, whose great achievements were due to new organizational methods: planning and nationalization of building. After a speech by Mr. Tupini, Minister for Public Works, Italy, the general discussion continued, and Mr. Kapadia, Employers' delegate, India, expressed doubts regarding the efficacy of governmental action in his country. Mr. Aublanc, Workers' delegate, France, protested against the substitution of the Marshall Plan for the Monnet Plan, a step which, in his opinion, had slowed up French reconstruction work; Mr. Bordaz, Government delegate, made strict reservations in regard to Mr. Aublanc's remarks. Mr. McDougall, Government delegate, Canada, expressed satisfaction at the development of the building industry in his country, while Mr. Gadola, speaking on behalf of Italian workers, gave reasons for the instability of the industry in Italy and suggested possible remedies. Mr. Smets, Workers' delegate, Belgium, drew particular attention to the problem of industrial training and recommended the planning of the building industry. The sixth sitting ended with a speech by Mr. Subercaseaux, Government delegate, Chile. Mr. Caterini, Workers' delegate, Italy, declared on behalf of the Free Italian Confederation of Building Workers, that only the investment of foreign capital could offset the lack of Italian capital. Mr. Parys, Government delegate, Belgium, gave a more favourable account than his compatriots of Government action in his country. Mr. Doyle, Australia, paid tribute to free enterprise, and Mr. Woolsey closed the general discussion by deploring, on behalf of Canadian workers, the political turn which certain speeches had taken. Replying to delegates, the Secretary-General thanked them for the informative character of their speeches and found a measure of compatibility between the views of the supporters of free enterprise and those of the supporters of total planning. At the eighth sitting, a vote was taken on the draft memoranda and resolutions submitted by the three sub-committees on industrial relations, industrial training and the instability of employment. The Committee decided upon the agenda for its Third Session and adjourned after the closing speeches. Annexed to the proceedings are the reports of the sub-committees and the memoranda and resolutions adopted by the Committee.

*Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee. Third Session, Geneva, 1951.*

General Report. Geneva 1951, 88 pp. (no price).

The first chapter describes action taken in the different countries in pursuance of resolutions of previous sessions of the Committee. As far as stability of employment in the building industry is concerned, Canada, whose investment policy helps it to meet the requirements of the employment programme, has done much to carry out the Committee's recommendations; the same is true of Denmark and Norway, where the accent is placed on the financial aspects of the problem; in India, on the other hand, the present organization of the building industry makes it difficult for such an attitude to be adopted. Further, and still in connexion with the idea of stabilizing employment, most countries describe their attempts at technical improvement, particularly by prefabrication methods and the establishment of research centres, and the stabilization of their building industries. With regard to industrial training, countries in general accept the Committee's point of view, while naturally taking account of the peculiarities of different local labour systems, and they appear willing to collaborate closely, at the international level, in exchanging information and even apprentices. It would be desirable for the provisions of the resolution concerning Recruitment, which are already applied in France, the United States and the United Kingdom, to be applied also in India and the Union of South Africa; on the other hand, efforts have been made almost everywhere



to apply the terms of the resolution concerning Labour-Management Co-operation.

The next chapter, entitled "Studies and Enquiries" first reviews all the public works reserve programmes which are available to meet possible under-employment situations, and notes that the existing results of economic research do not supply Governments with the necessary data to enable them to take decisions. It was on this account that the Housing Sub-Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe put forward, in 1949, a series of recommendations with the purpose of developing international exchange of documentation, in which the technical and economic aspects of building problems will occupy an important place, and of guiding research in this field along more practical lines. Dealing next with working conditions affecting health, the report describes the many dangers of paints, dust, varnishes, paint and varnish removers and other harmful products, the occupational diseases of various categories of building workers and means of protecting them against these dangers, either by medical prevention, general technical protection or personal protection of the individual worker. Finally, with regard to the safety of workers, it appears that fairly complete legislation exists and that many practical steps have been taken in the various countries to apply the Committee's recommendations.

In the third and last chapter, emphasis is laid on the magnitude of building needs as a result of the second world war. It is noted that most countries have had to regulate their building industry; that they have generally been obliged to control rents and to adopt a systematic investment policy with regard to building; and that, further, re-armament, equipment, and especially military equipment costs usually take priority over building in national programmes. After a brief account of technical developments in machinery and equipment, materials and building methods, the report closes with two short statements, on systems of payment by results, and silicosis, respectively.

*Welfare in the Construction Industry.* Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee. Third Session, Geneva, 1951, 39 pp. (no price).

This report deals with welfare problems in the construction industry.

The first rather brief chapter sets out the conditions giving rise to special problems in the construction industry, namely, the temporary nature of most of the sites, mobility of sites (e. g. road-building), location of sites, which may be distant from workers' homes or built-up areas, variations in the numbers employed according to the type of undertaking, and special problems concerning safety and hygiene.

The second chapter studies the possibilities of welfare development in the construction industry. It deals with the transport problem to and from work, which grows in importance as distances from the site become longer. Certain employers pay compensation for travelling time. Others provide transport to and from the site; reasonable comfort is demanded. On occasion the time spent in travel is reckoned as working time. Certain types of work require the provision of protective clothing, which is to an increasing extent provided for the workers free of charge.

The provision of suitably equipped shelters, as well as of changing rooms, is a necessity on almost all construction sites.

Where a firm provides sleeping accommodation for its employees, the dormitories must be as hygienic as possible. Where the firm provides collective meals, they must be substantial and healthy and served in suitable quarters. As soon as work of some duration is started on a site, essential sanitary facilities must be provided. Special allowances should be given to enable workers living far from the site to visit their families periodically.

In certain branches of construction, special working conditions give rise to particular health and safety problems: e.g. in caisson work and in cement works. Where the workers of one firm have to pass their leisure time together, it would appear necessary to provide for certain recreational activities. The welfare worker has an essential part to play. Parallel with this, co-operation should be developed between employers and workers. Many countries have gone very far in this direction. Efforts made by employers to provide better welfare amenities for their employees sometimes encounter difficulties arising out of competition. It would be desirable for contract documents to be more precise and to follow a standard pattern.



In conclusion, the Committee emphasizes the difficulty of laying down precise rules capable of application, in practice, to a variety of undertakings.

After recommending that the importance of economic problems and the effective help that can be given by a welfare officer should not be overlooked, the Committee recommends the development of committees, etc. on which both employers and workers would be represented, and of increased contacts with managements, so as to improve industrial relations.

In an appendix, the pamphlet lists various points for discussion.

*Fourth Conference of American States Members of the International Labour Organization. Montevideo, April-May 1949. Record of Proceedings. Geneva, 1951, xxiv, 289 pp. (no price).*

The present volume contains an administrative section, in addition to the debates on the Director-General's report, dealing in particular with the effects of industrialization on labour productivity in Latin America. Other debates deal with living and working conditions of native populations, conditions of employment for agricultural workers, and the settlement of labour disputes. The annex contains the texts of the resolutions proposed and adopted.

*Co-operative Organization. Regional Conference for the Near and Middle East. Teheran, April 1951. Geneva, 1950, 77 pp. (no price).*

The report, which begins by describing the present position of co-operative activity in the countries of the Near and Middle East, points out in the first place that the movement in this region, dating back about a quarter of a century, has been very slow and unequal in developing. In their order of diminishing importance, one can generally list credit co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives, consumer co-operatives, housing co-operatives, and several others even less developed. In contrast to other countries, where the co-operative movement derives its strength from a federal constitution, the chief role here is played by governments, which support the co-operatives by legal measures and public finance, subjecting them in return to certain controls.

The report goes on to study the part to be played by co-operation in the development of productive resources of the countries under review, and shows how rural production could be increased by setting up or developing growers' co-operatives and co-operatives for the supply of fertilizers, seeds or agricultural implements, and by encouraging irrigation, consolidation-of-holdings or credit co-operatives. Similarly, the development of co-operatives for the organization of credit, supply, marketing and production would be valuable for handicrafts and small-scale industries, which are particularly important in the region.

Co-operation would moreover seem to be just as useful at the distributive stage. Small and medium-sized producers cannot but gain from joining forces in such a way as to liberate themselves from middlemen and directly influence the market, either by means of straightforward marketing co-operatives or through the specialized distribution services of other forms of co-operative. Consumers have also every reason to form co-operatives of the staff of an undertaking, or merely "buyers' clubs", which collect orders from their members. Problems of regional or national groups and of initial credits arise in this connexion and, on the whole, can be solved only by governments.

After stressing the need for developing housing, nutrition, insurance and mutual relief co-operatives as part of a policy of social progress, the report tries to assess the conditions of future development. In the first place, the introduction or amendment of co-operative legislation must adopt a fairly precise definition of co-operation, although leaving it wide enough to cover co-operations multiple forms. There should also be widespread supervision of the activities and accounts of co-operatives, and systematic training should be organized, both for the workers and members of co-operatives. Finally, as part of their plans for co-ordination, governments should set up specialized services and encourage the formation of co-operative federations.

In conclusion, the report recognizes that the development of the co-operative movement must depend on the resources available to the various governments, but it points out that, if they are to be really useful, co-operatives must become less sporadic than they are at present.



*Labour Problems. Vocational Training and Organization of an Employment Regime.* Regional Conference for the Near and Middle East, Teheran, April 1951. Geneva, 1951, 47 pp. (no price).

This report, which aims at setting out the practical aspects of the problems relating to vocational training and the organization of an employment regime in the Near and Middle East, begins by emphasizing the general inadequacy of statistical data on the subject, and studies the employment situation in the countries under review. In general, agriculture employs about two-thirds of the population of the region, salaried wage-earners being only a small proportion of the total, owing to the preference shown by the big land-owners for leasing their land or for the *métayage* system. Agricultural labour is incidentally generally scarce. During the last ten years or so there have been important changes in the industrial sector, the development of the petroleum industry and its subsidiaries being of particular importance. The expansion of processing industries as a result of the cessation of international trade during the war should also be mentioned. The position of the working classes is still such as to confer a peculiar character on employment problems in the Near and Middle East.

Dealing first with employment problems as such, the report shows that there is considerable unemployment, especially among skilled workers and the liberal professions, as well as rural under-employment due to the lack of complementary seasonal jobs. It stresses the importance of increasing productivity in the near future by improving agricultural methods and organizing industrial work.

As regards solutions, the report recommends a rationalized employment policy which would lead to a full use of resources and to better distribution of the available labour, while at the same time providing funds to set up efficient employment bureaux. It also notes that it is necessary to develop vocational training, and above all to relate it to the actual requirements of economy, doing away with the academic form in which such training is at present all too frequently given.

The report lists in its closing pages the bases of discussion suggested for the Regional Conference for the Near and Middle East to be held in April 1951.

*Labour Problems in Turkey.* Geneva, 1950, 282 pp., (7 Sw.frs, \$1.75).

After some rapid observations on labour problems in general and on the part played in this field by the international organizations, together with a brief outline of the history of labour legislation in Turkey since the middle of the last century, this book, which sets forth the results of a recent investigation, gives a general sketch of Turkey's economic and social position. Passing on to administrative problems relating to labour, it points out the inadequacy of the part assigned to the Turkish Ministry of Labour and the latter's lack of vitality; it recommends improvements in this respect and also with regard to the Labour Council, whose investigations do not appear to be sufficiently systematic.

In an attempt to define conditions of work and employment, the study stresses the exaggeratedly low level of wages, and recommends that in fixing future wage rates, the cost of living and regional labour needs in Turkish industry be taken into account. Hours of work are legally fixed at 48 hours a week, but commonly run to 10 or 11 hours a day, a state of affairs which must be set right following a rational study of productivity. Similarly there should be a weekly rest period, wages should be paid for public holidays and the system of annual holidays with pay be legally instituted. Existing legislation should also be extended to non-manual workers, the criterion of manual work being abandoned in favour of one based on managerial status, for instance, or on wage-earners in small-scale industries and handicrafts. Industrial home work should also be regulated, as well as that of domestic workers and, above all, of agricultural workers.

The following chapter, which deals with social security legislation, emphasizes the fragmentary nature of existing measures and the fact that the lower the wages—and they are very low in Turkey—the greater the need for protection. Complete legislation is therefore particularly urgently needed. A summary analysis shows that cash benefits for sickness and occupational diseases reach about the same level as in other national legislation. On the other hand, it is urgently necessary to set up a public health service so as to reduce the inadequacies of the present system of the payment of benefits, and more particularly to give effective protection to maternity. After stressing the need to recast the legal and financial statutes of the pension insurance scheme, the study



recommends legislative reform which would enable the scheme to be rapidly adapted to variations in general economic conditions, as well as the introduction of insurance books to facilitate administration. Passing on to an examination of the position with regard to sickness insurance, it comes to the conclusion that a general programme of medical services is needed. In criticizing the system of social insurance, it recommends an overhaul of the administrative organization, and demands that both employers' and workers' contributions to the Workers' Insurance Institution be increased.

The next chapter, which deals with the problem of industrial accidents, points out the high incidence of these in Turkey and the need to reduce them by appropriate methods, in particular by fuller, more precise and stricter legislation than that in existence. Moreover, both the technical training and the number of labour inspectors supervising the relevant regulations are inadequate, as are the efforts made to prevent accidents. It therefore seems particularly necessary to standardize and rationalize methods of accident prevention, to set up organizations for research and to institute statistics.

Under the title "Industrial Relations", the work first studies the legal provisions governing trade union activities in Turkey; such activities are guaranteed by the Constitution and, while they can be regulated, they cannot be suppressed. Nevertheless, it seems that the right to organize is insufficiently protected, since employers can take whatever steps they like against a trade unionist, including dismissal. It seems particularly advisable to extend more realistic protection to the right to collective negotiation, since there is nothing to prevent employers from refusing to negotiate with trade unions, and also to give legal status to collective agreements. It would also be useful to make the system of compulsory arbitration more flexible, or even to substitute for it a system of voluntary arbitration in industrial disputes which would be more acceptable to the contending parties, and, in any case, to arrange for the trade unions to participate as soon as possible in the work of the Grand Arbitration Boards.

Turning finally to problems of employment and vocational training, the book points out that the organization of the employment service in Turkey is still in its initial phase and is meeting with great difficulties. The irregular and inadequate methods by which this service is financed should be rapidly improved, as should also the recruitment and training of its staff. The technical organization of the service is in itself, a considerable achievement, but there are still certain gaps in the sectors of office inspection, employment, employment statistics and placement methods. As regards vocational training, the Turkish Government is acutely aware of the need for a general policy: the lack of skilled labour is obvious, and, while technical education is particularly well developed in Turkey, vocational distribution, school equipment and the level of professional skill acquired are unsatisfactory. There should also be considerable reforms in the organization of apprenticeship and of vocational training for adults.

The appendices contain technical and statistical details concerning the pension insurance scheme and industrial safety regulations.

*Report of the Manpower Committee.* Governing Body, 113th Session, Brussels, November 1950, (G.B.113/13/23), 3 pp.

The Committee studied the following problems:

- (a) Report on progress of work (Chapter III: Activities in Asia) (G.B.113/JMPC/D.1).  
The four Training Centres (organization and administration of national training curricula, organization and administration of apprenticeship, training of instructors for professional training, training of managerial and supervisory personnel) have started functioning despite the low attendance (618 persons).
- (b) Technical Assistance (G.B.113/AMP/D.2), in particular the question of setting up a Technical Assistance Unit under the Asian Action Station.
- (c) Reproduction and translation into the principal languages of Asia of technical documentation for professional training (G.B.113/AMP/D.3).



*Policies and Trends of FAO.* Memorandum by the Director-General, Tenth Session, 25 October 1950 (CL/10/5), 3 pp.

The Director-General points out the great bearing on FAO's work of certain events, i.e. the Korean crisis, the expanded Technical Assistance Programme and the Ecosoc resolutions on full employment, which he also expects profoundly to affect the Organization's future work. These important developments, to which must be added the impending transfer of FAO's headquarters to Rome, should be given full consideration in any review of the Organization's long-term policies and trends, even though they are still more or less in an incipient stage. The Director-General draws the Council's attention to three special reports: "The Introduction to the Programme of Work for 1951" (doc. C 50/3), "FAO Yesterday and Tomorrow" (doc. CL/10/3), a foreword to the work of FAO in 1949/50, and "Basic Trends and Issues" (doc. CL/10/2), a foreword to the outlook and state of food and agriculture in 1950. Suggestions for the revision and definition of the objectives proposed for FAO and for the policy to be pursued will be made later.

*Financial and Administrative Aspects of Technical Assistance.* Report of the Twelfth Session of the Committee on Financial Control, FAO Conference, Special Session, 3 November 1950 (C 50/13, 10 October 1950), 28 pp.

The Committee on Financial Control studied the budgeting and accounting arrangements to be made by FAO under the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme, in accordance with paragraph 19 of Ecosoc resolution 222 (IX) A of 15 August 1949 (approved by the General Assembly on 16 November 1949). It examined the memorandum prepared by the Director-General, and noted that, whereas FAO was to receive 29 per cent of the Technical Assistance Fund, it was in fact receiving that same percentage of each country's contribution. The Committee therefore urged the Organization to ask the Technical Assistance Board to give further consideration to the means whereby the contribution of each country could be used most effectively by the agencies, regardless of each individual agency's share in the total technical assistance fund.

The document includes the Director-General's note on the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme (budgeting and accounting arrangements), which deals with the following questions: the central control of funds, the budgetary aspect, FAO's financial arrangements, FAO's accounting arrangements, and progress in the execution of the programme. Annexed are models of a basic agreement between FAO and Member States for the provision of Technical Assistance to the relevant Government, and of a supplemental agreement between the said Governments and FAO.

*FAO Regional Organization.* Report by the Director-General, FAO Conference, Special Session, 3 November 1950 (C 50/7, 18 September 1950), 11 pp.

The Director-General gives an account of the Organization's present position and of its regional structure under which there are three Regional Offices; in Rome (for Europe), in Cairo (for the Near East) and at Bangkok (for Asia and the Far East). In addition there is a sub-office of the European Office at Geneva, under ECE, a branch office of the Forestry Division of FAO in Rio de Janeiro, and a representative of FAO working with the ECLA Office at Santiago, Chile. He points out that the present system must be altered in view of the transfer of headquarters to Rome, the development of the Technical Assistance Programme, and the widening responsibilities of the UN Regional Commissions. So long as the Organization's resources do not permit the establishment of FAO attachés to countries or groups of countries, the present system of Regional Offices will have to be maintained, Regional Representatives of FAO being the direct representative of the Director-General. The Regional Office for Europe will, however, be discontinued and replaced by a Regional Office for North America, which will maintain contact with the United States and Canada, as well as with the United Nations and Specialized Agencies in North America. Three sub-regional offices will be set up in Latin America, at Mexico City for Central America and the Caribbean, at Rio de Janeiro for Eastern South America, and at Santiago for Western South America. A



fourth will be opened at Bogota or Caracas for the Gran Colombian sub-region if financial resources permit. The question of the location of the Regional Office at present situated in Bangkok will be reviewed in consultation with the Member Countries concerned. Regional Conferences are to be held in all the above-mentioned areas between December 1950 and June 1951 if the majority of members in the regions concerned so desire.

*The Work of FAO 1949-50.* (Foreword: FAO Yesterday and Today. *Part I: Organization-wide developments*). Council of FAO, Tenth Session, 25 October 1950 (CL/10/3, 20 September 1950), 23 pp.

In his introduction, the Director-General attempts to survey the work done by FAO during the first five years of its existence, and to examine its future needs and possibilities. He points out that modern advances in science and technology make greatly increased well-being possible for all mankind. Vigorous international action can relieve tensions by removing their fundamental causes. It can be shown that the worst evils from which mankind suffers are not ineradicable, and that some of the worst difficulties associated today with agricultural production and distribution can be eliminated. The Director-General gives an account of his visits to various parts of the world, during which he found everywhere great eagerness to improve, however little, living conditions and the level of education of the peoples; he states the conviction, derived from his experience, that great progress is possible among rural populations if present technical knowledge can be made available everywhere to bring about more efficient use of the land, to maintain and increase the productivity of the soils in cultivation, and to increase productivity on mismanaged land.

The report lists 50 developments in the work of the past five years of FAO's existence, in all the fields with which it is concerned—agriculture, nutrition, fisheries, forests, economics, the distribution of produce, the well-being of rural populations, etc.

In the section on organization-wide developments of FAO, the following matters are dealt with: civilian relief and rehabilitation in Korea, the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme and FAO's contribution to it; the 1951 work programme; the establishment of headquarters in Rome; FAO's Regional Offices; relations with the Regional Economic Commissions of UN; continuing needs of children; FAO's relations with Unicef; relations with non-governmental organizations, etc.

*The Mechanization of Agriculture.* Washington-Rome, 1950, 108 pp. (\$1). The first part, which serves as an introduction, describes "world trends in the utilization of industrially manufactured agricultural equipment". It points out that animal traction still represents 85 per cent of total agricultural traction, the use of mechanized traction, although by now considerable, being used mainly in the highly developed countries. The chief centres for the manufacture of agricultural equipment are North America, Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. The volume of production was nearly trebled between 1937 and 1948. In connexion with the economic problems involved in the use of mechanized agricultural equipment, the report suggests that the parcelling out of land is an obstacle to such utilization, while the shortage of rural labour tends to encourage it. Moreover, the adoption of equipment involving high purchasing and maintenance costs raises important problems regarding investment. Another problem is raised by the need for the specialized training of labour for the utilization and maintenance of mechanized equipment.

The second part of this pamphlet, which deals with "regional aspects of agricultural mechanization", relates in the first place to North America, which has more than 70 per cent of the world's tractors, and supplies more than two-thirds of world production, the amount available for export having greatly increased since the war. A remarkable increase in productivity, due as much to the intensive use of machines as to progress in agricultural methods, has made it possible to reduce the agricultural labour force by 20 per cent since 1913.

Europe owns about 15 per cent, and produces 20 per cent, of the world's tractors; production and importations have enabled almost all losses due to war damage to be made good. In 1948 and 1949, the United Kingdom provided about half the mechanized equipment imported into Continental Europe, the other half coming



almost entirely from North America. High costs make it improbable that exports from Europe will be increased, especially in view of American competition. Economic policies have generally been successful in increasing both agricultural productivity and mechanization, but they have encountered great difficulties owing to the parcelling out of land. This problem might be solved by the development of co-operatives for production, supplies of motor fuel, and vocational training. In this matter the U.S.S.R. is in a special position, owing to the methodical action undertaken there and the remarkably clear and speedy results obtained.

In spite of its endeavours to increase its own output, Latin America depends largely on Europe and North America for its agricultural equipment, and absorbs nearly 20 per cent of world tractor exports. Low agricultural wages, a large rural labour force and a great shortage of foreign currency serve to explain the relatively low level of agricultural mechanization in that area.

Despite favourable factors such as the existence of petrol deposits and the low density of population, agriculture in the Near East, where there is 0.3 per cent of the world's stocks, is only very slightly mechanized. However, present government plans indicate the probability of a rapid increase in mechanization.

In the Far East, the establishment of sterling balances in certain countries during the war led to some increase of mechanization by encouraging the importation of agricultural machinery. The fuel shortage, the extreme density of population and the excessive parcelling out of land make it generally improbable that there will be any appreciable use of mechanized equipment in the near future, except in some of the more highly developed countries such as Malaya or Burma.

Africa has less than one per cent of the world's agricultural equipment stocks, concentrated almost exclusively in the Union of South Africa and French North Africa. In the other regions, where village cultivation is almost the only type of farming, opportunities for mechanizing agriculture are at present very limited, or only at the experimental stage.

Lastly, Australia and New Zealand benefit from a relatively high degree of agricultural mechanization, supplied to a considerable extent by local production; this is explained by the vast tracts of land under cultivation and the high standards of living obtained in those countries.

*Commodity Reports: Rice.* Washington, 15 December 1950, 29 pp. (25 cents).

Owing to bad harvests in China and Burma, world rice production in 1949-50 was lower than in the previous year. The outlook for 1950-51 is however better, and rice exports in 1950 may exceed those of 1949. Nevertheless, the international rice trade has attained barely two-fifths of the pre-war level, and consumption in the Far East is very considerably below needs. The areas given over to rice in 1949-50 reached the record figure of 91.3 million hectares; yet production, provisionally estimated at 150.5 million tons, was scarcely more than pre-war, and lower than that of the previous year. This is mainly due to the catastrophic harvest in the Chinese mainland and to internal disturbances in certain other countries, e.g., Burma and Indochina. Bumper crops have been produced in Japan, Brazil and the U.S.A.; Italian and Egyptian production is declining. There were big changes in 1950 in the trend of the rice trade in the Far East: the two great traditional importers, China and India, retired almost entirely from the market, while Japan put forward large demands for rice. The precarious balance established between supply and demand seems to be partly due to the high price of rice as compared with wheat and secondary cereals. In other parts of the world, the rice trade does not seem to have undergone any major modifications. Rice needs in the Far East have greatly increased as compared with pre-war, so that it has become necessary to impose strict regulations on the sale and distribution of rice, as well as to introduce rationing in most of the Asiatic countries. Prospects for the 1950-51 crop are rather more favourable, both in Asia and elsewhere, but the Korean conflict may upset the supply and demand for rice by encouraging the accumulation of stocks. An increase in production is expected for 1951-52 (failing exceptionally bad weather conditions), as well as an increase in the volume of trade. A policy should be adopted aimed at expanding the area under cultivation by land reclamation and



irrigation, and at increasing yields by the use of chemical fertilizers and modern methods. The report concludes with twelve statistical tables showing rice production, yields and trade.

#### UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

*International Scientific Co-operation.* Mutual obligations and privileges of Unesco and certain international non-governmental organizations with a view to facilitating the execution of their joint programme in the field of international scientific co-operation, Report of the Director-General to the Executive Board (24EX/16, 16 November 1950), 4 pp.

The General Conference at its Fifth Session (5C/Resolutions, 33.31) authorized the Director-General to review the form and content of the formal agreements concluded with certain international non-governmental organizations, with the object of simplifying them in order to establish a basic model agreement. Accordingly, the Director-General reviewed the agreements in force and submitted in the annex a model agreement (agreement with the International Council of Scientific Unions of 16 December 1948). In drawing up the model, experience gained through relations with certain non-governmental organizations and the Directives adopted by the General Conference at its Fifth Session were taken into account.

Apart from the mutual obligations and privileges arising out of the admission of the interested organization to consultative arrangements with Unesco, the Agreement provides for mutual consultation, the grant of an annual subsidy by Unesco for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of the member organizations in question and to provide funds for scientific projects of international interest included in Unesco's programme. For its part, the organization undertakes to give specialized advice at Unesco's request on the planning of its programme in the field of international scientific co-operation, and to advise Unesco on its working relationship with the organizations within its field.

The agreement is valid for one year, and is tacitly renewed from year to year, subject to approval by the competent bodies of both organizations.

*Proposal for setting up a Supervisory Commission of Unesco.* Report by the Director-General to the Executive Board, (Twenty-Fourth Session) (24 EX/24, 7 November 1950), 7 pp.

The General Conference at its Fifth Session (5C/Resolutions, 25) requested the Director-General to study a proposal for setting up a Supervisory Commission to supervise the operations culminating in the preparation of the Unesco budget, to guarantee to the General Conference that the budget had been drawn up with a full knowledge of all the facts and with the necessary impartiality, and to consider any other matters submitted to it by the General Conference or the Executive Board.

The Director-General submits to the Executive Board the results of his investigations and a description of the functions and responsibilities which would be attached to the proposed Commission. His report includes a brief review of the experience of other organizations in the operation of a Supervisory Commission or its equivalent (Supervisory Commission of the League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the United Nations), and draws attention to some of the effects of setting up such a Commission on the Constitution, programme and inter-relationship of Unesco's various bodies. It points out that if the financial and administrative responsibilities of the Executive Board were to be preserved as they are at present, the establishment of a Supervisory Commission would inevitably lead to duplication of work, which would considerably increase the time required for the preparation of the budget. Since moreover, it is particularly difficult in Unesco to separate "programme" from "budget", the Executive Board, deprived of its responsibilities with respect to finance, could not carry out its chief task of watching over the execution of the programme.

For these reasons, and particularly since a decision is to be taken on biennial sessions of the General Conference of Unesco, the Director-General advises the Executive Board



to recommend to the General Conference to wait for this decision before giving further study to the establishment of such a Commission.

*Preliminary study by the Director-General on the possibility of the adoption of an International Instrument for the reduction of obstacles to the free movement of persons engaged in educational, scientific or cultural activities.* Executive Board, Twenty-Fifth Session (25 EX/13), 15 January 1951), 15 pp.

One of Unesco's principal aims, both under its Constitution and according to several resolutions of the General Conference, is to reduce obstacles to the free movement of persons engaged in educational, scientific or cultural activities, to promote direct personal contact between representatives of diverse cultures, and thus to help in developing international understanding between peoples.

The Director-General's preliminary study gives an account of the way in which Unesco is carrying out these responsibilities under present regulations; the remedial measures already effected: exchanges of persons, financial arrangements, grants, administrative facilities, guarantees, the establishment of equivalences of degrees, etc.; regional agreements (Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, Latin American countries, countries of the Arab League); international action by the UN Transport and Communications Commission; possible scope for an international instrument formulated by Unesco; determination of categories of persons to be affected by such an instrument; facilities that might be granted by its application (passports, visas, transport costs, economic and administrative facilities, maintenance of professional rights in the country of domicile, problems of double taxation, access to museums, exhibitions, libraries, etc.).

*Relations with the Secretariat of the Council of Europe.* Executive Board, Twenty-Fifth Session (25 EX/27, 15 January 1951), 12 pp.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe approved the resolutions submitted by a group of cultural experts who met in Strasbourg in June 1950, proposing close contact and collaboration between the Council of Europe and Unesco. In his report, the Director-General of Unesco reviews the decisions taken by the Executive Board with regard to Unesco's relations with the Secretariat of the Council of Europe (Executive Board resolutions of the Eighteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-Third Sessions) and the requests formulated by the Council of Europe (forms of possible collaboration between Unesco and the Council, Comparative study of educational systems and curricula in Europe, development of teaching the leading European languages; equivalences of university degrees; preparation of university syllabuses on European problems and organizations, and extracts from unbiased geography and history textbooks showing the bonds uniting the peoples of Europe).

Annexed is the report of the Committee of Cultural Experts to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 30 June 1950 [CM (50) 34].

*Report by the Director-General on the First Meeting of the International Commission for the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind.* Executive Board, Twenty-Fifth Session (25 EX/41, 17 January 1951), 2 plus 9 plus 3 pp.

In accordance with Resolution 4.123 of the Fifth Session of Unesco's General Conference, the Director-General, in consultation with the International Council of Scientific Unions and the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, has appointed nine scientists, in their personal capacity, as members of the International Commission for the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind. The Commission held its first meeting in December 1950 in Paris under the chairmanship of Professor P. B. Carneiro (Brazil), the Rapporteur being Professor Morazé.

The report to the Director-General on the Commission's meeting is given in Annex I to the present document, which includes a draft budget for five years. Annex II contains the Statutes of the Commission. The latter is to prepare a scientific and cultural history of mankind (cf. doc. 25 EX/41 Corr. 18 January 1951).

*Studies of Social Tensions, 1947-1952* (Unesco/SS/2, 19 January 1951), 6 pp.

The report outlines Unesco's major undertakings in social tensions research under four main groups: (1) studies of national character and allied questions ("way of life" studies,



community studies, national stereotypes); (2) studies of technology and tensions from the standpoint of education, science and culture (technology and education, technology and community, technology and under-developed areas); (3) studies of tensions arising out of population questions (cultural assimilation of immigrants); (4) studies of tensions arising from racial contacts and the problems of ethnic groups (dissemination of scientific facts about race, pilot study in Brazil, studies of ethnic and cultural groups). A number of special investigations are also to be made in various countries (India, Germany and Japan). National investigations were made between 1947 and 1949 and are at present in process of completion.

*Brief Outline of Unesco's Library and Bibliographical Programmes, 1951* (Unesco/CUA/7, 30 January 1951), 11 pp.

While the Library Division of Unesco forms part of the Department of Cultural Activities, its responsibilities extend over the whole range of Unesco's programmes for education, culture and science, wherever these affect library services, bibliography, documentation and the supply of publications. The report gives an account of its three main activities, which are closely interrelated: (1) public library development (India pilot project, Latin American Public Library Conference, public library publications); (2) bibliography and documentation (improvement of bibliographical services, documentary reproduction, *Index bibliographicus*, guide to the libraries of the Near and Middle East); (3) Clearing House for publications (questionnaires, Unesco Bulletin for Libraries, exchange and gift, the Unesco Coupon Scheme, Unesco-CARE Book Programme).

In the annex is a list of Unesco publications and documents on librarianship and bibliography.

*The Technique of International Conferences. A Progress Report on Research Problems and Methods, 19 February 1951.*

Under this title, Unesco has published a limited number of copies of a working document intended for a specialized public—more particularly for its National Commissions and for social science research institutes and reviews. In its Spring number of 1950 (Vol. II, No. 1), the *International Social Science Bulletin* published an article by Professor Walter R. Sharp entitled "The Scientific Study of International Conferences"; this already showed what a valuable contribution the social sciences could make to the finding of solutions for the many problems raised by international discussions, congresses and conferences, whose success often depends on such solutions.

The report in question considers the problems which might be systematically studied with a view to the improvement of the conditions in which international conferences are held. They are either administrative and procedural problems concerning the preparation and organization of a conference, or psychological and sociological problems arising from numerous obstacles to the exchange of ideas between participants, due to the diversity of the working languages and to the delegates' different cultural backgrounds. The report thus deals with the following subjects: administrative management problems, conduct of discussion, intra-conference communication (verbal and written), cultural, ideological and sociological factors, and problems of official representation. The last part of the report contains general considerations governing future research. From the point of view of methodology and documentation, it contemplates various possibilities in the way of content analysis, direct observation and interviewing, and the use of questionnaires. Although the combined use of the contributions of different social science disciplines in international conference study clearly requires the *team* method of research, individual scholars, working independently, can contribute much to our understanding of specific problems. Comparative analyses of the proceedings of conferences may also aid in strengthening hypotheses.

The attainment of the best research conditions necessitates close co-operation between the conference participants and the research team. Each has a unique contribution to make to the search for better ways of conducting conferences, and the working relations between the two groups must be established with great care. In order to carry out studies "in depth", the investigators must carefully prepare their work prior to the opening of the conference session to be observed—if possible, at the



headquarters of the secretariat of the organization concerned. The co-ordination of the various social science disciplines, if effective, will be one factor in the success of the studies undertaken. Hypotheses concerning the behaviour of international groups will be verified preferably through the study of small conferences of a non-political nature. Finally, certain problems that bear on the behaviour of groups and are similar to those raised by international conferences can be studied in universities, form the subject of experiments on national groups, and occasion research under the auspices of private institutions.

To sum up, the main object of the report was to give an idea of the situation after two years of preliminary research work done under Unesco's auspices. It is in no way intended to be a complete picture of research possibilities in the still comparatively unexplored field of international conferences. During the present year, Unesco intends to conduct a limited number of field observations of international conferences of a non-political nature, with a view to checking more rigorously certain hypotheses concerning the organization of conferences, their procedure and the various factors which come into play during their functioning.

*Bibliographies in the Social Sciences.* A Selected Inventory of Periodical Publications. Paris, 1951, 129 pp. (\$0.45, 125 frs).

The study and improvement of documentation in the social sciences is a prominent feature of Unesco's programme; the ultimate aim is the co-ordination and systematization of the various means of documentation and of documentation services.

At a first meeting of six experts, held in Paris on 8 and 9 November 1949, the principal problems were reviewed, and it was decided to hold another meeting in December 1949, for which a series of papers should be prepared as a basis for effective work.

In its introduction, the present booklet lists the various sources of documentation, in particular, articles in periodicals, which are fairly easily traceable by means of the various indexes and abstracts.

Official documents, of which there are a great many, are more difficult to find, owing to the lack of complete lists or abstracts.

Readers may usefully refer to bibliographical essays, such as the "Survey of Contemporary Economics" and the "Bilans de la connaissance économique". They can also consult the indexes of current research in a given branch of science.

The pamphlet goes on to summarise the reports submitted to the meeting of December 1949. The first problem dealt with was Abstracts.

In his paper, G. Popovitch studies abstracts in political science and law. After listing the qualities of a good abstract, Mr. Popovitch deals with personnel recruitment, the languages used and time required for publication. He proposes the establishment of a central organ to co-ordinate the work of national bodies, and the setting up by Unesco of a Joint Committee to prepare a model bulletin. Owing to the present small circulation of abstracting bulletins, a satisfactory solution to the problem must be sought at the international level.

André Piatier deals with abstracts in political economy. He shows that it is difficult to define the field accurately, and considers that abstracts should indicate the type of article or work analysed. The best solution seems to him a central organization linking at the international level the work of five or six abstracting agencies each covering a clearly defined linguistic area.

René Koenig states in his report that bibliographical services in sociology are wholly inadequate. The situation could, however, be improved by methodically developing existing institutions. Bibliographies giving trend reports and a systematic catalogue would be very useful, but an international organization would be too costly to set up.

Two reports deal with problems specifically relating to official documents. The full importance of governmental publications is appreciated only in the United States, the United Kingdom and a few European countries, writes Jerome K. Wilcox. Unesco should encourage each country to publish directories of their own publications; a directory on a world scale does not seem desirable. Some five or six regional centres for Europe might usefully assemble official documents; an international congress would have to be called to collect documents and organize exchanges. A. D. Roberts studies



the question of documents and publications of international organizations, and suggests various ways in which the present situation might be improved.

The paper presented by B. Berelson and B. L. Smith proposes the preparation of a bibliography and a unified abstracting system in the social sciences. The complete rationalization of the publications and the bibliography would take several years; however, the publication of bulletins containing abstracts of varying length and critical reviews would meet the most urgent needs.

The last report, submitted by J. Meynaud, studies administrative and commercial problems raised by the publication of a documentation bulletin. He deals in detail with the choice and acquisition of reviews for abstracting, the organization of abstracting with the choice and acquisition of reviews for abstracting, the organization of abstracting, the compilation of the bulletin, its printing, tables, microfilm reproduction and translations of articles. The author does not think that documentation bulletins can have a large market. In view of the services they render to libraries, the price would appear very moderate. Unesco should help the documentation agencies to develop their services and promote and facilitate contacts between them.

The second part of the pamphlet gives full information on 59 documentation services in the social sciences, and reproduces in facsimile extracts from 14 abstracting bulletins.

*Inventories of Apparatus and Materials for Teaching Science.* Volume I: Primary, Secondary and Vocational Schools. Paris, 1950, 92 pp. (\$1, 300 frs).

Science is being increasingly taught throughout the world. Unesco has endeavoured, ever since it was established, to make science teaching satisfactory in the war-damaged areas and in the under-developed countries.

The present pamphlet, which is the first inventory of apparatus needed in primary, secondary and vocational schools, is designed to show teachers in those countries what apparatus is being used in the most advanced countries.

After analysing model courses prepared by six experts, the inventory lists all the apparatus and materials needed for them. It indicates both the quantities required for 200 pupils in primary schools, 40 pupils in secondary schools, and 100 pupils in vocational schools, and the prices of the various apparatus in dollars.

The appendices include conversion tables for the various elements, a list of the principal suppliers of scientific instruments, the text of the recommendations adopted by the Twelfth International Conference on Public Education, and a bibliography.

*Inventories of Apparatus and Materials for Teaching Science.* Volume III: Technical Colleges, Part I: Veterinary Sciences. Paris 1950, 98 pp. (\$1.20, 350 frs).

At the close of the second world war, the number of laboratories, universities and libraries destroyed formed an impressive total. Unesco worked out a programme for the reconstruction of the old centres and the erection of new buildings, with a view to the unification and development of science teaching. This project, to which was added the unification of curricula and equipment for science teaching, was intended to stimulate international co-operation in this field.

The present pamphlet deals with the veterinary sciences; a comparison of the systems of teaching in force in various countries shows that there is a large measure of similarity between them, despite certain variations. Basing itself on this observation, Unesco has tried to draw up an inventory of the scientific apparatus needed for the efficient working of a veterinary college, and, by way of example, provides a syllabus of practical work and courses in a model college.

Before admittance to college, students should have elementary knowledge of the various scientific disciplines, such as physics, chemistry, etc. Within the college itself, there are 10 departments, and in each case there is a list of courses, practical demonstrations and apparatus used.

In conclusion and for practical purposes, the report gives the addresses of some manufacturers of scientific apparatus.



*Report on the activities and meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee on Abstracting and Indexing in the Medical and Biological Sciences.* Paris, 1951, 92 pp. (\$0.85).

The present report describes the work done by the Co-ordinating Committee up to 1949. It extends to human medicine and biology in so far as these are directly related to medical knowledge.

Following the lead given by the British Medical Association, research work was co-ordinated under the auspices of Unesco. There were several meetings following that of December 1946, at all of which Unesco endeavoured to promote co-ordination in the field of scientific abstracting. Following the meeting of October 1947 and the Second General Conference of Unesco at Mexico City, the Interim Co-ordinating Committee on Abstracting was set up and met for the first time on 5 and 6 April 1948.

The present pamphlet reproduces the reports prepared for the meetings and summaries of the discussions in so far as they clarify the debates and proposed measures; it also includes the resolutions adopted at the meetings.

The first four abstracting bulletins on which the delegates tried to reach agreement were the "Biological Abstracts" (U.S.A.), the "Excerpta Medica" (Netherlands), the "British Abstracts" (G.B.) and the "Abstracts of World Medicine and Abstracts of World Surgery". Problems of the distribution of the work to be done, of reaching greater uniformity in working methods, and of clearing were also discussed.

This project is the first of its kind undertaken at the international level.

*Some Suggestions on the Teaching of Geography.* Paris, 1949, 98 pp. (100 frs).

This document was prepared by French experts, Messrs. Ficheux, Chabot, François and Meynier, and does not express Unesco's official point of view. It was particularly directed to geography teachers, with the object of recalling the part to be played by geography in general education, and also of providing a useful basis for the discussions at the seminar for geography teachers arranged for the summer of 1950. Geography consisted for many years, merely of a dry list of names or a pictorial description of the earth and its inhabitants; during the past thirty years or so, this concept has altered, and geography may now be defined as the localization, description, explanation and comparison of human landscapes and activities over the surface of the globe. It has certain points in common with other sciences, such as geology, but differs from them owing to the fact that its chief aim is to combine the various elements, whereas the other sciences tend to break them down. Going on to study the aims of geography teaching, the authors show that it can promote a slow but sound development of children's civic, social and international education, making them understand that they belong to the great community of mankind, and that this privilege entails certain responsibilities. Such training requires that school-children be given as accurate a picture as possible of the present-day world; it is incidentally not enough to have a minimum of geographical knowledge; there must also be sound methods of investigation and work. The geographical spirit should, indeed, be developed by practical means: excursions, teaching by films, and the use of maps; and team-work should play an important part. Wherever possible, the teacher should relate isolated facts observed to the situation as a whole. Three model lessons illustrate the general considerations set forth in the first chapters of the pamphlet: Switzerland (study of the geography of a given region); oil (typical study of economic geography); the geography of malaria (instance of the sampling method). In the last chapter, the authors mention the technical and other difficulties encountered in the teaching of geography. They propose a study plan applicable to teaching at all three levels of education.

*The Haiti Pilot Project. Monographs on Fundamental Education.* Paris 1951, 84 pp. (35 cents).

This report describes the early stages of a project launched by the Haiti Government and Unesco to combat illiteracy in the Valley of Marbial in Haiti.

After briefly surveying the origins of the plan, its basic characteristics and estimated costs, the report studies the life of the peasants from the economic, social and religious angle (property structure, agricultural problems, family life, social instability, religious and social life, primitive aspects of political practices, etc.).

The following problems arise in education: insufficient number of children attending



school and poor quality of the teachers, due to the low standard of living of the population; the problem of Creole which, together with French, is the language spoken by the population, whence the need to evolve a Creole grammar and literary language.

There are many difficulties and they are increased by the population's political ignorance. Whilst the peasants will accept discipline and advice from a foreign country, they cannot understand the need for a stable social and political order requiring the selection of leaders recruited from among themselves.

The pamphlet gives some practical information, showing in particular how co-operation is organized between the Government of Haiti and Unesco on the one hand and the other interested Agencies—UN, FAO, WHO—on the other. The first results of the project are then summarized, as well as the related activities of the United Nations: irrigation work, beginning of industrialization, health service. In the appendix are the texts of the working plan for fundamental education, and of the Agreement between the Haitian Government and Unesco.

#### INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

*Final Report of the Legal Commission of ICAO.* Fourth Session of the Assembly, May-June 1950 (doc. 7015, A4/LE/2 of 18 June 1950), 50 pp.

The Legal Commission of ICAO's Assembly considered in detail the draft Convention on damage caused by aircraft to third parties on the surface, and decided to postpone adoption of the draft in view of the need to study it further and reach a compromise between certain greatly differing proposals. Nevertheless, considerable progress was made in drafting the Convention which is given as Annex "A" to the Final Report. The particular problems were: The definition of "operator" (Annex "B"), jurisdiction to consider problems arising out of claims and to carry out decisions arising out of the system of responsibilities adopted ("Annex "C"), provisions governing insurance and other security (Annex "D"). In its draft resolution (Annex "E"), the Commission proposes (1) that the text in question be circulated to Contracting States and interested international organizations, with the request to communicate their comments or proposals to ICAO; (2) that the Council of ICAO be requested to place a final draft on the agenda of the next session of the Assembly.

#### WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

*The Psychiatric Aspects of Juvenile Delinquency*, by L. Bovet. Geneva, Series of monographs, 1951, No. 1, 99 pp. (4 Sw. frs).

In this study, which was prepared at the request of WHO's Section on Mental Health, the author gives a complete analysis of the problem of juvenile delinquency, its aetiology, prevention and treatment, based on personal contacts with 150 specialists and some 60 specialized institutions.

Some people consider social maladjustment to be a phenomenon fundamentally due to constitutional causes (Lombroso's theory of the born criminal); for others, it is above all the result of sociological factors; but whether juvenile delinquency be attributed to somatic factors (psychopathy, mental deficiency, or organic sickness or disease), to sociological and psychological factors (qualitative defects of the "superego", partial backwardness of development, psychoneuroses or psychoses), or to secondary social factors (films, wireless, reading matter, alcohol)—there is always a "psychological common denominator conducive to criminality".

A delinquent is a socially maladjusted person whose treatment has never been undertaken or has failed. In other words, any genuinely rational preventive methods should attack the underlying problems of which delinquency is merely a manifestation. Treatment would appear to offer a more restricted field than prevention. Above all, it should not be harmful. The need for enlightened observation and diagnosis should be stressed. There are various methods of treatment (mobile treatment or treatment in institutions, partial liberty, post-cure).

These various methods have, however, a common primary purpose, namely to help



the juvenile delinquent to build up an emotional equilibrium which will bring him inward security—itself the basis of the moral integrity and respect for others without which no human behaviour can be genuinely adapted to society's needs.

#### UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND

*Continuing Needs of Children.* (A/1597, 2 December 1950), 2 pp.

Having considered Resolution 310 (XI) of the Economic and Social Council in the light of its own Resolutions 57 (I) and 318 (IV), the General Assembly, by a resolution of 1 December 1950 (314th plenary meeting of its Fifth Session), decided the following (A/1455, A/1580): The General Assembly, recognizing the necessity of continued action to relieve the sufferings of children, particularly in under-developed countries and countries that have been subjected to the devastation of war and to other calamities, Reaffirms its approval of Unicef's policy to devote a greater share of the Fund's resources to the development of programmes outside Europe; Expresses again its gratitude to Governments and individuals for their generous contributions enabling the Fund to carry out its tasks; Renews its appeal to Governments and private persons to continue their contributions to the Fund. The General Assembly went on to recommend to Member States that they develop and improve their national child welfare services, requested Ecosoc, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, to give greater emphasis to the importance of supporting national programmes designed to aid children within the framework of existing United Nations activities for promoting the economic and social development of under-developed areas, and decided that the Executive Board of Unicef should be reconstituted as from 1 January 1951. This Board is to consist of delegates of Member States represented on the Social Commission and of the Governments of eight other States, not necessarily Members of the United Nations, to be designated by the Economic and Social Council for appropriate terms, with due regard to geographical distribution and to the representation of the major contributing and recipient countries.

*Report of Unicef's Executive Board* (70th-73rd Meetings, November 1950, E/ICEF/159, 8 December 1950), 70 pp.

The Agenda of the meetings of Unicef's Executive Board contained the following items:

- (a) Progress Reports by the Executive Director (doc.E/ICEF/155 and Corr.1), summarizing major developments since the last session (July 1950) and dealing with the following subjects: Plans of operation for Asia (E/ICEF/153 and Corr.1) and Latin America (E/ICEF/154 and Corr.1), Execution of programmes in the Middle East (E/ICEF/158 and Corr.1), Supply assistance for handicapped children and medical programmes in European countries (E/ICEF/157), Milk conservation project in Europe (E/ICEF/R.81 and Corr.1), Use of Unicef raw materials in Europe and Israel for children's shoes, clothing and institutional supplies (E/ICEF/156 and Corr.1).
- (b) Resources available for allocation.
- (c) Summary of apportionments and allocations.
- (d) Arrangements with WHO for payment for international project personnel.
- (e) Assistance for BCG campaigns.
- (f) Unicef assistance to countries in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe (Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Germany).
- (g) Course organized in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland for training specialists on handicapped children; Swedish course in social pediatrics.
- (h) Return of certain existing allocations to general resources.
- (i) Problem of the International Children's Centre (docs. E/ICEF/R.111 and Corr.1, E/ICEF/R.119, E/ICEF/R.111/Add.1, E/ICEF/136, par.76, E/ICEF/R.121).
- (j) Report of Committee on Administrative Budget.
- (k) Allocations for freight.
- (l) Final report of Unicef's Executive Board.

The Annex to the Report contains a table of allocations approved by the Executive Board (1948-1951).



### III. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

#### ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

*The Organization for European Economic Co-operation.* Paris, 1950, 47 pp. (no price).

The pamphlet begins with a brief historical survey of this Organization, which was set up in 1947 by 14 European countries, with a view to drawing up a common programme of economic recovery; it began as a Co-operation Committee assisted by a large number of specialized technical committees. The Organization itself was constituted by a convention of April 1948, which set it a second task, namely to help the American Government to carry out its programme of aid to Europe.

The Organization consists of the "Council" (its governing body) which meets periodically and consists of the delegates of Member States; the, "Executive Committee", which receives its powers from the Council without having itself the right to take decisions; the "General Secretariat", whose functions are administrative; and a number of horizontal "technical committees", to study a given general problem, and of vertical "technical committees", to deal with a particular branch of the Organization's activities.

After a rapid review of the Organization's relations with the United States and with other international bodies, the pamphlet lists its achievements since 1945: annual programmes for European recovery and reports on that recovery; attempts made to improve the inter-European payments system and to solve the dollar shortage problem; liberation of inter-European exchanges; co-ordination of investments; and activities in the fields of productivity, public finance and employment. Annexed are a number of tables and a map giving information concerning Member States, and the structure and work of OEEC.

*Possibilities of Increasing the Use of Tropical Timber.* Paris, 1950, 95 pp. (no price).

The present report was drawn up by a group of experts including representatives of the producing, importing and consumer countries, as well as commercial experts and representatives of private organizations, with a view to achieving a wider use of tropical timber and the certainty of increased regular production. It studies export and consumption possibilities, problems of exploitation and mechanization, and the conditioning of tropical timber. The experts recommend an intensification of propaganda for the employment of tropical timber, and list its uses. Freight rates and new transport methods, export and import duties and relations with the dollar zone are all examined in detail. After dealing with the effects of devaluation and the liberation of trade, and recommending the setting up of an international tropical timber technical association, the report compares tropical timber with European and American timber. The final chapter summarizes the experts' conclusions and recommendations.

*Terminology of Productivity.* Paris, 1950, 13 pp. (no price).

The Productivity Group of OEEC has devoted part of its work to the study of basic definitions of productivity. The object of the present note is to define the meaning to be given to the term *productivity of labour* (output quotient divided by duration of work), and to explain methods of productivity measurement. It is a contribution to the development of the studies on productivity statistics now being pursued in many European countries.

#### THE CARIBBEAN COMMISSION

*Population Movements in the Caribbean*, by Malcolm J. Proufoot. Central Secretariat,

Kent House, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, 1950, VIII, 187 pp. (no price).

The present study, which was prepared on the basis of recommendations from the Caribbean Commission made in May 1948, constitutes a provisional survey of population problems in the Caribbean. In the absence of valid statistics, except for Puerto-Rico and, in part, Jamaica, the survey was particularly difficult to compile. The author begins by giving a general picture of the situation, including information on the



standard of living, population pressure in Puerto-Rico, the drift from country districts, and unemployment and under-employment, following these up with a detailed account of migration movements of the labour force in this area. From these components it is possible to summarize the present migration prospects, which are given in detail with regard to each possible recipient country in the two Americas. The conclusion contains the outline of a bold programme designed to combat the evil effects of over-population: the improvement of education and of the social services, an increase in the economic potential, controlled emigration and birth-control. At the same time, the author stresses the fact that his estimates are based on variables which may entirely change in the future. The work includes detailed statistics and recapitulatory tables of present legislation.



# INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PERIODICALS

## I. SOCIAL STUDIES

### A. THE VARIOUS SOCIAL SCIENCES

#### *Organization of Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences*

BREUER (E.). "Bemerkungen zum ersten Weltkongress für Soziologie und politische Wissenschaften" (Zürich, 4-9 September 1950). *Friedens Warte*, 1951, No. 3, pp. 256-62.

Comments on the First World Congress of Sociology and Political Science.

As Mr. Torres Bodet showed in his inaugural address to the Congress, Unesco relies greatly on the various intellectual disciplines to help in solving the practical problems of maintaining peace among the peoples. The principal objective of the Zürich congress was the scientific study of international relations, but it was clearly not possible to draw up a plan for immediate action. The author briefly recalls the reports submitted to the sections on political science and sociology. At least eight different trends were revealed in the latter. In the circumstances, it is not possible to prepare any constructive work until methods have been completely clarified, and until the limits of psychology and sociology are laid down. The study concludes with a summary of the administrative measures adopted by the Congress.

DUNHAM (Arthur). "State-Wide Community Organization comes of Age." *Social Service Review*, December 1950, pp. 484-92.

The growing complexity of American social services has necessitated the setting up of co-ordinating bodies at State level. CCCA (Community Chests and Councils of America) has played an all-important part in the work of co-ordination; in 1949, it published a volume entitled *Directory of Statewide Agencies*, which gives some measure of the work accomplished. There are at present 194 co-ordinating bodies of varying types, but with similar functions. These functions are (a) organization of lectures; (b) research; (c) co-ordination; (d) joint planning and action; (e) education; (f) contacts with the legislature; (g) public relations; (h) financial centralization, and (i) assistance and advice to local communities. If these functions are to be fulfilled in each State, it becomes necessary to set up or extend bodies operating at State level.

#### *Sociology*

BOUMANN (P. J.). "Der Stand der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung in den Vereinigten Staaten." *Soziale Welt*, January 1951, pp. 141-50.

The present state of sociological research in the U.S.A.

Sociologists have found in the United States an environment in which the problems of social assimilation are particularly acute, and in which very elastic teaching at the higher levels has given ample latitude for the development of their studies. Abandoning the theoretical discussions which used to exercise European teachers, they have concentrated on the concrete observation of social groups, the perfecting of scientific methods of analysis, and the co-ordination of their research work with that of the other sciences, anthropology, psychology, etc. The researchers are in reality experts who, having been given a thorough basic training, devote themselves exclusively to one field, relying on team work to complete a common task. The far-reaching research done in



the field of "industrial relations" is an example of the efficacy of this method. More recently, however, authors like Parsons or Mertons seem to have tried to synthesize the theoretical deductions to be made from this tremendous prospecting job, thereby renewing interest in the work of European theorists.

ZANIECKI (Florian). "European and American Sociology after Two World Wars." *American Journal of Sociology*, November 50, pp. 217-21.

Objective sociology, which had developed very satisfactorily before the first world war, suffered much from the influence of totalitarian ideologies; the theorists of those doctrines indeed declined to have their work put on the same level as that of their opponents. The two wars clearly showed the interdependence of culturally diverse societies. The author sets out what he considers to be the problems of contemporary sociology: the need, once and for all, to reject explanations based on biology, such as racism, and to dispel the illusion of placing too much importance upon individual factors. Solidarity and international conflicts are above all manifestations of national, economic, religious, military, etc. groups. The individual must not be neglected, but be studied in terms of his relation to other individuals and not of all aspects of his personality.

P. Zaniecki concludes with a discussion of two important problems of method: the place of mathematics and statistics, and the link between the static and dynamic points of view in sociological studies.

HAMILTON (C. Horace). "Some Current Problems in the Development of Rural Sociology." *Rural Sociology*, December 50, pp. 315-21.

In his presidential address to the annual meeting of the Rural Sociological Society in September 1950, the writer examined the problems facing American rural sociologists.

Rural sociology implies the use of sociological methods for practical purposes, and is at the same time a science of considerable theoretical interest. Confusion between these two aspects is responsible for the difficulties with which it has to contend.

Rural sociology, in fact, like any other science, must have a theoretical and a practical aspect, which should complement, and not compete with, one another. Applied rural sociology instead of being neglected, should be encouraged on the same terms as theoretical research.

It is also essential that public opinion should have a better sense of the contribution which rural sociologists can make to the solution of current problems.

### *Anthropology*

BEALS (Ralph L.). "Urbanism, Urbanization and Acculturation." *American Anthropologist*, January-March 51, pp. 1-10.

Anthropology has been viewed of late with a certain scepticism and it is time that this discipline subjected itself to a measure of self-scrutiny. Relations between anthropology and sociology are marked on the one side by the very favourable reception given by sociologists to anthropological theories and, on the other, by the contemptuous attitude of anthropologists towards sociologists. The difference between the two disciplines derives from the fact that anthropology has adopted psychoanalytical diagrams, while sociology has confined itself to philosophical and bookish generalizations. Nevertheless there is room for fruitful co-operation between the two sciences, especially in the restricted field of the study of urbanism and urbanization. The author gives examples of urban characteristics which would lend themselves to such a joint study, and maintains that co-operation does not mean a fusion of the two disciplines.

### B. STUDIES OF SOCIETIES

VIRGIN ISLANDS, U.S.A., *Journal of Educational Sociology*, December 1950, pp. 185-248. In the summer of 1950, 54 United States students attended a six-weeks seminar on St. Thomas's Island (in the Virgin Archipelago), for the common study of problems of



social anthropology. In the special number dealing with this educational and scientific experiment, Ethel J. Alpenfels (director of the seminar) explains its administrative organization, the planning of the research work and the selection of the students, and she shows the practical importance of these overseas workshops. The one set up in the Virgin Islands was particularly interesting, because of the very considerable use made of the cinema, both to develop the students' spirit of observation, and to show the seminar's experiences. Celia M. Anderson describes the films that were used.

In the section entitled: "The community as a laboratory", Antonio Jarvis mentions some of the characteristics of the Island inhabitants, Alberta Allen and Constance Staples give an account of youth and educational problems, Morris F. de Castro (Governor of the Islands) broadly outlines the political structure, which is governed by the Organic Law of 1936, and Carol Kahler shows the role of the "godmother concept" in the highly religious socio-economic structure of this society.

A number of studies are grouped under the collective title "Cultural highlights". Pauline Kupcok writes on the history of the Islands since their discovery, Elinor Doryk on local dances, Emmabelle S. Boyles on the forms and instruments of their folk music, Irene M. Wojtowicz on food-growing and food habits, Lew Arthur on the relations between the United States and the Islands, and Jane McCallum on local cooking recipes. The issue is completed with a detailed bibliography.

DOZIER (Edward P.). "Resistance to Acculturation and Assimilation in an Indian Pueblo." *American Anthropologist*, January-March 1951, pp. 56-66.

The Tewa tribe of First Mesa, Hopi, Arizona, has succeeded, despite the much larger neighbouring group of the Hopi, in retaining its cultural, linguistic and psychological character. The author analyses the reasons for the resistance to assimilation, which has enabled the Tewa to dominate the Hopi. The reasons are both historical (legends concerning the origins of the two tribes) and social (very close social and family structure of the Tewa).

RADCLIFFE-BROWN (A. R.). "Murngin Social Organization." *American Anthropologist*, January-March 1951, pp. 37-55.

In this anthropological study, the author resumes his study of the problem of "marriage classes" and direct consanguinity in the North Australian people known as Murngins, a problem already studied by W. Lloyd Warner, W. E. Lawrence and G. P. Murdock.

COSER (Lewis A.). "Some Aspects of Soviet Family Policy." *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1951, pp. 424-34.

The Soviet rulers use family legislation to strengthen the family as a social institution. In so doing, they desire to (a) raise the birth-rate; (b) provide a counterweight to social mobility and secure some stability for the family; (c) use the framework of the family to inculcate in their citizens the principles of a socialist society. Where the status of women is concerned, legislation suffers from an unavoidable contradiction between a woman's vocation in the home, and the need for female labour. Anti-abortionist and anti-divorce measures, the abolition of co-education, etc. fall under the same Statute. The introduction of authoritarian trends in home and school education, and the abolition of free education also serve to tip the social balance in favour of the upper classes.

### C. PUBLIC OPINION

ASH (Philip). "The United Nations and the Periodical Press: a Preliminary Study." *The Journal of Social Psychology*, November 1950, pp. 191-214.

The author analyses the treatment given to United Nations activities both in the American periodical press and in the *United Nations Bulletin* and *U.N. World*. He also studies the articles on the United Nations appearing in the leading United States informative review, *Time*.

Generally speaking, American periodicals as a whole gave more space to the general aspects of United Nations activities than to special events, whereas the *United Nations Bulletin* and *U.N. World* dealt with both.



As regards *Time*, the author shows that it has never abandoned its hostility to the United Nations, that it pays more attention to conflicts within the Organization than to its constructive work, and he claims that *Time* selects and distorts news, rather than reporting impartially.

## II. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

### A. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

RADBRUCH (Gustav). "Geistige Mächte als Subjekte des Völkerrechts" (Spiritual Powers as Subjects of International Law). *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 1950, No. 3, pp. 385-89.

In view of the difficulties of organizing the post-war world, international problems of justice and arbitration have gained increasing importance, but they raise delicate problems. A judge or arbitrator must in fact be not only impartial, but must also speak in the name of an interest which is above the conflicting parties.

In the past, Christianity represented such a higher interest; it formed a corporate body with a head. For many centuries, the Catholic Church held a leading position; it founded universities and inspired international law. After numerous conflicts with the States, and as a result of the evolution of thought, it has lost both its role and its status, which modern science actually considers an historical anomaly.

Can Man create for himself a new common centre of interest, and endow it with a supernational organization? The dangers threatening mankind and men's minds at the present time are certainly the strongest stimulus to do so.

LENTZ (Theo. F.). "The Attitudes of World Citizenship." *The Journal of Social Psychology*, November 1950, pp. 207-14.

This article summarizes and compares two investigations made by questionnaires among two groups of young Americans in 1936 and 1946, in an attempt to discover the extent of international thinking.

The replies given to the second questionnaire show a distinct evolution in American public opinion: opposition to war and military service is greater, and there is less national and racial prejudice. Young Americans of 1946 are less attached to their region, their traditional ethics and religious practices; in general they are more tolerant and more favourable to "radical" measures such as social security.

This development, the author concludes, shows that the war has lessened the differences between nationalists and internationalists, and has bred a very serviceable international-mindedness. Research in this field should be encouraged by governments and international organizations.

Fox (Grace). "The Origins of UNRRA." *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1950, pp. 561-84.

UNRRA, which was set up to co-ordinate relief to war victims in the areas controlled by the United Nations, originated in a number of different activities inaugurated during the war. In Great Britain, a speech by Mr. Churchill in the Commons in August 1940 and the setting up of an inter-ministerial committee drew attention to the problems of Europe's post-war needs. In the U.S.A., a large number of private activities were at first co-ordinated by the State, and later replaced by State-instituted bodies, such as OFRRO.

A number of problems arose when the time came for international action and there were difficulties over practical implementation between relief bodies and the military administration in charge of distribution. Numerous amendments had to be made in preparing the convention which was finally signed at the White House by 44 States on 9 November 1943.

The author goes on briefly to analyse UNRRA's organization, consisting of a Council, which appointed the Director-General and the members of the various agencies, and he concludes with a quotation from Roosevelt's speech at the signing of the Convention.



#### D. UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

BORIS (George). "Assistance technique et point IV." *Politique Étrangère*. December 1950, pp. 533-50.

In this article, the author explains the ultimate intentions of the authors of Point IV and of the Technical Assistance Programmes, of which he studies the origins, while speculating on their future.

The Technical Assistance Programme, which was first propounded by President Truman in a speech to Congress on 20 January 1950, met an urgent need on the part of the United States to relieve the Marshall Plan and to take the place held by Great Britain in the nineteenth century. To do so, it must overcome the reluctance of American private capital, anti-colonial traditions and outworn economic beliefs.

Scarcely a month after the President's speech, Mr. Willard Thorp, Deputy Secretary of State, submitted to the United Nations Economic and Social Council the draft of a technical assistance programme, and certain measures were unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 16 November following.

Mr. Boris raises a number of questions, i.e. the transition from the immediate programme to one of long-term investment, the psychological and political obstacles which may arise in underdeveloped countries, and the distrust of American capital. One solution proposed by a group of United Nations experts would be to finance the programme with governmental funds through the International Bank for Reconstruction, pending investment offers from private capital.

GASSIER (Maurice). "Le quatrième point du Président Truman. Conditions techniques et psychologiques de succès." *Politique Étrangère*, February 1951, pp. 45-58.

Point IV is based on a right economic concept, but experience has shown that the sudden introduction of modern techniques in a backward country causes a psychological shock which may disrupt the established order. Hence industrialization causes more confusion than it does good. It would be far more important to improve the productivity of labour by the introduction of efficient tools, both in agriculture and in local home trades. Such an intermediate step would require far less capital investment than industrial equipment, and France could finance research into her colonial plant and the training of advisers. This method would also avoid the clash between two civilizations, which is the chief cause of revolutions, as shown in Indo-China.

CARR-GREGG (John R. E.). "The Colombo Plan. A Commonwealth Programme for South-East Asia." *International Conciliation*, January 1951, 55 pp.

Following the ravages caused by the second world war, Great Britain and the Commonwealth gave South East Asia financial and technical assistance. This proved to be inadequate, and a Conference of the Foreign Ministers of seven Commonwealth countries met in Colombo in January 1950. Mr. Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon, stated that Asia's basic problem was economic rather than political, whereupon Mr. Spender, Australia's representative, put forward a proposal for economic co-ordination and the setting up of a Consultative Committee. The latter met in Sydney in May 1950 and dealt with precise points: short and long-term assistance, technical assistance, etc. A Permanent Commission was appointed to work out the constitution of a Council for Technical Co-operation. The Consultative Committee next met in London in the autumn of 1950 to study the information supplied by each country, and to work out a six-year plan. The Colombo Plan, which was adopted on 4 October, contains a detailed analysis of each country's problems and programmes. More than half the estimated budget of £1,868 millions is to be provided by countries outside the area in question. It is expected to provide chiefly for the cultivation and equipment of valleys, irrigation, increased cereal production and electric power. Mr. Carr-Gregg's article ends with the text of the Statutes of the Committee for Technical Co-operation.



## E. RACIAL QUESTIONS

BURMA (John H.). "Race Relations and Anti-discriminatory Legislation." *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1951, pp. 416-23.

United States legislation, which used to serve the purposes of racial discrimination, is now becoming the chief agent in the fight against racism. Thus, between 1 January and 1 September 1949, 149 anti-discrimination Bills were brought in in the various State Legislatures. The author briefly outlines this legislation under groups of States, and points out that it is still rather fragmentary, but that a trend towards generalization is becoming visible. On occasion it has become a "Party matter" (especially of the Democrats)—an unfortunate development. The efficacy of this legislation exceeds all hopes: the application of the FEPC laws (Fair Employment Practice Code) occasioned almost no conflict, since the Bill's adoption implied its backing by public opinion in the States involved. It is certain that anti-discriminatory legislation in no way diminishes the need for propaganda and education; on the other hand, no cultural endeavour can suffice unless it is backed by law.

COTHRAN (Tilman C.). "Negro Conceptions of White People." *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1951, pp. 458-67.

The method of stereotyped conceptions can be applied to the study of a racial minority's reactions to a majority. For the purpose of his investigation, the author collected some 30 stereotyped conceptions widely held by Negroes, by means of rapid interviews, using the "open-ended" technique. He then interviewed a group of 174 Negroes belonging to three social classes, to observe their reactions to the conceptions in question. A detailed analysis of the replies gives extremely interesting indications about the prevalence of a particular stereotype. Generally speaking, these stereotypes are widespread in Negro society; the replies show considerable uniformity, and in most cases in a form unfavourable to the Whites, the degree of disfavour being greater in the lower than in the middle or upper classes.

BULLOCK (Henry Allen). "Racial Attitudes and the Employment of Negroes." *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1951, pp. 448-57.

An important factor in determining Negro employment, in addition to the attitude of the employer, is the type of an undertaking's economic organization. This enquiry which covered 989 undertakings in the State of Texas, combined these subjective and objective elements with a view to studying the chief problems of employment policy. The results show that, in the case of Texas, economic data determine the percentage of Negro labour employed. The kind of jobs open to Negroes depends mainly on the employer's racial attitude. In any event, the number of Negroes employed regularly diminishes as the professional level rises. This law would seem to be related to the racial attitudes of white workers.

JOHNSON (Granville B., Jr.). "The Origin and Development of the Spanish Attitude towards the Anglo and the Anglo Attitude toward the Spanish." *Journal of Educational Psychology*, November 1950, pp. 428-39.

By applying a projective test (explained in detail, *ibid.* April 1950, p. 30) to English and Spanish ethnical groups of schoolchildren between the ages of four and 12, the author was able to follow the development of racial attitudes. Racial prejudices followed parallel lines in both groups, but there were significant differences according to groups and age-categories. A comparison of subjects from the same age-groups showed the part played by age differences of less than one year. Thus, racial prejudice could be measured even before the age of four; in the Spanish group it could be discovered towards three and a half, and in the English group even earlier. As a whole, the Spanish group was more optimistic about inter-racial relations, while the English showed a combative spirit and a distinct feeling of superiority.







P A R T   V I  
CURRENT NEWS







# THE RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH TO THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

## A PRIZE CONTEST

Since the end of the second world war many efforts have been made to direct scientific resources toward research in areas considered to be of importance to the task of creating the conditions for an enduring peace between nations. Efforts in this direction have been greatly obstructed by the absence of a general agreement on the question of the relation of research to the promotion of peace. Not the least result of this has been that investments in research of possible significance to the problems of peace have been kept at a lamentably low level. There appears to be a definite need for thorough-going investigations of the interrelation of the sciences and the research approaches that have been brought to bear on the problems of war and peace.

The Institute for Social Research in Oslo has offered a Prize of 10,000 Norwegian crowns for the best paper on this problem of the relevance of research to the problems of peace: *To what extent is it possible to establish criteria for the delimitation of research of direct relevance to the problems of peaceful adjustment in international relations?*

The papers to be submitted will be expected to include attempts at a theoretical as well as a functional clarification of problems such as: In what sense and under what conditions would it be possible to speak of a science of peaceful adjustment? How could such a science be integrated? To what extent would existing science fit into such an integration? How could such a science, over time, hope to influence actions and contribute toward changing international relations?

If several areas of research were found to be generally recognized as highly relevant to the problems of peace, would there still be any possibility of establishing criteria for the construction of priority lists for the guidance of institutions and foundations dedicated to the promotion of peace? Could e.g., the degree of susceptibility to control and manipulation afford a criterion by which to give priority to investigations on one set of causal factors over another?

The papers to be submitted will not only be expected to present theoretical and functional discussions of relevant criteria of this kind but also to give concrete examples of possible application of such criteria to problems and theories in various fields of the sciences. To take cruder instances only: How can it be established whether psychological studies of aggression are more relevant to the promotion of peace than research in international law? How can it be determined whether it is easier to change conflict-promoting factors in individual attitudes or in political systems? How can it be decided whether inquiries into social stratification are more important than studies in philosophies and practices of child-rearing and education?

The Institute has appointed a Jury consisting of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Director of the Social Science Department of Unesco, Professors Daniel Katz, University of Michigan, and Arne Næss, University of Oslo, to judge the papers submitted in this Prize Contest. The Jury will be free to withhold the Prize if it should happen that none of the papers are found to qualify. The Institute reserves copyright and will arrange for the publication of all the papers which the Jury finds valuable enough to merit it.

Papers should be submitted in English or French to the Institute for Social Research, Kronprinsensgt. 5, Oslo, Norway, before 1 April 1952. They may be prepared by individuals or groups. Length is quite optional, but 70-150 double spaced pages has been tentatively indicated as the most suitable length. To ensure anonymity of author(s) during evaluation of papers by the jury, the manuscript and a statement of authorship must be enclosed in separate envelopes and both marked with a motto chosen for the paper.



## BOOKS RECEIVED

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- P. ALPERT, *Twentieth Century Economic History of Europe*, Henry Schuman Inc., 466 pp., New York, 1951.
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## THE RACE QUESTION IN MODERN SCIENCE

Unesco's Statement on Race, issued July 1950 by an eminent group of world-famous scientists, supports Unesco's contention that race differences are not inherent and that such as do exist arise only out of differing social environments and opportunities.

To present in greater detail various aspects of the race question, an important series of booklets has been produced, of which the following titles can be ordered now from your bookseller (each booklet costs \$ .25; 1/6; 75 fr. or the equivalent in your local currency.)

### RACE AND CULTURE, by MICHEL LEIRIS.

The three principal sections deal broadly with the limitations of the concept of "race"; man and his civilizations; and a refutation of the contention that there is a natural repulsion towards peoples of other races. The author undertakes an objective analysis of how racial prejudice was able to become established and the economic and social causes underlying its spread.

### THE ROOTS OF PREJUDICE, by ARNOLD M. ROSE.

Here we are given a discussion of the causes and effects of prejudice, with suggestions for action to reduce it in individuals or groups. Some causes of prejudice analysed are the apparent personal advantages to be gained thereby, and ignorance of other groups. Sections are also devoted to the transmission of prejudice to children, the psychology of prejudice, and prejudice as a warping of the personality.

### RACE AND PSYCHOLOGY, by OTTO KLINEBERG.

By submitting examples of the kinds of psychological tests given to different racial groups, and showing their validity or lack of it, the author establishes that the net result of all the research conducted in this field indicates that innate racial differences in intelligence have not been demonstrated. The relation of physique to mentality, the effects of race mixture, differences in personality and temperament are among the subjects treated.

### RACIAL MYTHS, by JUAN COMAS.

Citing texts from ancient sources such as the Bible, Aristotle, Cicero, etc., the author begins by tracing the origins and evolution of racism throughout the centuries, and shows that such manifestations take place whenever individual and collective security appear to be menaced. To disprove pseudo-biological racist theories, he further analyses and exposes the myths of blood superiority and of the racial inferiority of Jews, coloured peoples and hybrids.

### IN PREPARATION

### RACE AND BIOLOGY, by L. G. DUNN.

## OTHER UNESCO PUBLICATIONS IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

*Contemporary Political Science.*

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